MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part19_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.997138)
Duration: 21:25
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप्षाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवि
0:33–0:39part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, aficion causes such as sandalwood themselves
0:39–0:43explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like.
0:43–0:45Conclusion, Mind is Atomic.
0:47–0:52Naayangika conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects,
0:52–0:55yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises.
0:56–1:00Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously,
1:00–1:03is the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ.
1:03–1:08Therefore mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject establishing proof.
1:08–1:14This is also established by inference, while mitrezi produces cognition, his nose, tongue,
1:14–1:18skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction with
1:18–1:22mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because all the
1:22–1:27sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time.
1:27–1:31Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise,
1:31–1:36otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow.
1:36–1:41Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception.
1:41–1:47It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition.
1:47–1:53Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when one desires to know a pot.
1:53–1:59Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired sense organ,
1:59–2:05Without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition.
2:05–2:10Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence.
2:10–2:16Nor is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition.
2:16–2:20When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must
2:20–2:24be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost.
2:24–2:27The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit
2:27–2:31and demerit, because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced
2:31–2:34Successively.
2:34–2:39Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects
2:39–2:44At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ.
2:44–2:48This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions
2:48–2:51prevents cognition through the other sense organs.
2:51–2:56Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible.
2:56–2:59Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of
2:59–3:03cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously.
3:05–3:11Delimiters in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year,
3:11–3:16conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound.
3:17–3:22Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound.
3:23–3:28Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise
3:28–3:35are indistinctly. The objection of 20 songs.
3:35–3:40Memsaka objection, if 20 songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know all
3:40–3:44of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all 20 sounds and perception of all
3:44–3:49songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore
3:49–3:53the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition.
3:54–4:02Proposal of cognition of indifference. One Neayaka reply, clear cognition arises
4:02–4:08of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired noise is nearly a cognition of indifference.
4:08–4:13Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition
4:13–4:15of indifference.
4:15–4:20The msaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard
4:20–4:22no other sound.
4:22–4:27On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise
4:27–4:34of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds. Determinant causal status
4:34–4:41of desire to know and concentration. Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally
4:41–4:47auxiliary causes of perception of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound.
4:48–4:52Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative
4:52–4:57concomitance, as cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds.
4:57–5:03In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and
5:03–5:05g-hood are not known.
5:05–5:12Desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal.
5:12–5:17The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds.
5:17–5:21Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at
5:21–5:26one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise.
5:26–5:30When Neyayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend
5:30–5:35individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity
5:35–5:41of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively.
5:41–5:47Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind.
5:47–5:51When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited
5:51–5:53by the objects.
5:53–5:57It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known,
5:57–6:02The complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct.
6:02–6:08The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously.
6:08–6:12The Objection of Five Cognitions
6:12–6:18The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are
6:18–6:22simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it
6:22–6:25is more natural to regard them as simultaneous.
6:25–6:29Niyayika replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in
6:29–6:33experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous.
6:34–6:42The alternative of five minds is rejected. The alternative let mind be five-fold,
6:42–6:47one for each sense organ is inconsistent. If many minds were accepted in one self,
6:47–6:52the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience would be broken,
6:52–6:57Cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by one person as connected.
6:58–7:02Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self.
7:04–7:07Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts.
7:09–7:14The Mensaka's final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely
7:14–7:18in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts.
7:19–7:24How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in
7:24–7:28dance or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous.
7:28–7:3220 efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because
7:32–7:36there is no defeating cognition.
7:36–7:39Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous.
7:39–7:45Conclusion, desire to act regulates the production of action.
7:45–7:50The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by
7:50–7:52that desire.
7:52–7:57arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body and its parts.
7:58–8:04If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts
8:04–8:08delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are
8:08–8:15likewise produced by effort delimited by the body. Thus the atomic mind is established.
8:16–8:21The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established
8:21–8:27as apprehensible by the atomic mind, the definition of perception is not under-extended in perceptions
8:27–8:29of pleasure and the like.
