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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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1. 0:02–0:07Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum,
2. 0:07–0:11but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory.
3. 0:11–0:18Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances
4. 0:18–0:21because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory,
5. 0:21–0:25although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference.
6. 0:25–0:28Such a reason is at most merely common,
7. 0:28–0:33because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances.
8. 0:34–0:39In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect.
9. 0:40–0:48A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory.
10. 0:49–0:53Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
11. 0:55–1:0233. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
12. 1:02–1:08Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom unless
13. 1:08–1:12collocation of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known.
14. 1:12–1:18Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus
15. 1:18–1:23of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless
16. 1:23–1:27qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom.
17. 1:27–1:32Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom
18. 1:32–1:37and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum.
19. 1:37–1:42To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the perversion of that absence
20. 1:42–1:47by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent.
21. 1:49–1:52With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends.
22. 1:54–1:57The established doctrine of the contradictory reason.
23. 1:57–2:02The established doctrine is now stated.
24. 2:02–2:07Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the
25. 2:07–2:11reason that pervades the probandom.
26. 2:11–2:16It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance
27. 2:16–2:20of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom
28. 2:20–2:21is known.
29. 2:21–2:25The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter-positive of the reason's
30. 2:25–2:30absence and of the counter positive of the probandum's absence are mutually distinct.
31. 2:31–2:35Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative
32. 2:35–2:39concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear.
33. 2:41–2:42Alternative definitions.
34. 2:44–2:5035. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a
35. 2:50–2:53property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the
36. 2:53–2:59probandum, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandum, while
37. 2:59–3:03occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandum, or possessing occurrence while
38. 3:03–3:09not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory
39. 3:09–3:15reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative
40. 3:15–3:22reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandum has not previously been established,
41. 3:22–3:26The absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established.
42. 3:27–3:32A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason,
43. 3:32–3:36because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated.
44. 3:38–3:42Absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect, repetition.
45. 3:43–3:4836, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance
46. 3:48–3:52possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating
47. 3:52–3:56occurrence, but cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance is impossible
48. 3:56–4:00without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom.
49. 4:01–4:06This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with
50. 4:06–4:10the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a
51. 4:10–4:14counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the
52. 4:14–4:18the reason's absence from a subject endowed with a probandom may cause cognition of its
53. 4:18–4:22occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not
54. 4:22–4:26established by this cognition alone.
55. 4:26–4:30Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes
56. 4:30–4:34cognition of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition
57. 4:34–4:37of the reason as pervaded by the probandom.
58. 4:37–4:42This cognition resembles cognition of deviation in the reason, because both oppose cognition
59. 4:42–4:45of Provision.
60. 4:45–4:48Three types of Contradictory Reason.
61. 4:48–4:5037.
62. 4:50–4:54An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself,
63. 4:54–4:58in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-colocation
64. 4:58–5:04of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings.
65. 5:04–5:07This argument is not sound.
66. 5:07–5:12Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction,
67. 5:12–5:16Therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect.
68. 5:16–5:21Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason.
69. 5:21–5:24The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds.
70. 5:24–5:28First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
71. 5:28–5:32Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom.
72. 5:32–5:39And third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom.
73. 5:39–5:43are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because
74. 5:43–5:49of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir.
75. 5:49–5:54Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons.
76. 5:54–5:5938. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades
77. 5:59–6:05the probandom is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold.
78. 6:05–6:09Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandom, a reason
79. 6:09–6:13pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum
80. 6:13–6:17produces the defective contradiction.
81. 6:17–6:21Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence
82. 6:21–6:25of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason.
83. 6:25–6:30Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes
84. 6:30–6:35pervasion by the probandum, such pervasion is possible even without the absence of mutual
85. 6:35–6:37absence.
86. 6:37–6:42such as there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke,
87. 6:42–6:47or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive
88. 6:47–6:49reason.
89. 6:49–6:54In an inference establishing inagation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three
90. 6:54–6:58kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct
91. 6:58–7:03cognition of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of
92. 7:03–7:07something opposed to what pervades the pro-bandom.
