MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part4_RadioPlay.mp3

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.994795)
Duration: 21:08
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:32दाड़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़
0:32–0:38Everyone experiences that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous.
0:38–0:43Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object.
0:44–0:49The Mzaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a property as
0:49–0:55qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has already been determined
0:55–1:00by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first cognition's validity cannot
1:00–1:05be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity because doubt about
1:05–1:10validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering human conduct
1:10–1:16arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies,
1:16–1:21granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes
1:21–1:25that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first
1:25–1:29cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition
1:29–1:33Consisting in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness,
1:33–1:35otherwise doubt would not arise afterward.
1:37–1:40Udayanakari is a reputation of the Mishram Saka view.
1:42–1:46The Mishram M Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes as
1:46–1:51its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness.
1:52–1:56In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers
1:56–2:01apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to
2:01–2:06the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver.
2:07–2:11Therefore reflexive awareness determines both business and silverness as qualifies in the
2:11–2:16property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness
2:16–2:21is, I know this object before me as qualified by both business and silverness, not, I know
2:21–2:26both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking
2:26–2:31an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness
2:31–2:36are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing in the
2:36–2:41self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition, which makes
2:41–2:45thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that the self is the
2:45–2:50substrate of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not
2:50–2:54indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition. But its object is the
2:54–2:58first cognition, not the qualification by business and silverness in the property bearer,
2:58–3:03this, itself. Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined
3:03–3:08by the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness. In a state lacking habituation, because
3:08–3:12the first cognition's validity becomes an object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically
3:12–3:15through another means.
3:15–3:21of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view.
3:21–3:25The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known
3:25–3:30from its own causal aggregate, it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means.
3:30–3:35The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first cognition,
3:35–3:39while in the Ba view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an inference.
3:39–3:43Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically, prove
3:43–3:47something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already established.
3:48–3:53It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity is
3:53–3:58other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended. The
3:58–4:03validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended,
4:03–4:07therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that of
4:07–4:13the first cognition. And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called
4:13–4:18other relative to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable
4:18–4:24consequence of invalidity in cognition would follow. The Naya Yaka replies that in the unhabituated
4:24–4:29state the validity of the first cognition is known neither, as the guru school maintains,
4:29–4:33from the causal aggregate of the first cognition that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the
4:33–4:37the mere aggregate distinct from the substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference,
4:37–4:41in the general senses accepted by the Mishra and Bar schools.
4:41–4:45In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its validity becomes an object of
4:45–4:46doubt.
4:46–4:51Once the object has been determined, no doubt about the object arises in the third moment,
4:51–4:54and without doubt about validity there is no doubt about the object.
4:54–4:59Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity is not deviant.
4:59–5:03The validity of the disputed first cognition is not known from the causal aggregate of the
5:03–5:07first cognition producing the substrate of validity, because even after the first cognition
5:07–5:11has become determinate, and without a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted
5:11–5:14in the third moment, just like invalidity.
5:14–5:18Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity
5:18–5:22arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such
5:22–5:24a cognition.
5:24–5:29The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies
5:29–5:33validity alone and not its substrate is unsound.
5:33–5:38Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate
5:38–5:42of validity substrate, namely the first cognition.
5:42–5:46Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal
5:46–5:51aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties,
5:51–5:56The doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning.
5:56–6:00Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's
6:00–6:07own causal aggregate is contradictory, knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination,
6:07–6:10knowable in another manner.
6:10–6:16The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference.
6:16–6:20Traditionalists Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely
6:20–6:27negative inference. Example, this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire,
6:27–6:30because it produces activity toward fire capable of burning.
6:31–6:36Objection, unless validity is already known, negative pervasion between the reason and the
6:36–6:40probandom cannot be determined, how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition
6:40–6:45of validity? Answer, to avoid self-defeat, veridical cognition in general and its objects
6:45–6:51such as fire are initially accepted as established. Then, on the basis of that example's being knowable,
6:51–6:56being an object of prama, is inferred in fire. Since the probandum is generally familiar in the
6:56–7:01example, the specific validity of the cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandum, and because
7:01–7:06the probandum has not previously been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon
7:06–7:11or purely affirmative reason. It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property
7:11–7:16in all cognitions, since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs.