8:29–8:37Here ends the theory of the atomicity of mind in the perception section of the Tattva Sintmai.
8:37–8:42The Theory of Subsequent Cognition.
8:42–8:48Saka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:48–8:53The Msaka says, a present first cognition such as this is a pot is itself known, a
8:53–9:00Second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it.
9:00–9:04The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
9:04–9:09Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition,
9:09–9:13absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of
9:13–9:15the first cognition.
9:15–9:19Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
9:19–9:24Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such
9:24–9:29as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time
9:29–9:33of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative concomitance
9:33–9:37of subsequent cognition.
9:37–9:40Cognition has itself as its object.
9:40–9:45Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the light would likewise be capable
9:45–9:49of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed.
9:49–9:53Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition
9:53–9:57is required for usage concerning desire and the like.
9:57–10:01It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage
10:01–10:06is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second
10:06–10:07cognition.
10:07–10:12The Memsaka replies that the first cognition is itself its own object.
10:12–10:15A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself
10:15–10:17as its object.
10:17–10:21Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no
10:21–10:23mutual dependence.
10:23–10:28Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the
10:28–10:32power of usage, inheritance, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise
10:32–10:36an infinite regress follows.
10:36–10:41Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition.
10:41–10:45The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference.
10:45–10:50How can cognition itself be its own object under identity is unsound.
10:50–10:54Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective
10:54–10:55cognition.
10:55–11:00Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is possible
11:00–11:02without dependence on a relation.
11:02–11:07Just as cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition
11:07–11:10produces usage concerning itself.
11:10–11:14What is the nature of this special nature?
11:14–11:18Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot
11:18–11:24be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience.
11:24–11:29The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe
11:29–11:31it.
11:31–11:36Self-objectivity is self-luminosity.
11:36–11:39It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second
11:39–11:43mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first
11:43–11:45cognition possible without a second?
11:45–11:50Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental
11:50–11:52cognition.
11:52–11:56Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness.
11:56–12:00A collected cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning
12:00–12:05the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence,
12:05–12:08so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted.
12:08–12:12In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior
12:12–12:16award silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect.
12:17–12:21Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non apprehension of difference from remembered
12:21–12:25silver cause activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status.
12:27–12:31Thus cognition self objectivity means its self luminosity or capacity to produce usage
12:31–12:36concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage
12:36–12:40concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence
12:40–12:44of an impression that cognition itself had been its own object.
12:44–12:49The theory of tripartite perception
12:49–12:53Proponents of tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does
12:53–12:59not require a second mental cognition aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition.
12:59–13:02Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition.
13:02–13:07Every cognition of the form, I know this, simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition,
13:07–13:08unknown.
13:08–13:12The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action,
13:12–13:17therefore cognition has a tripartite form.
13:17–13:21Inconsistency of being illuminated by another
13:21–13:26The Nyayaka objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent
13:26–13:30cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward.
13:30–13:34The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leaminosity
13:34–13:39of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
13:39–13:43Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the
13:43–13:48nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition.
13:48–13:53Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition,
13:53–13:56because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions.
13:56–14:00The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another
14:00–14:05cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result.
14:05–14:09Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition,
14:09–14:13infinite regress arises in knowing the property cognition is not mental.
14:13–14:17Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of
14:17–14:21an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable.
14:23–14:30Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality. The inference, a simple first cognition is
14:30–14:35a momentary perceptual quality of the self, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived,
14:35–14:39is unsound, because if cognition is accepted as mental an infinite regress follows.
14:39–14:48Counter inferences are also possible. Cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye or the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception.
14:48–14:57If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established.
14:57–15:04The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus because cognition is self-luminous.
15:04–15:10Self-objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself.
15:10–15:13This capacity is a special nature of cognition.
15:13–15:19Its contrary is neither being produced by contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself.
15:19–15:25Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and the like and is fruitless.
15:25–15:30Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual.
