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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:00–0:04Chapter 3 The Bahram-UHD Full Translated Text
0:04–0:09Chapter 4 Appendix Pure Mithaili Translation of Bahram-UHD
0:09–0:14Bahram-UHD Vachu-Sputty's commentary on Shankara's Brahma-Sakrabharsha,
0:14–0:19Original Sanskrit Vachu-Sputty-Misraha Sanskrit-Mithaili Translation,
0:19–0:23Gajendra Thakkar, the Fields of the Two Notions.
0:23–0:27You and I, the object and the subject, are, by their very natures,
0:27–0:33opposed to one another like darkness and light. When it is established that the nature of one
0:33–0:39cannot intelligibly be that of the other, it is even less intelligible that the attributes of one
0:39–0:44should become united in the substratum of the other. Therefore the superimposition upon the
0:44–0:50conscious self, the subject that is the field of the notion I, of the object that is the
0:50–0:55field of the notion you and of its attributes, and conversely, owing to error in this matter,
0:55–1:01the superimposition of the subject and its attributes upon the object can in truth occur only
1:01–1:07as false superimposition. Nevertheless, because the distinction between mutually and completely
1:07–1:13different attributes, and likewise between their different substrata, is not apprehended,
1:13–1:18there arises the natural usage I am this and this is mine, through the superimposition
1:18–1:24of each upon the other both in nature and in attributes. In this usage, truth and falsehood
1:24–1:30are mingled and its cause is erroneous cognition. Salutations to that immortal Brahman, whose
1:30–1:36nature is immeasurable bliss and knowledge who, as Lord, makes the two kinds of indefinable
1:36–1:41of the idea his ministers and brings about the false manifestation of ether, air, fire,
1:41–1:47water, and earth, and from whom this entire world of the moving and the moving, the
1:47–1:52high and the low, has arisen. The Vedas are his breath, the five great elements
1:52–1:58are his sight. The moving and unmoving world is his smile, and his sleep is the great dissolution.
1:58–2:03Salutations to the Eternal Vedha and to Bhava. The Vedha is endowed with six limbs,
2:03–2:10and Bhava is possessed of many imperishable qualities or aviayas. Salutations to Martanda,
2:10–2:15Tila Kaslamin and Mahagena Pati. All are worthy of universal worship and grant the fruits of
2:15–2:22every desire. Salutations to Biasa, the author of the Brahmasutras, the second creator, and
2:22–2:26an incarnation of the power of knowledge of Lord Hari.
2:26–2:30Chapter 3 The Bahram-UHD Full Translated Text Cont.
2:30–2:362. Having bowed to Shankara, whose nature is stainless knowledge and who is a notion
2:36–2:42of compassion, I begin the analysis of the lucid yet profound Basha composed by him.
2:42–2:47as water from the royal road becomes pure when it falls into the stream of the Ganges,
2:47–2:53so the trifling words of people such as myself become sanctified when joined to the work
2:53–2:54of the Acharya.
2:54–3:00Advaayahsa, now an object about which there is no doubt, or knowledge of which serves
3:00–3:06no purpose, cannot become an object that a discriminating inquirer desires to know.
3:06–3:11For example, a pot present in bright light and brought into contact with the visual
3:11–3:15organ accompanied by the mind or the teeth of a crow.
3:15–3:19The case of Brahman is just the same because the knowledge opposed to the condition in
3:19–3:25which the prop is pervaded by inquiry doubt and purpose are present is already available
3:25–3:31here. The point is this, only the self is called Brahman because it is great or because
3:31–3:37it makes everything grow. This self is known through the undisputed, anerring and immediate
3:37–3:42experience of I as distinct from the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect, their
3:42–3:48objects, and in brief everything capable of being denoted by the word this.
3:48–3:55This experience is present in all living beings from worms and insects up to gods and sages.
3:55–3:59Therefore the self cannot be an object of the desire to know.
3:59–4:04Indeed no one doubts is this I or not, nor does anyone make the error.
4:04–4:10This is absolutely not I. Nor is it proper to say that because judgments such as I am
4:10–4:15thin, I am fat and I am going are seen to be used in coordination with attributes of
4:15–4:21the body. The body is the substratum of the word I. If the body were its substratum,
4:21–4:27there could be no recognition such as I, who enjoyed myself with my parents in childhood.
4:27–4:33Now in old age enjoy myself with my grandchildren. There is in fact not the slightest mark
4:33–4:38of recognition between the youthful body and the aged body by which their identity could
4:38–4:44be ascertained. Therefore, that which remains continuously the same amid changing things
4:44–4:48is different from them just as the thread that strings flowers together is different
4:48–4:54from the flowers. In the same way, the principle denoted by the word I which persists through
4:54–5:00the bodily changes of childhood, youth and so forth is distinct from those bodies.
5:00–5:30अद्वाय आच्शाखंट, तू, वोरोवा अपर्सन, विन अद्विमर्श्विम्स अद्वाई भाषिए आद्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर
5:30–5:35despite the difference of body. Therefore the body is not the substratum of Ines.
5:35–5:40Nor are the senses its substratum because despite the senses being different,
5:40–5:44recognition of the substratum of Ines occurs in the statement,
5:44–5:50what I myself saw, I am now touching. That the self is distinct from objects is exceedingly
5:50–5:56direct. The intellect and the mind are merely instruments. Therefore these instruments cannot
5:56–6:02in reality be the substratum of the cognition I which apprehends the agent. Although the
6:02–6:08body and the self are not identical, statements such as I am thin and I am blind are made.
6:08–6:13In my view, their meaning should be understood figuratively. Just as the statement the
6:13–6:18long haul is shouting means that the people seated in the long haul are shouting. Thus
6:18–6:24it is established that the self, distinct from the body, senses, mind, intellect,
6:24–6:29objects, and in brief from everything capable of being denoted by this, is known through
6:29–6:35the exceedingly clear experience ofight, and because there is no doubt, it is not an object
6:35–6:41of the desire to know. The self is not an object of inquiry also because inquiry into
6:41–6:47it serves no purpose. The point is this, liberation, in the form of cessation of
6:47–6:52transmigration, is the intended fruit to be taught here. None experience of the
6:52–6:58true nature of the Self is the cause of transmigration and that transmigration is to cease through
6:58–7:01knowledge of the true nature of the Self.
7:01–7:08Ad-Y-H-Sak-Kant 3. If beginningless transmigration continues together with beginningless knowledge
7:08–7:13of the true nature of the Self, then since there is no opposition between the two, how
7:13–7:18can the former cease? And how can there be non-experience of the true nature of
7:18–7:24the Self, apart from the experience of I, there is no other cognition of the true nature
7:24–7:30of the Self. This Self, distinct from the bodied senses, and so forth, is established by the
7:30–7:36exceedingly clear experience of I that is equally present in all human beatings because
7:36–7:43it would contradict experience. Even a thousand UPUH nishads cannot negate it. Even a thousand
7:43–7:48scriptures together cannot turn a pot into cloth. Therefore, because they would contradict
7:48–7:55experience, in my view the statements of the Upuh Nishads should be understood in a secondary
7:55–8:01sense. Keeping these considerations in mind, an objection is raised and the commentator
8:01–8:06answers it with the words. The Fields of the Two Notions and so forth. From the
8:06–8:11Fields of the Two Notions, Ruken in truth occur only as false superimposition is
8:11–8:17the statement of the objection. The answer begins with nevertheless. In relation to the
8:17–8:22nevertheless of the answer, the word although should be understood as supplied in the statement
8:22–8:28of the objection, where the fields of the two notions this and I were to be stated,
8:28–8:32the word you has been used in place of this in order to show the complete difference
8:32–8:37between these two sides of experience, the word you is more opposed to the word
8:37–8:43I than the word this is, because usages such as I am this and I am that are widely found.
8:43–8:50Advaayah Sakant, for, the self, whose nature is consciousness, is the subject. The inert
8:50–8:56intellect, senses, body, and external objects are objects of commission, for they delimit
8:56–9:02the conscious self, that is, they present it in determinate and limited forms through
9:02–9:08their own respective forms. The complete difference that forms the basis for the impossibilities
9:08–9:13of mutual superposition is illustrated by the words like darkness and light. No one
9:13–9:19can ever understand utterly different things such as light and darkness as being the nature
9:19–9:24of one another. This is what the sentence says when it is established that the nature
9:24–9:29of one cannot intelligibly be that of the other. For one to be the other means that
9:29–9:34the nature of one is present in the other. That is, that the two are identical. This
9:34–9:37is unintelligible. Very well, the different substratas the
9:37–9:43self and the non-self may not be mutually identical. Nevertheless, their attributes such
9:43–9:50as inertness and consciousness, permanence and impermanence, may be mutually superimposed.
9:50–9:55Even when substratas are known to be different, the superimposition of their attributes
9:55–10:00is observed. For example, a crystal is known to be different from a flat
10:00–10:30आप येप पिकोज़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़�
10:30–10:34reflection of another coloured substance, even though that other substance is known to
10:34–10:40be different from it. But the conscious self is a colourless subject, it cannot receive
10:40–10:45the reflection of an object. Followers of the batter school also say, in what way could
10:45–10:50there be a reflection of sound, smell, taste, and so forth.
10:50–10:56Udwh Succont. 5. Therefore when the remaining alternatives are eliminated, the conclusion
10:56–11:02is that mutual transference of the attributes eternally connected with the object and the
11:02–11:08subject could occur only on the basis of a mutual relation between these two substratas.
11:08–11:14If these two substratas were known as completely different and remained mutually unrelated,
11:14–11:20their attributes would be still more clearly unrelated because, with their respective substratas
11:20–11:25intervening, those attributes would be even farther removed from one another.
11:25–11:29This is what is expressed by the words even less and so forth.
11:29–11:34The cause of error in this matter means the cause of error concerning the object.
11:34–11:37The word false conveys concealment.
11:37–11:42What is beaming said is this superimposition is dependent upon non-apprehension of difference.
11:42–11:45Conversely, apprehension of difference is present here.
11:45–11:49This apprehension removes the non-apprehension of difference.
11:49–11:54And it also removes the superimposition dependent upon that non-apprehension.
11:54–11:59The syntactic connection of the sentence is although this could in truth occur only as
11:59–12:06false superimposition, nevertheless the implied intention of this statement is as follows.
12:06–12:12All this would be correct only if the true nature of the self were manifested in the experience
12:12–12:15of I. But that is not so. The point is this.
12:15–12:21In shruti, asamriti, itihasa and purana, the true nature of the self is said to
12:21–12:27be free from all limiting adjuncts, a homogenous reality of infinite bliss and consciousness
12:27–12:30in different one and non-dual.
12:30–12:35Statements whose purport is to teach the self in this form cannot be reduced even by Indra
12:35–12:40to a secondary meaning because of their opening middle and concluding statements and their
12:40–12:42purposeful repetition.
12:42–12:48For repetition establishes the importance of the subject as in our beautiful, our beautiful,
12:48–12:54its insignificance, and secondary meaning is still farther removed from it.
12:54–12:59Adwaah Sakkant 6. The experience of my presence the self as
12:59–13:04limited and mixed with many kinds of suffering and grief. How then can this experience have
13:04–13:10the true nature of the self as its object? Or how can it be an unknowing experience?
13:10–13:15Nor can it be said that shruti conflicts with perception, and since perception is
13:15–13:21an older and senior means of knowledge, Truti, which depends upon perception, should be considered
13:21–13:28invalid or secondary. Truti is awfulous, entirely free even from the possibility of defect, and
13:28–13:33the very fact that it produces cognition makes its validity self-revealing, therefore with
13:33–13:40respect to its fruit, namely true knowledge. Truti is independent of other means of knowledge.
13:40–13:46If it is said that although Shruti is independent with respect to the cognition it produces,
13:46–13:51it depends upon perception with respect to its own origination, and because perception
13:51–13:57contradicts it, the cognition from Shruti will not arise so that the invalidity of
13:57–14:03Shruti follows the answer is no, because there is no contradiction with its origination.
14:03–14:07Knowledge born of Shruti does not destroy the practical validity of perception,
14:07–14:13otherwise, through absence of its own cause, it would not arise at all. It negates only
14:13–14:19the ultimate validity of perception, nor is the cause of scriptural knowledge a perception
14:19–14:24that is ultimately true, because true knowledge is observed to arise from instruments that
14:24–14:30are valid at the practical level even though they are not ultimately valid. For example,
14:30–14:35the properties of shortness and length belong not to letters but to sounds, yet they are
14:35–14:41superimposed upon letters and become causes of correct comprehension of meaning, in ordinary
14:41–14:46usage, people who understand different objects such as a tree and an elephant respectively
14:46–14:51from the words naga and naga are not in fact regarded as deluded.
14:51–14:54Udwh Sarkont 7.
14:54–14:59It is not proper to regard a word that has no other purport as being used secondarily
14:59–15:00with respect.
15:00–15:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ
15:30–15:35The later cognition whose very essence is the sublation of the earlier could not intelligibly
15:35–15:40arise, and it has already been shown that the ultimate validity of perception is not
15:40–15:43independently established.
15:43–15:45The sutra of the great sage J.Y.E.
15:45–15:50Meini says only this much, where the earlier and the later are connected.
15:50–15:54The earlier alternative is weaker, as in the case of a Prakriti rite.
15:54–16:00There is also a verse to this effect, where two cognitions arise successively without
16:00–16:01depending upon one another.
16:01–16:06The superiority of the later cognition over the earlier is known.
16:06–16:11Moreover, even according to those who take the self to be the substratum of Ines, the
16:11–16:16truth of the cognition I cannot be accepted, for in the judgment I am in this dwelling
16:16–16:22and cognize, the all-pervading self is cognized as limited just as to a person standing
16:22–16:28on level ground, the huge trees on the summit of a high mountain appear like blades of grass,
16:28–16:34nor can it be said that the experienced limitation belongs to the body and not to the self. If
16:34–16:40that were so, the experience would not take the form I am and so forth, and if the word
16:40–16:45I were taken as being used secondarily for the body, the experience would not take the
16:45–16:47form I cognize either.
16:47–16:50Udhsakont 8.
16:50–16:53Only when both the speaker and the hearer who understands
16:53–16:58the meaning except that a word denotes some other thing is its use secondary, such use
16:58–17:01arises after knowledge of difference.
17:01–17:06For example, the word Agnihotra ordinarily denotes the obligatory right bearing that
17:06–17:12name, but in the context of a right of a different nature connected with the kundapayinamayana.
17:12–17:15In the sentence he offers the month long Agnihotra.
17:15–17:21The word Agni-Hotra is used secondarily on the basis of similarity in the end achieved
17:21–17:22by the two rites.
17:22–17:28Likewise, the word Lion is used secondarily for a pupil known from experience to be different
17:28–17:34from a lion, but here the primary referent of the word Eye is not experienced as definitely
17:34–17:38and clearly distinct from the body and so forth.
17:38–17:42Only after such an experience could the word Eye be used secondarily for the body
17:42–17:44and so on.
17:44–17:49How can it be maintained that through long usage a word may become conventionally established
17:49–17:55in a secondary meaning so that its secondary character is no longer known as with Taylor,
17:55–18:01whose literal meaning is Sesame Oil, but which is used for mustard oil, for even there,
18:01–18:06only after Difference has first been established with respect to extraction from Sesame or
18:06–18:09another seed, oiliness, and so forth?
18:09–18:13the supposition arise that mustard oil and the like are principally tailor, and they
18:13–18:20are denoted by that word. But the identity of sesame oil and mustard oil is not thereby
18:20–18:25established. The conclusion, therefore, is that in the case of those who know both the
18:25–18:30primary and secondary meanings, secondary usage is invariably accompanied by knowledge
18:30–18:35of difference. When the pervader, namely knowledge of difference, is absent here,
18:35–18:40secondary usage pervaded by it also disappears.
18:40–18:44Ad-YAH Sarkont 9. Nor can it be said that although the youthful
18:44–18:49and aged bodies are different, in the judgment I am that same one there is recognition of
18:49–18:55one and the same self, and thus experience of a self distinct from the body and so forth
18:55–19:01is established. In fact such a judgment belongs to a critical inquirer engaged in
19:01–19:08reflection on reality, not to ordinary people. In practical life even critical inquirers do
19:08–19:13not rise above the level of ordinary people. The revered commentator later says this very
19:13–19:19thing in the words there is no difference from animals and so forth adherents of other
19:19–19:25schools also say only those who reflect upon scriptural instruction make this distinction,
19:25–19:30not those who merely receive the text. Therefore when the other alternatives are
19:30–19:35eliminated. It is proper to accept that the ordinary person who says I am in this dwelling
19:35–19:42and so forth understands the self itself as limited, just as space is understood as limited
19:42–19:47by a pot, jar, vessel and so on. In order to preserve the validity of the use of the
19:47–19:53word I, it is not proper to say that the self, like the body and so forth, is also
19:53–19:58limited. Its size would then have to be either like an atom or like the body. If
19:58–20:00if it were atomic, usages suck.
20:00–20:30चज़ायम खविश्विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आ
20:30–20:36in opposite directions and the body would be thrown into disorder or no action would occur at all.
20:36–20:42If consciousness were held to belong to the aggregate of parts, then when one part were injured the
20:42–20:48conscious self would not understand itself to be partially injured nor is any stable relation
20:48–20:54of coexistence among the many parts observed. When any one part is destroyed the aggregate
20:54–21:00lacking that part cannot cognize. If cognition itself is taken to be the substratum of the
21:00–21:06notion I, its falsity still remains, because the notion I apprehends a permanent substance,
21:06–21:12whereas cognitions are momentary. Thus statements such as I am fat, I am blind,
21:12–21:16I am going would have to be understood as arising from superimposition. Thus,
21:16–21:21when the basis of the notion I has been shown to be groundless like rotten soil,
21:21–21:26the revered shruti can unobstructedly remove from the self the notions of agency,
21:26–21:33enjoy a ship, pleasure, pain, grief, and so forth that arise as consequences of the experience of
21:33–21:39I. Therefore, in the words superimposing each upon the other and so forth, the nature cause
21:39–21:45and result of the notion I have been elaborated, its faucet is well known from all authoritative
21:45–21:51true-ty, esmeriti, itihasa and purana of the two substratas, body and self, the nature
21:51–21:57of one is superimposed upon the other. For example, in I am this body, identification
21:57–22:03with this is an event of practical usage, not a cognitive judgement.
22:03–22:08Ordinary usage means worldly conduct, that is, an expression such as I am this. The
22:08–22:14word iti in the statement I am this indicates such actions as accepting or abandoning things
22:14–22:20understood by valid cognition to be beneficial or harmful to the body.
22:20–22:22Aadvayah Sakant 11.
22:22–22:27The attribute of one substratum is also superimposed upon the other.
22:27–22:33For example, upon the self on which the body and so forth have been superimposed are superimposed
22:33–22:38the bodily properties of birth, death, old age, disease, and so forth.
22:38–22:44And upon the body and so forth on which selfhood has been superimposed are superimposed
22:44–22:50the attributes of the self such as consciousness. As a result there arises ordinary usage or
22:50–22:57verbal expression such as this old age, death, sun, cow, ownership, and so forth is mine.
22:57–23:02The word E.T. in the statement this is mine indicates action and the like in conformity
23:02–23:08with the experience just described. The statement that ordinary conduct takes place after
23:08–23:14superimposition is reasonable because the agent of both acts superimposition and ordinary
23:14–23:20conduct is taken to be the same person. By showing that superimposition is temporarily
23:20–23:26prior to ordinary conduct, it becomes clear that superimposition is the cause of ordinary
23:26–23:32conduct. This alone is intended by the statement ordinary conduct together with its cause in
23:32–23:37the form of false cognition and so forth. False cognition is superimposition with
23:37–23:43it as the cause. The existence or non-existence of ordinary conduct follows the existence
23:43–23:48or non-existence of superimposition. Having thus stated the nature of superimposition
23:48–23:54and its fruit, namely ordinary conduct, the commentator states its cause with the words
23:54–24:00because the distinction between one and the other is not apprehended, that is, because
24:00–24:05their separateness is not understood. A question arises here, if there were absolutely no
24:05–24:10difference between the two, failure to apprehend difference would be natural, but then how could
24:10–24:16superimposition occur? The answer is given by the words completely different attributes
24:16–24:22and substratas from the ultimate standpoint. Difference means non-identity of the substratas
24:22–24:25and non-mixture of their attributes.
24:25–24:33R-Y-H Succont, 12, Granted, the illusion of identity produced by failure to understand
24:33–24:38the distinction between two real things is intelligible as in the illusion of silver
24:38–24:44in a shell when the distinction between the shell and silver is not understood, but here,
24:44–24:49apart from the conscious self that is the supreme reality, there is no real thing such
24:49–24:50as the body.
24:50–24:55Wents then comes the failure to understand its distinction from the conscious self,
24:55–24:57and wents the illusion of identity?
24:57–25:00answer is because truth is joined with
25:00–25:30विश्विद तो च्विद तो विचार-विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आ� आप आप आप
25:30–25:34rather than a literal union, conveying the sense that something becomes as though what
25:34–25:41it is not. What is being said is this superimposition of something that does not appear at all is
25:41–25:47impossible, therefore commission of the superimposed thing is necessary, not its real existence.
25:47–25:52Granted, when there is commission of the thing to be superimposed, what was previously
25:52–25:58seen is superimposed but that commission itself is conditioned by superimposition,
25:58–26:03It therefore seems difficult to avoid the defect of mutual dependence.
26:03–26:05The answer lies in the word natural.
26:05–26:09This ordinary conduct is natural and beginningless.
26:09–26:14By stating the beginninglessness of conduct, the beginninglessness of its cause superimposition
26:14–26:16is also stated.
26:16–26:22Thus intellect senses, body, and so forth continue to appear in each preceding false
26:22–26:27commission and at each subsequent occasion superimposition occurs again.
26:27–26:32Since this process is beginningless like the succession of seed and sprout, there is no
26:32–26:35defect of mutual dependence here.
26:35–26:38Udwa Hsakont, 13, very well.
26:38–26:42Superimposition requires only the prior appearance.
26:42–26:48It does not require the ultimate reality of the appearing object, but if body senses
26:48–26:53and so forth were utterly unreal, like a lotus lake in the sky, even their appearance
26:53–26:58existence would be unintelligible. Even the reality of the conscious self consists only
26:58–27:04in its luminosity. There is no principle distinct from that, such as inheritance in a class
27:04–27:10called existence or causal efficacy, for admitting such a principle would produce duality.
27:10–27:16Again, if another existence and another causal efficacy were required to establish the
27:16–27:22reality of this existence and causal efficacy, there would be infinite regress. Therefore
27:22–27:29luminosity alone must be accepted as the nature of reality. Consequently, because body and
27:29–27:34so forth appear, they would not be unreal. They too would become real like the conscious
27:34–27:40self. If they are unreal, they cannot appear. How then can truth and falsehood be joined?
27:40–27:45Here it may be asked, what is this thing called superimposition? The answer is,
27:45–27:51the appearance elsewhere, in a form resembling memory of something previously seen. Some
27:51–27:56Some say that superimposition is the attribution elsewhere of the properties of one thing.
27:56–28:02Others hold that when one thing is superimposed upon another, superimposition is the illusion
28:02–28:06produced by failure to apprehend the distinction between the two.
28:06–28:12Still others say that when one thing is superimposed upon another, contrary properties are imagined
28:12–28:13in the latter.
28:13–28:18But whatever the view, none falls outside the characteristic that one thing appears
28:18–28:21as though enowed with the properties of another.
28:21–28:27Our ordinary experience is also precisely this, a shell appears like silver, and one moon appears
28:27–28:31together with another, that is, as two.
28:31–28:37Udwh Succont, 14, the words previously seen and so forth in this definition are further
28:37–28:39explained as follows.
28:39–28:44The appearance of what was seen before means the manifestation of an object previously
28:44–28:45seen.
28:45–28:50False appearance is impossible without a conjunction of the superimposed element and that upon
28:50–28:56which it is superimposed, therefore the words previously seen indicate the superimposed and
28:56–29:02unreal element. The word seen is intended to show that the superimposed element is only
29:02–29:08empirically real, not ultimately real. Yet what is presently being seen cannot be what
29:08–29:14is superimposed, therefore the word previously is used. Though the thing previously seen
29:14–29:20is true in its own form, in its superimposed form it is indefinable and therefore false.
29:20–29:26The true substratum of superimposition is expressed by the words elsewhere, this elsewhere
29:26–29:31is the shell and the like, which is ultimately real. In this way the conjunction of truth
29:31–29:38and falsehood is stated. Granted, the definition, the appearance elsewhere of something previously
29:38–29:43seen is too broad because in the cow named Calachi there is the perception of cowhood
29:43–29:49previously seen in the Kausvas dimati. Likewise, when Dvadatta previously seen at Patalipatra
29:49–29:55is seen at Mahishmati, there is the perception elsewhere of that same Dvadatta. Both are
29:55–29:59valid cognitions. The word appearance is also well known in
29:59–29:59Kana...
30:00–30:30नाटक आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप
30:30–30:35memory also falls under this definition. In a dream, owing to the defect of sleep, attention
30:35–30:41is not given to the present absence of remembered parents and others, therefore the time and
30:41–30:46place in which they had previously been seen as present are superimposed upon the present
30:46–30:48experience.
30:48–30:54Udwa Hsakont 15. The same definition also applies to experiences
30:54–30:59such as the shell is yellow and sugar is bitter. The process is this, the yellow colour
30:59–31:05situated in bile that has come into contact with an exceedingly clear ray issuing from
31:05–31:11the eye is experienced as separate from the bile, the shell too is experienced, but owing
31:11–31:16to a defect of the sense organ its whiteness remains concealed. The non-relation of the
31:16–31:22yellow colour to the shell is not experienced. Because this non-apprehension of non-relation
31:22–31:28resembles earlier experiences such as a heap of yellow gold or a yellow bale fruit. The
31:28–31:35relation of collocation previously seen there is superimposed upon yellowness and shellhood,
31:35–31:40and the person says yellow shell. The experience sugar is bitter is to be explained in the
31:40–31:46same way. In the same way, the ray of the visual organ comes into contact with a clear
31:46–31:51mirror or sheet of water in front, but overpowered by the stronger rays of the sun, it
31:51–31:57is reflected from there, comes into contact with the face and produces cognition of the
31:57–32:04face. Owing to a defect, it does not apprehend the face in its real location that is, in the
32:04–32:09direction opposite itself but superimposes upon the face the property previously seen
32:09–32:14in the mirror or sheet of water of facing toward itself. Thus the definition applies
32:14–32:20also to the illusion of reflection. In the same way should be explained the illusion
32:20–32:26of seeing two moons, era concerning direction, the circle of a firebrand, a mirage in the
32:26–32:32form of a celestial city, and the illusion of seeing a snake inside a bamboo.