7:17–7:20Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be
7:20–7:24not being delimited by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example.
7:25–7:30Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire,
7:30–7:34with respect to fire as qualifcant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire,
7:34–7:38ultimately establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire.
7:38–7:43A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his own
7:43–7:47cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying validity.
7:48–7:52His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may deny
7:52–7:57validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known either.
7:58–8:01Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity
8:01–8:05toward fire and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the
8:05–8:09the stated form will remain unknown.
8:09–8:13The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier produces recollection of
8:13–8:18validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present, or absence of cognition
8:18–8:22of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it.
8:22–8:26By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition
8:26–8:31of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent
8:31–8:33from fire its qualifier.
8:33–8:38The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this
8:38–8:41recollection born of a prior impression.
8:41–8:46Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible.
8:46–8:49The Navya Nayaka view
8:49–8:54The Navya Nayaka say that the validity of the first cognition, that is, the app.
8:54–8:58The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire, which makes
8:58–9:03firehood its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where firehood
9:03–9:08is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier. It does
9:08–9:14not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making firehood its qualifier.
9:14–9:19It does not fail to take fire as qualifacant. It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located
9:19–9:25with firehood, or it does not make a qualifier absent from fire its qualifier.
9:26–9:30This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier and producing
9:30–9:35activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking
9:35–9:39fire capable of burning is qualifacant.
9:39–9:46Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire.
9:46–9:49DETERMINATION OF INVALIDITY
9:49–9:53All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion,
9:53–9:58the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in other
9:58–10:03as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where firehood was absent.
10:03–10:09In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between
10:09–10:14the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as probandom that produces activity
10:14–10:19toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of
10:19–10:25firehood. Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason
10:25–10:29consisting in absence of the absence of the reason that pervades in validity.
10:29–10:33The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the
10:33–10:37absence of the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the
10:37–10:42probandum. When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the
10:42–10:47probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is
10:47–10:51required, without familiarity with the probandum, absence of the probandum
10:51–10:57can not be inferred. But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum,
10:57–11:03prior familiarity with the probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference. Negative
11:03–11:08pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar in an example.
11:09–11:13For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because it
11:13–11:18possesses spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without prior
11:18–11:20familiarity with space, because absence of space
11:20–11:24of pervades what is not space.
11:24–11:26It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by
11:26–11:28validity can be inferred when validity is
11:28–11:31qualifier was not previously known.
11:31–11:34Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier, such a
11:34–11:38qualified inference is not possible at first.
11:38–11:41First there is the inference validity is present in the first
11:41–11:43cognition, then from the same reason arises the
11:43–11:46qualified inference, the first cognition is
11:46–11:51qualified by validity. This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is the substrate of the
11:51–11:57absence of a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition, the absence of a pot is
11:57–12:03on the ground. In this way absence of cognition having firehood is mowed and a substrate devoid
12:03–12:09of firehood is inferred. But a doubt first arises, does this cognition having firehood
12:09–12:14as mowed make firehood a qualifier in fire endowed with firehood, or in something devoid
12:14–12:20of firehood? There is no third alternative. Therefore a decisive inference of the
12:20–12:24probandum is impossible without first apprehending, in something possessing
12:24–12:29firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode. The same order
12:29–12:35applies in an inference concerning the eternality of cognition. An alternative
12:35–12:41form of the purely negative inference. Validity may also be determined by
12:41–12:46another purely negative inference, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier,
12:46–12:50takes as its object something possessing firehood, because it is an objected cognition and does
12:50–12:55not take as its object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid,
12:55–12:58as in an invalid cognition of fire.