15:30–15:35The simple first cognition is self-luminous.
15:35–15:39usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an
15:39–15:44object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition.
15:44–15:49Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self
15:49–15:52objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature.
15:52–15:58Cognition produced by sense object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual.
15:58–16:03Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the
16:03–16:08self. Determinant perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced
16:08–16:13by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive
16:13–16:15object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause.
16:17–16:20Naoyaka refutation of self-luminosity
16:22–16:27The Naoyaka replies, perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first
16:27–16:31cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this
16:31–16:37silver. Activity arises from determination of the object. Self-objectivity of the first
16:37–16:42cognition is not established by experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver,
16:42–16:45arises after the first cognition, this experience cannot be discarded.
16:47–16:51Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress,
16:51–16:56because not every cognition must be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an
16:56–17:01object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition
17:01–17:06is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition.
17:08–17:10Cognition is not its own object.
17:12–17:16Agency is being the inhering locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of the result of
17:16–17:20an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being the meaning of a
17:20–17:25verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its
17:25–17:29own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object.
17:29–17:35Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears.
17:35–17:39Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore
17:39–17:42cannot qualify the first cognition.
17:42–17:46It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of
17:46–17:50the word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self.
17:50–17:54Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition
17:54–17:56thereby becomes cognition of the self.
17:56–18:01The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore
18:01–18:04does not generate an objecthood related to itself.
18:04–18:08The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense-contact, because it
18:08–18:13is produced by contact with mind, it is mental.
18:13–18:17Inference establishing subsequent cognition
18:17–18:21The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first
18:21–18:25cognition produced by a sense-organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because
18:25–18:30it is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself,
18:30–18:34because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property
18:34–18:37of the self, and is not produced by itself.
18:37–18:41Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus
18:41–18:46of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition.
18:46–18:50Knownness or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition.
18:50–18:54When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or
18:54–18:59memory is present, subsequent cognition arises. When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure,
18:59–19:04another object, or another cognition are present, the effect of this no ability may be arrested,
19:04–19:08therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously.
19:10–19:14Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition
19:16–19:20Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition
19:20–19:24produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye.
19:24–19:28The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the
19:28–19:32object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent
19:32–19:35cognition through contact in the form of knownness.
19:35–19:40God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects.
19:40–19:44The Memsaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition
19:44–19:47creates an infinite regress is unsound.
19:47–19:51Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an
19:51–19:55object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ.
19:55–20:00It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known.
20:00–20:03When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual
20:03–20:08cause for another object is present, the required no ability of the subsequent cognition
20:08–20:11can be inhibited.
20:11–20:16Necessary no ability is not the cause of self-luminosity.
20:16–20:21For men-saka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition
20:21–20:25is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self,
20:25–20:28every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-liminous.
20:28–20:32Reply, no such pervasion is established.
20:32–20:36If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite
20:36–20:38chain arises.
20:38–20:42Nor can self-liminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to
20:42–20:44a sense organ is perceived.
20:44–20:49If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order
20:49–20:53is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated
20:53–20:56cause, the rule of causality is destroyed.
20:56–21:00Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another
21:00–21:04inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would
21:04–21:05not be avoided.
21:05–21:09If the speaker's desire, no self-luminosity, or inhibition by perception of another
21:09–21:14object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition.