32:32–32:34Ad-Y-H-Saconte 16.
32:34–32:40What is beading said is this mere manifestation is not reality otherwise the body senses,
32:40–32:44and so forth would become real merely because they appear.
32:44–32:49It is not that a rope and the like do not appear as a snake, or that a crystal and
32:49–32:54the like do not appear as endowed with redness, yet despite appearing in such forms, they
32:54–33:01do not actually become a snake and so forth, nor are they really endowed with those attributes.
33:01–33:06If they were, then one would have to accept that in a mirage the man d'Kenea itself,
33:06–33:11with constantly moving high and low waves, had descended nearby, and a person who ran
33:11–33:16there could drink that water and quench his thirst. Therefore, even though a superimposed
33:16–33:22object appears. Its ultimate reality cannot be accepted, however unwelcome that conclusion
33:22–33:28may be. Nor is it proper to ask, the water of a mirage is unreal, but the mirage itself
33:28–33:35is ultimately real in its own form, whereas the body senses, and so forth are unreal even
33:35–33:39in their own form and therefore cannot be objects of experience, how then can they
33:39–33:45be superimposed? If an unreal object can never be an object of any experience, how
33:45–33:51How does the unreal mirage become an object of experience as water and so forth?
33:51–33:56Even though a mirage is real in its own form, it cannot be real in the form of water and
33:56–33:57the like.
33:57–34:03It may be said that there is no entity called absence distinct from positive beading.
34:03–34:07One existing thing is called absent with respect to the form of another existing
34:07–34:11thing while in its own form it is positive being.
34:11–34:16It has been said, absence is merely another positive entity considered in relation to
34:16–34:17another thing.
34:17–34:24Thus, absence can be regarded as another mode of positive being and made an object of experience.
34:24–34:29But how can a world that is utterly unreal devoid of all efficacy and without any real
34:29–34:32essence become an object of experience?
34:32–34:35And how can it be superimposed upon the conscious self?
34:35–34:4317. Nor can it be accepted that although the objects of experience are utterly devoid of
34:43–34:49any capacity to manifest themselves, their respective cognitions, through a power residing
34:49–34:55within cognition itself as cognition, produce the appearance of unreal objects as a particular
34:55–35:00kind of transformation, and that this power of cognition which manifests
35:00–35:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आ
35:30–35:35its relation to a fresh cognition would then have to be explained, leading to infinite regress.
35:35–35:40If it is said that manifesting the unreal is simply the nature of cognition,
35:40–35:45then what is this relation between truth and falsehood? If it is said that the relation
35:45–35:52between valid cognition and an unreal object is such that the former, namely valid cognition,
35:52–35:58is determined under the control of the unreal object R. What extraordinary good fortune for
35:58–36:04for poor cognition, that it acquires determinacy even from the unreal, nor does cognition perform
36:04–36:10any action upon that unreal object, because it is improper to suppose that an unreal object
36:10–36:16can be the substratum of such an action. If it is said that cognition is not subordinate
36:16–36:20to the unreal, but that it is simply the nature of cognition never to appear apart
36:20–36:27from the unreal are, what unfortunate partiality in favor of the unreal, by which cognition
36:27–36:32is always bound to it, although cognition is neither produced by the unreal nor of the
36:32–36:39same nature as it. Therefore the bodied senses, and so forth, which are utterly unreal and
36:39–36:44devoid of real existence, cannot be objects of experience.
36:44–36:51Udwaahsakont, 18, our answer here is this, if what lacks real existence cannot enter
36:51–36:56the field of experience, are these rays then really watered so that they may become
36:56–36:59objects of experience. The opponent says,
36:59–37:03There is no real existence of water in the rays,
37:03–37:06because the rays are not of the nature of water.
37:06–37:11The existence of a thing is twofold, true with respect to its own nature and false with
37:11–37:15respect to something different from itself. It has been said,
37:15–37:20At any time a person apprehends the existence of a thing as true or false either with
37:20–37:25respect to that thing's own nature or with respect to another thing,
37:25–37:30Our answer is, does the cognition of water in the rays fall within the sphere of truth?
37:30–37:35Then being valid, it would be neither erroneous nor sublated.
37:35–37:40The Leponin Tugend says certainly it would not be sublated if the rays were understood
37:40–37:44not as water but as something different from water.
37:44–37:49But when the rays are understood as water, how can that cognition be annoying or unsublated?
37:49–37:54Our answer then is, the waterness superimposed upon rays whose nature is non-water is
37:54–38:00not true because those Reys, being identical with non-Waterness, cannot intelligibly be
38:00–38:06of the nature of Waterness, but that Waterness is not false either because you yourself admit
38:06–38:12that absence is nothing but a positive entity in another form, not anything else since no
38:12–38:18such separate entity is established. That is, the falsity of one thing is only another
38:18–38:23thing, yet the superimposed form is not another thing either, if it were. It would
38:23–38:28be either the ray or water of the Ganges. On the first alternative the cognition would
38:28–38:33take the form ray, not water. On the second it would take the form water of the Ganges,
38:33–38:38not water here. Even if the particular place were not remembered, the cognition should
38:38–38:45be merely water, not here. Nor can it be accepted that it is utterly false, an illusory
38:45–38:50object devoid of all existence, because it has already been said that such a thing
38:50–38:54cannot intelligibly enter the field of experience.
38:54–38:58Therefore the water superimposed upon the rays must be regarded as indefinable.
38:58–39:05It is neither true nor false nor both true and false because the last alternative is
39:05–39:06self-contradictory.
39:06–39:11Thus the superimposed water appears like ultimately real water and for that reason
39:11–39:17seems like water previously seen, but in reality it is neither water nor the water
39:17–39:18previously seen.
39:18–39:20It is false and indefinable.
39:20–39:25In the same way, the body senses, and the entire world are indefinable.
39:25–39:30Though new, they are superimposed upon another substratum, the Conscious Self, as though they
39:30–39:35were objects presented in preceding erroneous commission.
39:35–39:39The definition of superimposition given above applies perfectly here.
39:39–39:44The sublation of the world consisting of body senses, and so forth will be explained
39:44–39:45later.
39:45–39:52Conscious self is the subject matter of Shruti, Esmeriti, Itihasa and Purana when ascertained
39:52–39:55by reasoning based upon and not opposed to these.
39:55–40:00Its nature is purity, consciousness and freedom and it is de...
40:00–40:02अछि। अछि। आपने आपने अछि। अछि।
40:02–40:04अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि।
40:04–40:06अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि।
40:06–40:08अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि।
40:08–40:10अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि।
40:10–40:12अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि।
40:12–40:17in a class called existence or causal efficacy. Thus everything is clear.
40:17–40:25Udwh Succont 19. All inquirers accept the indefinable superimposition defined above,
40:25–40:31but there is considerable disagreement regarding its finer details. Therefore, in order firmly to
40:31–40:38establish its indefinability, the commentator says some people describe it thus and so forth.
40:38–40:44of another's attribute means here the attribute of a cognition whose object is silver or the form
40:44–40:51of the cognition. Superimposition occurs elsewhere. That is, in an external object. According to
40:51–40:57the Sortran Ticca view, external existence is real. Superimposition is the attribution of the
40:57–41:03form of cognition to that external object. According to the Vayna Navada view, though
41:03–41:08there is no external reality, an external falsity is produced by the impressions of
41:08–41:14beginningless of Elydia, and the form of commission is superimposed upon that.
41:14–41:19The support for this view is as follows, the general rule is that whatever is experienced
41:19–41:25in a particular form should be accepted in precisely that form, because difference from
41:25–41:31that form is established only when a stronger commission sublates it. Although it is possible
41:31–41:36to interpret the sublating condition this is not silver as sublating only the element
41:36–41:42this. It is not proper to extend its sublation to the silver element. If the substratum silver
41:42–41:48were sublated, then both silver and its attribute of thisness would be sublated. Therefore
41:48–41:53it is more reasonable to hold that only the attribute of thisness is sublated, not
41:53–41:59the substratum silver. Consequently, when the externality of silver is sublated,
41:59–42:05silver is inferentially taken to be confined within our cognition. Thus the external superimposition
42:05–42:10of an object that is the form of cognition is established.
42:10–42:17Udwh Succonte 20 But some others that is, those not satisfied with the doctrine that the form
42:17–42:22of cognition is superimposed say that when one thing is superimposed upon another, there is
42:22–42:28an illusion arising from non-apprehension of the distinction between the two. They state
42:28–42:33the reason for their dissatisfaction thus, that silver and the Leica forms of cognition
42:33–42:39must be established either by experience, namely perception or by inference. The inference
42:39–42:45on this matter will be refuted later, as for perception, it would have to be either the
42:45–42:50cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. The experience of silver does
42:50–42:56not indicate that silver is of the form of cognition because it reveals silver as
42:56–43:03an external object situated on the substratum, this, not as an internal object. Otherwise,
43:03–43:08because Noah and cognition would be identical, the cognition would take the form I am silver.
43:08–43:15The proponent of Atma-Kyati may say, erroneous cognition determines its own form as external,
43:15–43:20therefore its object is not the substratum of the word I. Its being the form of cognition
43:20–43:26is understood from the sublating cognition. To this we reply, R, let the long lived
43:26–43:32gentleman examine this sublating cognition. Does it distinguish the object present before us from
43:32–43:38silver or does it also tell us that its nature is a form of cognition? Let the gods praise the
43:38–43:43intelligence of the person who says that the sublating cognition reveals the previously
43:43–43:49experienced object as beating of the nature of cognition. If it is said that from the denial of
43:49–43:55the presence of silver before us its beating a form of cognition is inferred, that too is
43:55–44:01incorrect, for from denial of failure to apprehend remoteness, the object would be established as
44:01–44:06distant from the knower how then would the extreme nearness of the knower's own nature follow.
44:06–44:12The sublating cognition negates neither silver nor thisness, it negates only the practical usage
44:12–44:18concerning silver that arose from failure to apprehend their difference. Nor does the cognition
44:18–44:24of silver in a shell itself produce silver because it is contrary to experience to say that
44:24–44:30the manifestation of silver can have the shell as its substratum. Nor can it be said that the
44:30–44:35shell is the substratum merely as an existent thing, not as a known thing, for then the definition
44:35–44:41of substratum would be overextended, since existence is common to all things and anything
44:41–44:47could become the substratum. Nor is the shell the substratum as a cause of cognition, because
44:47–44:52the sense organ too is a cause. Thus the word substratum can mean only that which is
44:52–44:57manifest, but in the cognition of silver the shell is not manifest. How then is it the
44:57–45:00substratum? If it's manifestation
45:00–45:30नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक �
45:30–45:35Again, if cognition were not restricted to its proper object, confidence in everything would
45:35–45:40be destroyed. Therefore it must be accepted that every cognition is valid.
45:41–45:43Udwh Sarkont
45:43–45:5021. Thus the two cognitions, silver and this, are of two kinds, memory and experience.
45:50–45:56Here this is the apprehension merely of the object present before us, owing to a defect.
45:56–46:01the shellhood present there is not apprehended. The mere that which had previously been apprehended
46:01–46:08because of similarity, awakens the impression of the former experience of silver and produces a
46:08–46:14memory of silver. Although that memory is of the nature of apprehension of an object previously
46:14–46:20apprehended, it remains merely as apprehension because of the defect. The aspect previously
46:20–46:26apprehended belonging to its object disappears. For this reason the distinction between the memory
46:26–46:33of silver and the apprehension of the mere object present before us whether in their own cognitive
46:33–46:39forms or in relation to their objects is not apprehended. Consequently because they resemble
46:39–46:46a cognition of silver actually produced by sense contact these two cognitions call this and silver
46:46–46:51though different as perception and memory produce practical usage and coordinate predication as
46:51–46:57though they were one. In some cases there are two perceptions whose mutual difference is not
46:57–47:03apprehended as in the shell is yellow. In this situation, as in the example of a transparent
47:03–47:08crystal, the yellowness of bile present in the ray of light issuing from the eye is apprehended
47:08–47:14but the bile itself is not apprehended. Owing to some defect the shell too is apprehended
47:14–47:19merely as existing, while its whiteness is not apprehended.
47:19–47:24Because non-apprehension of the non-relation between quality and qualified resembles the
47:24–47:30cognition of a heap of yellow gold, here too there arises practical usage in the form
47:30–47:36of identity and coordinate predication. At the time of sublation, this practical identity
47:36–47:41produced by non-apprehension of difference is sublated, therefore the sublating force
47:41–47:46of the cognition of difference in the form not this is understood.
47:46–47:51Understood in this way, even the erroneous character of the earlier cognition, well known
47:51–47:53in the world, is established.
47:53–47:59Thus all cognitions whose doubtful or erroneous nature is disputed up because they are cognitions,
47:59–48:01true like the cognition of a pot.
48:01–48:06This view is explained in the words when one thing is superimposed upon another.
48:06–48:11The worldly superimposition of silver and the like upon a shell and the like is not
48:11–48:13governed by some other cognition.
48:13–48:19Rather, on one side there is the memory of silver in which the aspect of its object
48:19–48:22has disappeared and only apprehension remains.
48:22–48:27And on the other side there is the mere object present before us in the form this
48:27–48:28and its cognition.
48:28–48:33The illusion arises from non-apprehension of the separateness of these two.
48:33–48:39The erroneous character consists only in speaking of memory and apprehension as co-ordinate
48:39–48:43with one another and in practical usage as silver and the like.
48:43–48:50Ad-YAH Sarkont, 22, but others, who are not satisfied even with this view, say, when one
48:50–48:55thing is superimposed upon another, contrary attributes are imagined in the latter.
48:55–49:01The basic consideration is this, everyone has the same experience that the commission
49:01–49:07this is silver causes a person seeking silver to act toward the object before him and to use
49:07–49:12coordinate predication. This cannot arise merely from memory and apprehension or from
49:12–49:18non-apprehension of the mutual difference between their respective objects for how could the action
49:18–49:24and speech of an intelligent being which depend upon apprehension arise merely from non-apprehension.
49:24–49:29It has been said here that they arise not from mere non-apprehension but from memory and
49:29–49:35apprehension in which the difference of their forms and objects is not apprehended because
49:35–49:40of their resemblance to a valid cognition of silver present before one. They produce
49:40–49:46practical usage in the form of identity and coordinate predication. To this the proponent
49:46–49:51of any affect Kiati replies. The resemblance of this cognition to valid silver cognition
49:51–49:57as a cause of practical usage must either itself be apprehended or without being
49:57–50:00apprehended operate merely by its existence.
50:00–50:04अछि।
50:30–50:35difference between these two is apprehended is self-contradictory for if there is non-apprehension
50:35–50:40of difference. The cognition cannot take the form between these two, and if between these
50:40–50:45two is apprehended, how can difference remain unapprehended? Thus it must be said that
50:45–50:51non-apprehension of difference, without itself being apprehended, becomes a cause of practical
50:51–50:58usage merely by its existence. The question is, does it cause practical usage by producing
50:58–51:03superimposition or does it itself become the cause without producing superimposition? Our
51:03–51:10view is that practical usage by an intelligent being cannot intelligibly be the direct result
51:10–51:15of ignorance, therefore non-apprehension of difference becomes effective only by producing
51:15–51:21a superimposed cognition. An objection may be raised, the action of an intelligent
51:21–51:26being is not the result of ignorance but of an apprehension and memory whose mutual
51:26–51:30difference is not known. Our answer is, not so.
51:30–51:35Mere memory of the primary meaning of the word silver is not a cause of action, because
51:35–51:41it is indisputable that a person seeking silver acts toward the substratum of thisness.
51:41–51:46Without desire regarding the substratum of thisness, how could the person act toward
51:46–51:51it? To say that one desires one thing but acts for another is self-contradictory.
51:51–51:57Again, if it is not known that the substratum of thisness is silver, how can a person seeking
51:57–51:59silver desire it?
51:59–52:04If it is said that desire arises because the substratum of thisness has not been apprehended
52:04–52:09as different from silver, the reply is, when it has not been apprehended as being silver,
52:09–52:12why does the person not remain indifferent to it?
52:12–52:17Pulled in opposite directions by acceptance and indifference, this intelligent person
52:17–52:23would remain undecided, finally, through the superimposition of silver upon the substratum
52:23–52:28of thisness. His mind settles on acceptance. Therefore, non-apprehension of difference
52:28–52:34causes the action of an intelligent person by producing superimposition. The sequence
52:34–52:40is this because difference is not understood. The property of silver is superimposed upon
52:40–52:45the substratum of thisness. Then the fact that an object of the class silver is beneficial
52:45–52:51is remembered next that beneficialness is inferred of the silver superimposed upon the
52:51–52:56substratum of thisness because it belongs to the class silver. Thereafter the person seeking
52:56–53:02silver acts toward that superimposed silver. Thus the sequence is established. A general
53:02–53:07memory of silver cannot help infer that the substratum of thisness is beneficial
53:07–53:13because it would not be known that the Proben's silverhood resides in the subject. Influence
53:13–53:19arises from seaming the subject and probens in the same locus, not in different loci.
53:19–53:25It has been said, inference arises when one who knows the pervasion sees the subject and
53:25–53:28the reason in the same locus.
53:28–53:31Ad-Yh Succont 23.
53:31–53:35Pervasion in superimposition, this perception of one locus occurs.
53:35–53:38Therefore, this inference is established.
53:38–53:43The cognition of silver and the like that is under dispute has the object present
53:43–53:48before one as its object, because a person seeking silver and the like invariably acts
53:48–53:54toward that present object. A cognition that invariably causes a person seeking an object
53:54–54:00to act toward that object has that very object as its object, as with the valid cognition
54:00–54:06of silver admitted by both you and us. The cognition in question is of that kind, therefore
54:06–54:11its object is the substratum of thisness itself. When it is said that the shell is
54:11–54:17not the substratum because it is not directly present. You must clarify whether by saying
54:17–54:22the shell is not the substratum of the cognition, this is silver you mean shellhood or merely
54:22–54:28the bright, shining substance present before one. If shellhood is not the substratum
54:28–54:34we too accept this, but if the bright, shining substance before one is not the substratum
54:34–54:39then in saying so you stand alone against direct experience. The fact is that a person
54:39–54:46who experiences this is silver while having that experience points with a finger and so forth
54:46–54:52toward the object before him. It is also observed that when, because of a defect, a causes production
54:52–54:58of its ordinary effect is obstructed, that cause acquires a capacity to produce a different kind
54:58–54:59of effect for ex...
55:00–55:05For example, from a sugar cane seed scorched in a forest fire there arises a plantain shoot
55:05–55:11and the digestive fire of a person afflicted with the disease bas-marca digests a great
55:11–55:16quantity of food. An inference of the truth of an illusion that has been established by
55:16–55:23sublating perception to be objectless is defective, like an inference that fire is not hot.
55:23–55:28Be it objection that confidence in all means of knowledge would collapse if erroneous
55:28–55:34cognition were regarded as unrestricted to its own object has been answered.
55:34–55:42Udwaah Sakhont, 24, by me in the Nyayakoneka. In my view, the validity of cognition is intrinsic
55:42–55:48because of its own capacity to make known, not because of a fixed relation to its object.
55:48–55:53Therefore the matter is not elaborated here. The doctrine that memory loses its character
55:53–55:59as memory has been criticised briefly here, its detailed discussion should be seen in
55:59–56:04the Brahmatattva Samic Shra. Therefore it is said, but others say that when one thing
56:04–56:09is superimposed upon another, contrary attributes are imagined in the latter.
56:09–56:14When silver and the like are superimposed upon a shell and the like, those attributes
56:14–56:19of silver and the like that are contrary to the attributes of that very shell and
56:19–56:24the like are superimposed, this is the syntactic connection of the sentence.
56:24–56:29Let this disagreement among the inquirers remain, what use has it in the present context?
56:29–56:34The commentator answers with the words in whatever way it may be and so forth.
56:34–56:39The imagining of one thing's attribute in another thing is falsity, above we have
56:39–56:43made clear that this falsity is indefinability.
56:43–56:47From this it follows that in the view of every inquirer there must necessarily be
56:47–56:53the place for the indefinable superimposition of the attributes of one thing upon another,
56:53–56:57therefore indefinability is a doctrine accepted by all views.
56:57–57:03This is their intention, even those who hold the theory of non-apprehension of the difference
57:03–57:09between memory and experience must unwillingly accept it because they accept coordinate
57:09–57:12predication and the regularity of action.
57:12–57:18Rdwh Succont 25 Again, how can an object and its attributes
57:18–57:22be superimposed upon the inner self, which is not an object?
57:22–57:28Everyone superimposes one object upon another object present before him, and you say that
57:28–57:33the inner self, lying outside the field of the notion you, is not an object.
57:33–57:38The answer is, it is not wholly non-objective, because it is the object of the notion
57:38–57:45eye and the experience of the inner self is immediate, nor is there a rule that superimposition
57:45–57:52occurs only upon another object present before one, though space is not perceptible and discriminating
57:52–57:58people superimpose upon its surface, impurity, and so forth. In the same way there is no
57:58–58:04contradiction in the superimposition of the non-self upon the inner self. This falsity
58:04–58:09It is established not only according to the views of inquirers into reality, but also
58:09–58:11in ordinary experience.
58:11–58:17Therefore, the common tater says, Our experience in the world is such, a shell appears like
58:17–58:18silver.
58:18–58:21But this is not silver completes the first sentence.
58:21–58:27Granted, experience proves an illusion in which one thing is of the nature of another,
58:27–58:33but in what is actually one and undivided, an illusion of difference is not observed.
58:33–58:38then comes the illusion of difference among jivas who are in reality none different from
58:38–58:43the conscious self. The commentator answers, though there is one moon, it appears as though
58:43–58:45accompanied by another moon.
58:45–58:47Udh-H Sarkant
58:47–58:5326. In the words again, How and so forth, an objection is once more raised against
58:53–58:58superimposition upon the conscious self. The intention is this, is the conscious
58:58–59:05self manifest or not? If it is not manifest, how can an object and its attributes be superimposed
59:05–59:11upon it? Silver all the attributes of silver are not superimposed upon and a manifest substance
59:11–59:18standing before us. If the self is manifest, then, if it were inert, it would not reasonably
59:18–59:24be illuminated by a light dependent upon another. As a pot and the lycar, a manifest self must
59:24–59:30either be self-luminous or illuminated by another. The second alternative is impossible,
59:30–59:35and the first two is not acceptable on your view. Because of contradiction, one and the
59:35–59:41same thing cannot be both agent and object. An object is that which bears the result
59:41–59:46of an action residing in another. The act of cognition does not reside in anything
59:46–59:52other than the self. How then can the self be its object? Because of contradiction,
59:52–59:58same thing cannot be both self-luminous and something illuminated by another, if the act
59:58–1:00:00of cognition is taken to inhibit.
1:00:00–1:00:30ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये ना�
1:00:30–1:00:35Just as Chaitra, although he bears the fruit of his own action, is not an object because
1:00:35–1:00:40he does not bear the fruit of an action in herring in another, so too the self is not
1:00:40–1:00:41an object.
1:00:41–1:00:46Chaitra reaches the city through an action in herring in himself.
1:00:46–1:00:53Adwaeh Sakant, 27, the result of that action belongs both to Chaitra and to the city,
1:00:53–1:00:57yet objected belongs only to the city because the city possesses the property of
1:00:57–1:01:03bearing the fruit of an action residing in another, namely Chaitra. Chaitra too obtains
1:01:03–1:01:10the fruit of the action, but since the act of going in here is only in Chaitra, he is not the object.
1:01:10–1:01:17This view is unreasonable because it contradicts scripture. Shruti clearly says Brahman is truth,
1:01:17–1:01:22knowledge and infinite. The same is also clear through reasoning, is the result called
1:01:22–1:01:29manifestation of the object that in which both object and self are manifest inert or self-luminous.
1:01:29–1:01:34If it is inert, both object and self would be inert. Then, when there is no difference
1:01:34–1:01:40among the three, by what would what be illuminated? Consequently, the entire world would remain
1:01:40–1:01:46a manifest, nor would mutual dependence among the three be of any help, as the saying
1:01:46–1:01:51goes, the blind holding the hand of the blind fall at every step, nor can it be
1:01:51–1:01:57said that although cognition itself is a manifest, it manifests both object and self like the
1:01:57–1:02:03eye and other senses for to manifest means to produce cognition, and since the cognition
1:02:03–1:02:09produced would be inert, it could not remove the aforesaid defect of one blind person showing
1:02:09–1:02:14the way to another. Subsequent cognitions would also be inert, consequently there would
1:02:14–1:02:20be an infinite regress. Therefore consciousness must necessarily be accepted as manifest
1:02:20–1:02:26by itself without dependence on another. Even if this is accepted, what advantage have you
1:02:26–1:02:32gained concerning the object and self which are by nature inert? You may say, the advantage
1:02:32–1:02:39is that their consciousness is not inert. Adwayah Sakant, 28, but it does not follow
1:02:39–1:02:44from this that because consciousness is not inert, the object and self are also not
1:02:44–1:02:49inert. If the sun is learned, does the father also become learned? You may say
1:02:49–1:02:56that it is the very nature of self-luminous consciousness to be related to object and self.
1:02:56–1:03:01Then the parallel reply is that it is also the nature of a learned son to be related
1:03:01–1:03:07to his father. You may define the relation thus. The manifestation of consciousness co-exists
1:03:07–1:03:13with the manifestation of object and self. It never exists without their manifestation.
1:03:13–1:03:17This is its nature. Then the question is, is consciousness different
1:03:17–1:03:23on one side from its own manifestation and on the other from the manifestation of object
1:03:23–1:03:28and self. If it is different consciousness will no longer be self-luminous and will not
1:03:28–1:03:34constitute the manifestation of object and self. You will then say that the manifestation
1:03:34–1:03:40of consciousness and the manifestation of object and self are not different from consciousness
1:03:40–1:03:45but are the very nature of consciousness. If so, by the statement consciousness exists
1:03:45–1:03:51together with object and self nothing more has been said than the manifestation of consciousness
1:03:51–1:03:57exists together with the manifestation of object and self. No progress has been made in the position.
1:03:57–1:04:03Therefore what you wish to prove that the self, itself inert, is the substratum of self-luminous
1:04:03–1:04:10consciousness is not established. Nor do past and future objects coexist with the consciousness
1:04:10–1:04:16whose objects they are, although this coexistence has so far been granted for the sake of argument.
1:04:16–1:04:20You may say, cognition of rejection, acceptance.