12:58–13:03If objecthood located in the qualifcant is regarded as a separate entity, the probandom
13:03–13:07will be, this cognition of fire does not make as qualifier firehood located in what
13:07–13:13is not fire, firehood not co-located with firehood, or firehood absent from the substrate of
13:13–13:19objecthood. It's positive meaning, being cognition that makes as qualifier firehood located in
13:19–13:24fire or in the substrate of objecthood is established through presumption. The positive
13:24–13:29form of the pro-bandom has not previously been independently established, because no
13:29–13:36familiar example of it exists. In the illusion of fire, fire is not the substrate of objecthood,
13:36–13:42the Qualificand is its substrate. Hence the inference does not prove what is already established.
13:44–13:51Account of validity when Objecthood is regarded as a separate entity. Other teachers say that,
13:51–13:56in an illusion of fire, the Objecthood residing in the Qualifier is not distinct from the
13:56–14:01Objecthood residing in the Qualificand, therefore that Objecthood cannot be said to be undelimited
14:01–14:06by a property not co-located with Firehood. For this reason the preceding inference
14:06–14:11does not incur the defect of proving what is already established.
14:11–14:14Objection A person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel
14:14–14:17for the jewel and acts toward it may by chance obtain the jewel.
14:17–14:22Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing activity that obtains
14:22–14:26the jewel will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of jewel cognition.
14:26–14:30Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a jewel does not produce activity
14:30–14:35obtaining the jewel, it is cognition of an object different from the jewel cognition.
14:35–14:39The dual is obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible.
14:39–14:43Although dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times,
14:43–14:47the mind can know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition
14:47–14:49and recollection.
14:49–14:52Therefore the reason is not unestablished.
14:52–14:57Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose pro-bandom is absence
14:57–15:02of invalidity, because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive
15:02–15:03instance.
15:03–15:06The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form.
15:06–15:12The cognition this is earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent.
15:12–15:15It does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier.
15:15–15:19It does not make a property absent from the qualifcant earthhood its qualifier.
15:19–15:24While making earthhood its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualifcant.
15:24–15:29It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a
15:29–15:36property absent from Earth it's qualifier. This is because it is a determinant cognition of
15:36–15:42Earthhood taking odor bearing Earth as qualificant. An illusion of Earthhood makes Earthhood a
15:42–15:47qualifier in a substrate devoid of Earthhood, hence the illusion does not make the inference
15:47–15:52prove what is already established. The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificant,
15:52–15:58whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no deviation. The positive probandum,
15:58–16:03being cognition with Earthhood as mode and something possessing Earthhood is established through presumption.
16:05–16:09If only cognition taking a distinct objecthood as object is regarded as determinant,
16:09–16:13the probandom may be expressed not as, this cognition of Earth as Earth does not make Earthhood
16:13–16:17located in Earth its qualifier, but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier an Earthhood
16:17–16:22absent from Earth, not co-located with Earthhood, or absent from the substrate of objecthood.
16:22–16:27Its positive meaning, an objecthood that makes us qualify Earthhood co-located with Earthhood,
16:27–16:29is established through presumption.
16:30–16:32The view of still other teachers
16:34–16:38Still other teachers say that the probandom is absence of cognition that apprehends an object
16:38–16:41delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood.
16:42–16:46The reason is the cognition this is earth has as counter positive an objecthood in which a property
16:46–16:51not co-located with odour is not made the mode while a property co-located with odour is made the mode.
16:52–16:54In this way doubt is not included in the probandom.
16:55–16:58Alternatively, the probandom may simply be determined at cognition.
16:58–17:05The erroneous cognition, the earth is cold is nevertheless valid in its component concerning earth.
17:05–17:11In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant,
17:11–17:16because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components.
17:16–17:25Objecthood differs when the qualifican differs, but there is no proof that objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs.
17:25–17:29The form of the affirmative inference, the view of other teachers.
17:29–17:35Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an objecthood residing in earth,
17:35–17:39and that objecthood is delimited by a property co-located with earthhood,
17:39–17:43or is undilimited by a property not co-located with earthhood,
17:43–17:46or is undilimited by a property absent from earth.