21:14–21:18elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of cognition hood
21:18–21:21alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप्षाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवि part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, aficion causes such as sandalwood themselves explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like. Conclusion, Mind is Atomic. Naayangika conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises. Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ. Therefore mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject establishing proof. This is also established by inference, while mitrezi produces cognition, his nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time. Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise, otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow. Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception. It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition. Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when one desires to know a pot. Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired sense organ, Without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition. Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence. Nor is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition. When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost. The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit, because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced Successively. Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ. This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions prevents cognition through the other sense organs. Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible. Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously. Delimiters in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year, conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound. Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound. Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise are indistinctly. The objection of 20 songs. Memsaka objection, if 20 songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all 20 sounds and perception of all songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition. Proposal of cognition of indifference. One Neayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired noise is nearly a cognition of indifference. Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition of indifference. The msaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no other sound. On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds. Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration. Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound. Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance, as cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known. Desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal. The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise. When Neyayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively. Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind. When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited by the objects. It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, The complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct. The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously. The Objection of Five Cognitions The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural to regard them as simultaneous. Niyayika replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous. The alternative of five minds is rejected. The alternative let mind be five-fold, one for each sense organ is inconsistent. If many minds were accepted in one self, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience would be broken, Cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by one person as connected. Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self. Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts. The Mensaka's final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts. How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in dance or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous. 20 efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because there is no defeating cognition. Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous. Conclusion, desire to act regulates the production of action. The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by that desire. arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body and its parts. If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body. Thus the atomic mind is established. The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established as apprehensible by the atomic mind, the definition of perception is not under-extended in perceptions of pleasure and the like. Here ends the theory of the atomicity of mind in the perception section of the Tattva Sintmai. The Theory of Subsequent Cognition. Saka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. The Msaka says, a present first cognition such as this is a pot is itself known, a Second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it. The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition, absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of the first cognition. Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Cognition has itself as its object. Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the light would likewise be capable of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed. Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition is required for usage concerning desire and the like. It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second cognition. The Memsaka replies that the first cognition is itself its own object. A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself as its object. Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no mutual dependence. Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the power of usage, inheritance, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise an infinite regress follows. Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition. The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference. How can cognition itself be its own object under identity is unsound. Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective cognition. Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is possible without dependence on a relation. Just as cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition produces usage concerning itself. What is the nature of this special nature? Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience. The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe it. Self-objectivity is self-luminosity. It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first cognition possible without a second? Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental cognition. Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness. A collected cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence, so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior award silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non apprehension of difference from remembered silver cause activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status. Thus cognition self objectivity means its self luminosity or capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition itself had been its own object. The theory of tripartite perception Proponents of tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does not require a second mental cognition aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition. Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition. Every cognition of the form, I know this, simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition, unknown. The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action, therefore cognition has a tripartite form. Inconsistency of being illuminated by another The Nyayaka objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward. The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leaminosity of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition. Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition, because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions. The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result. Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition, infinite regress arises in knowing the property cognition is not mental. Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable. Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality. The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the self, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted as mental an infinite regress follows. Counter inferences are also possible. Cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye or the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception. If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established. The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus because cognition is self-luminous. Self-objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This capacity is a special nature of cognition. Its contrary is neither being produced by contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself. Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and the like and is fruitless. Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual. The simple first cognition is self-luminous. usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition. Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature. Cognition produced by sense object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual. Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the self. Determinant perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause. Naoyaka refutation of self-luminosity The Naoyaka replies, perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver. Activity arises from determination of the object. Self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, arises after the first cognition, this experience cannot be discarded. Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress, because not every cognition must be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition. Cognition is not its own object. Agency is being the inhering locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being the meaning of a verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object. Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears. Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore cannot qualify the first cognition. It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self. Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to itself. The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense-contact, because it is produced by contact with mind, it is mental. Inference establishing subsequent cognition The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition produced by a sense-organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of the self, and is not produced by itself. Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition. Knownness or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition. When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory is present, subsequent cognition arises. When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present, the effect of this no ability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously. Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye. The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent cognition through contact in the form of knownness. God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects. The Memsaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition creates an infinite regress is unsound. Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ. It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known. When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual cause for another object is present, the required no ability of the subsequent cognition can be inhibited. Necessary no ability is not the cause of self-luminosity. For men-saka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self, every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-liminous. Reply, no such pervasion is established. If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite chain arises. Nor can self-liminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense organ is perceived. If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated cause, the rule of causality is destroyed. Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-luminosity, or inhibition by perception of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition. elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of cognition hood alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

← Transcript index