1:04:20–1:04:27R-d-y-h-s-a-cont, 29, or indifference toward that object arises, and therefore the object
1:04:27–1:04:28coexists.
1:04:28–1:04:34Our answer is, no, because cognition of rejection and so forth, like the object consciousness
1:04:34–1:04:40itself cannot intelligibly take that past or future thing as its object. If it is said
1:04:40–1:04:46that because it produces rejection and so forth, the cognition of rejection and so forth makes
1:04:46–1:04:52the thing its object and because it produces an object directed cognition of rejection and
1:04:52–1:04:59so forth, the object consciousness likewise makes the object its object, then we ask
1:04:59–1:05:00the cause of b-
1:05:00–1:05:30विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग और चिष्चिंग भाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित
1:05:30–1:05:36the example of the learned son and his father. Nor, as the Bane and Avedyns hold, are objects
1:05:36–1:05:43themselves of the nature of luminosity. Objects are experienced as limited, long, gross, and
1:05:43–1:05:49so forth. But luminosity reveals itself as internal, neither gross nor subtle, neither
1:05:49–1:05:54short nor long. Therefore an object distinct from the self-luminous self is certainly
1:05:54–1:06:00in definable, like the second moon experienced together with the one moon. In this luminosity
1:06:00–1:06:06no difference is naturally experienced, therefore there is no obstacle to its identity with
1:06:06–1:06:12the one self, nor can the differences among indefinable objects.
1:06:12–1:06:17Udwa hsarkhant 30. Produce difference in determinate luminosity,
1:06:17–1:06:22otherwise there would be overextension. It will also be shown later that mutual
1:06:22–1:06:26difference does not enter the field of valid commission.
1:06:26–1:06:31Therefore this luminosity itself which is self-luminous, one, changeless, eternal and
1:06:31–1:06:33without parts is the inner self.
1:06:33–1:06:39That is, it is the self that cognizes as the determinate self distinct from mere indefinable
1:06:39–1:06:41body senses and so forth.
1:06:41–1:06:46The self that does not depend upon another for its illumination and is without parts
1:06:46–1:06:49cannot be an object of commission.
1:06:49–1:06:54How then can the attributes of objects such as the body and senses be superimposed upon
1:06:54–1:06:55it?
1:06:55–1:07:00In the Baasha the word how expresses the objection, such superimposition, is not reasonable.
1:07:00–1:07:02Why is it not reasonable?
1:07:02–1:07:08The answer is, everyone superimposes one object upon another object present before
1:07:08–1:07:09him.
1:07:09–1:07:14The intention is this, a thing that is illuminated independence upon another and has parts.
1:07:14–1:07:20apprehended in its general form may, because of a defect of a sense organ, fail to be apprehended
1:07:20–1:07:26in its specific form and thus appear as though different from its true nature, but the inner
1:07:26–1:07:32self does not depend upon another for its illumination. No sense organ is required to know it,
1:07:32–1:07:37whose defect could make cognition of the self defective, nor does it have parts,
1:07:37–1:07:43some of which might be apprehended and others not. It is impossible for one and the same
1:07:43–1:07:48thing at the same time to be both apprehended and unapprehended by itself. Therefore, on
1:07:48–1:07:54the doctrine of the self's self-luminosity, superimposition cannot occur, and if the self
1:07:54–1:07:57were never manifested at all, then.
1:07:57–1:08:03Udwh Sarkant 31. Superimposition could not occur because it would not be present before
1:08:03–1:08:09one, that is, immediately experienced. When a shell is not present before one, silver
1:08:09–1:08:16is not superimposed in the form this is silver. Thus superimposition is shown to be impossible both
1:08:16–1:08:22in complete apprehension and in total non-apprehension. Granted, if the conscious self were not an
1:08:22–1:08:28object, superimposition could not occur upon it, but it is the object of the notion I.
1:08:28–1:08:33Why then could superimposition not occur? The commentator answers with the words which
1:08:33–1:08:39is always outside the field of the notion you. If the conscious self were an object,
1:08:39–1:08:44the subject would be different from it, but the real subject is the conscious self itself.
1:08:44–1:08:49An object is different from it and falls within the field of the notion you.
1:08:49–1:08:54Therefore the qualification outside the field of the notion you is intended to remove the
1:08:54–1:09:00possibility that the self might be non-self and to avoid infinite regress. Consequently,
1:09:00–1:09:07The self must necessarily be called non-objective, and for this reason there is no superimposition
1:09:07–1:09:14upon it. This is the intention. The common tater answers. The answer is, it is not wholly non-objective.
1:09:14–1:09:20Why? Because it is the object of the notion I. The intention is this. It is true that the inner
1:09:20–1:09:26self, being self-luminous, is not an object and is without parts. Nevertheless, having assumed
1:09:26–1:09:31the condition of J. Leave Up, although in reality it is not limited by the properties
1:09:31–1:09:37of the particular intellect, mind, subtle, and gross body's senses, and so forth imagined
1:09:37–1:09:42by beginningless and indefinable of E. L. I. D. Y. O. It appears as though limited, though
1:09:42–1:09:47non-different, as though different, though non-agent, as though an agent.
1:09:47–1:09:53Ud-Y. H. Succont. 32. Though a non-enjoyer, as though an enjoyer, and though non-objective,
1:09:53–1:09:59as though the object of the notion I, it is like space which appears divided and possessed
1:09:59–1:10:00of diverse properties.
1:10:00–1:10:05तिस ओएग तो दिफरन्सिज अगिंटिंग आजिंट्च शच्च पोट जार अव्वेसल.
1:10:05–1:10:10When the principle of consciousness has been apprehended in the self whose nature is homogeneous
1:10:10–1:10:16consciousness, in reality nothing at all remains unapprehended, bliss, itonality,
1:10:16–1:10:21or pervasiveness, and so forth are not different from its nature as consciousness so that they
1:10:21–1:10:26might remain unapprehended when consciousness is apprehended, though all these have been
1:10:26–1:10:31apprehended with certainty because of imagined difference they appear as though not separately
1:10:31–1:10:37discriminated and are therefore called unapprehended, nor is the difference between the self and
1:10:37–1:10:43intellect and so forth real such that that difference too would necessarily be apprehended
1:10:43–1:10:49together with the apprehension of the conscious self, for intellect and so forth are indefinable
1:10:49–1:10:55and therefore their difference from the self is also indefinable and false, thus in the
1:10:55–1:10:59self-luminous and a mixed conscious self. Non-apprehension of the difference is
1:10:59–1:11:05that limit it as intellect and so forth, and the consequence superimposition of those limiting
1:11:05–1:11:12factors produce the condition of J. Diva. It is intelligible that this J. Diva participating
1:11:12–1:11:18in the nature of both not this, namely the non-objective conscious self and this, namely
1:11:18–1:11:23the inert object, should become the object of the Notion Eye. The sequence is this,
1:11:23–1:11:29in the Notion Eye, the conscious self appears as agent and enjoyer. In an indifferent
1:11:29–1:11:35self there can be no capacity to act or enjoy, and the aggregate of the activities of body
1:11:35–1:11:39and senses that is, intellect and so forth in which.
1:11:39–1:11:42R-D-Y-H-S-R-C-O-N-T 33.
1:11:42–1:11:48There is capacity to act and enjoy, lacks consciousness, therefore the conscious self,
1:11:48–1:11:53joined with the aggregate of the body as effect and the senses as instruments, acquires
1:11:53–1:11:59the capacity for agency and enjoyership. Though self-fluminess, through association with objects
1:11:59–1:12:05such as the intellect, it somehow becomes the object of the notion I, the substratum of
1:12:05–1:12:11egoity, and is called J. E. D. Vuk creature, or Noah of the field K. Shetrajna and so
1:12:11–1:12:17forth. The J. E. D. Vuk is in reality not different from the conscious self. Shruti says,
1:12:17–1:12:24its own nature, as that very J. E. V. and so forth. Therefore the J. E. D. V. though self-luminous
1:12:24–1:12:29and non-different from the conscious self, is fitted in ordinary usage by the notion
1:12:29–1:12:34I to appear as agent and enjoyer for this reason it is called the substratum of the
1:12:34–1:12:40notion I. Nor is it proper to say that there is mutual dependence here that when
1:12:40–1:12:45superimposition occurs the J. E. D. V. becomes an object and when the J. E. V.
1:12:45–1:12:51comes an object, superimposition occurs. For this process is beginningless like the relation
1:12:51–1:12:57of seed and sprout, and there is no contradiction in each subsequent superimposition having as
1:12:57–1:13:03its object that which has already been made an object by each preceding superimposition
1:13:03–1:13:07and its impression. This has already been made clear in the
1:13:07–1:13:12Barshav by the words this natural ordinary usage. Therefore the statement it is not
1:13:12–1:13:17Not wholly non-objective is entirely reasonable, though the Je-Diva, being non-different from
1:13:17–1:13:22the conscious self and self-luminous, is not an object in itself.
1:13:22–1:13:26It is an object in its form conditioned by limiting adjuncts.
1:13:26–1:13:28This is their intention.
1:13:28–1:13:31Ud-Yah-Succont 34.
1:13:31–1:13:36Granted, we do not deny superimposition on the ground that the Je-Diva is not
1:13:36–1:13:40an object because its illumination does not depend upon another.
1:13:40–1:13:45Rather, our position is that the inner self is illuminated neither by itself nor with the
1:13:45–1:13:49help of another, and therefore is not an object.
1:13:49–1:13:54How then is superimposition possible upon an inner self that is never manifested at all?
1:13:54–1:13:59The common tater answers, the experience of the inner self is immediate.
1:13:59–1:14:05Pratha is the realization of the inner self, because that realization is immediate, although
1:14:05–1:14:12in the inner self realization is not anything different from the self. The distinction suggested
1:14:12–1:14:18in the phrase realization of the self is secondary just as in the phrase consciousness of the
1:14:18–1:14:23self. The essence of the statement is this, the conscious self must necessarily be accepted
1:14:23–1:14:30as immediately experienced because if it remained a manifest all things would remain a manifest
1:14:30–1:14:32and the world would become dark.
1:14:32–1:14:34This has already been stated.
1:14:34–1:14:37Trutie 2 says to this effect, when it shines,
1:14:37–1:14:40everything shines by its light all this is illumined.
1:14:40–1:14:44Having given this real answer, the commentator,
1:14:44–1:14:46in the manner of a mature dilictician,
1:14:46–1:14:49grants for arguments sake the indirectness
1:14:49–1:14:52of the conscious self and gives another answer.
1:14:52–1:14:54And there is no such rule in this matter.
1:14:54–1:14:55And so forth.
1:14:55–1:14:57Why should there not be a rule
1:14:57–1:15:00that superimposition occurs only upon another?
1:15:00–1:15:30अब्चिक्त प्रज़न्त बफोवाश्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्�
1:15:30–1:15:35from that superimposition knowledge. In such a condition, when therefore space cannot be
1:15:35–1:15:41known by an external sense organ, nor is it known by the mind, because without the aid
1:15:41–1:15:47of a sense organ the mind does not operate with respect to external objects. Thus space
1:15:47–1:15:52is not perceived upon it children, that is, people devoid of discriminative knowledge
1:15:52–1:15:58who see merely what others point out sometimes superimpose blueness, a quality of earth,
1:15:58–1:16:03sometimes brightness, a quality of fire, and they determine it to be blue like the petal
1:16:03–1:16:07of a blue lotus or white like a row of royal swans.
1:16:07–1:16:12Here too, in the form of memory, there appears a property of light or darkness previously
1:16:12–1:16:13seen.
1:16:13–1:16:19In this way those people superimpose a surface upon space and compare it to a huge inverted
1:16:19–1:16:21bowl made of sapphire.
1:16:21–1:16:26The commentator concludes, in the same way that is, after answering all objections
1:16:26–1:16:32in the manner stated above, there is no contradiction in the superimposition upon the inner self
1:16:32–1:16:38of the non-self, namely intellect and so forth. Superimposition is of thousands of kinds why
1:16:38–1:16:45then elaborate this particular superimposition by stating objection and answer. Why not describe
1:16:45–1:16:50merely the general nature of superimposition, the commentator answers, this superimposition
1:16:50–1:16:53of the form described above.
1:16:53–1:16:59Ad-YAH Sakhont 36 When one thing is superimposed upon another,
1:16:59–1:17:04not even the slightest effect of a merit or defect arising from the form a thing falls
1:17:04–1:17:10upon the latter, it is only after the mutual superimposition of self and non-self described
1:17:10–1:17:15above which is called Avila idea that the means of knowledge, the instruments of
1:17:15–1:17:21those means, an ordinary conduct connected with them, as well as all scriptural instruction
1:17:21–1:17:27concerning injunction, prohibition, and liberation become operative.
1:17:27–1:17:33The wise call the superimposition of the form described above Aviv idea from Shruti,
1:17:33–1:17:38Asemriti, Itihasa Purana, and so forth, it is well known that Aviv idea is the seed
1:17:38–1:17:44of every evil. It will be said later that Vedanta operates for the removal of this
1:17:44–1:17:50of Ilaidea. The superimposition of the non-self upon the inner self alone is the sole cause
1:17:50–1:17:56of all evil, not the illusion of silver in a shell. Therefore this alone is called Avalidea
1:17:56–1:18:01because it cannot be destroyed in the absence of knowledge of one's own nature. For this
1:18:01–1:18:07reason, not superimposition in general but this one in particular has been described.
1:18:07–1:18:12The words of this form indicate its character as a cause of evil because it is such.
1:18:12–1:18:18It is the cause of evil, by superimposing upon the inner self, which is free from desire
1:18:18–1:18:24and so forth, the attributes of the adverse inner organ, which is inowed with desire and
1:18:24–1:18:25so forth.
1:18:25–1:18:30It makes the sorrowless inner self sorrowful, for this reason it is the cause of evil,
1:18:30–1:18:35adherents of other views to accept superimposition in this form, otherwise there would be no
1:18:35–1:18:37need to describe it.
1:18:37–1:18:41Therefore it is said, the wise hold, and so forth.
1:18:41–1:18:423.
1:18:42–1:18:49Now, for one who thinks that this beginningless, RV-ID art firmly rooted and possessed of dense
1:18:49–1:18:55impressions cannot be removed because there is no means for its removal, the means of
1:18:55–1:19:01its removal is stated thus, and the ascertainment of the nature of a thing distinct from it,
1:19:01–1:19:05that is, doubt-free knowledge of the nature of the thing is called knowledge by the
1:19:05–1:19:11wise, in the inner self, which is completely different from intellect and so forth.
1:19:11–1:19:17nature and attributes of intellect and so forth are superimposed because the difference from
1:19:17–1:19:23intellect and so forth is not apprehended when, through hearing that is, the study of Vedanta
1:19:23–1:19:29reflection and so forth, knowledge of difference arises and the non-apprehension of difference
1:19:29–1:19:35is removed, the ascertainment of the nature of the thing that sublates of Ilaidea, namely
1:19:35–1:19:41knowledge whose nature is the conscious self appears in its real form. This is the intention,
1:19:41–1:19:47granted, even after Avila idea, firmly rooted and enowed with dense impressions, has been
1:19:47–1:19:53sublated by knowledge. It may appear again owing to its impressions and may produce
1:19:53–1:19:59effects favourable to itself, such as fresh impressions. The commentator answers in such a
1:19:59–1:19:59condition.
1:20:00–1:20:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ�
1:20:30–1:20:35inner organ and so forth. The meaning is this, the very nature of repeated
1:20:35–1:20:40ascertainment of truth is such that it removes erroneous cognition endowed with
1:20:40–1:20:45beginningless, firmly rooted, dense impressions. The nature of the intellect
1:20:45–1:20:50is to incline toward truth. Adherents of other schools to say, the real nature
1:20:50–1:20:56of a thing unaffected by error is not sublated because even without effort
1:20:56–1:21:02the intellect naturally inclines toward it. In particular, the question is how could true
1:21:02–1:21:08knowledge whose nature is the conscious self, holier inward and immediate, ever be sublated
1:21:08–1:21:14by indefinable avid idea, in the statement by joining truth and falsehood, because there
1:21:14–1:21:20is no mutual discrimination. Ordinary conduct such as I am this and this is mine occurs.
1:21:20–1:21:26Ordinary conduct in the form of verbal expression was explicitly stated. The ordinary
1:21:26–1:21:31worldly conduct indicated by the word E.T. is shown in the statement after the mutual
1:21:31–1:21:38superimposition of self and non-self described above which is called Avila-i-Dian so forth.
1:21:38–1:21:40This is self-evident.
1:21:40–1:21:47Advaah Sakant 39 Again, why do means of knowledge such as perception and scriptural
1:21:47–1:21:53instructions have an Avila-i-Dia flitted person as their subject? The answer is this.
1:21:53–1:21:59It is unintelligible that a person devoid of the notions I and mine with respect to body,
1:21:59–1:22:04senses, and so forth could be the knower, therefore the operation of the means of knowledge
1:22:04–1:22:07to would be unintelligible.
1:22:07–1:22:12Ordinary conduct connected with perception and so forth is impossible without employing
1:22:12–1:22:13the senses.
1:22:13–1:22:18The operation of the senses is impossible without control, and no action can be brought
1:22:18–1:22:24about by a body upon which the nature of the self has not been superimposed. In the absence
1:22:24–1:22:30of all these, it is also unintelligible that the unattached self could be the knower.
1:22:30–1:22:35In the absence of a knower, the means of knowledge cannot operate. Therefore, means of knowledge
1:22:35–1:22:42such as perception and scriptural instruction have an avil idea afflicted person as their
1:22:42–1:22:47subject. Here the objection is raised. Then how do means of knowledge such as perception
1:22:47–1:22:53have an avil idea afflicted person as their subject. Vidya that is valid knowledge, this
1:22:53–1:22:58ascertainment of truth, how then can the means of knowledge which are instruments of that
1:22:58–1:23:04true knowledge find their locus in something afflicted by avil idea, the fruit of the means
1:23:04–1:23:09of knowledge is knowledge which is opposed to avil idea, therefore those means cannot
1:23:09–1:23:15have their locus in something afflicted by avil idea. This is their intention, what
1:23:15–1:23:20according to your statement, let perception and so forth be admitted as means of knowledge
1:23:20–1:23:26in ordinary conduct, but scripture which teaches what is beneficial to human beings is opposed
1:23:26–1:23:32to a viideo, so how can it have an viideo-flated person as its subject? For this reason the
1:23:32–1:23:36commentator says, and scriptural instruction.
1:23:36–1:23:43Advaayah Sakant, 40, the answer is, when a person is devoid of the notions I and mine
1:23:43–1:23:49with respect to the body, senses, and so forth. That is, devoid of superimposition of
1:23:49–1:23:53the nature and attributes of the self, it is unintelligible that he could be the Noah and
1:23:53–1:23:58the operation of the means of knowledge to his unintelligible. The intention is this
1:23:58–1:24:04to be the Noah means to be the agent of the act called cognition, and such agency
1:24:04–1:24:10is independence with respect to the cognitive act. This independence consists in all causal
1:24:10–1:24:15factors other than the Noah being impelled by him while he is not impelled by them.
1:24:15–1:24:21Therefore the means of knowledge, that is, the instruments of cognition, must be impelled
1:24:21–1:24:22by the Noah.
1:24:22–1:24:27No instrument can be set in motion without an act of the Noah himself.
1:24:27–1:24:33The immutable, eternal, conscious self, incapable of change, cannot by itself become active.
1:24:33–1:24:38Therefore, becoming active through superimposition of the properties of the active intellect
1:24:38–1:24:39and so forth.
1:24:39–1:24:44can control the means of knowledge. Thus the means of knowledge have their locus in a person
1:24:44–1:24:50afflicted by a vile idea, granted that the means of knowledge do not operate what loss
1:24:50–1:24:56is there to us. The commentator answers, indeed, without the employment of the senses and
1:24:56–1:25:00so forth. Ordinary conduct connected with perception and
1:25:00–1:25:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ
1:25:30–1:25:35without staffs as well. In this way the use of and so forth in the expression perception
1:25:35–1:25:41and so forth becomes intelligible. The word conduct denotes an action and requires an
1:25:41–1:25:47agent. Therefore conduct and without employing have the same agent. The syntactic connection
1:25:47–1:25:52is ordinary conduct that would occur without employment. Why should the know employ the
1:25:52–1:25:57means of knowledge? Why do the means of knowledge not operate by themselves? The
1:25:57–1:26:03The commentator answers, and the operation of the senses, that is, the operation of the
1:26:03–1:26:06means of knowledge, is impossible without control.
1:26:06–1:26:12An instrument not controlled by an agent never operates with respect to its object, otherwise
1:26:12–1:26:17cloth would be produced by the shuttle and the like without the control of a weaver.
1:26:17–1:26:20Why then should the body itself not be the controller?
1:26:20–1:26:25If this were accepted, superimposition of the self would become pointless.
1:26:25–1:26:30The answer is, no action can be brought about by a body upon which the nature of the self
1:26:30–1:26:36has not been superimposed, otherwise action would occur even in deep sleep.
1:26:36–1:26:41This is the intention, granted, just as a weave-up without superimposing his own nature
1:26:41–1:26:45upon the shuttle and the like moves them and becomes the maker of cloth.
1:26:45–1:26:51So the self, without superimposing its own nature upon body senses, and so forth,
1:26:51–1:26:53may move them and become their knower.
1:26:53–1:26:59The commentator answers, and when none of these, that is, when mutual superimposition
1:26:59–1:27:01of nature and attributes.
1:27:01–1:27:08Ad-Y-H-Saconte, 42, is present then it is unintelligible that the unattached self, which
1:27:08–1:27:14is in every way and at all times distinct from all attributes and substrata, could become
1:27:14–1:27:15a knower.
1:27:15–1:27:19A weaver and others control and move the shuttle and so forth, but the self whose
1:27:19–1:27:25selfhood has not been superimposed upon body and so forth, being and attached cannot perform
1:27:25–1:27:31any action. This is the intention, therefore the very existence of the means of knowledge
1:27:31–1:27:36necessarily rests upon superimposition. Hence the common tater says, and without
1:27:36–1:27:42knowerhood, no operation of the means of knowledge can occur, that which is independent
1:27:42–1:27:46with respect to valid knowledge, the fruit of the means of knowledge becomes the
1:27:46–1:27:52Valid knowledge is a particular modification of the inner organ directed toward the object
1:27:52–1:27:57to be known and is of the nature of consciousness present in the agent.
1:27:57–1:28:02If the conscious self were not superimposed upon the inert inner organ, how could the
1:28:02–1:28:07modification of the inert inner organ be of the nature of consciousness?
1:28:07–1:28:12Again, if the active inner organ were not superimposed upon the conscious self, how
1:28:12–1:28:16could the conscious self be the agent of this modification?
1:28:16–1:28:21Therefore, from mutual superimposition there arises the fruit called valid knowledge, which
1:28:21–1:28:24abides in the conscious self as agent.
1:28:24–1:28:30When that fruit arises, knowhood arises, with that valid knowledge as its object, the operation
1:28:30–1:28:33of the means of knowledge begins.
1:28:33–1:28:38By the use of the word knowhood, valid knowledge itself is also intended.
1:28:38–1:28:42If the fruit of the means of knowledge were not valid knowledge, the means of knowledge
1:28:42–1:28:47knowledge would not become active consequently they would not be means of knowledge at all.
1:28:47–1:28:50This is their intention. Finally the common tater says,
1:28:50–1:28:56therefore means of knowledge such as perception have only a person afflicted by avid idea
1:28:56–1:28:58as their subject.
1:28:58–1:29:03Udhsarkant 43 and there is no difference from animals
1:29:03–1:29:08and the like. Indeed when animals and the like bring their auditory sense and other
1:29:08–1:29:14senses into relation with sound and other objects. If a cognition of those sounds and
1:29:14–1:29:21so forth as unfavorable arises, they withdraw from them, and if a favorable cognition arises,
1:29:21–1:29:27they advance toward them. Seeing a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, they understand
1:29:27–1:29:33he wants to strike me and begin to run away, but seeing green grass in his hand, they go
1:29:33–1:29:39toward him. In the same way, human beings in out with cultivated intelligence, seeing fierce
1:29:39–1:29:44looking strong men shouting with raised swords in their hands, withdraw from them and approach
1:29:44–1:29:50people of the opposite disposition. Therefore, with respect to human beings, ordinary conduct
1:29:50–1:29:55concerning means of knowledge and objects of knowledge is similar to the conduct of
1:29:55–1:30:00animals. In the case of animals and the like it is well known that
1:30:00–1:30:06KONDUCT CONNECTED WITH PERCEPTION AND THE OTHER MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE ALWAYS FOLLOWS NON-DISCRIMINATION.
1:30:06–1:30:11BECAUSE THE SAME PATTERN IS OBJERVED IN THEM, IT FOLLOWS THAT EVEN IN THE CASE OF LEARNED PERSONS,
1:30:11–1:30:17KONDUCT CONNECTED WITH PERCEPTION AND THE LIKE IS AT THAT VERY MOMENT OF THE SAME KIND.
1:30:17–1:30:21UD YAH SAKKONT 44. GRANTED.
1:30:21–1:30:26LET THIS BE SO IN THE CASE OF IGNORANT PEOPLE, BUT EVEN IN THOSE WHO HAVE UNDERSTOOD
1:30:26–1:30:32the true nature of the inner self as taught by Shruti and reasoning consistent with it,
1:30:32–1:30:37ordinary conduct connected with means of knowledge, the instruments of those means, and the objects
1:30:37–1:30:43known by them is observed. How then can the means of knowledge have only a person qualified
1:30:43–1:30:49by Aviv idea as their subject? The commentator answers, and there is no difference from
1:30:49–1:30:53animals and the like, though through Shruti and reasoning they know the inner self
1:30:53–1:31:00to be distinct from body senses, and so forth. In conduct concerning means and objects of
1:31:00–1:31:06knowledge they do not rise above the characteristics of living beings that merely sustain life.
1:31:06–1:31:11The actions even of such learned persons are seen to be like the actions of animals and
1:31:11–1:31:18birds, whose lack of discrimination is undisputed. Because of this similarity, at the time
1:31:18–1:31:24of ordinary conduct, Aviv idea is inferred even in the learned person. The particle and
1:31:24–1:31:29joins this reason to the one already stated. The intention is that the reasoning given
1:31:29–1:31:34above and the answer to the foregoing objection together establish that the subject of the
1:31:34–1:31:40means of knowledge is a person qualified by Aviv idea. This is analysed in the words
1:31:40–1:31:46indeed, animals and so forth. The statement when their auditory sense and so forth are
1:31:46–1:31:52related to sound and so forth illustrates perception as a means of knowledge.