17:46–17:50This is because it is cognition of the counter-positive of an objecthood
17:50–17:53in which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode,
17:53–17:58or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not located in a
17:58–18:02non-substrative odor, or it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood
18:02–18:09co-located with odor. But this view is unsound. In such an inference the
18:09–18:14probandum would be unfamiliar. It must therefore be accepted that in such a
18:14–18:18purely negative inference the positive probandum is established only through
18:18–18:22presumption. Thus a special provision is known in being cognition that
18:22–18:27produces activity toward the odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively
18:27–18:31in hands, feet, and the like.
18:31–18:35Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that property is
18:35–18:39the reason establishing cognitive validity.
18:39–18:46Objection and reply concerning apprehension of the object hood of fire capable of burning
18:46–18:49It may be objected that the object hood of fire capable of burning, delimited by
18:49–18:54cognition of fire, cannot be determined by the first cognition, this fire is capable of burning,
18:54–18:57because that cognition does not take itself and its objecthood as objects.
18:58–19:03Nor can that object have be determined by a later reflexive awareness of fire capable of burning,
19:03–19:07because the burning capacity of the fire before one is not an object of reflexive awareness.
19:08–19:12Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend the burning capacity apprehended
19:12–19:17by the first cognition. If the fire had located in the fire before one and apprehended by the
19:17–19:21first cognition is made an object of reflexive awareness, validity would be known intrinsically.
19:22–19:26For the same reason it would become impossible to determine that cognition of earth and water
19:26–19:29takes as its object the substrate of odor and viscosity respectively.
19:30–19:35Answer, when reflexive awareness arises a fire making firehood its mode, burning capacity is
19:35–19:40apprehended in the fire that is its object. Consequently, objecthood with respect to
19:40–19:44burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended in the first cognition of fire
19:44–19:49also presented by recollection. Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented
19:49–19:54by recollection, the property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively
19:54–19:59is mentally determined with clarity. For after a qualified determination that something
19:59–20:03is the substrate of odor and the like, a person experiences, I apprehended earthhood and
20:03–20:08so forth in the substrate of odor and the like. This is like the qualified determination
20:08–20:12of pervasion in smoke presented by recollection, or the qualified cognition of fragrance
20:12–20:15in sandalwood through a visual cognition.
20:15–20:18It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of
20:18–20:21earthhood as mode in the substrate of odor.
20:21–20:25Just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status of the substrate of
20:25–20:27odor as qualificand.
20:27–20:31Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood as mode arises,
20:31–20:34cognition occurs of being cognition with earthhood as mode in the substrate
20:34–20:36of earthhood.
20:36–20:40Likewise, absence of a mode absent from earth, or absence of a mode absent
20:40–20:45from the qualificant, for example, absence in earth cognition of cognition making pothood
20:45–20:48its mode, is mentally determined with clarity.
20:48–20:54Thus validity might be intrinsically determined by cognition's own causal aggregate.
20:54–20:57But this argument is unsound.
20:57–21:01The validity present in a first cognition made available for recollection by another
21:01–21:04Another first cognition cannot avoid being apprehended extrinsically.