93. 7:07–7:12are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence
94. 7:12–7:18of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also
95. 7:18–7:24be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the
96. 7:24–7:31smoke of black aloe, because it possesses sharp, odorless, white smoke. With this,
97. 7:31–7:34the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends.
98. 7:34–7:4539. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter reason of equal
99. 7:45–7:50strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason and
100. 7:50–7:55counter reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its absence.
101. 7:56–8:00Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their respective
102. 8:00–8:06occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is no
103. 8:06–8:13occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Refutation of alternative definitions.
104. 8:15–8:20Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute
105. 8:20–8:25counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength
106. 8:25–8:31must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter reason as endowed with perversion
107. 8:31–8:35and subject propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced.
108. 8:36–8:41Cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot
109. 8:41–8:47both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason
110. 8:47–8:53such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the
111. 8:53–8:58probandum is present in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandum
112. 8:58–9:03is present in the subject. A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom
113. 9:03–9:10and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified
114. 9:10–9:14occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandom nor that of a counter reason
115. 9:14–9:21pervaded by the absence of the probandom is established. Nor can a reason qualified by
116. 9:21–9:25substantive reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandom and possessing
117. 9:25–9:30non-difference from perversion by the probandum be called counterbalanced.
118. 9:30–9:35Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction
119. 9:35–9:40cannot consist in the presence or absence of perversion by the probandum.
120. 9:40–9:46With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter reason ends.
121. 9:46–9:49The established doctrine of the equally strong counter reason
122. 9:49–9:5541. The established doctrine is now stated.
123. 9:55–10:10A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence of an equally strong counter reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
124. 10:10–10:20Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence.
125. 10:20–10:26Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning
126. 10:26–10:30the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection belonging
127. 10:30–10:35to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counter balanced
128. 10:35–10:38by an equally strong reason.
129. 10:38–10:42An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original
130. 10:42–10:46reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent
131. 10:46–10:48has not denied either.
132. 10:48–10:52the counter-reason subject propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties,
133. 10:52–10:56hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counter-balance would be a
134. 10:56–11:02defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and
135. 11:02–11:07counter-reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood,
136. 11:07–11:12they become mutual counter-reasons. When both are known together in this form,
137. 11:12–11:16they are fallacious in both inference for oneself and inference for another because
138. 11:16–11:23the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either provision or subject propertyhood
139. 11:23–11:31is necessary. 42. Since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence,
140. 11:31–11:35either provision or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason,
141. 11:35–11:37this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance.
142. 11:39–11:42It should not be said that the reasons provision by the absence of the probandom
143. 11:42–11:47can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandom and its absence,
144. 11:47–11:50and therefore the rule requiring absence of perversion is unnecessary.
145. 11:51–11:56If probandom and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandom.
146. 11:58–12:03Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion is necessary in the opposition between
147. 12:03–12:08probandom and its absence, because cognition of absence of perversion arises after cognition
148. 12:08–12:14of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of perversion,
149. 12:14–12:17like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance.
150. 12:20–12:24Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness.
151. 12:26–12:3143. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded
152. 12:31–12:34by the pro-bandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject,
153. 12:34–12:40they can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject
154. 12:40–12:43is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be
155. 12:43–12:48non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance.
156. 12:48–12:50This argument is not sound.
157. 12:50–12:54The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of
158. 12:54–12:59two opposed reasons in one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this
159. 12:59–13:04reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons.
160. 13:04–13:08Only the substantive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance,
161. 13:08–13:13By obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons,
162. 13:13–13:17it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject.
163. 13:17–13:22Absence of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even
164. 13:22–13:27a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present.
165. 13:27–13:32The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance
166. 13:32–13:37through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood.
167. 13:37–13:41This organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause,
168. 13:41–13:47even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater.
169. 13:47–13:51Objection, all inferences would be stopped.
170. 13:51–13:5644, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counter-thesis
171. 13:56–14:00each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences
172. 14:00–14:04presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped.
173. 14:04–14:08It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it
174. 14:08–14:13will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis
175. 14:13–14:17will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will
176. 14:17–14:19be completely defeated.