1:31:52–1:31:55Cognition of sound and so forth is its fruit.
1:31:55–1:32:00The words if it is unfavorable state the fruit of inference.
1:32:00–1:32:05First the nature of the sound is cognized, then remembering the unfavorableness of that
1:32:05–1:32:07kind of sound.
1:32:07–1:32:11Unfavorableness is inferred in the perceived object belonging to that class.
1:32:11–1:32:16The example is seeing a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand and so forth.
1:32:16–1:32:19The rest of the meaning is clear.
1:32:19–1:32:26Adwai H. Succont, 45, but the situation is different with conduct connected with scriptural
1:32:26–1:32:27instruction.
1:32:27–1:32:33A reflective person does not regard himself as entitled to a scriptural right until he
1:32:33–1:32:37understands the self's relation to the next world.
1:32:37–1:32:43Nevertheless, the true Self-knowable only from Vedanta, beyond hunger and so forth, free
1:32:43–1:32:49from distinctions such as Brahmin and Kshatriya, and liberated from transmigration, is not required
1:32:49–1:32:55for eligibility, because it is of no use for eligibility and is contrary to it.
1:32:55–1:33:01No scriptural instruction that becomes operative before realization of such a nature of
1:33:01–1:33:08the Self can avoid having a person qualified by Aviv idea as its subject. For example, a
1:33:08–1:33:13statement such as a Brahmin should sacrifice becomes operative on the basis of superimposition
1:33:13–1:33:19upon the Self of distinctions of vana, ashrama, age, and so forth.
1:33:19–1:33:25Adwayah Sakant 46. Granted that means of knowledge such as perception have a person
1:33:25–1:33:31unqualified by Avil idea as their subject. But how will scripture, which gives instructions
1:33:31–1:33:37such as he who desires heaven should perform the Jaya Tishtoma sacrifice, produce activity
1:33:37–1:33:41through superimposition of the body upon the self?
1:33:41–1:33:46Here the person entitled to the right is held to be one capable of enjoying the fruit
1:33:46–1:33:51in the next world. Hence the sutra of the great Ichariyya says, the fruit of an
1:33:51–1:33:56act enjoined by scripture accrues to the person instructed, because such is the nature of
1:33:56–1:34:01the instruction, that is, the injunction known through verbal testimony.
1:34:01–1:34:07He who desires heaven should perform the gyatishtoma sacrifice, appels that person toward the
1:34:07–1:34:09act enjoined by it.
1:34:09–1:34:14The body and so forth, which will turn to ashes, are not capable of enjoying the fruit
1:34:14–1:34:16in the next world.
1:34:16–1:34:21therefore scripture by postulation assumes some eligible person distinct from body and
1:34:21–1:34:27so forth. Knowledge of that person is video. How then does scripture have a person qualified
1:34:27–1:34:33by other idea as its subject? Raising this objection, the commentator says, but in the
1:34:33–1:34:39case of conduct connected with scriptural instruction and so forth. The particle but
1:34:39–1:34:44shows the difference between scriptural conduct and ordinary conduct connected with
1:34:44–1:34:50perception and so forth. Unless the person who desires heaven is accepted as related
1:34:50–1:34:55to the next world, the scripture concerning eligibility cannot operate. Therefore scripture
1:34:55–1:35:00must by postulation assume this much alone. It need not assume
1:35:00–1:35:30विम्द पर्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम
1:35:30–1:35:35reduced by action, therefore scripture consisting of injunction and prohibition operates with
1:35:35–1:35:42respect to a person who, through beginningless avil idea has the notions of agency, enjoyership,
1:35:42–1:35:44brahminhood and so forth.
1:35:44–1:35:52Adway hsarkant, 47, in the same way vedanta 2 has only a person qualified by avil idea
1:35:52–1:35:58as its subject without the distinction among no knowledge and known comprehension of its
1:35:58–1:36:04meaning is impossible, Vedanta instructs the person qualified by Avala idea and establishes
1:36:04–1:36:11him in the very nature it teaches, in which all Avala idea is erased. Its difference from
1:36:11–1:36:16injunctive scripture is that injunction does not bring about this final establishment.
1:36:16–1:36:22Thus it is established that scripture has only a person qualified by Avala idea as
1:36:22–1:36:29its subject. Granted, because the person taught in the UPUH Nyshads is contrary to and useless
1:36:29–1:36:34for eligibility, heed is not required for eligibility, but in the prescribed course
1:36:34–1:36:40of study heed is known from the UPUH Nyshads, and that knowledge may obstruct the path of
1:36:40–1:36:46eligibility. Then, because the meaning of one part of the Vedda destroys the meaning
1:36:46–1:36:51of another part, the entire Vedda would lose its status as a means of knowledge.
1:36:51–1:36:58commentator answers, and any scriptural instruction that becomes operative before realization of
1:36:58–1:37:04such a nature of the self and so forth. Knowledge of the person taught in the Upayush Nishads
1:37:04–1:37:10is indeed opposed to eligibility but before that knowledge arises. The injunction to
1:37:10–1:37:15action produces the appropriate ordinary conduct, and Brahma knowledge that has not yet
1:37:15–1:37:20is and cannot sublate it. If their relation is taken to be with different persons, one
1:37:20–1:37:26qualified by knowledge and the other by abhidhi, the other difference in their respective fields
1:37:26–1:37:32becomes intelligible, therefore they do not mutually sublate one another. For example,
1:37:32–1:37:37although from the standpoint of duty there is the prohibition do not injure any living
1:37:37–1:37:42being, a scriptural instruction such as one who wishes to kill his enemy by an
1:37:42–1:37:48a Pichara right should perform, the Shayena sacrifice is not sublated by do not commit
1:37:48–1:37:53violence. The reason is the difference in the person addressed. One who has conquered
1:37:53–1:37:58the enemy called Anger is entitled to the prohibition, but one who remains under the
1:37:58–1:38:04control of that enemy called Anger is entitled to the instruction concerning the Shayena
1:38:04–1:38:06and the like.
1:38:06–1:38:13I have already said that superimposition is cognition of a thing in a form in which it
1:38:13–1:38:15does not actually exist.
1:38:15–1:38:21When a son, wife, and so forth are well or unwell, a person superimposes upon himself
1:38:21–1:38:27the property of the external object and says, I myself am well, I myself am unwell.
1:38:27–1:38:33Likewise, by superimposing properties of the body he says, I am fat, I am thin,
1:38:33–1:38:37I am fair, I am standing, I am going, I am jumping.
1:38:37–1:38:40I superimpose properties of the senses, he says.
1:38:40–1:38:46I am mute, I am one-eyed, I am impotent, I am deaf, I am blind.
1:38:46–1:38:51In the same way he superimposes upon himself the properties of the inner organs such as
1:38:51–1:38:54desire, resolve, doubt and determination.
1:38:54–1:38:59Thus he superimposes upon the inner self, the witness of all his activities, the
1:38:59–1:39:05inner organ denoted by the Notion I, and then in the reverse direction Superimposes the
1:39:05–1:39:11inner self, witness of all, upon the inner organ and so forth. The meaning of the answer
1:39:11–1:39:16because of the difference in the person addressed has been made clear above, by the words in
1:39:16–1:39:22this way. It is again made clear that the subject of scripture is a person qualified
1:39:22–1:39:28by Avila idea, superimposition of Vana, a king should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice
1:39:28–1:39:33and so forth, superimposition of a shrama. A householder should marry a woman of the same
1:39:33–1:39:39vana, and so forth, superimposition of age. One whose hair is black should tend to sacred
1:39:39–1:39:45fire, and so forth, superimposition of condition. One whose disease is incurable should enter
1:39:45–1:39:51the water and abandon life, and so forth. The word and so forth includes a mixture
1:39:51–1:39:58of vana, major sins, secondary sins, and other such superimpositions that produce disqualification
1:39:58–1:39:59or impurity.
1:40:00–1:40:06Having thus described the mutual superimposition of self and non-self through objection and answer,
1:40:06–1:40:11and having confirmed it by an examination of means and objects of knowledge,
1:40:11–1:40:17the commentator again recalls its previously stated nature so that its character as the cause of evil
1:40:17–1:40:22may be discussed in detail, I have already said that superimposition.
1:40:22–1:40:26Ad-Y-H-Saconte 49.
1:40:26–1:40:31Superimposition is cognition of a thing in a form in which it is not is a concise statement
1:40:31–1:40:38of what was said earlier, the appearance elsewhere, in a form resembling memory of something previously
1:40:38–1:40:39seen.
1:40:39–1:40:43Here the superimposition of I, the nature of the substratum, cannot become a cause
1:40:43–1:40:49of evil until it produces the superimposition of mine, the nature of an attribute.
1:40:49–1:40:55the superimposition of an attribute the sense of mine is the direct cause of all the evils
1:40:55–1:41:02of the cycle of transmigration. This is elaborated by the words son, wife, and so forth. Having
1:41:02–1:41:07superimposed identity with the body upon the self, and then having superimposed upon
1:41:07–1:41:13that body the property of ownership regarding son, wife, and so forth, a person, just
1:41:13–1:41:18as in the superimposition of bodily qualities such as fatness says, I myself am well,
1:41:18–1:41:25myself am unwell when property is intact. Ownership is intact and the owner regards himself as complete
1:41:25–1:41:32when property is lacking. Ownership is incomplete and the owner regards himself as incomplete.
1:41:32–1:41:37Through ownership a person superimposes upon the self external properties such as the well-being
1:41:37–1:41:43or ill-being that attach to the body. This is their intention. If this is the case
1:41:43–1:41:47with an externally conditioned property such as ownership, what need is there to
1:41:47–1:41:53speak of bodily properties such as thinness which do not depend upon an external adjunct.
1:41:53–1:41:59For this reason the common tater says, likewise, the properties of the body and so forth.
1:41:59–1:42:01Advaith Sarkant.
1:42:01–1:42:0250.
1:42:02–1:42:07The nature of the self is superimposed upon the senses which are more inward than the
1:42:07–1:42:08body.
1:42:08–1:42:13A person then superimposes upon the self such properties of those senses as deafness.
1:42:13–1:42:19The nature of the self is superimposed upon the inner organ, which is still more inward.
1:42:19–1:42:25He then superimposes upon the self properties of that inner organ such as desire and resolve.
1:42:25–1:42:27This is the syntactic connection.
1:42:27–1:42:33After describing the superimposition of attributes, the commentator states its basis, the superimposition
1:42:33–1:42:39of the substratum in the words thus superimposing that which is denoted by the notion I and
1:42:39–1:42:41so forth.
1:42:41–1:42:47in which a modification of the form arises. Namely the inner organ is what is denoted
1:42:47–1:42:53by the Notion Eye. That inner organ is superimposed upon the inner self by reason of its consciousness
1:42:53–1:42:59and indifference. The inner self is the witness of all modifications of the inner organ.
1:42:59–1:43:05Thus agency and enjoyership have been explained. Consciousness is explained by the words
1:43:05–1:43:11in the reverse direction. The inner organ and so forth are inert. Consciousness is the opposite
1:43:11–1:43:17of that. Through that consciousness, that is, in this manner, he superimposes the inner self,
1:43:17–1:43:23witness of all, upon me inner organ and so forth. The intention here is this. The J.E.D.
1:43:23–1:43:29Vaid is consciousness delimited by the inner organ and so forth. A mixture of this and not this.
1:43:29–1:43:35It is the agent and enjoyer, the locus of both kinds of Avila idea as effect and cause,
1:43:35–1:43:42the substratum of egoity, the transmigrating being, the receptacle of the entire mass of suffering,
1:43:42–1:43:49and the material cause of mutual superimposition. Its material cause in turn is superimposition
1:43:49–1:43:55itself. Therefore, like seed and sprout, this process is beginningless, and there is no defect
1:43:55–1:43:57of mutual dependence here.
1:43:57–1:44:04Udwa Hsakont, 51, thus this beginningless, endless and natural superimposition whose
1:44:04–1:44:11nature is erroneous cognition and which produces agency, enjoyership and so forth, is directly
1:44:11–1:44:14experienced by everyone.
1:44:14–1:44:19The whole of Vedanta begins for the removal of this cause of evil and for the attainment
1:44:19–1:44:22of knowledge of the oneness of the self.
1:44:22–1:44:29How this is the purport of the entire Vedanta will be shown by us in this Shari-Yiraka-Mimamsa.
1:44:29–1:44:32Adva-I-Hsakkant 52.
1:44:32–1:44:37After confirming superimposition by examining means and objects of knowledge, the commentator
1:44:37–1:44:43for the benefit of the student states its nature again and makes it still firm up because
1:44:43–1:44:49everyone experiences it, thus this beginningless and endless and so forth.
1:44:49–1:44:53Endless means that it is not destroyed in the absence of valid knowledge.
1:44:53–1:44:57Because it is beginningless and endless it is called natural.
1:44:57–1:44:59Whose nature is erroneous cognition?
1:45:00–1:45:09Nature of Erroneous Commission is Indefinability, what possesses that nature is referred to here, namely, superimposition is Indefinable.
1:45:09–1:45:18The explanation of in the reverse direction has also made clear that the inner organ and so forth are inert and that consciousness is their opposite.
1:45:18–1:45:24Through that consciousness the inner self is superimposed upon the inner organ and so forth.
1:45:24–1:45:30The common tater concludes the topic, for the removal of this cause of evil and so forth.
1:45:30–1:45:33How can it be removed in the absence of opposed commission?
1:45:33–1:45:38The answer is for the attainment of knowledge of the oneness of the self.
1:45:38–1:45:40Attainment means realisation.
1:45:40–1:45:45The purpose is not merely manta-ricitation or performance of ritual action.
1:45:45–1:45:50The oneness of the self is its complete non-association with the entire world while
1:45:50–1:45:56beating of the nature of bliss Vedantap which unfailingly produces this realization, destroys
1:45:56–1:46:02superimposition at its root. The intention is this, if the notion I concerning the self
1:46:02–1:46:08were valid, the self would already be known and inquiry into Brahman would be fruitless,
1:46:08–1:46:13consequently no desire to know Brahman would arise. In the absence of that desire, there
1:46:13–1:46:18would be no study of Vedantap for the sake of Brahman knowledge, it would merely
1:46:18–1:46:24be used incidentally for mantra-acitation. Then the Upanishadic conception concerning
1:46:24–1:46:29the self would not acquire the status of a means of knowledge. Such an invalid conception,
1:46:29–1:46:35however often repeated, could not remove the real agency, in joyouship, and so forth of
1:46:35–1:46:42the self. In truth, valid knowledge removes an attributed form, not a real nature.
1:46:42–1:46:49Udwh Succont 53. And false cognition cannot remove a real nature. Even the continuous
1:46:49–1:46:55cognition of a rope as a snake thousands of times cannot sublate the rope's nature as a rope.
1:46:55–1:47:01But a form produced by erroneous cognition is sublated by valid cognition. And even though
1:47:01–1:47:06the impression of erroneous cognition may be very strong, it is destroyed by the
1:47:06–1:47:11impression produced through concentrated, uninterrupted and long-continued repetition
1:47:11–1:47:18of valid cognition. Granted, in Vedanta too, instructions concerning meditations on Prana
1:47:18–1:47:24and the like are seen in many places. How then can the sole purport of all Vedanta sentences
1:47:24–1:47:29be the teaching of the oneness of the Self? The commentator answers in the words, the
1:47:29–1:47:35purport of the whole of Vedanta lies in this and so forth. The body itself is called
1:47:35–1:47:41Sharaqa, the one dwelling in it. The Sharaqa is the individual self. What is referred to here
1:47:41–1:47:48is the inquiry whose purpose is to show that the nature of the self indicated by the word T-Vam
1:47:48–1:47:54in the sentence Tat, T-Vamasi is precisely the nature of the Supreme Self indicated by the word
1:47:54–1:48:02Tat. Udh-Hsukhant, 54, the substance of what is intended here is as follows.
1:48:02–1:48:081. The injunction to study one's own Vedic branch commands study of the entire Vedda up to the
1:48:08–1:48:14fruitful comprehension of its meaning, therefore just as ritual injunctions and prohibitions
1:48:14–1:48:21indicated by the expression one's own Vedic branch. Vedanta 2 is an object of study for producing
1:48:21–1:48:26fruitful knowledge of its meaning. 2. According to the principle that the meaning of a sentence
1:48:26–1:48:32is not separate from the meaning found in ordinary usage. The power of Vedanta to convey meaning,
1:48:32–1:48:39like that of mantras, is admitted everywhere. Free Vedanta produces knowledge of the One in a self,
1:48:39–1:48:45unrelated to the world, a homogeneous mass of consciousness and bliss, free from agency and
1:48:45–1:48:51enjoyorship. Nevertheless, this Vedanta conflicts with the notion, I a notion, that appears
1:48:51–1:48:57doubtless and unsublated and apprehends the self as endowed with agency, in joyouship,
1:48:57–1:49:02suffering, grief, and delusion. Because of this, Vedanta would have to depart from its
1:49:02–1:49:08direct literal meaning and yield only a figurative meaning, or remain merely an instrument for
1:49:08–1:49:14mantricitation. Then its meaning would differ from the meaning it intends to declare.
1:49:14–1:49:18Consequently, there would be no need to begin the four chapters. Shari-yirakam
1:49:18–1:49:22imamsa whose purpose is inquiry into its meaning.
1:49:22–1:49:28Ad-YAH Sakhonth 55 If it is held that the self directly present
1:49:28–1:49:33in every person's experience of I is not doubtful and that knowledge of it yields
1:49:33–1:49:37no fruit, then no inquiry would begin from a desire to know it.
1:49:37–1:49:39This is the poor vapaksha.
1:49:39–1:49:41The Siddhi hantai is this.
1:49:41–1:49:45If the notion I were valid, the foregoing objection would be proper.
1:49:45–1:49:51this notion cannot sublate scriptural statements, and neither scripture nor the entire tradition
1:49:51–1:49:57of acharyas regards it as valid. Therefore it is superimposed. The purport of Vedaantai
1:49:57–1:50:00is not a meaning different from what it declared.
1:50:00–1:50:30नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, बआषाक साहित्य, नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब �
1:50:30–1:50:35The desire to know Brahman by the expression desire to know, the common tater indicates the
1:50:35–1:50:42existence of both doubt and fruit. Here knowledge of Brahman is explicitly called the fruit because
1:50:42–1:50:48it is directly the object of desire. Unlike ritual action that follows knowledge of a right
1:50:48–1:50:53and the result of the action, no other thing following Brahman knowledge is the principal
1:50:53–1:51:00fruit. Brahma knowledge, free from every doubt, is itself the supreme fruit. It is the end of all
1:51:00–1:51:05suffering and is of the nature of homogeneous bliss. The object of this knowledge taught by
1:51:05–1:51:12Vedanta is known through the method of reasoning called Brahma-Mimamsa. A competent inquirer proceeds
1:51:12–1:51:18toward this goal with greatest certainty. Although that goal is already attained because of
1:51:18–1:51:22of beginningless Avila idea it appears as though unattained and becomes an object of
1:51:22–1:51:28desire, just as a person who fails to notice a necklace already hanging around his own neck
1:51:28–1:51:35regards it as absent and when another person points it out obtains it although the necklace
1:51:35–1:51:39was already possessed so too is Brahma knowledge attained.
1:51:39–1:51:46Advayah Sakkant 56 In this sutra the word Atha is taken to mean immediately Atha,
1:51:46–1:51:51let there be the beginning because the desire to know Brahman is not itself something that
1:51:51–1:51:58can be initiated. The desire to know arises from doubt and therefore indicates doubt as
1:51:58–1:52:04its cause. Doubt makes the beginning of inquiry meaningful because it indicates both the cause
1:52:04–1:52:10that impels a competent inquirer to undertake this scriptural inquiry doubt and the fruit.
1:52:10–1:52:14It is proper that the sutra be placed at the very beginning of the treatise.
1:52:14–1:52:21For this reason the revered commentator says, this is the first sutra of the Vedanta inquiry
1:52:21–1:52:28whose exposition is proposed. The word Mimamsa denotes inquiry worthy of respect. This inquiry is
1:52:28–1:52:34worthy of respect because its fruit is ascertainment of an exceedingly subtle meaning which becomes the
1:52:34–1:52:40cause of the highest human end. A Mimamsa Shastra is a treatise that teaches this inquiry. It
1:52:40–1:52:46is called Shastra because by it this inquiry is taught or correctly expounded to students.
1:52:46–1:52:53A sutra is a statement which, though composed with few syllables and few words, indicates much
1:52:53–1:53:00meaning and is full of substance. After explaining the purport of the sutra in this way, the commentator
1:53:00–1:53:05explains the first word, affa. Here the word affa is understood in the sense of immediate
1:53:05–1:53:09succession. The syntactic connection is that the word
1:53:09–1:53:14atha occurring among the words of the sutra conveys the sense of immediate succession.
1:53:14–1:53:19The meaning or suspiciousness has no grammatical connection with the meaning of the sentence.
1:53:19–1:53:25In fact, when the word atha is used in another sense, it can produce auspiciousness by
1:53:25–1:53:29its mere sound. Reference to a preceding topic is, in
1:53:29–1:53:34effect, not different from immediate succession, when the meaning immediately after it
1:53:34–1:53:41accepted. Then, just as the desire to know Dihama is necessarily connected with the preceding
1:53:41–1:53:46act of study of one's Vedha, some preceding cause must likewise be accepted for the desire
1:53:46–1:53:52to know Brahman. Immediate succession to the study of one's own Vedic branches common
1:53:52–1:53:57to both the inquiry into Dihama and the inquiry into Brahman.
1:53:57–1:53:58Why?
1:53:58–1:53:5957.
1:53:59–1:54:01Now a question arises.
1:54:01–1:54:05The word atha is also seen in the sense of beginning.
1:54:05–1:54:11For example, in the Vedat atha toryam jayatishtama that is, now this jayatishtama begins and
1:54:11–1:54:16in ordinary usage, atha shabhanusha sanam wa atha yoganusha sanam that is, now the
1:54:16–1:54:20science of words or the science of yoga begins.
1:54:20–1:54:23Why then should atha not be understood here in the sense of beginning?
1:54:23–1:54:26The answer is not in the sense of beginning.
1:54:26–1:54:32Why? Because the desire to know Brahman is not a thing that can be initiated. In the
1:54:32–1:54:38wording of this sutra, desire to know appears as more prominent than Brahman or Brahman knowledge,
1:54:38–1:54:43nor can it be said that, just as in the sentence the staff bearer recites the permission
1:54:43–1:54:49and responds the staff, though subordinate, is intended so here Brahman and Brahman knowledge,
1:54:49–1:54:54though subordinate may be intended, for here the desire to know, by indicating
1:54:54–1:54:59Doubt and Fruit, assists the scripturally prescribed activity in the form of inquiry.
1:55:00–1:55:01निद ब्रामन अछि।
1:55:01–1:55:02अछि।
1:55:02–1:55:03निद ब्रामन अछि।
1:55:03–1:55:08not intended doubt and fruit would not be intended i that consequently a discriminating
1:55:08–1:55:13inquirer would not inquire into something pointless, like examining the teeth of an
1:55:13–1:55:18arrow. Brahman and Brahman knowledge could then not be the subject matter and fruit of
1:55:18–1:55:24the treatise. In near absence of superimposition upon a subject contrary to the notion i,
1:55:24–1:55:30the status of Vedanta as a means of knowledge would also become unintelligible, a figurative
1:55:30–1:55:36meaning that impels one toward action or a meaning useful in mantra recitation like
1:55:36–1:55:42the syllable hum can remain dependent upon the injunction to study one's Vedic branch,
1:55:42–1:55:46therefore the prominence of the desire to know which indicates doubt and fruit through
1:55:46–1:55:51both the word and the complete sentence is intended.
1:55:51–1:55:54Advaayah Sakkant 58.
1:55:54–1:55:58Nor can the word Jainasabith understood in the sense to be begun so that the
1:55:58–1:56:03neighbouring word atha might also indicate a beginning, because in every section the
1:56:03–1:56:08beginning of the desire to know is not itself the topic to be examined. The knowledge of
1:56:08–1:56:14Brahman that qualifies the desire to know might be regarded as something that can be
1:56:14–1:56:19begun, but even that is not connected with the word atha because Brahman knowledge is
1:56:19–1:56:24not principle here. Desire to know and inquiry are not one and the same thing, so that
1:56:24–1:56:29beginning of inquiry could be understood as in the beginning of the Yogashastra. The word
1:56:29–1:56:35mimamsa is derived from the root man in the sense of inquiry, whereas the word jenasa means
1:56:35–1:56:41desire to know. The desire to know impels a person toward inquiry. The impeller and that
1:56:41–1:56:46into which one is impelled cannot be won. If they were won, the relation of mover and moved
1:56:46–1:56:52would be unintelligible. When a word's own meaning is appropriate, imagining another meaning
1:56:52–1:56:57meaning would also be an improper extension. Therefore the statement is proper because
1:56:57–1:57:01the desire to know Brahman is not a thing that can be initiated.
1:57:01–1:57:07Ad-YAH Sarkant 59 Why, then, should the meaning of the word
1:57:07–1:57:13athenaught be auspiciousness? The sutra would then mean because it produces auspiciousness.
1:57:13–1:57:19The desire to know Brahman should be undertaken daily. The answer is the meaning auspiciousness
1:57:19–1:57:24has no grammatical connection with the meaning of the sentence. Only that meaning of a word
1:57:24–1:57:29becomes a constituent of the sentence meaning which has a grammatical relation to it. Such
1:57:29–1:57:35a meaning is either explicitly stated or implied. Here auspiciousness is neither the explicit
1:57:35–1:57:41nor the implied meaning of affa. It is merely an effect produced by hearing the sound
1:57:41–1:57:47of the word, just as by hearing the sound of a drum or conch. In verbal usage,
1:57:47–1:57:52effect produced or recalled by the sound of a word is not seen to have a grammatical
1:57:52–1:57:57connection with the meaning of the sentence. Objection. Here and elsewhere the word atha
1:57:57–1:58:03indicates auspiciousness. As Semri Ti Tu says, Om and atha these two words first emerged
1:58:03–1:58:08from the throat of Brahmat, therefore both are auspicious. Answer when the word atha
1:58:08–1:58:14is used in another sense, it produces auspiciousness by its mere sound. Atha used in the
1:58:14–1:58:20sense of immediate succession and so forth also produces auspiciousness merely through
1:58:20–1:58:26its sound, like the sound of a flute or veener, or like the sight of a water-filled pitcher
1:58:26–1:58:30brought for some other purpose. Therefore there is no conflict with the statement of
1:58:30–1:58:36SM Riti. Even while retaining the meaning of immediate succession, auspiciousness
1:58:36–1:58:41is obtained merely by hearing the sound. This is their intention.
