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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.993702)
Duration: 23:12
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0:02–0:32विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� �
0:32–0:37is dark because it is Mitra's Sun, being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous
0:37–0:44condition because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable. Under this definition,
0:44–0:49possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition and the inference air
0:49–0:54is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, although it pervades the
0:54–1:00probandum perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject. Likewise, in the
1:00–1:04The inference water is knowable because it possesses taste, earthhood would become an
1:04–1:08extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and
1:08–1:11undesirable result.
1:11–1:15Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the
1:15–1:20reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom smoke because it is accompanied
1:20–1:23by an extraneous condition.
1:23–1:27Therefore the qualification pervading the probandom delimited by the reason proves
1:27–1:32pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition.
1:32–1:36The defect of irrelevant diversion.
1:36–1:3721.
1:37–1:42Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem.
1:42–1:46Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum or establishment of the unqualified
1:46–1:51absence of the probandum would become possible only after deviation of the reason from
1:51–1:55a qualified probandum or the qualified absence of the probandum had been established
1:55–2:00through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition.
2:00–2:05Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would
2:05–2:07arise.
2:07–2:12The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or the unqualified
2:12–2:17absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified probandom or the qualified
2:17–2:20absence of the probandom.
2:20–2:23It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of
2:23–2:28reason from the unqualified probandom, deviation from the qualified probandom should first be
2:28–2:33established. But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely
2:33–2:36and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified probandom.
2:38–2:46Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason
2:46–2:52from the unqualified probandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from
2:52–2:57the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition
2:57–3:04is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples, sound is
3:04–3:09nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is mitra's son, the alleged
3:09–3:14extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the
3:14–3:18contextually relevant probandom, because that condition does not establish the reasons
3:18–3:25deviation from the probandom. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through
3:25–3:30something that pervades the probandom delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone
3:30–3:36produces the reasons deviation from the probandom. Therefore no separate description or establishment
3:36–3:43of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine of the author of the Ratnokosa
3:43–3:5123, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined
3:51–3:55probandom is a deviant extraneous condition.
3:55–3:59Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reason's
3:59–4:01presence in the subject.
4:01–4:06For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property
4:06–4:10of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is
4:10–4:15a deviant extraneous condition, because produce-ness does not pervade the reason no ability but does
4:15–4:20pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality.
4:20–4:24On the other hand, if produce-ness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality
4:24–4:27alone becomes the extraneous condition.
4:27–4:31In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous
4:31–4:35condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to
4:35–4:39the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reason's deviation from the probandom,
4:39–4:43if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that extraneous condition.
4:45–4:49This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandom
4:49–4:53delimited by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition,
4:53–4:57because that probandom ultimately becomes the finally determined probandom.
4:59–5:03Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition.
5:05–5:0924, this doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand.
5:10–5:17According to it, in the inference a dyad does not in here in a non-eternal substance because it is a produced substance lacking magnitude,
5:17–5:25inheritance in a substance devoid of touch would become an extraneous condition, because possession of parts has been established in the dyad.
5:26–5:31In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandum.
5:32–5:38Whatever property pervades this probandum but not the reason, being a produced substance lacking magnitude,
5:38–5:42would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result.
5:43–5:48Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain through the subject
5:48–5:54property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not
5:54–5:59established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous
5:59–6:04condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by
6:04–6:09an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject
6:09–6:15propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum.
6:16–6:20Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end.
6:21–6:2725. Here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous
6:27–6:32condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandum is the
6:32–6:38extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but
6:38–6:42does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an extraneous condition.
6:44–6:49In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an
6:49–6:54extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility
6:54–6:59owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference,
6:59–7:04there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not
7:04–7:09an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandom fire owing to
7:09–7:19the deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandom. 26.
7:19–7:24The probandom familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is regarded,
7:24–7:28through the relation of collocation, as the finally determined probandom delimited by
7:28–7:35that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood,
7:35–7:41and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandom due to
7:41–7:47the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous
7:47–7:52condition deviates from the probandom because the extraneous condition pervading the probandom
7:52–7:57itself deviates from the probandom, this extraneous condition may be either co-extensive
7:57–8:00with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandum.
8:00–8:05An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property
8:05–8:10of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum, consequently, the reason accompanied
8:10–8:15by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum.
8:15–8:20For example, in the inference destruction is non-eternal existence, serving as an
8:20–8:24extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction.
8:24–8:29When the inference air is perceptible, possession of manifest color, serving as an extraneous
8:29–8:33condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air.
