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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:07The Established Doctrine of Deviation
0:07–0:1212. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated.
0:12–0:22Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum.
0:22–0:33Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandum.
0:33–0:38Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness.
0:38–0:42A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom,
0:42–0:47and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect.
0:47–0:54An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances,
0:54–0:58distinct from a property residing only in similar instances,
0:58–1:03and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandom.
1:03–1:09This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing
1:09–1:15nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons.
1:15–1:2113. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are
1:21–1:26treated as separate fallacious reasons, Godama's ancient five-fold division of fallacious reasons
1:26–1:28would collapse.
1:28–1:32Goddaman includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and
1:32–1:36thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all.
1:36–1:40Nor should it be asked why Goddaman did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong
1:40–1:44counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the
1:44–1:48probandom, while placing the rest in another class.
1:48–1:53The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it
1:53–1:58It is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them.
1:58–2:03With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends.
2:03–2:05Prima-facephew of the common reason.
2:05–2:0714.
2:07–2:11The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom is
2:11–2:16not common reasonhood, because such a definition over extends to the non-exclusive reason,
2:16–2:19as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the
2:19–2:24and common reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also over extends to
2:24–2:31the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance.
2:31–2:35For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the
2:35–2:39probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom,
2:39–2:44or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness.
2:44–2:47Mere currents in a counter-instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice,
2:47–2:49the remaining qualifiers pointless.
2:50–2:53Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
2:54–3:0115. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance.
3:02–3:06The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers.
3:07–3:15Merely saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent.
3:15–3:23It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one.
3:23–3:33Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless.
3:33–3:42Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter-instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
3:42–3:52This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence in a counter instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason.
3:52–3:58A current in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonous.
3:58–4:1016. It may be proposed that commoness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom, and also in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom.
4:10–4:15This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are
4:15–4:19knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is
4:19–4:23either a jar or some other object.
4:23–4:26This proposal, however, is unacceptable.
4:26–4:31No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common,
4:31–4:35non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons.
4:35–4:39The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with
4:39–4:44the probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under
4:44–4:49extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance.
4:49–4:54With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends.
4:54–4:59The established doctrine of the common reason.
4:59–5:03The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common
5:03–5:05reasonhood.
5:05–5:08The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandum is
5:08–5:16ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown,
5:16–5:20or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present, if the
5:20–5:26reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise
5:26–5:33this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive
5:33–5:38reasons such as no ability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such
5:38–5:42as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects, because an estate of doubt
5:42–5:47it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons.
5:48–5:51With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends.
5:53–5:55Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason
5:56–6:0118, excluded from all similar and all counter instances, is called uncommon reasonhood.
6:02–6:06But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with a probandom
6:06–6:10does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon?
6:11–6:16In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood. Soundhood occurs only in the subject,
6:16–6:20sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason,
6:20–6:24because cognition of pervasion and of subject propertyhood are causes of inferential cognition.
6:26–6:30Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandum is not
6:30–6:35uncommonness, because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential
6:35–6:40cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandom is certain. In
6:40–6:45the example, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless
6:45–6:51reason once pervasion has been established. Recutation by the ancient scholars
6:51–7:0019. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded
7:00–7:04from all similar instances held to possess the probandom and from all counter instances
7:04–7:10possessing the absence of the probandum. At the time of cognizing pervasion, when the probandum
7:10–7:15and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in
7:15–7:20the subject endowed with the probandum, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily
7:20–7:26faultless. In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of
7:26–7:31a faultless reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect
7:31–7:35of a reason unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from
7:35–7:39both similar and counter instances.
7:39–7:43Possession of odor may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound
7:43–7:48is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of
7:48–7:53soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of perversion.
7:53–8:00A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance.
8:00–8:04from all similar instances is the defect.
8:04–8:0820. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon
8:08–8:13defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition
8:13–8:18of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and
8:18–8:21could be useful in inference for another.
8:21–8:25Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandim is established
8:25–8:29only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances.
8:30–8:33Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion.
8:33–8:37The defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances.
8:38–8:42If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood and stops,
8:42–8:46the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for
8:46–8:51incomplete use of the niya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where
8:51–8:54the contradiction of perversion must be made explicit.
8:54–9:00Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is merely a deficiency in the use of Nyaya
9:00–9:02statements in inference for another.
9:02–9:07In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs
9:07–9:10cognition of perversion.
9:10–9:15Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances
9:15–9:17alone.
9:17–9:22With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends.
9:22–9:24The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason
9:24–9:3121. According to the Established Doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes
9:31–9:37negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject.
9:37–9:41In the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood. Soundhood is excluded from both
9:41–9:45similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence
9:45–9:52of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence.
9:52–9:56In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and
9:56–10:00its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both
10:00–10:02sides.
10:02–10:07The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct.
10:07–10:12Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic.