1:58:41–1:58:44Udh Sakhont 60. Granted.
1:58:44–1:58:50Even without conveying the meaning of immediate succession, the word affa may depend upon some
1:58:50–1:58:56preceding cause. Understand this as follows. Is the word affa used in the sense of immediate
1:58:56–1:59:02succession or in the sense of beginning? In this interrogative sentence the second affa
1:59:02–1:59:07presents the second alternative after the first alternative has been stated. Here the
1:59:07–1:59:13second occurrence of atha does not mean immediately atha because the statement of the opponent
1:59:13–1:59:20intervenes between the first atha and the second. Nevertheless, it depends upon the topic previously
1:59:20–1:59:25stated. If there were no dependence, the subject of the question would become different
1:59:25–1:59:30from the first subject and the framing of an alternative would be impossible. No one
1:59:30–1:59:36asks, is the self eternal or is the intellect impermanent? Therefore, even if the meaning
1:59:36–1:59:41immediately after is not accepted, why should the word after not depend upon a preceding
1:59:41–1:59:42topic?
1:59:42–1:59:48The answer is, reference to a preceding topic is, in effect, not different from immediate
1:59:48–1:59:49succession.
1:59:49–1:59:54The intention is this, we do not insist on the meaning immediately after merely for
1:59:54–1:59:59the sake of temporal proximity, our purpose is to ascertain a preceding cause that becomes
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2:00:00–2:00:30तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो �
2:00:30–2:00:31is proper.
2:00:31–2:00:34UD-YH SACCANT 61.
2:00:34–2:00:39Granted that the meaning is immediately after what is thereby established, the answer is
2:00:39–2:00:45when the meaning is immediately after immediate succession must be succession after some definite
2:00:45–2:00:49thing simply saying after is not enough.
2:00:49–2:00:54After doing something a person necessarily does something else but mere succession is
2:00:54–2:00:59seen to yield neither a perceptible benefit nor an unseen benefit.
2:00:59–2:01:05One must identify a thing immediately after which the desire to know Brahman occurs, such
2:01:05–2:01:11that in its absence that desire does not arise and in its presence it necessarily arises.
2:01:11–2:01:16This is stated in the words some preceding thing with which the desire to know Brahman
2:01:16–2:01:18is necessarily connected.
2:01:18–2:01:21Advaishsakant 62.
2:01:21–2:01:27Granted, like the desire to know Dihama, the desire to know Brahman too arises immediately
2:01:27–2:01:34after study of one's own Vedic branch because Brahman, like Dihama, is known only through
2:01:34–2:01:39scripture. When scripture is not known, knowledge of its own subject, Dihama and Brahman does
2:01:39–2:01:45not arise and because of the injunction to study, a person should study his own Vedic
2:01:45–2:01:51branch. Knowledge of scripture necessarily occurs. Therefore, even in the case of inquiry
2:01:51–2:01:58into Brahman. The word Athamins only immediate succession to Vedic study. The commentator says,
2:01:58–2:02:04immediate succession to the study of one's own Vedda is common to both the desire to know Dihama
2:02:04–2:02:10and the desire to know Brahman. Here, by one's own Vedda, the subject matter of the Vedda is
2:02:10–2:02:17intended and study of that subject matter is implicitly understood. This succession also follows
2:02:17–2:02:22from the first sutra, Atharthodharma Jnasa. There would be no need to begin the present
2:02:22–2:02:28sutra separately because the word Dihama used in that sutra indicates the meaning of
2:02:28–2:02:33the entire Vedda and Brahman too. Like Dihama there's a meaning of the Vedda. Therefor
2:02:33–2:02:39succession to Vedic study applies equally to both. This is the intention. Now an
2:02:39–2:02:43objection arises. What distinction does the desire to know Brahman have here in
2:02:43–2:02:49In comparison with the desire to know Dihama, the answer is immediate succession specifically
2:02:49–2:02:52to knowledge of ritual action.
2:02:52–2:02:57Note because the desire to know Brahman is possible in a person who has studied Vedanta
2:02:57–2:03:00even before the desire to know Dihama.
2:03:00–2:03:05In the context of cutting the knot of the heart and the like, a rule of immediate sequence
2:03:05–2:03:10is indeed present because their unordered sequence is intended to be taught but here
2:03:10–2:03:13no such sequence is intended.
2:03:13–2:03:18There is no evidence of a subordinate principle relation between Inquiry into Diharmat and
2:03:18–2:03:26Inquiry into Brahman, nor of a renewed relation of eligibility in one who is already eligible.
2:03:26–2:03:31Ad-Yah Sakant 63 The meaning is this, the distinction of
2:03:31–2:03:36the desire to know Brahman, in comparison with the desire to know Diharmat consists
2:03:36–2:03:41in its occurring immediately after knowledge of ritual action, in statements such as
2:03:41–2:03:47they desire to know through sacrifice. The explicit use of the instrumental case connects
2:03:47–2:03:53sacrifice and the like as auxiliaries to Brahma knowledge. For the principal object of desire
2:03:53–2:03:58is knowledge alone. What is not principal must be related to the principal thing. But even
2:03:58–2:04:03here sacrifice and the like are not auxiliaries to the production of knowledge of the sentence
2:04:03–2:04:10meaning because the sentence itself produces that knowledge. Nor is it reasonable that a sentence
2:04:10–2:04:15should require the assistance of action. A person who knows the relation between words
2:04:15–2:04:22and their meanings understands the true nature of the principles governing the use of sounds,
2:04:22–2:04:27remembers the relations of subordinate and principle earlier and later among things,
2:04:27–2:04:33and the requirements of expectancy, proximity and semantic fitness obtains an obstructed
2:04:33–2:04:38knowledge of the sentence meaning even without performing any action. If such knowledge
2:04:38–2:04:43knowledge did not arise, knowledge of the meaning of injunctive and prohibitive sentences
2:04:43–2:04:48would also not arise consequently performance and abstention which are the meanings of those
2:04:48–2:04:53sentences would fail. If performance and abstention are held to arise from knowledge
2:04:53–2:04:59of them, there would be mutual dependence when there is knowledge, performance and abstention
2:04:59–2:05:00according to the
2:05:00–2:05:06Sentence meaning occur, and from that performance and abstention knowledge of it again arises,
2:05:06–2:05:12nor can it be maintained that only Vedanta sentences depend upon action for making their meaning
2:05:12–2:05:18understood while other sentences do not because there is no special reason for such a distinction.
2:05:18–2:05:24Ad-YAH Succont 64 Now a person whose intellect is initially
2:05:24–2:05:29impure cannot immediately comprehend the validity of the identity taught by the sentence Tat
2:05:29–2:05:36Tivam-a-Seed but when the Jeeva denoted by Tivam whose nature is that of agent and enjoyer
2:05:36–2:05:42and the Supreme Self denoted by Tat which is eternally pure conscious and unattached
2:05:42–2:05:47because incompatibility in the literal meanings of the two words appears certain but one
2:05:47–2:05:53whose impurities of the inner organ have been diminished by sacrifice, gift, austerity,
2:05:53–2:05:57fasting, and the like, and who possesses faith will understand the compatibility of
2:05:57–2:06:03tat and tivam and know their identity. If this is said, we'll ask, is the ascertainment
2:06:03–2:06:08of the compatibility that is a cause of valid cognition itself produced by action
2:06:08–2:06:13which is not a means of knowledge, or is action, in addition to perception and
2:06:13–2:06:19other means, also a means of knowledge. If compatibility is ascertained through reasoning
2:06:19–2:06:25that does not conflict with Vedanta and is based upon Vedanta, action is unnecessary.
2:06:25–2:06:30Therefore, by hearing tat, tivamasi and similar statements, one obtains the knowledge that
2:06:30–2:06:36the nature of the jediva is the nature of the supreme self. Having strengthened that
2:06:36–2:06:41knowledge by reasoning consistent with it, one then realises Brahman by long, uninterrupted
2:06:41–2:06:47contemplation of the truth, that is, by Nidhadiya Suhna.
2:06:47–2:06:52Sacrifice and the like assist this Nidhadiya Suhna, as it has been said, discipline of mind
2:06:52–2:06:59practiced for a long time, continuously and with reverence, acquires a firm foundation,
2:06:59–2:07:05celibacy, austerity, faith, sacrifice, and so forth constitute that reverence.
2:07:05–2:07:09For this reason scripture says, having known that one, the learned Brahmin should
2:07:09–2:07:14practice wisdom. After knowing through verbal testimony and reasoning one should engage
2:07:14–2:07:17in nided dire SUHNAR.
2:07:17–2:07:24R-Y-H Sarkant 65 Some hold here that sacrifice and the like merely destroy the impurities of
2:07:24–2:07:31the inner organ, which are enemies of liberation. This alone is their utility. Others hold that
2:07:31–2:07:37they purify the aspirant, a person purified by sacrifice and the like, through devotional
2:07:37–2:07:43and long continued uninterrupted contemplation of Brahman, approves all impressions of beginningless
2:07:43–2:07:48of ill-id, consequently the inner self becomes stainless, pure and luminous. Hence,
2:07:48–2:07:55SM Riti says, through Brahmiyajna, Divyajna, Pitriyajna and the other great sacrifices and
2:07:55–2:08:01sacrifices generally, a person produces fitness for the attainment of Brahman and one in whom
2:08:01–2:08:07these 48 purificatories and scars have been completed. Others say that action aids Brahman
2:08:07–2:08:13knowledge by discharging the three debts. SM Riti says, having discharged the three debts,
2:08:13–2:08:19a person should fix his mind on liberation. Still others hold that although various actions
2:08:19–2:08:24are enjoined for their own respective fruits, because of statements such as Brahman's desire
2:08:24–2:08:30to know it through Vedic study, sacrifice, and so forth, they assist contemplation of
2:08:30–2:08:35Brahman through a relation of conjunctive separateness. Just as Kādhīra would while
2:08:35–2:08:42serving the purpose of a sacrifice as a sacrificial post also produces virility in the sacrifice
2:08:42–2:08:48up because the rule is, when one thing serves two purposes, the relation is called conjunctive
2:08:48–2:08:49separateness.
2:08:49–2:08:56Adwaya hsākānt, 66. For this very reason there is also the sutra of the great sage
2:08:56–2:09:02Badawayana because of scriptural statements concerning sacrifice and the like, all are
2:09:02–2:09:08required for contemplation of Brahman as in the case of a horse. Here the word all indicates
2:09:08–2:09:13sacrifice, gift, austerity and so forth. The meaning is that all these are required
2:09:13–2:09:19for contemplation of Brahman, therefore whether one takes authoritative scripture or the
2:09:19–2:09:25sutra of the great sage, in every case only contemplation of Brahman joined with sacrifice
2:09:25–2:09:31and the like and are now with the three qualities of devotion, long duration and uninterruptedness
2:09:31–2:09:37is capable of destroying beginningless avil idea and its impressions and producing realization
2:09:37–2:09:43of Brahman, that is, liberation. For this purpose the performance of action is necessary,
2:09:43–2:09:49but performance of these actions is impossible without knowledge of their many distinctions,
2:09:49–2:09:53their seen and unseen fruits, the relation of things connected with them as inherent
2:09:53–2:10:00or remote causes. Auxiliary rights directly prescribed are obtained by extension also.
2:10:00–2:10:30शजरी कमपनेच डान तो देर अड़ा और आद दिखण्ध क्विली परसन सब दिखण्ध राइटश नाटज नाटज नाटड़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ ना�
2:10:30–2:10:34desire to know Brahman is possible in one who has studied his Vedda.
2:10:34–2:10:39Adwaya H. Sarconte 67, the implied meaning of this statement
2:10:39–2:10:45is as follows. It is said that action is necessary for contemplation of Brahman, that
2:10:45–2:10:51is, Nididhira Suhna. The question is, in what manner is action necessary? Is it necessary
2:10:51–2:10:57for producing the fruit, just as in an Agni-rite and the Lycoccillaries such as fuel
2:10:57–2:11:03sticks are required for producing the final unseen fruit, or is action necessary for its
2:11:03–2:11:08own existence? Just as a cake split in two and the deity Agni are required, the view
2:11:08–2:11:14that action is necessary for the production of the fruit does not withstand examination.
2:11:14–2:11:20It must be accepted that contemplation of Brahman produces realization of Brahman's
2:11:20–2:11:25nature. But this realization is not a product like a lump made by kneading flour, not
2:11:25–2:11:31a modification like rice produced by pounding paddy, not a purification like the cleansing
2:11:31–2:11:36of a mortar by sprinkling, and not an acquisition like milk obtained by milking.
2:11:36–2:11:42First it is not a product. The realization of Brahman produced by contemplation is not
2:11:42–2:11:47an inert thing distinct from Brahman, like a sense born cognition of a pot distinct
2:11:47–2:11:53from the pot. Brahman is not manifested in dependence upon another light, its realization
2:11:53–2:12:00is its own eternal nature. Therefore its production is unintelligible. Any different kind of experience
2:12:00–2:12:04produced by contemplation would be doubtful like an imagined thought and therefore could
2:12:04–2:12:10not be authoritative because such thoughts produced with the aid of contemplation are
2:12:10–2:12:15often seen to be unstable. For example, if a person whose body has become numb from
2:12:15–2:12:21extreme cold while repeatedly contemplating a fire known by inference, experience is
2:12:21–2:12:28a huge blazing fire that experience does not accord with other authoritative cognition because
2:12:28–2:12:34contrary results of such experiences are widely observed in the world. Therefore the distinctive
2:12:34–2:12:40character of valid realisation is not produced by this process and action is not required
2:12:40–2:12:45for producing any fruit through contemplation. In the changeless, eternal and all-pervading
2:12:45–2:12:52Brahman contemplation can produce neither modification, purification, nor acquisition.
2:12:52–2:13:00Udhvayah Sukhant 68. Granted that realization of Brahman is not produced, but perhaps purification
2:13:00–2:13:06occurs through removal of the covering of twofold indefinable avid idea. Just as a stage
2:13:06–2:13:12jahan raises the curtain concealing a dancer and she becomes an object of direct perception
2:13:12–2:13:18for the audience. Perhaps action serves to remove the covering, but there is this difference.
2:13:18–2:13:24When the curtain is raised, the dancer becomes an object of the audience's perception. Here
2:13:24–2:13:30only the cessation of abil ideas covering is produced, nothing else, because realization
2:13:30–2:13:36of Brahman cannot be produced. Brahman's nature is eternal. Here the question arises,
2:13:36–2:13:40what is contemplation of Brahman? Is it the successive repetition of what has been
2:13:40–2:13:46understood from verbal testimony, or a continuous sequence of doubtless cognitions obtained from
2:13:46–2:13:52authoritative words. If it is repetition of what has been understood from verbal testimony,
2:13:52–2:13:59even repeated practice cannot remove original of elidea. Only ascertainment of truth and its
2:13:59–2:14:04continuous repetition destroy error and its impressions at the root, not repetition of
2:14:04–2:14:11doubt or merely repetition of general knowledge. Even if the cognition opposed to a man or some
2:14:11–2:14:16tall large object is repeated a hundred times, in the absence of specific knowledge it will
2:14:16–2:14:20not be ascertained that the object is a man.
2:14:20–2:14:25Adwai H. Sarkont 69. It has now been said that after the cognition
2:14:25–2:14:31born of hearing has revealed the J. E. Eva's real nature as the supreme self. Cognition
2:14:31–2:14:36born of reflection confirms it. Therefore a continuous sequence of doubtless cognitions
2:14:36–2:14:42based in due form upon verbal testimony, when contemplated with the assistance of action,
2:14:42–2:14:48becomes the cause of destruction of twofold avil idea. But this destruction is impossible
2:14:48–2:14:53without producing the experience of Brahman. The cessation of an error whose nature is
2:14:53–2:14:59immediate experience occurs only through immediate valid cognition, not through an indirect
2:15:00–2:15:30अछि।
2:15:30–2:15:38The experience of the Jeeva denoted by T. Vamas afflicted by suffering, grief and so forth ceases.
2:15:38–2:15:43This realization does not arise merely from verbal testimony, even when accompanied by
2:15:43–2:15:50reflection it arises from perception, because realization is the necessary fruit of perception,
2:15:50–2:15:54otherwise one would have to accept the impossible conclusion that a Bangian sprout could
2:15:54–2:15:57arise from a cut cutajah seed.
2:15:57–2:16:02Therefore it is proper that the inner organ, refined by contemplation of the doubtless meaning
2:16:02–2:16:09of the great sentences, negates the adjunct conditioned forms of the immediately experienced
2:16:09–2:16:16J.E.D.Va denoted by T.Vam and manifests its true nature as Brahman denoted by Tatt.
2:16:16–2:16:21This experience is not a production of Brahman because Brahman is not a produced thing,
2:16:21–2:16:27it is itself a particular modification of the inner organ concerning Brahman.
2:16:27–2:16:31Brahman is not illuminated by another light through that modification.
2:16:31–2:16:36Verbal testimony reveals Brahman, but Brahman does not thereby become other illuminated
2:16:36–2:16:38like the non-self.
2:16:38–2:16:43That which is free from all limiting adjuncts is called self-luminous consciousness, not
2:16:43–2:16:45an adjunct conditioned object.
2:16:45–2:16:50The commentator himself says, it is not necessarily wholly non-objective.
2:16:50–2:16:56Udvah Sarkant 70 Even at the time of realization of Brahman
2:16:56–2:17:02there is not yet complete freedom from limiting adjuncts, because the modification of the inner
2:17:02–2:17:08organ is itself a limiting adjunct, standing at the boundary where it destroys itself and
2:17:08–2:17:14other adjuncts. If the modification of the inner organ were not related to consciousness
2:17:14–2:17:20as an adjunct, the self-luminosity of an inert modification would be unintelligible,
2:17:20–2:17:25because there would be no reflection of consciousness there and the modification could not produce
2:17:25–2:17:31knowledge, nor is it unacceptable that an inferred thought or contemplation of inferred
2:17:31–2:17:37fire produces an experience of fire because there the nature of fire is indirect, whereas
2:17:37–2:17:43here the J. E. D. Vaub skewered by limiting adjuncts, whose nature is Brahman, is immediately
2:17:43–2:17:49experienced from the outset. Purity, consciousness, and the other qualities are not in reality
2:17:49–2:17:55outside the jadeiva, they are not different from it. The jadeiva free from limiting adjuncts
2:17:55–2:18:02is called Brahman, whose nature is purity, consciousness, and so forth. Freedom from limiting
2:18:02–2:18:07adjuncts to is not some other thing different from the jadeiva, just as with the aid of
2:18:07–2:18:13impressions produced by repeated practice of the science of music. The auditory sense
2:18:13–2:18:19directly experiences the distinct notes such as Shajja in different ascending and descending
2:18:19–2:18:25sequences, so through the inner organ endowed with impressions produced by repeated contemplation
2:18:25–2:18:33of the meaning of Vedanta sentences, the Jeeva directly experiences its own nature as Brahman.
2:18:33–2:18:38If it is said that the cooperation of action is required to produce the modification of the
2:18:38–2:18:44inner organ, namely realization of Brahman, the answer is no, because action does not coexist
2:18:44–2:18:51with contemplation, a person who understands without doubt from sentences such as tativamasi
2:18:51–2:18:56that he is the self distinct from the body pure conscious, an attached, a non-agent,
2:18:56–2:19:02and a non-enjoyer how can he understand himself to be eligible for action, and one who understands
2:19:02–2:19:07such eligibility how can he be the non-agent or non-eligible?
2:19:07–2:19:13R.D.Y.A.H. Sarkant. 71. It may be said, even after truth has been ascertained, behaviour
2:19:13–2:19:20produced by error continues. For example, although a person knows that sugar is sweet, one afflicted
2:19:20–2:19:26by a disorder of bile experiences it as bitter, he tastes the sugar, spits it out
2:19:26–2:19:33and rejects it. Therefore, because impressions of a v idea remain, ritual performance continues
2:19:33–2:19:39and action. Assisting knowledge destroys those impressions. It is proper to accept this,
2:19:39–2:19:45but the question is how can action, which is itself of the nature of avi idea destroy
2:19:45–2:19:51avi idea and by what will the action that destroys it itself be destroyed. Many things
2:19:51–2:19:56are seen to destroy themselves and other things of their own class. For example,
2:19:56–2:20:00Cow's milk digests itself and helps digest.
2:20:00–2:20:02अछि। नाटक पोझन दिस्ट्ट।
2:20:02–2:20:04आप नूट्रलाईजिद अछि।
2:20:04–2:20:09and powder of nomali placed in muddy water settles to the bottom together with the impurities
2:20:09–2:20:16and clears the water. In the same way, action of the nature of Avel idea removes other Avel
2:20:16–2:20:22idea and then itself ceases. In reply to this it is said, it is true that repeated
2:20:22–2:20:26hearing of the sentences beginning in the beginning, dear one, there was only beaming
2:20:26–2:20:32and ending in tat-tive amnesty, aided by inquirer Inter-Brahman, produces doubtless
2:20:32–2:20:38valid knowledge concerning the inner self distinct from the body and so forth. This inner self is
2:20:38–2:20:44not the material cause of the physical body and the like, but beginningless avidya alone is their
2:20:44–2:20:52material cause. Nevertheless, because impressions of avidya remain, the notion of transmigration and
2:20:52–2:20:57the corresponding ordinary conduct continue, but the knower understands this conduct and these
2:20:57–2:21:03notions to be false and does not place trust in them, just as a person afflicted by bile,
2:21:03–2:21:07though sugar tastes bitter to him, does not believe that bitterness to be real.
2:21:08–2:21:15Udwa H. Sarkont 72 How then can a person who knows with certainty that action, agent,
2:21:15–2:21:21instrument, injunction, and fruit all these things are unreal be qualified for action,
2:21:21–2:21:25Only one who regards all these as real is qualified.
2:21:25–2:21:30Otherwise it would be difficult to prevent animals, children, and the like from being
2:21:30–2:21:36qualified. In a section concerning ritual injunction, the person who knows the distinctions
2:21:36–2:21:42among action, agent, and so forth is called knowledgeable. For this very reason the revered
2:21:42–2:21:48commentator says that scriptural instruction has a person afflicted by avi idea as its
2:21:48–2:21:55subject, thus just as the Rajasuya is performed only by one who identifies himself with the royal
2:21:55–2:22:02class, not by one who identifies himself as Brahmin or Vaisyartha, so only a person possessing
2:22:02–2:22:08the cognition of distinction such as twice-born status, agency, action, and instrument is
2:22:08–2:22:15qualified for ritual action. One who has no notion of these distinctions has no eligibility,
2:22:15–2:22:22As in the case of a Vajipya performed by a Brahmin or Kshatriya, an unqualified person does not obtain
2:22:22–2:22:28the fruit of a Vedic right even though capable of performing it skillfully and of enjoying the fruit.
2:22:28–2:22:34Thus, in actions with perceptible fruits, attainment of the fruit is observed when capacity and
2:22:34–2:22:39commencement of action are present, but in actions with unseen fruits, the fruit is known
2:22:39–2:22:45only from scriptural instruction, and therefore the right does not apply to an unqualified
2:22:45–2:22:51person, for this reason action is not required in Nididaya Suhna.
2:22:51–2:22:53Udhya Hsarkant 73.
2:22:53–2:22:59Granted, just as the notion I am a human, beading is required for eligibility for
2:22:59–2:23:05an enjoined act, so too in the case of prohibition only one who has this notion is qualified
2:23:05–2:23:07as its subject.
2:23:07–2:23:12One who has no notion of beading human has no eligibility with respect to a prohibition,
2:23:12–2:23:19just like an animal and so forth. Consequently such a person, even if he performs a prohibited
2:23:19–2:23:25act would not be more sinful than a low animal, this would violate scripture. The answer is
2:23:25–2:23:30no. A person who has attained realization in the present life is not completely free
2:23:30–2:23:36from the notion I am a human beading because the impressions of avid idea remain. A
2:23:36–2:23:42subtle trace of it persists. Nevertheless, he does not have genuine conviction in what continues
2:23:42–2:23:49only falsely. What follows from this? The conclusion is one who has faith in an injunction is qualified,
2:23:49–2:23:56one without faith is not. Therefore, one who does not believe in notions such as human status is
2:23:56–2:24:02not qualified for injunctive scripture. SM Riti 2 says, an offering or gift made without faith
2:24:02–2:24:08With prohibited scripture does not require faith, it applies of itself to a person who
2:24:08–2:24:10engages in a prohibited act.
2:24:10–2:24:16Therefore, even after knowing the true nature of Brahman, if a person, like one bound in
2:24:16–2:24:20worldly bondage, violates prohibitions, he incurs sin.
2:24:20–2:24:26Hence no doctrine that accepts conduct contrary to scripture is admissible, for this reason
2:24:26–2:24:31action is not necessary in nided diaries you age enough for producing the fruit,
2:24:31–2:24:37Nor is action necessary for the arising of nided dire SUH nut because once doubtless knowledge
2:24:37–2:24:40has arisen from verbal testimony.
2:24:40–2:24:42There is no eligibility for action.
2:24:42–2:24:47Scripture says, not by action, not by progeny, not by wealth.
2:24:47–2:24:50Immortality is attained only by renunciation.
2:24:50–2:24:53Udwh Succont 74.
2:24:53–2:24:55Then is action of no use at all here?
2:24:55–2:25:00so, a statement such as they desire to know through sacrifice.
2:25:00–2:25:30विचार-विमर्शक बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता
2:25:30–2:25:35the king's man. It is not the king who is brought but the person qualified by the word
2:25:35–2:25:40man. Although the king is in reality principal in the expression he is merely the qualifier
2:25:40–2:25:46of the word man. Grammatically the principal entity is the man. In the same way sacrifice
2:25:46–2:25:52and Vedic study are enjoined as means to the desire to know Brahman. Fasting as austerity
2:25:52–2:25:54is enjoined in the same manner.
2:25:54–2:25:58Udh-i-ah-sakhont 75.
2:25:58–2:26:03Mere abstention from food is not austerity, one in whom the desire to know Brahman arises
2:26:03–2:26:08while eating pure, wholesome, measured food at the proper time and according to need is
2:26:08–2:26:14an ascetic, not one who observes complete fasting because he would die, nor are vows
2:26:14–2:26:19and fasts such as chandrayana the real nature of austerity because the balance of
2:26:19–2:26:23bodily humours may be disturbed in such a person.
2:26:23–2:26:28Daily and occasional duties diminish sin and purify the aspirant.
2:26:28–2:26:34Scripture says, An atme adjinn is one who understands, By this act my body is purified, By this act
2:26:34–2:26:36my body is nourished.