8:33–8:37Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective
8:37–8:40probandom.
8:40–8:44When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified
8:44–8:49probandom depends upon its deviation from the qualificon, that is, from the unqualified
8:49–8:52probandom.
8:52–8:56defective irrelevant diversion arises.
8:56–9:0227. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the
9:02–9:07qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the
9:07–9:12qualificand, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises.
9:12–9:16For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible
9:16–9:21touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier
9:21–9:26perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts
9:26–9:30with the qualificon probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject.
9:32–9:36If the reasons deviation from the qualified probandum were not held to depend upon its
9:36–9:42deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandum, cognition of deviation from the
9:42–9:47qualified probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualified
9:47–9:52Probandim depends upon deviation from the unqualified Qualifican Probandim or the original
9:52–9:58Probandim, establishing deviation from the Qualified Probandim does not incur the defect
9:58–10:01of irrelevant diversion.
10:01–10:07Alternative Doctrine of the Extraneous Condition, No Irrelevant Diversion.
10:07–10:1228, Alternatively, Cognition of the Deviation of a Reason Accompanied by an Extraneous
10:12–10:16Condition may be explained as follows.
10:16–10:20In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
10:20–10:25the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility
10:25–10:30because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood,
10:30–10:33but it does not deviate from substancehood.
10:33–10:37Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the reason
10:37–10:42being Mitra's son deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property
10:42–10:47pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's
10:47–10:51sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar.
10:51–10:55Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it is not the counter-positive
10:55–11:00of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being Mitra's sun, and such
11:00–11:06non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar.
11:06–11:11Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates
11:11–11:16from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom.
11:16–11:21Such extraneous conditionhood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore,
11:21–11:25in the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant
11:25–11:30diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the
11:30–11:33extraneous condition.
11:33–11:36Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect.
11:36–11:41In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition.
11:41–11:47Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect.
11:47–11:51It may be objective that under this definition nonaudibility would become an extraneous condition
11:51–11:55in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference,
11:55–11:58water is knowable because it possesses taste.
11:58–12:01But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative
12:01–12:05pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while nonaudibility and earthhood do not
12:05–12:09not pervade the qualified probandom.
12:09–12:13Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition.
12:13–12:1429.
12:14–12:18It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the
12:18–12:22definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that
12:22–12:26is not an extraneous condition because cognition of the visiating power of an extraneous
12:26–12:30condition is destroyed for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited
12:30–12:34by a property of the subject is free from defect.
12:34–12:36This objection is untenable.
12:36–12:40In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions
12:40–12:46pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained.
12:46–12:49Mere observation of the reasons in variable relation with the probandom, without the
12:49–12:53assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment
12:53–12:56that the extraneous condition pervades it.
12:56–13:00Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous
13:00–13:03condition.
13:03–13:08of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs
13:08–13:12in parts of the mountain is not.
13:12–13:1730. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable
13:17–13:23hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom
13:23–13:24is present.
13:24–13:28But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is
13:28–13:32not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from
13:32–13:37being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the
13:37–13:41perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet
13:41–13:45fuel is an extraneous condition. In an inference concerning the darkness of
13:45–13:48mitreous sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and
13:48–13:52in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object,
13:52–13:57existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet
13:57–14:01fuel increases the intensity of the probandom smoke. Affirmative and
14:01–14:05negative concomitance not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility
14:05–14:09of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the
14:09–14:14darkness of mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality
14:14–14:19of a produced object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained
14:19–14:27to pervade its respective probandom. Objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
14:27–14:3331, it may be objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through
14:33–14:34evidence.
14:34–14:38If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible.
14:38–14:42But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through
14:42–14:47favorable hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect.
14:47–14:52Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the pervasion
14:52–14:57not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition,
14:57–15:00because an equal means generates doubt about provision.
15:01–15:06Where favorable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation, either extraneous condition
15:06–15:12and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions provision
15:12–15:17of the probandum is ascertained. Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity
15:17–15:22of an extraneous condition, therefore it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that
15:22–15:27that produces doubt about the reason's deviation from the probandom.
15:27–15:32Reply, subject otherness is a defect.
15:32–15:3732, some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades
15:37–15:40the absence of the probandom.
15:40–15:44The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject otherness and the means producing
15:44–15:48cognition through subject otherness that the reason deviates from the probandom
15:48–15:50would have equal force.
15:50–15:55Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the subject,
15:55–16:00because both something pervading the probandom and something pervading its absence would occur there.
16:01–16:03But this is impossible.
16:04–16:08Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandom and its absence.