177. 14:19–14:22This argument is not sound.
178. 14:22–14:25On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum is not
179. 14:25–14:29directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex
180. 14:29–14:33would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis.
181. 14:33–14:37the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either
182. 14:37–14:41before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference
183. 14:41–14:44would become pointless.
184. 14:44–14:46Refutation of the objection.
185. 14:46–14:51No, this objection is not sound.
186. 14:51–14:57The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason.
187. 14:57–15:01It has already been stated that perversion and subject propertyhood constitute the
188. 15:01–15:04strength of a reason.
189. 15:04–15:09a sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infer only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
190. 15:10–15:13A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements.
191. 15:14–15:19Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped.
192. 15:20–15:23Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect.
193. 15:25–15:31Some scholars say that a reason encounter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons,
194. 15:31–15:36Therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defective counterbalance.
195. 15:36–15:41This view is not sound.
196. 15:41–15:45A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately.
197. 15:45–15:51If the two are treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance.
198. 15:51–15:57Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out.
199. 15:57–16:01the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences
200. 16:01–16:05concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance.
201. 16:06–16:12This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom
202. 16:12–16:16are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously.
203. 16:18–16:22Doubt concerning the probandom is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors.
204. 16:22–16:3047. The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate
205. 16:30–16:34inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt.
206. 16:35–16:39The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out,
207. 16:39–16:44hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum.
208. 16:46–16:49An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt.
209. 16:50–16:53Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandum
210. 16:53–16:58is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the
211. 16:58–17:02probandum arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandum would have to
212. 17:02–17:11be regarded as destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the
213. 17:11–17:17absence of the probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum. But two counter
214. 17:17–17:21balanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective
215. 17:21–17:27probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that
216. 17:27–17:33cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is,
217. 17:33–17:37inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the
218. 17:37–17:43probandum, is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and
219. 17:43–17:48certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandum and its absence
220. 17:48–17:53cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom. The cognitions produced by these two reasons
221. 17:53–17:58combined to become doubt concerning the probandom, although neither reason separately produces doubt.
222. 18:01–18:03Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view
223. 18:05–18:1048. This view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of
224. 18:10–18:15probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandom, opposes cognition of
225. 18:15–18:20the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter reason
226. 18:20–18:23pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom.
227. 18:24–18:28Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the
228. 18:28–18:33probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object
229. 18:33–18:37is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition.
230. 18:37–18:4149. Definitions of the fallacious reasons
231. 18:42–18:4649. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results.
232. 18:46–18:53A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative
233. 18:53–18:59concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result.
234. 18:59–19:05A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom.
235. 19:05–19:09Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition
236. 19:09–19:13of the absence of the probandom.
237. 19:13–19:17In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of
238. 19:17–19:23knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself.
239. 19:23–19:28In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture
240. 19:28–19:33of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect.
241. 19:33–19:37In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a
242. 19:37–19:41result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as
243. 19:41–19:47deviation is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of
244. 19:47–19:51perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood, is the result.
245. 19:53–19:59The result of a counterbalanced reason. 50. Encounterbalance, as with audibility and
246. 19:59–20:04producedness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the
247. 20:04–20:08result, because cognition of the reason's perversion and the like remain present.
248. 20:08–20:15Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise.
249. 20:15–20:22Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not separately applied.
250. 20:22–20:28Its result is nearly the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained?
251. 20:28–20:33Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject,
252. 20:33–20:37which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom,
253. 20:37–20:40constitute the characteristic of counterbalance.
254. 20:41–20:45When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom,
255. 20:45–20:49no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises,
256. 20:49–20:53then only the reason's pervasion by the probandom is ascertained.
257. 20:54–20:57The prakharasama produces inquiry.
258. 20:57–21:0451. An objection may be raised. Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the
259. 21:04–21:09like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning
260. 21:09–21:14the probandom. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing
261. 21:14–21:17the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom?
262. 21:19–21:25This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the
263. 21:25–21:29reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter reason is present.
264. 21:30–21:35Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counter balance produces inquiry.