2:26:36–2:26:40Hear the words, By this act indicates sacrifice and the like.
2:26:40–2:26:47SMR 82 says, One in whom these 48 purificatory samskaras have been completed.
2:26:47–2:26:52A statement of the Afar Vaveh also shows that after sin has been diminished by performance
2:26:52–2:26:59of daily, occasional and desire-motivated actions, a person whose intellect is purified
2:26:59–2:27:04and in whom inquiry has arisen sees Brahman through meditation, a person of purified
2:27:04–2:27:11intellect sees Brahman through meditation, S.M. Riti 2 says, when sin has been diminished,
2:27:11–2:27:12knowledge arises.
2:27:12–2:27:20UD-YAH Succont, 76. Action and so forth. It is certain that daily rights destroy previously
2:27:20–2:27:27accumulated sin and purify a person. Once the indirect assistance of daily action in
2:27:27–2:27:32the arising of knowledge has thus become clear, it is not proper to imagine its direct
2:27:32–2:27:37assistance through the doctrine of conjunctive separateness because that would require many
2:27:37–2:27:43many unnecessary assumptions. The point is this performance of daily rites produces merit.
2:27:43–2:27:49The world is by nature impermanent, impure and full of suffering, but erroneous cognitions
2:27:49–2:27:55of permanence, purity, happiness and so forth defile satva, that is, be intellect. The
2:27:55–2:28:00cause of this defilement is sin. When sin is diminished, the doors of perception
2:28:00–2:28:05and reasoning open, and through perception and inference a person unobstructedly
2:28:05–2:28:11knows the impermanence, impurity and painfulness of the world, from that arises dispassion
2:28:11–2:28:16in the form of non-attachment to the world, from that awakens the desire to remove worldly
2:28:16–2:28:22existence, from that follows a search for the means of its cessation. Hearing that knowledge
2:28:22–2:28:27of the true nature of the self is the means of that cessation. The person desires to
2:28:27–2:28:32know it. Then, through the sequence of hearing, study, and so forth, he obtains that
2:28:32–2:28:38knowledge. Therefore it is reasonable that action is a remote auxiliary to the arising
2:28:38–2:28:44of knowledge through purification of satva in the form of the intellect. The Bhagavad-Gita
2:28:44–2:28:492 repeats this meaning for the sage who wishes to attain yogat action is said to be the
2:28:49–2:28:55cause for one established in yogat tranquility is said to be the cause.
2:28:55–2:29:0277. If this is so, a person whose intellect is already pure because of action performed
2:29:02–2:29:08in a previous birth, even though he performs no action in this life, and in whom dispassion
2:29:08–2:29:13has arisen from understanding the lack of essence in worldly existence, does not need
2:29:13–2:29:19to perform action in order to produce dispassion, for dispassion is already obtained by him
2:29:19–2:29:24through the actions of a previous birth. In this context, Scripture says concerning
2:29:24–2:29:30the superior person or he may renounce directly even from the stage of student-ship. Here it
2:29:30–2:29:36has been said, even before knowledge of ritual action, the desire to know Brahman is possible
2:29:36–2:29:42in one who has studied Vedanta. Therefore a person remaining in the student stage has
2:29:42–2:29:48no such debt whose discharge would require him to perform action. Accordingly, the
2:29:48–2:29:52statement of Brahmin is born with three debts should be understood as referring to
2:29:52–2:29:58one who becomes a householder. Otherwise it would conflict with the scriptural statement
2:29:58–2:30:00or he may renounce directly from the householder.
2:30:00–2:30:30नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक �
2:30:30–2:30:36presence it necessarily arises. Knowledge of ritual action is not such a thing, hence
2:30:36–2:30:41it is clear that here the word ather does not state a sequence immediately after knowledge
2:30:41–2:30:43of ritual action.
2:30:43–2:30:49Udwa Hsarkhant 78 Granted that no sequence is fixed by force
2:30:49–2:30:54of meaning, as there is between the Agnahotra and preparing the gruel for it, but perhaps
2:30:54–2:31:01sequence is fixed by direct shruti here by the suffix ktva. The Jabala statement says
2:31:01–2:31:07having become a householder, then become a forest weller, having become a forest weller,
2:31:07–2:31:10then renounce. Here having become a householder indicates
2:31:10–2:31:15performance of sacrifice and the like. There is also an SM Riti statement to the same
2:31:15–2:31:22effect, having studied the Vedda according to rule, produced a sun, and performed sacrifices
2:31:22–2:31:27according to one's capacity, one should direct the mind toward liberation.
2:31:27–2:31:32There is also a condemnatory statement, the twice-born who desires liberation without studying
2:31:32–2:31:37the Vedic producing progeny and performing sacrifice goes downward.
2:31:37–2:31:43The answer is, in the context of cutting the heart, there is a rule of immediate sequence.
2:31:43–2:31:49That is, in a statement such as first cut the heart, then the tongue, then the side,
2:31:49–2:31:55words first and then are intended to teach sequence. Here no such sequence is intended
2:31:55–2:32:01because later in this same scripture it is said, or he may renounce from any stage student
2:32:01–2:32:07ship, householder life, or forest life. All these statements indicate the indispensability
2:32:07–2:32:12of dispassion. Therefore scripture says, on the very day that dispassion arises one
2:32:12–2:32:18should renounce. The condemnatory statement is addressed to a person of impure intellect.
2:32:18–2:32:23such a person does not remain steadier in the means to liberation. Out of laziness he
2:32:23–2:32:29also fails to perform the daily and occasional duties of a householder and, under the burden
2:32:29–2:32:34of sin increasing at every moment, falls into a lower state.
2:32:34–2:32:35This is its meaning.
2:32:35–2:32:37Udwh Succont.
2:32:37–2:32:4379. Granted that sequence is not established by direct trutial by force of meaning, why
2:32:43–2:32:49then should sequence not be accepted on the basis of textual or deposition, principle subordinate
2:32:49–2:32:55relation or procedure? The answer is, there is no evidence for a subordinate principle
2:32:55–2:33:00relation. Auxiliary components such as fuel sticks and principle rights such as the
2:33:00–2:33:06ani produce one and the same fruit, are taught by one procedural sentence, are
2:33:06–2:33:11performed by the same qualified person, and are connected with one and the same time
2:33:11–2:33:17full moon on you moon, because their simultaneous performance is impossible, sequence is required
2:33:17–2:33:23and for determining the particular sequence, textual order position and so forth become
2:33:23–2:33:28evidence but where there is no subordinate principle relation nor a rule of one fruitful
2:33:28–2:33:34performance by the same qualified person as in separate rites such as Soria, Arianna
2:33:34–2:33:39and Prajapati that there is no need for a specific sequence, therefore textual order
2:33:39–2:33:44and the like do not become evidence determining a particular sequence, although because all
2:33:44–2:33:51words cannot be uttered simultaneously, some sequence necessarily occurs. There is no direct
2:33:51–2:33:56statement or other evidence establishing a subordinate principal relation between the
2:33:56–2:34:00desire to know Diharma and the desire to know Brahman.
2:34:00–2:34:05Ad-Yh Sakhont 80 An Objection is Raised Even where there
2:34:05–2:34:11There is no subordinate principle relation. A rule of sequence is observed. For example,
2:34:11–2:34:17for a person desiring cattle, a milking vessel is used in the carrying of water. An auxiliary
2:34:17–2:34:24of the Darshapornaymahsa sacrifice or in the injunction having performed the Darshapornaymahsa,
2:34:24–2:34:30he should perform the Somersacrifice sequence is fixed between Darshapornaymahsa and the
2:34:30–2:34:34so must sacrifice although they are not subordinate and principle.
2:34:34–2:34:40The answer is, nor is there evidence for renewed eligibility in a person already eligible.
2:34:40–2:34:46A person desiring heaven is eligible for Darsha Pornayma Epsa, the same person when desiring
2:34:46–2:34:52cattle is eligible for the milking vessel in the carrying of water, because that vessel
2:34:52–2:34:55assists an auxiliary of Darsha Pornayma Epsa.
2:34:55–2:35:00The milk vessel does not itself directly produce cattle, nor is there a...
2:35:00–2:35:30श्क्रिठ्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्
2:35:30–2:35:35as the same sequence through the sequence of the carrying of water which it assists.
2:35:35–2:35:41As for the sequence between the Soma Sacrifice and the Darshapornimahsut offering, its application
2:35:41–2:35:46here has already been excluded by denial of a direct injunction.
2:35:46–2:35:51Udhvahsutkont 81. Even without a subordinate principal relation
2:35:51–2:35:57or renewed eligibility of a person already eligible if actions were defined by one
2:35:57–2:36:01One and the same fruit or sequence could be accepted.
2:36:01–2:36:06For example, the six sacrifices beginning with the Agni have one goal, attainment of
2:36:06–2:36:09heaven and therefore their sequence is accepted.
2:36:09–2:36:14Or if Dihama were a limb of Brahman, a sequence could be accepted in the four chapters of
2:36:14–2:36:19the Brahma Satras, because some aspects of Brahman taught in the four chapters would
2:36:19–2:36:24be mutually connected and the identity of the object to be known would create
2:36:24–2:36:25a sequence.
2:36:25–2:36:30Then because the desires to know Dihama and Brahman had the same object to be known sequence
2:36:30–2:36:33between the two could be accepted.
2:36:33–2:36:35But neither situation exists here.
2:36:35–2:36:41Therefore it is said, the fruit and the object of the desires to know are also different.
2:36:41–2:36:47The fruit of knowledge of Dihama is a peculiar worldly prosperity and it depends upon performance.
2:36:47–2:36:52The fruit of Brahman knowledge is Nishrayasa, the highest good and it does not depend
2:36:52–2:36:54upon any further performance.
2:36:54–2:36:58Their fruit of knowledge means fruit of the desire to know.
2:36:58–2:37:03The difference is not merely in the nature of the fruits but also in the process of attaining
2:37:03–2:37:04them.
2:37:04–2:37:08Hence it is said, and this depends upon performance.
2:37:08–2:37:10Adwaah Sakant 82.
2:37:10–2:37:15De-harm up which is the object of the desire to know has to be brought into being.
2:37:15–2:37:20At the time of knowledge it is not present because it depends upon human action, but
2:37:20–2:37:26hear the object of the desire to know is eternally existent Brahman. It exists without
2:37:26–2:37:31beginning or end and does not depend upon human action. The modes of operation of the
2:37:31–2:37:36means that provide knowledge of these two objects are also different.
2:37:36–2:37:41Scripture that teaches Diharma instructs a person by impelling him to action.
2:37:41–2:37:46Scripture concerning Brahman merely teaches because knowledge arises from the scriptural
2:37:46–2:37:52sentence. No action is commanded of the person with respect to knowledge. Just as knowledge
2:37:52–2:37:58of an object arises automatically from contact between sense organ and object, so to hear.
2:37:58–2:38:03A thing that is to be produced is produced by the action of an agent, depends upon that
2:38:03–2:38:10action, and does not exist before its production. What exists eternally is always true, it
2:38:10–2:38:15is never false at any time. This difference between the objects of knowledge is not
2:38:15–2:38:20not merely a difference of nature but also a difference in the mode of operation of their
2:38:20–2:38:25corresponding means of knowledge. Therefore it is said there is also a difference in the
2:38:25–2:38:28function of scripture.
2:38:28–2:38:35Ad-YAH Sarkant 83. Here the word Qudana means scriptural instruction, not merely an injunctive
2:38:35–2:38:41sentence. A general meaning is secondarily conveyed by a word that ordinarily denotes
2:38:41–2:38:47a particular kind. In awfulous scripture there is no place for an utterance expressing a commander's
2:38:47–2:38:54will because a command is an expression of human desire. Therefore here Kedana means teaching or
2:38:54–2:39:00instruction. For this very reason it has been said, the means of knowing Dihama is instruction.
2:39:00–2:39:06This instruction concerns Bavana that is human action taught by scripture and its objects,
2:39:06–2:39:12sacrifice and the like. Sacrifice and the like are objects of Bavana because the activity
2:39:12–2:39:17in the form of effort is determined independence upon them. Even the derivation of the word
2:39:17–2:39:23object is understood from a root meaning binding, that is, that to which effort is bound.
2:39:23–2:39:28Scripture makes known Dihama in the form of sacrifice and the like by impelling a
2:39:28–2:39:33person to employ the means conducive to attaining the desired fruit. It makes actions
2:39:33–2:39:38known and thereby presents sacrifice as the means to attain the desired fruit.
2:39:38–2:39:44The Harmasastra does not operate in any other way, but instruction concerning Brahman merely
2:39:44–2:39:47tells a person the truth.
2:39:47–2:39:52It does not impale him to action because the instruction produces cognition without
2:39:52–2:39:54prescribing an act.
2:39:54–2:39:59YAH Sarkont 84. It may be the objected Vedanta teachers Brahm
2:40:00–2:40:30विचार-विमर्विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आप आप आप
2:40:30–2:40:36eternal and unproduced, nor can an action be commanded with respect to Nidid-Dhira-Suh-Not
2:40:36–2:40:41because Nidid-Dhira-Suh-Not being established by the observation of positive and negative
2:40:41–2:40:47concomitance as the sole cause of knowledge cannot become the object of an injunction,
2:40:47–2:40:52nor is there an injunction with respect to knowledge produced by verbal testimony
2:40:52–2:40:57because this knowledge arises unobstructedly in one who has studied the Vedda knows
2:40:57–2:41:03the relation between word and meaning and understands the proper rules of verbal cognition.
2:41:03–2:41:09It is as with knowledge of an object arising from contact between sense and object. The
2:41:09–2:41:15commentator connects the example to the matter at hand by saying, So to hear, and if prescribing
2:41:15–2:41:20knowledge of the self were taken to be the purport of Vedanta sentences, ascertainment
2:41:20–2:41:25of the true nature of the self would no longer be knowledge produced by verbal testimony
2:41:25–2:41:30because the purport of those sentences would then be an injunction to know the self, not
2:41:30–2:41:36the nature of the self itself. It cannot be said that because knowledge depends upon the
2:41:36–2:41:41object to be known, an object taught by a sentence whose purport lies elsewhere can
2:41:41–2:41:47nevertheless be ascertained in its real nature, for even superimposed commission is said
2:41:47–2:41:52to depend upon an object although it is not commission of the object's real nature.
2:41:52–2:41:58it is established that the purport of Vedanta is not an injunction to know.
2:41:58–2:42:04Adwaya Sarkant 85 The conclusion of the present discussion is stated thus,
2:42:04–2:42:10therefore let some such means be specified immediately after which the desire to know
2:42:10–2:42:16Brahman arises. That means, in whose absence Inquiry into Brahman does not arise and in
2:42:16–2:42:22In whose presence it necessarily arises, is this discrimination between eternal and non-eternal
2:42:22–2:42:28things, dispassion toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next possession of the
2:42:28–2:42:32disciplines beginning with Shama and Dharma and desire for liberation.
2:42:32–2:42:36When these means are present, the desire to know Brahman and knowledge of Brahman
2:42:36–2:42:42are possible either before inquiry into Diharmoh or after it, but not in their absence.
2:42:42–2:42:48the word aphor indicates immediate succession to the acquisition of the qualifications just
2:42:48–2:42:49stated.
2:42:49–2:42:50Udh.
2:42:50–2:42:51Hsarkhant.
2:42:51–2:42:5286.
2:42:52–2:42:58If this discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things were to determinate, Brahman would
2:42:58–2:43:03already be known and the desire to know Brahman would become pointless.
2:43:03–2:43:08And if it were merely general knowledge, not ascertainment, it could contain doubt
2:43:08–2:43:13or error distinct from a determination of truth, such knowledge could not produce dispassion.
2:43:13–2:43:19If dispassion is not produced, how could this become the cause of inquiry into Brahman?
2:43:19–2:43:24Therefore the matter should be understood thus, by eternal and non-eternal things their qualities
2:43:24–2:43:28are intended. Discrimination between eternal and non-eternal
2:43:28–2:43:34things means discrimination of their qualities together with the eternal and non-eternal
2:43:34–2:43:41It is not necessary to make specific judgments concerning each separate eternal and non-eternal
2:43:41–2:43:47substratum such as this is true and eternal and this is false and non-eternal, a general
2:43:47–2:43:52ascertainment of the distinction of eternal and non-eternal between the substratum and
2:43:52–2:43:54their qualities is sufficient.
2:43:54–2:44:00To be eternal means to be true, that in which truth is present is eternal and true,
2:44:00–2:44:02and therefore becomes an object of desire.
2:44:02–2:44:09be non-eternal means to be false, that in which falsity is present is non-eternal and false,
2:44:09–2:44:14and therefore does not become an object of desire, among things experienced as object
2:44:14–2:44:20and subject, as the fields of the notions you and I what is established as true, eternal,
2:44:20–2:44:25and of the nature of happiness enters the sphere of desire but what is impermanent,
2:44:25–2:44:30false, and filled with the three kinds of suffering should be abandoned. In a person
2:44:30–2:44:36whose intellect has been purified by actions performed in a previous birth or in this birth.
2:44:36–2:44:43This discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things arises through experience and reasoning.
2:44:43–2:44:46Udhsakont 87.
2:44:46–2:44:51It cannot be said that there is no such thing as truth because in the absence of truth
2:44:51–2:44:57even the false that appears with truth as its substratum would be unintelligible.
2:44:57–2:45:00for the nihilist emptiness itself is ex-
2:45:00–2:45:05Sceptid as true, reflecting discriminately in the light of the experience and reasoning of
2:45:05–2:45:10the finest persons in the human world, and seeing oneself together with the rest of the
2:45:10–2:45:15conscious world undergoing continuous birth and death surrounded by the three kinds of
2:45:15–2:45:21suffering in all worlds from satyr loka down to avasite, helplessly wandering among the
2:45:21–2:45:27waves of the ocean of transmigration one contemplates the impermanence, impurity and painfulness
2:45:27–2:45:34of this worldly existence through every division of time. Instant moment watch date night, fortnight
2:45:34–2:45:41month, season, half year, year, yuga, the period of four yugas, manvantara dissolution, and great
2:45:41–2:45:47dissolution. From this contemplation born of discrimination between eternal and non-eternal
2:45:47–2:45:54things arises dispassion toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next. Arthur means a fruit
2:45:54–2:46:01that is desired. Indifference toward it after recognising it as unfit for enjoyment is dispassion.
2:46:01–2:46:05From this comes abundant possession of the disciplines beginning with Sharma and Dhamma.
2:46:05–2:46:11The mind, intoxicated by the liquor-like impurities of attachment and the rest, sends
2:46:11–2:46:16the various senses running toward higher and lower objects, causes many actions to
2:46:16–2:46:21be performed, and produces fruits in the form of merit and sin. Into the terrible
2:46:21–2:46:27fire of transmigration it offers the self as an oblation and thus produces a vast mass
2:46:27–2:46:30filled with names of many sufferings.
2:46:30–2:46:32Ad-Y-H Sarkont.
2:46:32–2:46:3388.
2:46:33–2:46:38This frenzy of the mind produced by the liquor of attachment and the rest comes to an end
2:46:38–2:46:44through the ripening of dispassion acquired by continuous practice of the contemplation
2:46:44–2:46:45described above.
2:46:45–2:46:50Then the mind, brought under the control of the self, becomes restrained.
2:46:50–2:46:56This restraint of mind born of dispassion is called Shama or mastery in the form of Shama.
2:46:56–2:47:01Making the restrained mind fit to be applied to the investigation of truth is Dharma or
2:47:01–2:47:07Samadhana just as a quiet and trained calf becomes fit to pull a plow or cart.
2:47:07–2:47:12The word and so forth in the Bhāshā includes the desire to withdraw from objects, namely
2:47:12–2:47:18Uparati, endurance, namely Titicca and faith in truth. Therefore Shruti says,
2:47:18–2:47:25Enowed with Shama, Dharma, Uparati, Titicca, Samadhana and faith, a person sees the self in
2:47:25–2:47:30the self and sees all things in the self. Possession of the disciplines beginning with
2:47:30–2:47:36Shama and Dharma means abundant acquisition of these disciplines. After this arises the desire
2:47:36–2:47:42to be free from the bondage of worldly existence, hence the common Tata says desire
2:47:42–2:47:47for liberation. In a person who has heard that knowledge of Brahman, eternally pure
2:47:47–2:47:52and conscious, is the cause of liberation. The desire to know Brahman can arise either
2:47:52–2:47:59before inquiry into Dihama or after it. Therefore the immediate succession conveyed by the word
2:47:59–2:48:05affa is only succession to this acquisition of qualifications, not succession to inquiry
2:48:05–2:48:07into Dihama.
2:48:07–2:48:158. 89. The word Atta indicates a cause. Vedic statements such as just as enjoyment obtained
2:48:15–2:48:21by an action in this world is exhausted, so enjoyment obtained by diharma in the next
2:48:21–2:48:27world is exhausted teach the impermanence of the fruits of prosperity producing actions
2:48:27–2:48:32such as Agnihokra and statements such as the Noah of Brahman attains the supreme state
2:48:32–2:48:38teach that knowledge of Brahman accomplishes the highest human end. For this reason, immediately
2:48:38–2:48:44after abundant acquisition of the qualifications stated above, the desire to know Brahman should
2:48:44–2:48:50arise. Not only inquiry, but knowledge too arises from that inquiry. Therefore the commentator
2:48:50–2:48:56says and to know, and at the end concludes with therefore. The word atta, occurring
2:48:56–2:49:01in sequence, is explained thus. It conveys the meaning of cause. The commentator
2:49:01–2:49:06makes its causal meaning clear by in the Vedda itself and so forth.
2:49:06–2:49:12Here a question arises, granted that inquiry into Brahman arises when the qualifications
2:49:12–2:49:17described above have been acquired, but this itself is inconsistent, because dispassion
2:49:17–2:49:21toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next is impossible.
2:49:21–2:49:26A fruit is an object of desire and is therefore understood as beneficial.
2:49:26–2:49:31How can there be dispassion toward something that itself generates attachment?
2:49:31–2:49:36Udwaah Sarkont 90 It may be said that there is dispassion toward
2:49:36–2:49:39pleasure because suffering is joined to it.
2:49:39–2:49:42But then pleasure too is joined to suffering.
2:49:42–2:49:44Why should there not be the attachment to suffering?
2:49:44–2:49:49Therefore a person should accept pleasure and try to remove suffering, even if suffering
2:49:49–2:49:51inevitably comes.
2:49:51–2:49:54He should treat it and enjoy only the pleasure.
2:49:54–2:49:59In this way one who wants fish brings fish together with bones and scales takes the edge.
2:50:00–2:50:30विबल पूशिन अविशार-विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना�
2:50:30–2:50:35or sexual pleasure is joined with suffering caused by exhaustion, but this reasoning does not apply
2:50:35–2:50:41to heavenly and other pleasures of the next world, because Shruti calls them imperishable. We have
2:50:41–2:50:46drunk Soma, we have become immortal, and it is also said the merit of one who performs the
2:50:46–2:50:53Chathamassya sacrifice is not exhausted, nor can perishability be inferred here from the fact
2:50:53–2:50:59that produced things are perishable, because Shruti sublates such an inference. Just as
2:50:59–2:51:05as an inference of the purity of a human skull from its similarity to a conch is sublated.
2:51:05–2:51:12Adwai H. Succont, 91, thus the qualifications described above would prove non-existent,
2:51:12–2:51:17and there would be no occasion for the desire to know Brahman to refute this conclusion.
2:51:17–2:51:23The revered sutra author uses the word atta, and the commentator explains its meaning
2:51:23–2:51:28within the Vedda itself and so forth. The purport is this. The many kinds of
2:51:28–2:51:33suffering caused by animals, beggars, and so forth may obstruct the fruits of agriculture
2:51:33–2:51:39or cooking, but remedies for them are possible. Dependence upon the external means over long
2:51:39–2:51:45periods and continual diminution, these two are inseparably joined to every kind of produced
2:51:45–2:51:50pleasure. Even the finest cook cannot separate poison from food in which poison has been
2:51:50–2:51:55mixed with honey and eat the honey alone. Thus statements such as enjoyment obtained
2:51:55–2:52:01by action in this world which teach diminution, determine the secondary sense of statements
2:52:01–2:52:06such as having drunk Soma we have become immortal because the primary meaning of the latter
2:52:06–2:52:10is impossible. A proranic statement says, Continuance until
2:52:10–2:52:15dissolution is called immortality. Hear the word Brahman brings to mind the means
2:52:15–2:52:21of knowledge of Brahman, namely the Vedda. The relevant statements such as enjoyment
2:52:21–2:52:26obtained by action in this world uptaken by the pronoun Atta as the cause, the ablative
2:52:26–2:52:30suffix Tas indicates their causal status.
2:52:30–2:52:33Advaayah Sakkant 92.
2:52:33–2:52:37Brahmajigvayah sum means the desire to know Brahman.
2:52:37–2:52:41Brahman is that whose characteristic will be stated later by the sutra from which the
2:52:41–2:52:46origination and so forth of this world proceed.
2:52:46–2:52:51there is no doubt here that the word Brahman might mean a class or something else. The
2:52:51–2:52:57word Brahmana in the genitive case has an objective meaning, not the meaning of some residual general
2:52:57–2:53:03relation because a desire to know necessarily requires an object to be known and no other
2:53:03–2:53:08thing has been stated as the object to be known. The pronoun atta takes up the cause
2:53:08–2:53:14stated in the preceding sentence and the ablative case with the suffix tas indicates
2:53:14–2:53:19causality. Granted that the bliss of Brahman, like produced pleasures such as heaven, might
2:53:19–2:53:24be accompanied by suffering, the answer is that scripture teaches. Through knowledge
2:53:24–2:53:29of Brahman a person attains the supreme goal. Trutie declares the exhaustion of
2:53:29–2:53:35enjoyments such as heaven and calls Brahman knowledge the highest human end. Therefore
2:53:35–2:53:40abundant acquisition of the qualifications stated above will occur and inquiry into
2:53:40–2:53:46Brahman will certainly arise. The meaning of the compound Brahmajigvayah site is desire
2:53:46–2:53:52to know Brahman. It is taken as a genitive tapyashya compound. The interpretation of
2:53:52–2:53:57earlier commentators as a dative compound, Brahman-Jenasa inquiry for Brahman is to be
2:53:57–2:54:03understood as rejected here. Katiayana's rule is that in a dative compound the relation
2:54:03–2:54:08between a basic substance and its modification is understood.