16:09–16:14How, then, could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys
16:14–16:19pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandom merely because there is
16:19–16:26doubt that it pervades the probandom? This view is untenable. On the basis of being a
16:26–16:31pervader of the probandom, subject otherness certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous
16:31–16:36condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom.
16:36–16:44Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect. 33, it may again be objected that
16:44–16:48were an extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reasons probandom,
16:48–16:52favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing perversion is absent,
16:52–16:58non-experience of perversion is appropriate. On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition
16:58–17:03and favorable hypothetical reasoning are present, the condition is defective because it pervades
17:03–17:09the probandom, not because it fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the
17:09–17:14extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the
17:14–17:20probandum. The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and
17:20–17:24the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons
17:24–17:29pervasion by the probandum, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective
17:29–17:36by producing cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable.
17:36–17:40To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence
17:40–17:46of favorable hypothetical reasoning. Consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning
17:46–17:55would be the defect, not the extraneous condition. Doctrine of extraneous conditions continued.
17:57–18:02Resolution of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect.
18:04–18:0934. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous
18:09–18:14condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts in one and the same
18:14–18:18substratum with both the probandum and its absence, therefore its relations with the probandum
18:18–18:24and the absence of the probandum must be admitted in different substrata. Consequently, an extraneous
18:24–18:28condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation to the probandum, must necessarily be
18:28–18:34accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces
18:34–18:39the absence of pervasion, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition.
18:39–18:47Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as defects.
18:47–18:51Another definition of an extraneous condition.
18:51–19:0235. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason.
19:02–19:08In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the
19:08–19:13relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition.
19:13–19:17For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction
19:17–19:22with what fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire, because smoke is absent
19:22–19:26in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the absence of the
19:26–19:29relation of perversion between fire and smoke.
19:29–19:35Similarly, in the inference destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion
19:35–19:40of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation
19:40–19:43between the reasoned producedness and non-eternality.
19:43–19:48In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the substratum
19:48–19:53of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject
19:53–19:57air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch
19:57–19:59and perceptibility.
19:59–20:04subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness
20:04–20:08cannot be an extraneous condition.
20:08–20:13The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition.
20:13–20:1936, some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting
20:19–20:23counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the
20:23–20:26counter-positive of an absence.
20:26–20:30Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition.
20:30–20:35A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual
20:35–20:39of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the
20:39–20:42probandom.
20:42–20:47But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition
20:47–20:50in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion
20:50–20:54would arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation
20:54–20:59of smoke's pervasion by fire.
20:59–21:02of the YATU author's definition.
21:02–21:0837. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as
21:08–21:13the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter
21:13–21:17indicated by the absence of a non-locker's possessing the property delimiting the counter-positives'
21:17–21:22counter-positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition
21:22–21:26of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject
21:26–21:30would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation.
21:30–21:35Therefore the Yattu author's definitions are unacceptable.
21:35–21:41Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion.
21:41–21:4238.
21:42–21:46Some scholars say that either what pervades the pro-bandam or what does not pervade the
21:46–21:49reason is an extraneous condition.
21:49–21:53For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality
21:53–21:58is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not
21:58–22:04destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The probandum does not become an
22:04–22:09extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because the probandum has no separate role
22:09–22:14in establishing the reason's deviation from the probandum. Otherwise every inference would
22:14–22:20be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect.
22:20–22:2930. Division of extraneous conditions. 39 extraneous conditions are of two kinds,
22:29–22:35certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandom but not the reason,
22:35–22:40and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandom, is a certain extraneous condition.
22:41–22:45In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire,
22:45–22:48possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition.
22:48–22:54Where there is doubt concerning the reasons non-pervasion of the probandum or the conditions
22:54–22:59pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition.