Plain text

दाड़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़ Everyone experiences that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous. Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object. The Mzaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a property as qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has already been determined by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first cognition's validity cannot be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity because doubt about validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering human conduct arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies, granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition Consisting in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness, otherwise doubt would not arise afterward. Udayanakari is a reputation of the Mishram Saka view. The Mishram M Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes as its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness. In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver. Therefore reflexive awareness determines both business and silverness as qualifies in the property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness is, I know this object before me as qualified by both business and silverness, not, I know both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing in the self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition, which makes thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that the self is the substrate of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition. But its object is the first cognition, not the qualification by business and silverness in the property bearer, this, itself. Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined by the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness. In a state lacking habituation, because the first cognition's validity becomes an object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically through another means. of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view. The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known from its own causal aggregate, it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means. The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first cognition, while in the Ba view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an inference. Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically, prove something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already established. It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity is other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended. The validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended, therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that of the first cognition. And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called other relative to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable consequence of invalidity in cognition would follow. The Naya Yaka replies that in the unhabituated state the validity of the first cognition is known neither, as the guru school maintains, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the the mere aggregate distinct from the substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference, in the general senses accepted by the Mishra and Bar schools. In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its validity becomes an object of doubt. Once the object has been determined, no doubt about the object arises in the third moment, and without doubt about validity there is no doubt about the object. Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity is not deviant. The validity of the disputed first cognition is not known from the causal aggregate of the first cognition producing the substrate of validity, because even after the first cognition has become determinate, and without a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted in the third moment, just like invalidity. Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such a cognition. The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies validity alone and not its substrate is unsound. Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate of validity substrate, namely the first cognition. Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties, The doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning. Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's own causal aggregate is contradictory, knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination, knowable in another manner. The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference. Traditionalists Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely negative inference. Example, this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire, because it produces activity toward fire capable of burning. Objection, unless validity is already known, negative pervasion between the reason and the probandom cannot be determined, how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition of validity? Answer, to avoid self-defeat, veridical cognition in general and its objects such as fire are initially accepted as established. Then, on the basis of that example's being knowable, being an object of prama, is inferred in fire. Since the probandum is generally familiar in the example, the specific validity of the cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandum, and because the probandum has not previously been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon or purely affirmative reason. It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property in all cognitions, since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs. Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be not being delimited by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example. Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire, with respect to fire as qualifcant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire, ultimately establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire. A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his own cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying validity. His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may deny validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known either. Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity toward fire and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the the stated form will remain unknown. The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier produces recollection of validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present, or absence of cognition of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it. By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent from fire its qualifier. The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this recollection born of a prior impression. Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible. The Navya Nayaka view The Navya Nayaka say that the validity of the first cognition, that is, the app. The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where firehood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier. It does not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making firehood its qualifier. It does not fail to take fire as qualifacant. It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with firehood, or it does not make a qualifier absent from fire its qualifier. This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier and producing activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking fire capable of burning is qualifacant. Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire. DETERMINATION OF INVALIDITY All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion, the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in other as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where firehood was absent. In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as probandom that produces activity toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of firehood. Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason consisting in absence of the absence of the reason that pervades in validity. The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the absence of the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the probandum. When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is required, without familiarity with the probandum, absence of the probandum can not be inferred. But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference. Negative pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar in an example. For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because it possesses spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without prior familiarity with space, because absence of space of pervades what is not space. It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by validity can be inferred when validity is qualifier was not previously known. Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier, such a qualified inference is not possible at first. First there is the inference validity is present in the first cognition, then from the same reason arises the qualified inference, the first cognition is qualified by validity. This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is the substrate of the absence of a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition, the absence of a pot is on the ground. In this way absence of cognition having firehood is mowed and a substrate devoid of firehood is inferred. But a doubt first arises, does this cognition having firehood as mowed make firehood a qualifier in fire endowed with firehood, or in something devoid of firehood? There is no third alternative. Therefore a decisive inference of the probandum is impossible without first apprehending, in something possessing firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode. The same order applies in an inference concerning the eternality of cognition. An alternative form of the purely negative inference. Validity may also be determined by another purely negative inference, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, takes as its object something possessing firehood, because it is an objected cognition and does not take as its object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid, as in an invalid cognition of fire. If objecthood located in the qualifcant is regarded as a separate entity, the probandom will be, this cognition of fire does not make as qualifier firehood located in what is not fire, firehood not co-located with firehood, or firehood absent from the substrate of objecthood. It's positive meaning, being cognition that makes as qualifier firehood located in fire or in the substrate of objecthood is established through presumption. The positive form of the pro-bandom has not previously been independently established, because no familiar example of it exists. In the illusion of fire, fire is not the substrate of objecthood, the Qualificand is its substrate. Hence the inference does not prove what is already established. Account of validity when Objecthood is regarded as a separate entity. Other teachers say that, in an illusion of fire, the Objecthood residing in the Qualifier is not distinct from the Objecthood residing in the Qualificand, therefore that Objecthood cannot be said to be undelimited by a property not co-located with Firehood. For this reason the preceding inference does not incur the defect of proving what is already established. Objection A person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel for the jewel and acts toward it may by chance obtain the jewel. Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing activity that obtains the jewel will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of jewel cognition. Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a jewel does not produce activity obtaining the jewel, it is cognition of an object different from the jewel cognition. The dual is obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible. Although dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times, the mind can know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition and recollection. Therefore the reason is not unestablished. Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose pro-bandom is absence of invalidity, because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive instance. The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form. The cognition this is earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier. It does not make a property absent from the qualifcant earthhood its qualifier. While making earthhood its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualifcant. It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a property absent from Earth it's qualifier. This is because it is a determinant cognition of Earthhood taking odor bearing Earth as qualificant. An illusion of Earthhood makes Earthhood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of Earthhood, hence the illusion does not make the inference prove what is already established. The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificant, whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no deviation. The positive probandum, being cognition with Earthhood as mode and something possessing Earthhood is established through presumption. If only cognition taking a distinct objecthood as object is regarded as determinant, the probandom may be expressed not as, this cognition of Earth as Earth does not make Earthhood located in Earth its qualifier, but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier an Earthhood absent from Earth, not co-located with Earthhood, or absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, an objecthood that makes us qualify Earthhood co-located with Earthhood, is established through presumption. The view of still other teachers Still other teachers say that the probandom is absence of cognition that apprehends an object delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood. The reason is the cognition this is earth has as counter positive an objecthood in which a property not co-located with odour is not made the mode while a property co-located with odour is made the mode. In this way doubt is not included in the probandom. Alternatively, the probandom may simply be determined at cognition. The erroneous cognition, the earth is cold is nevertheless valid in its component concerning earth. In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant, because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components. Objecthood differs when the qualifican differs, but there is no proof that objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs. The form of the affirmative inference, the view of other teachers. Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an objecthood residing in earth, and that objecthood is delimited by a property co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property not co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property absent from earth. This is because it is cognition of the counter-positive of an objecthood in which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode, or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not located in a non-substrative odor, or it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood co-located with odor. But this view is unsound. In such an inference the probandum would be unfamiliar. It must therefore be accepted that in such a purely negative inference the positive probandum is established only through presumption. Thus a special provision is known in being cognition that produces activity toward the odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively in hands, feet, and the like. Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that property is the reason establishing cognitive validity. Objection and reply concerning apprehension of the object hood of fire capable of burning It may be objected that the object hood of fire capable of burning, delimited by cognition of fire, cannot be determined by the first cognition, this fire is capable of burning, because that cognition does not take itself and its objecthood as objects. Nor can that object have be determined by a later reflexive awareness of fire capable of burning, because the burning capacity of the fire before one is not an object of reflexive awareness. Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend the burning capacity apprehended by the first cognition. If the fire had located in the fire before one and apprehended by the first cognition is made an object of reflexive awareness, validity would be known intrinsically. For the same reason it would become impossible to determine that cognition of earth and water takes as its object the substrate of odor and viscosity respectively. Answer, when reflexive awareness arises a fire making firehood its mode, burning capacity is apprehended in the fire that is its object. Consequently, objecthood with respect to burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended in the first cognition of fire also presented by recollection. Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented by recollection, the property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively is mentally determined with clarity. For after a qualified determination that something is the substrate of odor and the like, a person experiences, I apprehended earthhood and so forth in the substrate of odor and the like. This is like the qualified determination of pervasion in smoke presented by recollection, or the qualified cognition of fragrance in sandalwood through a visual cognition. It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of earthhood as mode in the substrate of odor. Just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status of the substrate of odor as qualificand. Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood as mode arises, cognition occurs of being cognition with earthhood as mode in the substrate of earthhood. Likewise, absence of a mode absent from earth, or absence of a mode absent from the qualificant, for example, absence in earth cognition of cognition making pothood its mode, is mentally determined with clarity. Thus validity might be intrinsically determined by cognition's own causal aggregate. But this argument is unsound. The validity present in a first cognition made available for recollection by another Another first cognition cannot avoid being apprehended extrinsically.

← Transcript index