265. 21:36–21:40This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason, in deviation,
266. 21:40–21:44doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom, whereas in
267. 21:44–21:48counter balance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises.
268. 21:50–21:53The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously.
269. 21:53–21:56Objection.
270. 21:56–22:00Subsubtive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time.
271. 22:00–22:04How, then, can one reason obstruct the other?
272. 22:04–22:08Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist.
273. 22:08–22:10Answer.
274. 22:10–22:15After the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second
275. 22:15–22:19reason arises, the first reflection ceases.
276. 22:19–22:23Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject
277. 22:23–22:26rises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood.
278. 22:28–22:32It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging
279. 22:32–22:37to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both substantive reflections can arise.
280. 22:38–22:43Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods
281. 22:43–22:48is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible.
282. 22:48–22:5453. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions
283. 22:54–22:59of two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible.
284. 23:00–23:04For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance.
285. 23:05–23:11This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter
286. 23:11–23:15reason, are impossible without recollection of both pervasions. Proponent and opponent
287. 23:15–23:17each present the pervasion of their own reason.

Plain text

Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum, but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory. Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory, although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference. Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances. In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect. A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory. Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. 33. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom unless collocation of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known. Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum. To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the perversion of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent. With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends. The established doctrine of the contradictory reason. The established doctrine is now stated. Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known. The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter-positive of the reason's absence and of the counter positive of the probandum's absence are mutually distinct. Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear. Alternative definitions. 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandum, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandum, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandum, or possessing occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandum has not previously been established, The absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated. Absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect, repetition. 36, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating occurrence, but cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom. This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the the reason's absence from a subject endowed with a probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason as pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation in the reason, because both oppose cognition of Provision. Three types of Contradictory Reason. 37. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction, Therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect. Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason. The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom. And third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom. are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons. 38. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandom is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandom, a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason. Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes pervasion by the probandum, such pervasion is possible even without the absence of mutual absence. such as there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive reason. In an inference establishing inagation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of something opposed to what pervades the pro-bandom. are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe, because it possesses sharp, odorless, white smoke. With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends. 39. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason and counter reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Refutation of alternative definitions. Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter reason as endowed with perversion and subject propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced. Cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandum is present in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject. A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandom nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is established. Nor can a reason qualified by substantive reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandom and possessing non-difference from perversion by the probandum be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of perversion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter reason ends. The established doctrine of the equally strong counter reason 41. The established doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence of an equally strong counter reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence. Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counter balanced by an equally strong reason. An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent has not denied either. the counter-reason subject propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counter-balance would be a defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and counter-reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter-reasons. When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for oneself and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either provision or subject propertyhood is necessary. 42. Since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence, either provision or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons provision by the absence of the probandom can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandom and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence of perversion is unnecessary. If probandom and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandom. Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion is necessary in the opposition between probandom and its absence, because cognition of absence of perversion arises after cognition of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of perversion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness. 43. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by the pro-bandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons in one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons. Only the substantive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance, By obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject. Absence of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present. The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood. This organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater. Objection, all inferences would be stopped. 44, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counter-thesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis. the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless. Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that perversion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason. a sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infer only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped. Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason encounter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons, Therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defective counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately. If the two are treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out. the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance. This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously. Doubt concerning the probandom is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors. 47. The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt. The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandum is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the probandum arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandum would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum. But two counter balanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the probandum, is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandum and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the probandom, although neither reason separately produces doubt. Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view 48. This view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition. 49. Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result. A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom. Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect. In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood, is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason. 50. Encounterbalance, as with audibility and producedness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's perversion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not separately applied. Its result is nearly the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom, constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's pervasion by the probandom is ascertained. The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised. Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom? This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter reason is present. Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counter balance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason, in deviation, doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom, whereas in counter balance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises. The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously. Objection. Subsubtive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time. How, then, can one reason obstruct the other? Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist. Answer. After the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases. Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject rises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood. It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both substantive reflections can arise. Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible. 53. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible. For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance. This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible without recollection of both pervasions. Proponent and opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

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