2:54:08–2:54:1698. 93. A dative compound occurs only where there is a relation between an original substance
2:54:16–2:54:22and its modification, as in wood for a sacrificial post or a stake for tying the sacrificial
2:54:22–2:54:27animal where the members of a compound do not stand in such a substance modification
2:54:27–2:54:33relation. There is no dative compound. Expressions such as fodder for a horse are
2:54:33–2:54:38accepted as genitive compounds. Even in the genitive compound the prominence of Brahman
2:54:38–2:54:44in relation to the desire to know is intelligible because the desire to know has been stated
2:54:44–2:54:49as principle in the sentence. Granted that in desire to know Brahman the word Brahman
2:54:49–2:54:56is used in many meanings then a doubt may arise inquiry into which Brahman is intended.
2:54:56–2:54:59In Brahma-hati-late means the Brahmin class.
2:54:59–2:55:00In Brahmajam it means the Brahmin class.
2:55:00–2:55:30विचार-विमर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ�
2:55:30–2:55:36should be understood not objectively but as expressing a residual general relation. Such
2:55:36–2:55:42a relation indicates general connection, not only an object relation. Desire to know concerning
2:55:42–2:55:47Brahman could therefore mean a desire to know everything related to Brahman.
2:55:47–2:55:54Adwaya H. Sarkant 94. Things auxiliary to the desire to know Brahman-Brahman's nature. The
2:55:54–2:55:59means of knowing it, reasoning, the means of attainment, and the fruit being directly
2:55:59–2:56:05or indirectly related to Brahman could all be understood within the expression Brahma
2:56:05–2:56:10jigwayahsa. But if the genitive is taken objectively, Brahman will indicate only the
2:56:10–2:56:16object, namely the nature of Brahman. The means of knowledge and so forth will not
2:56:16–2:56:21be the included, and then inquiry would arise into topics not yet introduced. To
2:56:21–2:56:24The one who holds such a view, the answer is given.
2:56:24–2:56:28The word brahmana in the genitive has an objective meaning.
2:56:28–2:56:31The reason is stated for a desire to know.
2:56:31–2:56:34An object fit to be known is required.
2:56:34–2:56:39The accomplishment of inquiry is connected with knowledge and the object of knowledge
2:56:39–2:56:40is brahman.
2:56:40–2:56:44In the absence of an object to be known, knowledge is not determined.
2:56:44–2:56:48And in the absence of knowledge, inquiry is not determined.
2:56:48–2:56:55primary requires an object, not a general relation. Even without a general relation,
2:56:55–2:57:00when an object is present, inquiry is determined. After seeing the sun or moon, one does not
2:57:00–2:57:06ask to what is this related. But upon hearing the word knowledge, why should one not ask
2:57:06–2:57:12knowledge of what? That is, what is its object? Therefore, because it is what is principally
2:57:12–2:57:17required, Brahman is connected only as the object, not through a general relation. The
2:57:17–2:57:20The general relation would be secondary.
2:57:20–2:57:26Consequently, the compound is a genitive tat brahse in which the genitive is objective.
2:57:26–2:57:29Advaith Sarkant 95.
2:57:29–2:57:34Granted that the genitive is accepted in the general sense of residual relation, even
2:57:34–2:57:40then there is no contradiction of the fact that Brahman is the object of inquiry because
2:57:40–2:57:45a general relation itself rests upon some specific relation.
2:57:45–2:57:51Nevertheless, the effort of one who abandons Brahman's direct objected and accepts indirect
2:57:51–2:57:55objected by way of a general relation is pointless.
2:57:55–2:57:57Now an objection is raised true.
2:57:57–2:58:02Inquiry cannot be determined in the absence of an object to be known, but inquiry might
2:58:02–2:58:08have some other object, while Brahman is connected with it through a residual relation.
2:58:08–2:58:13The common tater answers, no other thing has been stated as fit to be known, to
2:58:13–2:58:20abandon direct objecthood, which is what inquiry primarily requires and is first fit to be connected,
2:58:20–2:58:25and to make some general relation, required only later in some way, principle this would
2:58:25–2:58:31make the secondary primary and the primary secondary. Even the terms direct and indirect
2:58:31–2:58:36relation are based upon this order, but this is not pointless, it may be said, because
2:58:36–2:58:42its purpose would be to include by presupposition inquiry into all the remaining topics
2:58:42–2:58:48depend upon Brahman. The answer is no, because when the principle is accepted all the topics
2:58:48–2:58:54dependent upon it are automatically included by postulation. Brahman, the thing most desired
2:58:54–2:59:00to be attained through knowledge, is principle. Once that principle is accepted as the object
2:59:00–2:59:04of the desire to know, all those matters without separate desire to know which
2:59:04–2:59:10inquiry into Brahman would nevertheless be impossible are automatically included by
2:59:10–2:59:15postulation. No separate mention of them in the Sutra is necessary, just as when it is
2:59:15–2:59:20said the king is going here. The going of his entire retinue together with the king is
2:59:20–2:59:27understood, so should it be understood here. This is also in accordance with Shruti.
2:59:27–2:59:33Adwai H. Sarkont 96. Dil expressions used in the Barshat principle
2:59:33–2:59:39and subordinate correspond to explicit and implicit. Dil object estates his view thus.
2:59:39–2:59:45This is not pointless because its purpose would be to presuppose Inquiria into all remaining
2:59:45–2:59:47matters dependent upon Brahman.
2:59:47–2:59:49This has been explained above.
2:59:49–2:59:53The Sidhantin states his position with note because when the principle is accepted and
2:59:53–2:59:59so forth, though not explicitly present in the sentence, Brahman has real primacy.
2:59:59–3:00:00the room.
3:00:00–3:00:07मैणिंग मीणिंग अव दबाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, आप श्विष्विमर्शक रेक।
3:00:07–3:00:12The shruti passage beginning from which these beelings are born and the statement desire to
3:00:12–3:00:18know that Brahman, that is, Brahman clearly show that Brahman is the object of the desire to know.
3:00:18–3:00:24When the genitive case is accepted in the objective sense, this fully agrees with the sutra.
3:00:24–3:00:30Therefore the word Brahmana in the genitive has an objective meaning. Jainasa is the desire
3:00:30–3:00:35to know. The object of the desire expressed by the desiderative suffix is the knowledge
3:00:35–3:00:42that culminates in direct realisation because a fruit is the object of desire. In fact, Brahman
3:00:42–3:00:48is what is to be directly realised through knowledge produced by a means of knowledge.
3:00:48–3:00:55Direct realisation of Brahman is a human end because it uproots a v idea and all other evils
3:00:55–3:01:00and the entire seed of transmigration. Therefore Brahman itself is fit to be the
3:01:00–3:01:03object of the desire to know.
3:01:03–3:01:09Udhsakont 97 Having thus established the compound accepted
3:01:09–3:01:14by him, the commentator explains the meaning of the word Jnasa by saying, Jnasa is the
3:01:14–3:01:20desire to know, granted, but knowledge is not an object of desire, the real sphere of
3:01:20–3:01:25desire is attainment of pleasure or removal of suffering, or the means to these is
3:01:25–3:01:26desired.
3:01:26–3:01:29Brahma knowledge is not of this kind.
3:01:29–3:01:33Its experience is neither like the gain of pleasure nor like the cessation of something
3:01:33–3:01:38and desirable, nor is it a means to either for after knowledge arises.
3:01:38–3:01:42No special pleasure is seen and suffering continues.
3:01:42–3:01:47Still, it does not follow merely from the Sutra-Orpha's statement that knowledge
3:01:47–3:01:48is an object of desire.
3:01:48–3:01:55In answer to this objection it is said, knowledge that culminates in direct realization.
3:01:55–3:02:00Their knowledge is not desired, rather the knowledge that culminates in realization or
3:02:00–3:02:02experience is desired.
3:02:02–3:02:07The object of the desire expressed by the desiderative suffix is that knowledge which
3:02:07–3:02:09culminates in realization.
3:02:09–3:02:14Because the fruit is the object of desire should be understood in the sense that desire
3:02:14–3:02:19continues to operate toward the means until the fruit is obtained.
3:02:19–3:02:25Granted that knowledge culminates in direct realization, does it thereby become desirable?
3:02:25–3:02:30Knowledge of an unnecessary thing does not become desired even if it culminates in direct
3:02:30–3:02:32realisation.
3:02:32–3:02:37The answer is, in fact, Brahman is what is to be directly realised through knowledge
3:02:37–3:02:40produced by a means of knowledge.
3:02:40–3:02:45Granted that there is direct realisation concerning Brahman, why is it desired?
3:02:45–3:02:50The answer is, direct realisation of Brahman is indeed a human end.
3:02:50–3:02:51Is it prosperity?
3:02:51–3:02:52No.
3:02:52–3:02:58supreme bliss that is the nature of Brahman and divided and manifest when all impurities
3:02:58–3:03:03of suffering have been removed. Therefore it is the highest human end.
3:03:03–3:03:11Advaayah Sarkant 98. Granted that direct realization of Brahman is not a human end because a human
3:03:11–3:03:16end is something pervaded by human effort. In realization that is of the nature of
3:03:16–3:03:22Brahman there is none of production, modification, purification or acquisition Brahman is
3:03:22–3:03:28eternal and therefore cannot be pervaded by human action. How then is realization of Brahman
3:03:28–3:03:35a human end? The answer is, because it uproots evil such as Avali idea and the entire seed
3:03:35–3:03:40of transmigration. It is true that there is no production and so forth in realization
3:03:40–3:03:46of Brahman's nature but under the influence of beginningless and indefinable Avali idea,
3:03:46–3:03:51the nature of Brahman. Though not illuminated by another light and though itself luminous
3:03:51–3:03:57appears as though a manifest and as though illuminated by another although distinct from
3:03:57–3:04:03bodied senses and so forth. It appears as though non-different from them. Thus before destruction
3:04:03–3:04:09of Aviya-Idyya and the other seeds of transmigration, Brahman is as though unattained and after their
3:04:09–3:04:15destruction it is as though attained. In this form a person desires it. Therefore it is
3:04:15–3:04:17is properly called a human end.
3:04:17–3:04:20Advaitha Sarkant 99.
3:04:20–3:04:27In Avila idea and so forth, the words and so forth include the impressions of Avila idea,
3:04:27–3:04:33the cessation of Avila idea and the rest occurs through the force of direct realisation born
3:04:33–3:04:38of reflection and experience in the form of a Brahman shaped modification of the
3:04:38–3:04:39inner organ.
3:04:39–3:04:45Therefore, for a seeker of liberation endowed with the qualifications stated above, Brahman
3:04:45–3:04:48alone is the proper object of the desire to know.
3:04:48–3:04:54Without such knowledge, Abhilaideya and its impressions the root cause of many sufferings
3:04:54–3:04:59are not destroyed and without their destruction, the experience of the supreme bliss that
3:04:59–3:05:00is the Jeeva.
3:05:00–3:05:30विवाश नाच्य अजिद ब्रामन, अजिद नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य ना�
3:05:30–3:05:34our sentences because that purpose has already been accomplished by the Sutra,
3:05:34–3:05:39Atharva, Dharma, Jainasa which indicates the injunction to study one's Veda and the
3:05:39–3:05:45understanding of its meaning. Inquiry into Dihama indicates inquiry into the meaning
3:05:45–3:05:50of the Veda and knowledge of Dihama. Being a part of the complete meaning of the Veda
3:05:50–3:05:56secondarily it includes knowledge of Brahman and Adihama as well. Thus inquiry into
3:05:56–3:06:03Brahman, like inquiry into Dihama, may be indicated by inquiry into the meaning of the Vedic,
3:06:03–3:06:09but there is no rule that it must begin immediately after inquiry into Dihama, nor does inquiry
3:06:09–3:06:15into Brahman begin merely immediately after Vedic study. Therefore this sutra is stated
3:06:15–3:06:21in order to begin inquiry into Brahman and to show that it follows immediately upon
3:06:21–3:06:27qualifications such as discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, hence there
3:06:27–3:06:29is no repetition.
3:06:29–3:06:34Ad-YAH Sarkont 100 Granted that this sutra states inquiry
3:06:34–3:06:39to be the means of Brahman knowledge, but this is not reasonable because it cannot
3:06:39–3:06:44be examined, therefore the question arises. Then Brahman-Brahman must be either known
3:06:44–3:06:49or unknown. If it is known, there should be no desire to know it, and if it is
3:06:49–3:06:55unknown, a desire to know it is altogether impossible. Their answer is Brahman, eternal,
3:06:55–3:07:02pure, conscious, free, omniscient and omnipotent certainly exists. One who considers the derivation
3:07:02–3:07:08of the word Brahman understands in accordance with the meaning of the root-bree, meaning
3:07:08–3:07:14such as itonality and purity. Because Brahman is the self of all, its existence is well
3:07:14–3:07:20known. Every person knows his own existence. No one knows I do not exist. If the existence
3:07:20–3:07:26of the self were not well known, the entire world would cognize I do not exist.
3:07:26–3:07:33And the self itself is Brahman. The awfulest sentences of Vedanta are intrinsically valid.
3:07:33–3:07:38Brahman must be either known or unknown. If it is known, it has already become the
3:07:38–3:07:43object of determinate cognition produced by Vedanta sentences. Therefore there should
3:07:43–3:07:48be no further desire to know it, because a means of knowledge that has produced its fruit
3:07:48–3:07:54does not operate again upon its object, otherwise the definition of a means of knowledge would
3:07:54–3:07:55be violated.
3:07:55–3:08:01And if Brahman is not known from Vedanta, Vedanta does not teach it, consequently Brahman
3:08:01–3:08:06would remain forever unknown and no desire to know it could arise.
3:08:06–3:08:12Desire concerns something experienced and dear, never something wholly unexperienced,
3:08:12–3:08:17Granted that it may be dear still in the absence of a means of knowledge, knowledge
3:08:17–3:08:18of it is impossible.
3:08:18–3:08:22Verbal testimony must be said to be the means of its knowledge.
3:08:22–3:08:26This will be taught later by Shastray on it that, if scripture does not make Brahman
3:08:26–3:08:32known whence comes its validity concerning Brahman, and no other means of knowledge
3:08:32–3:08:33applies to Brahman.
3:08:33–3:08:38Therefore a known object is not the object of a desire to know, while an unknown
3:08:38–3:08:44object can be neither desired nor known, consequently inquiring into Brahman is impossible. This
3:08:44–3:08:46is the objection.
3:08:46–3:08:54Advaith Sarkant 101 The solution is Brahman, eternal, pure, conscious, and free. Certainly
3:08:54–3:09:00exists. The intention is that even before inquiry into Brahman begins, a person who
3:09:00–3:09:05has studied the Vedas, studied Narkata, Gramma, and so forth, understood the relation between
3:09:05–3:09:11words and meanings, and grasped the general meaning of the sentences from in the beginning
3:09:11–3:09:16there was only being to tat, tiv ammasi, obtains a general cognition of Brahman as eternal and
3:09:16–3:09:23so forth. This is possible even without inquiry, by referring to the object of knowledge with
3:09:23–3:09:28words such as Brahman in the Bharsha. Knowledge concerning Brahman is secondarily indicated
3:09:28–3:09:34as well for at the beginning of inquiry Brahman's existence is not altogether unknown,
3:09:34–3:09:40but only doubtful. The word eternal negates suffering caused by decay, pure removes suffering
3:09:40–3:09:46caused by limiting adjuncts such as body, conscious shows, Brahman as the blissful self that is
3:09:46–3:09:52not illuminated by another light but is itself luminous because bliss and luminosity are
3:09:52–3:09:53non-different.
3:09:53–3:09:59Ad-YAH Succont 102, Granted, If Liberation Already Exists
3:10:00–3:10:30ब्रामन्झ क्विली श्च्च आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आ
3:10:30–3:10:35its form conditioned by a vitha-dhya omniscient and omnipotent. This is established on the
3:10:35–3:10:41basis of being the cause of the world because whether something becomes a cause or not depends
3:10:41–3:10:46upon the presence or absence of power and knowledge. Again, whence comes realisation
3:10:46–3:10:52of Brahman in this form? The answer is one who analyses the meaning of the word Brahman
3:10:52–3:10:57experience of Brahman in this form comes not only from considering the sequence and
3:10:57–3:11:03context of sentences such as in the beginning there was being alone, but also from the derivation
3:11:03–3:11:09of the word Brahman itself. The root-brier indicates growth or excellence, because of
3:11:09–3:11:15this excellence. Qualities such as itonality, purity, and consciousness taught by other expressions
3:11:15–3:11:17are fitting in Brahman.
3:11:17–3:11:24Ad-YAH Sarkant 103 Having thus shown purity and the like to be well known in the literal
3:11:24–3:11:30meaning of tat. The commentator speaks concerning the literal meaning of t-van because Brahman
3:11:30–3:11:36is the self of all. Its existence is well known. The existence of Brahman is well known to
3:11:36–3:11:40everyone, even an ordinary farmer with dust-covered feet.
3:11:40–3:11:47Wents. Because it is his very self. Hence it is said, every person knows his own existence.
3:11:47–3:11:52Then by saying not not, ignorance of the self is negated and knowledge of the self
3:11:52–3:11:58is confirmed. A person does not fail to know I exist, but knows it with certainty. Someone
3:11:58–3:12:04may say, even while knowing I exist, one may not know the self. The answer is, if the existence
3:12:04–3:12:09of the self were not well known if he did not know the self in the form of the J. E.
3:12:09–3:12:15Diva, the substratum of I-ness, there would be no cognition of I either. Granted that
3:12:15–3:12:19everyone knows the self, the substratum of I-ness, what connection does that have
3:12:19–3:12:26with Brahman. The answer is, and the Self itself is Brahman. Because of the coordinate relation
3:12:26–3:12:31between Tatt and Tivam from shruti purity consciousness and the like belonging to the
3:12:31–3:12:38literal meaning of Tatt are known from direct experience. The Jeeva denoted by Tivam is known
3:12:38–3:12:43and knowledge of the word meanings precedes knowledge of the sentence meaning. Therefore
3:12:43–3:12:49from the sentence Tatt Tivam see the Jeeva denoted by Tivam is experienced as beading
3:12:49–3:12:55of the nature of Brahman. If Brahman as the Self is well known in ordinary life, then it
3:12:55–3:13:01is already known there should therefore be no desire to know it. The answer is no, because
3:13:01–3:13:07there are many mutually contradictory views concerning its specific nature.
3:13:07–3:13:12Ordinary people and Lokeatas regard the Self as merely the conscious body. Some others
3:13:12–3:13:17call only the conscious senses the Self. Some regard the mind as the Self. Some take me
3:13:17–3:13:23a momentary cognition as the self and some emptiness. Still others accept a self distinct
3:13:23–3:13:29from the body, passing from one body to another, an agent and enjoyer.
3:13:29–3:13:35Udh Sakant 104 The objecter points out the defect in the
3:13:35–3:13:40first of these alternatives. If in ordinary tradition here ordinary tradition means the
3:13:40–3:13:46teacher pupil succession. If from the sentence Tat T. Vamasi Brahman is well known as the
3:13:46–3:13:52self where one should say the self whose nature is Brahman then this is stated for the purpose
3:13:52–3:13:57of teaching identity, it would follow again that because it is known, Brahman is not an
3:13:57–3:14:04object of inquiry. The answer is no, why? Because there are many mutually contradictory
3:14:04–3:14:11views concerning its specific nature. Such contradictory views, in the absence of proof,
3:14:11–3:14:15become the cause of uncertainty. Therefore, although the general existence of Brahman
3:14:15–3:14:22is known, its true specific nature is doubtful for this reason inquiry is necessary. According
3:14:22–3:14:28to some, the self is only an enjoyer, not an agent. Others say that there is an omniscient
3:14:28–3:14:33and omnipotent Lord distinct from that self. Still others hold that the Lord is the self
3:14:33–3:14:39of that enjoying Jea'i'i'va. In this way many people adopt different views on the
3:14:39–3:14:44basis of reasoning and scriptural statements that are either established by valid means
3:14:44–3:14:50or erroneous. One who accepts any one of these views without inquiry will be deprived of the
3:14:50–3:14:56highest good and obtain evil. Therefore, beginning with the statement of the desire to know Brahman,
3:14:56–3:14:59respectful inquiry into the sentences of Vedanta,
3:15:00–3:15:30आविचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विच
3:15:30–3:15:35and supported views cannot contradict one another. Views concerning different substratas
3:15:35–3:15:41are likewise not mutually contradictory. The intellect is impermanent and the self is
3:15:41–3:15:47eternal do not contradict one another. Therefore all systems accept that the purity and other
3:15:47–3:15:52properties of the referent of Tat, known from Vedanta, reside in some substratum
3:15:52–3:15:58and that the Jeeva denoted by T.Vam is established by experience. Difference of
3:15:58–3:16:04opinion concerns only the manner in which it is manifest or unmanifest and its various
3:16:04–3:16:10states. Thus, even when the substratum is generally known, doubt concerning its specific
3:16:10–3:16:17nature is entirely proper because contradictory views exist. Among these views, the commentator
3:16:17–3:16:23first shows contradictory conceptions concerning the referent of T-Vam beginning with ordinary
3:16:23–3:16:29people and continuing through only an enjoyer, not an agent. If the self is regarded as the
3:16:29–3:16:35conscious body, the senses, the mind, or momentary cognition, the properties such as itonality
3:16:35–3:16:40belonging to the referent of tat cannot belong to the referent of T-Vam because the two
3:16:40–3:16:45are mutually incompatible. As for the nihilists, how can that which they regard as inexpressible
3:16:45–3:16:50and as the meaning of no word be taken as the referent of tat and T-Vam, a self
3:16:50–3:16:56that is agent and enjoyer also because it is subject to modification, does not accord
3:16:56–3:17:01with the itinality and other properties of the referent of tat. In the doctrine at takes
3:17:01–3:17:07the self not as agent but only as enjoyer, enjoyership still indicates modification so
3:17:07–3:17:13incompatibility with itinality and the like remains. In a view that regards selves as
3:17:13–3:17:18many, even if they are not taken to be itinjoyers, plurality gives rise to defects
3:17:18–3:17:22such as impermanence and abandon's non-duality.
3:17:22–3:17:29Udwh Sarkont 106 Just as there are contradictory views concerning
3:17:29–3:17:34the referent of T.Vam, there are differences of opinion concerning the referent of Tat as
3:17:34–3:17:35well.
3:17:35–3:17:39Lokeyartas and those who reject the Vedda as a means of knowledge regard cognition
3:17:39–3:17:42of the referent of Tat as false.
3:17:42–3:17:47Even among those who accept the Vedda as valid, some say that the referent of Tat
3:17:47–3:17:53is only figurative or is not the principal subject taught by Vedanta sentences. Thus,
3:17:53–3:17:59in showing differences of view concerning the referent of Tivam, the commentator also indicates
3:17:59–3:18:04differences concerning the referent of Tatt. Now a contradictory view directly concerning
3:18:04–3:18:09the referent of Tatt is stated. Some say that there is an omniscient and omnipotent
3:18:09–3:18:16Lord distinct from the Jeevas. Here Tatt is used in contrast to the individual selves.
3:18:16–3:18:21The Lord is distinct not only from the body and so forth but also from the Jeavers and
3:18:21–3:18:26is the ruler of the entire world, omniscience and omnipotence.
3:18:26–3:18:32His two natural qualities are stated to establish his rulership, but this Lord, distinct from
3:18:32–3:18:37the Jeavers, cannot stand in a relation of coordinate predication with the Reference
3:18:37–3:18:38of Tivan.
3:18:38–3:18:44Therefore the final view is stated, some say that the Lord is the self of the enjoyer.
3:18:44–3:18:50is, the Lord denoted by Tatt is the self of the enjoying Je Deva conditioned by Aviv
3:18:50–3:18:56I Deva, therefore the Je Deva is in reality non-different from the Lord, just as Pot Space
3:18:56–3:18:59is non-different from Great Space.
3:18:59–3:19:06Udvaiah Sukkant 107 Having finished mentioning the contradictory views, the commentator
3:19:06–3:19:11states their cause, in this way many people some views are based on sound reasoning,
3:19:11–3:19:17on for a spacious reasoning, some on scriptural statements understood in their correct sense,
3:19:17–3:19:23some on scriptural statements given an improper interpretation. Granted that contradictory
3:19:23–3:19:28views exist and thereby produced out, why nevertheless should inquiry into Brahman be
3:19:28–3:19:34begun, the answer is, the person who accepts any one of these views without inquiry the
3:19:34–3:19:39highest good is attained by true knowledge, not by false knowledge. Because false knowledge
3:19:39–3:19:44destroys faith and leads to evil, it is said, and he will obtain evil."
3:19:44–3:19:49Finally, with the word therefore, the purport of the sutra is concluded.
3:19:49–3:19:56In inquiry into Vedanta, reasoning concerned with the meaning of Vedanta sentences is primary.
3:19:56–3:19:59Other reasoning consistent with it is also auxiliary for example,
3:20:00–3:20:30सम्पल पर्वा मिमंश्ः इन दिएज्चमनेशन अव दिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटि�
3:20:30–3:20:35Brahman, the revered Sutra author says, from which the birth and so forth of this world
3:20:35–3:20:36proceed.
3:20:36–3:20:43Udhvayah Sarkhant, 108, having established in the first Sutra that beginning inquiry
3:20:43–3:20:49is proper, the Sutra author now begins the investigation of Brahman, from which the birth
3:20:49–3:20:52and so forth of this world proceed.
3:20:52–3:20:56Introducing this Sutra, the commentator says, it has been said that one should desire
3:20:56–3:20:58to know Brahman.
3:20:58–3:21:01What now is the defining characteristic of this Brahman?
3:21:01–3:21:06Although by taking knowledge of Brahman's nature as the principal subject, the auxiliary
3:21:06–3:21:12topics of means of knowledge and so forth are also pledged, Brahman's own nature is
3:21:12–3:21:17principal, therefore it is first established through objection and resolution.
3:21:17–3:21:23Whatever comes within experience is limited, impure, inert, and perishable.
3:21:23–3:21:27Brahman's nature cannot be characterized by knowledge of these things, because Brahman
3:21:27–3:21:32is their opposite eternal, pure, and of the nature of consciousness.
3:21:32–3:21:36No one characterizes an eternal thing by means of a produced thing.
3:21:36–3:21:41Norcan Brahman be characterized by its own qualities such as itonality, because these
3:21:41–3:21:43qualities are not already known.
3:21:43–3:21:48A characteristic is given through something well known, not through something wholly
3:21:48–3:21:49unknown.
3:21:49–3:21:54Norcan mere verbal testimony establish the characteristic here, for if Brahman is
3:21:54–3:21:56altogether unknown.