22:59–23:04In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable
23:04–23:08cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� � is dark because it is Mitra's Sun, being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable. Under this definition, possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition and the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, although it pervades the probandum perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject. Likewise, in the The inference water is knowable because it possesses taste, earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading the probandom delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition. The defect of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem. Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum or establishment of the unqualified absence of the probandum would become possible only after deviation of the reason from a qualified probandum or the qualified absence of the probandum had been established through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition. Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would arise. The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or the unqualified absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified probandom or the qualified absence of the probandom. It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of reason from the unqualified probandom, deviation from the qualified probandom should first be established. But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified probandom. Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandom, because that condition does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandom. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that pervades the probandom delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces the reasons deviation from the probandom. Therefore no separate description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine of the author of the Ratnokosa 23, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined probandom is a deviant extraneous condition. Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reason's presence in the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is a deviant extraneous condition, because produce-ness does not pervade the reason no ability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality. On the other hand, if produce-ness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality alone becomes the extraneous condition. In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reason's deviation from the probandom, if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that extraneous condition. This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandom ultimately becomes the finally determined probandom. Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition. 24, this doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand. According to it, in the inference a dyad does not in here in a non-eternal substance because it is a produced substance lacking magnitude, inheritance in a substance devoid of touch would become an extraneous condition, because possession of parts has been established in the dyad. In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandum. Whatever property pervades this probandum but not the reason, being a produced substance lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result. Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain through the subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum. Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. 25. Here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandum is the extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an extraneous condition. In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandom fire owing to the deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandom. 26. The probandom familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is regarded, through the relation of collocation, as the finally determined probandom delimited by that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood, and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandom due to the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandom because the extraneous condition pervading the probandom itself deviates from the probandom, this extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandum. An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum, consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum. For example, in the inference destruction is non-eternal existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction. When the inference air is perceptible, possession of manifest color, serving as an extraneous condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air. Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandom. When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the qualificon, that is, from the unqualified probandom. defective irrelevant diversion arises. 27. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the qualificand, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises. For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts with the qualificon probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject. If the reasons deviation from the qualified probandum were not held to depend upon its deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandum, cognition of deviation from the qualified probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualified Probandim depends upon deviation from the unqualified Qualifican Probandim or the original Probandim, establishing deviation from the Qualified Probandim does not incur the defect of irrelevant diversion. Alternative Doctrine of the Extraneous Condition, No Irrelevant Diversion. 28, Alternatively, Cognition of the Deviation of a Reason Accompanied by an Extraneous Condition may be explained as follows. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the reason being Mitra's son deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar. Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being Mitra's sun, and such non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar. Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom. Such extraneous conditionhood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore, in the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the extraneous condition. Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect. In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition. Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect. It may be objective that under this definition nonaudibility would become an extraneous condition in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference, water is knowable because it possesses taste. But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while nonaudibility and earthhood do not not pervade the qualified probandom. Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition. 29. It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition because cognition of the visiating power of an extraneous condition is destroyed for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject is free from defect. This objection is untenable. In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained. Mere observation of the reasons in variable relation with the probandom, without the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that the extraneous condition pervades it. Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition. of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not. 30. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom is present. But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition. In an inference concerning the darkness of mitreous sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object, existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel increases the intensity of the probandom smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitance not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness of mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective probandom. Objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 31, it may be objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through evidence. If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible. But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favorable hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect. Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the pervasion not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition, because an equal means generates doubt about provision. Where favorable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation, either extraneous condition and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions provision of the probandum is ascertained. Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity of an extraneous condition, therefore it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that that produces doubt about the reason's deviation from the probandom. Reply, subject otherness is a defect. 32, some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades the absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject otherness and the means producing cognition through subject otherness that the reason deviates from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandom and something pervading its absence would occur there. But this is impossible. Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandom and its absence. How, then, could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandom merely because there is doubt that it pervades the probandom? This view is untenable. On the basis of being a pervader of the probandom, subject otherness certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom. Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect. 33, it may again be objected that were an extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reasons probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing perversion is absent, non-experience of perversion is appropriate. On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandom, not because it fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion by the probandum, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable. To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning. Consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning would be the defect, not the extraneous condition. Doctrine of extraneous conditions continued. Resolution of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect. 34. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts in one and the same substratum with both the probandum and its absence, therefore its relations with the probandum and the absence of the probandum must be admitted in different substrata. Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation to the probandum, must necessarily be accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of pervasion, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition. Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction with what fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire, because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reasoned producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch and perceptibility. subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness cannot be an extraneous condition. The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition. 36, some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive of an absence. Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition. A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom. But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's pervasion by fire. of the YATU author's definition. 37. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter indicated by the absence of a non-locker's possessing the property delimiting the counter-positives' counter-positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yattu author's definitions are unacceptable. Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion. 38. Some scholars say that either what pervades the pro-bandam or what does not pervade the reason is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The probandum does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because the probandum has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the probandum. Otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect. 30. Division of extraneous conditions. 39 extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandom but not the reason, and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandom, is a certain extraneous condition. In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition. Where there is doubt concerning the reasons non-pervasion of the probandum or the conditions pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition. In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

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