10:12–10:17For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all similar instances
10:17–10:21is necessary.
10:21–10:26In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing cognition
10:26–10:30that the reason is excluded from all similar instances.
10:30–10:35Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing
10:35–10:41the absence of the pro-bandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative pervasion.
10:41–10:45Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar
10:45–10:49instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence
10:49–10:54of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example
10:54–10:56or counter example.
10:56–11:01In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar
11:01–11:03instances.
11:03–11:07Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier
11:07–11:09is pointless.
11:09–11:14A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once
11:14–11:19contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason.
11:19–11:24With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends.
11:24–11:28Prima-facive view of the non-exclusive reason 23.
11:28–11:33A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar
11:33–11:35and counter instances.
11:35–11:40Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are
11:40–11:44held to be established or unestablished.
11:44–11:48Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and delimited
11:48–11:50by a purely affirmative probandom.
11:50–11:55A reason such as noability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom, is faultless
11:55–11:58in, this object is nameable because it is knowable.
11:58–12:02On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take
12:02–12:07the form of the common defect in Earth is different from the other substances because it possesses
12:07–12:08odor.
12:08–12:13If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes
12:13–12:17common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence
12:17–12:22in all things are momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely
12:22–12:24common.
12:24–12:28If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished
12:28–12:32or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom.
12:32–12:39Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness.
12:39–12:43Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject
12:43–12:48and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter instance distinct
12:48–12:53from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness.
12:53–12:58In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless,
12:58–13:03and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory
13:03–13:04reason.
13:04–13:10A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative probandom, and making
13:10–13:15the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence, is not a definition of the non-exclusive
13:15–13:17reason.
13:17–13:21In the inference, all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom
13:21–13:25is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness
13:25–13:31is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning
13:31–13:35similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and
13:35–13:40non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes
13:40–13:46include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable.
13:46–13:52Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not
13:52–13:59non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known,
13:59–14:03in the subject or in objects distinct from the subject, as concomitant in a manner useful
14:03–14:09for apprehending perversion. But this definition overextends to a faultless
14:09–14:13reason, because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitants outside
14:13–14:19the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the subject,
14:19–14:22outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable.
14:23–14:27The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons,
14:27–14:31because concomitance useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain both in
14:31–14:38the subject and outside it. Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary.
14:39–14:43The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the
14:43–14:48individual reasons being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness.
14:49–14:53The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers.
14:54–14:58With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends.
14:59–15:02The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason.
15:04–15:1426. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason.
15:14–15:19reason. Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when all
15:19–15:26things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited. In an inference such as
15:26–15:31a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether, the reason of being
15:31–15:36the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known, becomes non-exclusive owing
15:36–15:41to absence of cognition of perversion. Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason
15:41–15:46is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative property and in which there is
15:46–15:51no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending pervasion.
15:51–15:55In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although
15:55–16:00no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative pro-bandom,
16:00–16:06it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply.
16:06–16:10Example of a non-exclusive reason.
16:10–16:15all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability. Then in the statement,
16:15–16:20all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason.
16:22–16:27In the context of a purely negative pro-bandom, when the absence of a property useful for
16:27–16:32apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known,
16:32–16:38the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises. Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance
16:38–16:42is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason.
16:42–16:48Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning pervasion and its demonstration are in both
16:48–16:55cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises.
16:55–17:00With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends.
17:00–17:03Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason.
17:03–17:0928. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence
17:09–17:14of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in
17:14–17:19this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree.
17:19–17:24Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter-positive of an absolute absence
17:24–17:28situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference, this substance
17:28–17:33possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood
17:33–17:37and the like, would also enter the definition.
17:37–17:42A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandum,
17:42–17:48not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandum.
17:48–17:53The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum, because opposition
17:53–17:58to the probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda.
17:58–18:02Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and
18:02–18:08positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing. Otherwise the distinction between
18:08–18:16absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established. Contradiction is a distinct fallacious
18:16–18:23reason, the traditional view. 29, an objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are
18:23–18:28mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished,
18:28–18:33not contradictory. Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason.
18:34–18:39It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the
18:39–18:43absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge,
18:43–18:49therefore this is defeat, not contradiction. Traditional scholars reject this objection.
18:50–18:54According to them, the absence of the probandum may be established by another defective reason,
18:54–18:58but the contradiction defect of the reason that first appeared as opposed to the pro-bandom itself
18:58–19:03prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious
19:03–19:12reason. Refutation of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that co-location of
19:12–19:17the reason with the absence of the pro-bandom is only a defect involving deviation. The defect
19:17–19:22of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier co-located with the
19:22–19:27absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished probandum 2, this
19:27–19:33qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandum,
19:33–19:38that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a
19:38–19:41separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to
19:41–19:47establish the probandum. If occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not
19:47–19:51added to the general definition of deviation, the uncommon reason is
19:51–19:55excluded, for this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general
19:55–20:01defect of a reason. But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect,
20:01–20:07and the additional qualifier is pointless. The special inclusion made to distinguish the
20:07–20:12contradictory reason from the common reason ultimately produces class intermixture.
20:13–20:16The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable.
20:16–20:19The view of other scholars
20:19–20:2731. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the probandum is not pointless
20:27–20:31in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the common reason.
20:31–20:36It is useful even in an inference whose probandum is unestablished.
20:36–20:42For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded
20:42–20:48by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for
20:48–20:53another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defect
20:53–21:00of superfluity. This view, however, is not sound. Only opposition
21:00–21:05is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with the probandom
21:05–21:10burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis
21:10–21:15would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect of superfluity
21:15–21:19in the reason is not automatically established.
21:19–21:24In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes
21:24–21:28the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses
21:28–21:34smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent.
21:34–21:38that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

Plain text

The Established Doctrine of Deviation 12. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated. Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum. Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandum. Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness. A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom, and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect. An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar instances, and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandom. This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons. 13. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated as separate fallacious reasons, Godama's ancient five-fold division of fallacious reasons would collapse. Goddaman includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all. Nor should it be asked why Goddaman did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the probandom, while placing the rest in another class. The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it It is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them. With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends. Prima-facephew of the common reason. 14. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom is not common reasonhood, because such a definition over extends to the non-exclusive reason, as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the and common reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also over extends to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance. For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness. Mere currents in a counter-instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice, the remaining qualifiers pointless. Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. 15. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance. The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers. Merely saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent. It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one. Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless. Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter-instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence in a counter instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason. A current in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonous. 16. It may be proposed that commoness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom, and also in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either a jar or some other object. This proposal, however, is unacceptable. No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common, non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons. The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance. With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends. The established doctrine of the common reason. The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood. The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandum is ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as no ability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects, because an estate of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends. Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason 18, excluded from all similar and all counter instances, is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with a probandom does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood. Soundhood occurs only in the subject, sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason, because cognition of pervasion and of subject propertyhood are causes of inferential cognition. Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandum is not uncommonness, because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandom is certain. In the example, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once pervasion has been established. Recutation by the ancient scholars 19. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess the probandom and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandum. At the time of cognizing pervasion, when the probandum and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandum, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless. In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter instances. Possession of odor may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of perversion. A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance. from all similar instances is the defect. 20. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful in inference for another. Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandim is established only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances. Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion. The defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances. If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood and stops, the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for incomplete use of the niya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction of perversion must be made explicit. Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is merely a deficiency in the use of Nyaya statements in inference for another. In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs cognition of perversion. Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances alone. With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason 21. According to the Established Doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject. In the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood. Soundhood is excluded from both similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence. In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both sides. The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct. Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic. For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all similar instances is necessary. In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances. Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing the absence of the pro-bandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative pervasion. Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example or counter example. In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar instances. Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier is pointless. A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason. With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends. Prima-facive view of the non-exclusive reason 23. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar and counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are held to be established or unestablished. Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and delimited by a purely affirmative probandom. A reason such as noability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom, is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is knowable. On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take the form of the common defect in Earth is different from the other substances because it possesses odor. If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence in all things are momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely common. If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom. Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness. Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness. In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory reason. A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative probandom, and making the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence, is not a definition of the non-exclusive reason. In the inference, all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable. Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known, in the subject or in objects distinct from the subject, as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion. But this definition overextends to a faultless reason, because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitants outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the subject, outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable. The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitance useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain both in the subject and outside it. Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary. The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual reasons being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness. The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers. With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason. 26. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason. reason. Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited. In an inference such as a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known, becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion. Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending pervasion. In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative pro-bandom, it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply. Example of a non-exclusive reason. all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability. Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason. In the context of a purely negative pro-bandom, when the absence of a property useful for apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises. Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason. Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning pervasion and its demonstration are in both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises. With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends. Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason. 28. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree. Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter-positive of an absolute absence situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference, this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition. A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandum, not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandum. The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum, because opposition to the probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda. Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing. Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established. Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view. 29, an objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory. Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason. It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction. Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandum may be established by another defective reason, but the contradiction defect of the reason that first appeared as opposed to the pro-bandom itself prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason. Refutation of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that co-location of the reason with the absence of the pro-bandom is only a defect involving deviation. The defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier co-located with the absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished probandum 2, this qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandum, that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandum. If occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition of deviation, the uncommon reason is excluded, for this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect of a reason. But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional qualifier is pointless. The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable. The view of other scholars 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the probandum is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose probandum is unestablished. For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defect of superfluity. This view, however, is not sound. Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with the probandom burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect of superfluity in the reason is not automatically established. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent. that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

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