3:21:56–3:22:02cannot be the meaning of any word and consequently cannot be the meaning of a sentence. Therefore,
3:22:02–3:22:07in the absence of a defining characteristic, Brahman cannot become an object of the desire
3:22:07–3:22:13to know. This is the objector's position. The revered sutra author answers this objection
3:22:13–3:22:19from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed. The world established by
3:22:19–3:22:25experience is not itself a defining characteristic of Brahman because it is Brahman's quality
3:22:25–3:22:31or identical with it rather because it arises from Brahman. The world can characterize Brahman
3:22:31–3:22:36just as a rival in different regions is a mark of the sun's motion.
3:22:36–3:22:42Birth and so forth means origination, continuance and dissolution. For brevity the sutra or
3:22:42–3:22:47for uses the neuter expression gematic to make this clear the common tater gives the
3:22:47–3:22:52the Coordinate New to Terms Birth, Continuance and Destruction.
3:22:52–3:22:59Rdwh Succont 109 The primacyl of origination among origination,
3:22:59–3:23:03Continuance and Dissolution is established both by the statement of Shruti and by the
3:23:03–3:23:09nature of things. Shruti says from which these beings are born, the sequence of
3:23:09–3:23:15origination, Continuance and Dissolution is also natural. Continuance and Destruction
3:23:15–3:23:20belong to a substratum that has come into existence through origination. In the expression
3:23:20–3:23:25of this world, the word this indicates the world known through perception and other means
3:23:25–3:23:31of knowledge, the genitive case shows its relation to origination and so forth, from
3:23:31–3:23:37which designates the cause. The ordered construction of this world divided by name and form filled
3:23:37–3:23:44with many agents and enjoyers, and definitely arranged by place, time, cause, action, and
3:23:44–3:23:50fruit is difficult even to imagine mentally. The cause from which the origination and so
3:23:50–3:23:55forth of such a world proceed is omniscient and omnipotent Brahman. The sentence of the
3:23:55–3:24:01sutra is completed thus, that from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed
3:24:01–3:24:07is Brahman. The expressions divided by name and form and so forth are self-explanatory.
3:24:07–3:24:13that many possible causes of the world are under discussion, primordial, prakriti time,
3:24:13–3:24:19planetary deities or the activity of directional guardians such as Indra, chance, the inherent
3:24:19–3:24:25nature of things, or non-being. Why then should a missiant and omnipotent Brahmin be accepted
3:24:25–3:24:31as the cause of the world's origination and so forth? The answer is, divided by name and form,
3:24:31–3:24:36filled with many agents and enjoys the qualifications beginning with divided,
3:24:36–3:24:42establish an intelligent cause and exclude the causality of incension, Pradhana imagined
3:24:42–3:24:45causes, non-being and the like.
3:24:45–3:24:53Adwa H. Sarkant, 110, things such as pots, divided by name and form, are observed to
3:24:53–3:24:55be produced by intelligent makers.
3:24:55–3:24:59The world under dispute too is divided by name and form.
3:25:00–3:25:30वो उन अईटिलिच्ण मेखा मुस्भील इक्षेटिद फो तुटू पोट तुटू फुर्ष्ट कन्सिदः सिन लिएजिंच तुटू नाटक आप पोट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप प
3:25:30–3:25:35imagined as creating the world. It may be said that intelligent planetary deities or
3:25:35–3:25:41guardians of the directions conceive name and form in their intelligence and make the world.
3:25:41–3:25:46Then Brahman of the nature described above is unnecessary. The answer is filled with
3:25:46–3:25:53many agents and enjoyers. Some persons, like cooks and priests at a sacrifice, are agents
3:25:53–3:25:59but not enjoyers. Others, like the ancestors in Ashradha and the sun in Avaishnara
3:25:59–3:26:06offering are enjoyers but not agents. Therefore the Sutra mentions both agents and enjoyers,
3:26:06–3:26:12place, time, cause, action, and fruit form and it are a divan for compound and each term
3:26:12–3:26:18should be taken separately. This world is the dwelling place of these agents and enjoyers.
3:26:18–3:26:24In this world some creatures arise in definite places such as the Black Antelope. Some occur
3:26:24–3:26:31at definite times such as the call of the cuckoo, some through definite causes such as the conception
3:26:31–3:26:37of a heron caused by thunder at the beginning of the rainy season, some perform definite actions
3:26:37–3:26:43such as only a brahmin and not another being entitled to perform a sacrifice for someone else.
3:26:43–3:26:48Likewise some experience definite fruits, some are happy and some unhappy,
3:26:48–3:26:51and one who is happy here may be unhappy elsewhere.
3:26:52–3:26:59Udwaah Succont, 111, such subtle order does not accord with chance, mere inherent nature,
3:26:59–3:27:05or a limited agent lacking omniscience and omnipotence. The knowledge and power of planetary
3:27:05–3:27:11deities and guardians of directions are limited, therefore they cannot know and construct the
3:27:11–3:27:18entire world. Even the complete design of a single body cannot at any one time be easily
3:27:18–3:27:23imagined by the mind much less the design of the entire universe. Therefore Brahman alone
3:27:23–3:27:29is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origination, continuance, and dissolution of the
3:27:29–3:27:36world. Thus the remaining sentence of the Sutra is completed. That is Brahman, granted. But why
3:27:36–3:27:42Why should the expression birth and so forth be understood as referring only to origination,
3:27:42–3:27:44continuance, and dissolution?
3:27:44–3:27:49Why not to such modifications of being as growth, transformation, and decay?
3:27:49–3:27:55The answer is that all the other modifications of being are included within these three.
3:27:55–3:27:59Therefore only origination, continuance, and dissolution are stated here.
3:27:59–3:28:03Ghasca enumerates six modifications of being.
3:28:03–3:28:10It is born, it exists, it grows, it changes form, it declines, and it perishes.
3:28:10–3:28:15But growth and the like occur during the period in which the world continues to exist, hence
3:28:15–3:28:21a doubt might arise that the world's origination, continuance, and dissolution from the primal
3:28:21–3:28:24cause are not clearly indicated.
3:28:24–3:28:30In order to remove this doubt, the three origination from Brahman, Continuance in Brahman and
3:28:30–3:28:33Dissolution into Brahman are principally intended.
3:28:33–3:28:39Growth is the increase of parts, just as from two threads a large cloth having many parts
3:28:39–3:28:45is produced, so growth is in fact included under origination.
3:28:45–3:28:50Transformation is said to be of three kinds according to the characteristics of Dharma.
3:28:50–3:28:563rd Y. H. Sarkont 112. Change of state and change of characteristic
3:28:56–3:29:02are likewise fundamentally forms of origination. For example, when a bracelet is made in the
3:29:02–3:29:07substratum that is gold, this is a change in the characteristic of the dharma, it is
3:29:07–3:29:13simply the origination of the bracelet. Similarly, the present existence and the like of the
3:29:13–3:29:18bracelet constitute change of characteristic, this too is origination. Difference is
3:29:18–3:29:24As such as newness and oldness constitute change of state, this also is origination.
3:29:24–3:29:29Decay is the diminution of parts and therefore is included under destruction.
3:29:29–3:29:34Thus as appropriate, growth and the like are included within origination and the rest,
3:29:34–3:29:37hence they are not mentioned separately.
3:29:37–3:29:42Even if it be granted that these are not included within origination and the rest,
3:29:42–3:29:47it would still be proper to mention only origination, continuance and dissolution
3:29:47–3:29:52because the Vedic sentence from which these beings are born and so forth, would thereby
3:29:52–3:29:57be recalled and Brahman would be ascertained as the primal cause of the world, otherwise
3:29:57–3:30:00by taking origination exist.
3:30:00–3:30:30नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप ना
3:30:30–3:30:36cannot be admitted to proceed from any cause other than unconscious Pradhana, Atoms, Non-Existence,
3:30:36–3:30:41an embodied J.E.D.Va or the Omniscient and Omnipotent Lord, nor can it arise merely
3:30:41–3:30:47from the intrinsic nature of things, because dependence upon a particular place, time
3:30:47–3:30:54and cause is observed here. Those who infer the Lord's causal agency regard this inference
3:30:54–3:31:00as proof of the existence and other attributes of a Lord distinct from embodied Jeevas.
3:31:00–3:31:05Granted that if origination alone is stated, continuance and dissolution are necessarily
3:31:05–3:31:11understood, then what is the purpose of the word's birth and so forth in the sutra?
3:31:11–3:31:16The answer is, Brahman is the cause of birth and so forth and so on.
3:31:16–3:31:22By this expression Brahman's status as the material cause is indicated, mere origination
3:31:22–3:31:27is common also to an efficient cause and therefore does not make material causality
3:31:27–3:31:32clear. The purpose of the previously mentioned special cause and effect has been stated in
3:31:32–3:31:39the sentence, the world endowed with the characteristics described above, and so forth. By this passage
3:31:39–3:31:44the nature of the Brahman proposed in the thesis has been established in the form of
3:31:44–3:31:50a defining characteristic, the means of knowing it will be stated subsequently.
3:31:50–3:31:57R. Y. H. Sarkont, 114. Nor is it the case that in the sutra from which the birth and
3:31:57–3:32:03so forth of this world proceed the very same subject has again merely been stated as a
3:32:03–3:32:09thesis. The purpose of the sutras is to string together the Vedanta sentences on one thread
3:32:09–3:32:15like a garland of flowers. For the inquiry, inter and confirmation of the realization
3:32:15–3:32:20of Brahman proceed precisely on the basis of those Vedanta sentences which are made
3:32:20–3:32:26the subject of the sutras. The Nayakas say that a subject admitted as possible in a thesis
3:32:26–3:32:32can be established by proof, but no proof can save a thesis that is contradicted the
3:32:32–3:32:37moment it is stated, as in a barren woman is a mother. For this reason origination
3:32:37–3:32:42and so forth are taken as the ground of the thesis. The Vaisheshikas and others
3:32:42–3:32:49also infer the Lord on this basis. The commentator says this in order to establish firmly these
3:32:49–3:32:55grounds as reasons supporting the thesis by this inference, and so forth. By saying here
3:32:55–3:33:01also, the question is raised when the subject under discussion has been concluded by this
3:33:01–3:33:06context. Why is a question about the subject of the next context raised through the example
3:33:06–3:33:11of a friend's capacity? The answer is that the Sutras are intended to arrange
3:33:11–3:33:18In order the purport of the Vedanta Sentences, through Inquiry into the Vedanta Sentences,
3:33:18–3:33:23the twofold of Eidia concealment and latent impression is destroyed and the manifestation
3:33:23–3:33:28of Brahman, that is, Realization, is accomplished.
3:33:28–3:33:35Udvayah Sukhant 115 at the end of the Treaties, as soon as the Inquiry into the
3:33:35–3:33:41meaning of the Vedanta Sentences is completed, the manifestation of Brahman is accomplished,
3:33:41–3:33:46It is not accomplished by inference or other independent means of knowledge.
3:33:46–3:33:51Nevertheless, in order to confirm the meaning of the Vedanta sentences that declare the
3:33:51–3:33:57cause of the world's origination, inference too is a means of knowledge so long as it
3:33:57–3:34:03does not contradict Vedanta because scripture itself regards reasoning as an aid.
3:34:03–3:34:08Truti says, It is to be heard and reflected upon, and the learned and intelligent man
3:34:08–3:34:13reaches the country of Gannhar that is one who has a teacher receive assistance from his
3:34:13–3:34:19own intelligence. If it is said that in regard to this Brahman there is no means of knowledge
3:34:19–3:34:25other than verbal testimony, then whence would reflection arise, and whence realization of
3:34:25–3:34:31Brahman, the answer is that there are the Vedanta sentences. Here inference is to be
3:34:31–3:34:36understood as of the kind that does not conflict with Vedanta and depends upon
3:34:36–3:34:42Vedanta. A reasoned determination that does not contradict fervourable testimony and proceeds
3:34:42–3:34:48on its basis is called reflection. Reasoning may take the form either of inference or of
3:34:48–3:34:50postulation.
3:34:50–3:34:57Aadwaya H. Sukhant 116. It is not the case with the desire to know Brahman as it is
3:34:57–3:35:00with the desire to no de-harm up where shrewd.
3:35:00–3:35:30श्रूथि आन्दलाएक लोगना, मेंजाव नोलज़, फिर्ष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्व
3:35:30–3:35:35particular modification of the inner organ, namely realization of Brahman. The fruit
3:35:35–3:35:41of this means of knowledge is the manifestation of Brahman's own nature when Avila idea has
3:35:41–3:35:47been removed. The word fruit is used figuratively because this is not something newly produced
3:35:47–3:35:53or refined. In the inquiry into de-harmat perception and other forms of experience
3:35:53–3:35:59function as auxiliary aids, not directly but in the inquiry into Brahman. Experience
3:35:59–3:36:06that is, realization functions directly. The subject of the Inquiry into Brahman is Brahman
3:36:06–3:36:12itself which is accessible to experience. Therefore it is said knowledge of Brahman culminates
3:36:12–3:36:18in experience. Experience of Brahman, that is, realization of Brahman, is the supreme
3:36:18–3:36:24human end because after all suffering has been destroyed it is of the nature of supreme
3:36:24–3:36:34Udhsakont 117 and the object of Brahma knowledge is an existent thing. In the case of what ought
3:36:34–3:36:40to be done only scripture has authority because it does not depend upon experience and the existence
3:36:40–3:36:46of what ought to be done depends upon a person's action. A worldly or Vedic action may be done,
3:36:46–3:36:51not done, or done otherwise as one may go on horseback, on foot, in another way,
3:36:51–3:36:57or not go at all. Likewise injunctions and prohibitions such as use 16 vessels in the
3:36:57–3:37:04Ataratra do not use 16 vessels offer after sunrise, offer before sunrise are meaningful
3:37:04–3:37:10as alternatives, general rules and exceptions. Granted that the object of inquiry is the
3:37:10–3:37:16experience of Brahman but the objection that Brahman cannot be its object is answered
3:37:16–3:37:21by, and the object of Brahma knowledge is an existent thing. The relation of Noah and
3:37:21–3:37:27known is a false form of a mental modification belonging to the realm of the world. Knowledge
3:37:27–3:37:34of Dihama does not culminate in such experience, because experience of Dihama is not itself
3:37:34–3:37:39a human end. The fruit attained by observing Dihama is the human end.
3:37:39–3:37:45Verbal testimony determines the performance of de-harm-up experience is unnecessary.
3:37:45–3:37:51Ad-Y-H Sarkont 118 An object does not admit alternatives such
3:37:51–3:37:56as in this way or not in this way exists or does not exist.
3:37:56–3:38:01Alternatives depend upon human intelligence but knowledge of the true nature of an
3:38:01–3:38:06object depends not upon human intelligence but upon the object itself.
3:38:06–3:38:12Regarding one and the same post, true cognition cannot be both this is a post and this is a
3:38:12–3:38:13man.
3:38:13–3:38:16This is a post or some other man is erroneous cognition.
3:38:16–3:38:21This is certainly a post is true cognition because it depends upon the object.
3:38:21–3:38:26Therefore the validity concerning an existent object is object-jubbant.
3:38:26–3:38:32What is to be done is not presently existent as such because it is not yet determined.
3:38:32–3:38:38The existence of what ought to be done depends upon the person who performs the action.
3:38:38–3:38:42Agency in worldly and Vedic action depends upon the person, and therefore the act may
3:38:42–3:38:44be done or not done.
3:38:44–3:38:50Going by horse and the like shows the indeterminacy of worldly action, while provisions concerning
3:38:50–3:38:55vessels in the Ataratra and the like show the indeterminacy of Vedic action.
3:38:55–3:39:01A person has freedom concerning what ought to be done, therefore injunction and prohibition
3:39:01–3:39:06are meaningful because doing or abandoning an act is under his control. It should be
3:39:06–3:39:11used as an injunction, it should not be used as a prohibition. The rule of offering before
3:39:11–3:39:16or after sunrise, the prohibition against touching a human bone, and the special rule
3:39:16–3:39:21that one guilty of Brahmin killing should wear an ornament made of such bone, these
3:39:21–3:39:27are injunctions and prohibitions of this kind. They are meaningful as alternatives,
3:39:27–3:39:34general rules and exceptions. If two mutually contradictory rules of equal force apply in
3:39:34–3:39:39one place, an alternative is unavoidable. The general prohibition against touching human
3:39:39–3:39:46bone is overridden by the special rule concerning an ornament for one guilty of Brahmin killing.
3:39:46–3:39:51Therefore here there is not an alternative but an exception. Only through injunction
3:39:51–3:39:57and prohibition is established such a previously unattained but producible state of affairs
3:39:57–3:40:00regarding which a person is free to act or
3:40:01–3:40:02Refrain. UD.
3:40:02–3:40:12UDWH Succont 11919. It is not so with existence things, hence it is said an object does not admit alternatives this way or that way.
3:40:12–3:40:20Existent or non-existent. Here alternative concerning the existence of a substance is denied.
3:40:20–3:40:25that alternatives are also seen regarding an existent thing, as in this is a post or
3:40:25–3:40:32a man. How then can it be said that the object does not admit alternatives? The answer is,
3:40:32–3:40:37the alternative occurs in a person's inner organ. Doubt and error depend upon the inner
3:40:37–3:40:42organ and its impressions, like a dream upon the mind alone, or upon the combined
3:40:42–3:40:48activity of mind, senses, and impressions. Doubt whether a post is a man, or the illusion
3:40:48–3:40:54of a man in a post does not depend upon the actual post or man, it depends upon apprehension
3:40:54–3:41:00of a substratum possessing common features. Therefore doubt and error do not alter the
3:41:00–3:41:06object's nature. True cognition depends not upon the intellect but upon the object. Therefore
3:41:06–3:41:12the nature of the object is determined by valid cognition, not by doubt and the like.
3:41:12–3:41:20Y. H. Sarkont. 120. Then Brahman knowledge too is object governed because its object is
3:41:20–3:41:25an existent thing. If it is an existent thing, Brahman must be the object of other means
3:41:25–3:41:31of knowledge would inquire into Vedanta sentences then not become pointless. No, because
3:41:31–3:41:36Brahman is not an object of the senses and therefore its relation is not apprehended
3:41:36–3:41:43through other means of knowledge. The senses naturally apprehend their objects, not Brahman.
3:41:43–3:41:48If Brahman were an object of the senses, the senses would apprehend its causal relation.
3:41:48–3:41:54Here the question arises. Sentences about existent things are often mere statements,
3:41:54–3:42:00as in there is fruit on the riverbank. Vedanta sentences to concern an existent thing would
3:42:00–3:42:04they then be only repetitions of what is known through other means?
3:42:04–3:42:10No. An inference based on the origination and so forth of the world has been mentioned
3:42:10–3:42:16as another means concerning Brahman, but it does not reveal Brahman's complete nature.
3:42:16–3:42:21The purpose of Vedantai is direct knowledge of the non-dual nature of Brahman, which
3:42:21–3:42:26is impossible through the senses or independent inference. When it has not been understood
3:42:26–3:42:32whether the relation is with Brahman or with something else, no determination can be
3:42:32–3:42:38made. Therefore the sutra from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed is not intended to
3:42:38–3:42:45indicate an inference, but to point out Vedanta sentences. Which Vedanta sentence is indicated
3:42:45–3:42:52by this sutra? Brih, the son of Varuna, approached his father Varuna and said, revered sir, teach me
3:42:52–3:42:58Brahman. Beginning from this, it is said, desire to know that from which these beings are born,
3:42:58–3:43:04by which when born they live and into which they finally enter. That is Brahman. This is the
3:43:04–3:43:10decisive statement concerning the matter. From bliss indeed these beings are born by bliss when
3:43:10–3:43:16born they live. Into bliss they enter is also a decisive statement. Other Vedanta passages can
3:43:16–3:43:22likewise be cited that teach Brahmins eternally pure, eternally conscious, eternally free
3:43:22–3:43:26nature and its character as the omniscient cause.
3:43:26–3:43:30Udhya Hsukhant, 121.
3:43:30–3:43:34We have already discussed this matter in detail in the Naya Akhanika.
3:43:34–3:43:40It will also be made clear later that because they have an existent thing as their subject,
3:43:40–3:43:43Vedanta sentences are not mere repetitions.
3:43:43–3:43:45Thus everything is clear.
3:43:45–3:43:51Shruti shows origination by from which continuance by by which when born they live
3:43:51–3:43:54and dissolution by into which they enter.
3:43:54–3:43:58The statement this is the decisive sentence on the matter removes the possibility that
3:43:58–3:44:01Pradhana or the like might be intended.
3:44:01–3:44:04The decisive statement is from Bliss indeed.
3:44:04–3:44:10That is, just as a rope together with Avitha idea is the material cause of the snake.
3:44:10–3:44:14The snake appears while the rope exists and dissolves into the rope.
3:44:14–3:44:19So Brahman together with Avitha idea is the material cause of the world.
3:44:19–3:44:25world abides in Brahman and dissolves into Brahman. Because it is the source of Scripture,
3:44:25–3:44:30I describe in causality with respect to the world, it has been indicated that Brahman
3:44:30–3:44:36is omniscient. To make this firm it is said, because it is the source of Scripture. Brahman
3:44:36–3:44:41is the source, that is, the cause of the vast body of Scripture consisting of the
3:44:41–3:44:46rigvila and the rest, filled with innumerable branches of learning and illuminating all
3:44:46–3:44:52things like a torch, a body of scripture that is comparable to an un-missint being. Such
3:44:52–3:44:57a body of scripture, consisting of the riggedet and the rest and possessing the quality of
3:44:57–3:45:00a missience, can arise only from an un-missint
3:45:30–3:46:00लोव भीझिंख, विमन भीझिंग, दिस्टिंक्छनजद वाशाना अश्रामा, अद्विश्ख़न्चद, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक �
3:46:00–3:46:05through funeral rites and teach truths concerning Brahman. It is great because
3:46:05–3:46:10it concerns great subjects and also because it is complete with many limbs
3:46:10–3:46:15and subsidiary limbs. Hence it is said filled with innumerable branches of
3:46:15–3:46:21learning, Purana, Naya, Mimamsa and the rest constitute ten branches of
3:46:21–3:46:25learning each in its own way supplements the Vedas. This also removes
3:46:25–3:46:31doubts concerning the authority of Scripture because all competent persons accept it. The
3:46:31–3:46:37authors of the Puranas and the rest are great sages by elaborating the meaning of the Vedda
3:46:37–3:46:42in their respective works and practicing it with faith. They accept the authority of
3:46:42–3:46:48the Vedda. This scripture does not fail to instruct, nor does it give obscure instruction,
3:46:48–3:46:53otherwise its authority would be doubtful. Therefore it is said, illuminating all things
3:46:53–3:46:59like a torch. It illuminates every subject in every way, therefore it neither fails to
3:46:59–3:47:04instruct nor instructs obscurely. For this reason it is like an omniscient being. The
3:47:04–3:47:10knowledge of an omniscient being reaches all subjects, and the subject matter of scripture
3:47:10–3:47:16likewise extends to all things, therefore the comparison is appropriate.
3:47:16–3:47:24by H. Succonte, 123, having stated the co-presence of cause and effect. The corresponding co-absence
3:47:24–3:47:30is now stated, indeed, of such a scripture. The distinctive feature of an omniscient being
3:47:30–3:47:36is knowledge of all subjects. Scripture too has this quality because its subject matter
3:47:36–3:47:42reaches everything. This is established by example when a treatise with an extensive
3:47:42–3:47:48subject matter arises from a particular person, that person possesses knowledge more extensive
3:47:48–3:47:54than that treatise. Even today, when someone writes a treatise covering many subjects, the
3:47:54–3:47:57speaker's knowledge is broader than what he states.
3:47:57–3:48:02Subtle distinctions among things can be experienced but cannot be fully expressed
3:48:02–3:48:08in words, just as the difference in sweetness among sugarcane juice, milk, and jaggery
3:48:08–3:48:14is experienced but cannot be clearly stated in speech. The word extensive shows that the
3:48:14–3:48:20subject matter of a statement may be broad but cannot equal the speaker's knowledge.
3:48:20–3:48:25The conclusion is drawn by the application what need is there to say, what need is there
3:48:25–3:48:30to state the unique omission and omnipotence of that great person from whom the Vedda
3:48:30–3:48:36arises as effortlessly at his breath. The expression divided into many branches applies
3:48:36–3:48:42from divided in diverse forms through origination. The conclusion begins with of that great person
3:48:42–3:48:48and continues through omnipotence. With very little effort means almost without effort,
3:48:48–3:48:54as in the saying, barley pudding is not salty. What divine sages cannot accomplish even with
3:48:54–3:48:59great effort. Brahman accomplishes playfully with almost no effort, from this his incomparable
3:48:59–3:49:05omniscience and omnipotence are established. Trutti concerning the effortless origination of
3:49:05–3:49:10the Vedda is also cited of this great person and so forth.
3:49:10–3:49:16Ad-Y-H Sarkhant, 124 Even the Mimamsakas who hold phonemes to be
3:49:16–3:49:23eternal must accept the non-eternality of words and sentences. A word consists of phonemes in a
3:49:23–3:49:29particular sequence and a sentence of words in a particular sequence. Sequence is a property
3:49:29–3:49:36of manifestation, not of the phonemes themselves, since phonemes are eternal and all-pervasive.
3:49:36–3:49:42No temporal or spatial relation of earlier and later is possible among them.
3:49:42–3:49:46Manifestation is non-eternal. Then even if the manifestation of phonemes be eternal,
3:49:46–3:49:51how can wordhood be eternal? Once words are non-eternal, sentences and the rest are
3:49:51–3:49:57likewise proved to be non-eternal, the repetition of words is like the imitation
3:49:57–3:49:59of a dance. The pupil follows the sequence.
3:50:00–3:50:30तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो �
3:50:30–3:50:35those who hold phonemes eternal and those who hold them non-eternal. The difference of opinion
3:50:35–3:50:42concerns only whether complete human freedom is to be admitted with respect to Vedic sentences.
3:50:42–3:50:47The follows of J. Y. E. M. I. N. E. who do not accept creation and dissolution,
3:50:47–3:50:53hold Vedic study through an eternal and uninterrupted succession of teachers and pupils.
3:50:53–3:50:58Followers of Vyasa hold, in accordance with the doctrine of creation and dissolution
3:50:58–3:51:05established by Shruti, Asemriti, Itihasa and the like, that the Supreme Self, omniscient
3:51:05–3:51:10and omnipotent as the cause associated with the beginningless of Eidia, is the creator
3:51:10–3:51:15of the eternal Vedda nevertheless, he preserves the sequence of the Vedda in conformity with
3:51:15–3:51:17the preceding creation.
3:51:17–3:51:26Adwa H. Sarkant, 125 This is just as sacrifice and Brahmin slaying, though they are illusory
3:51:26–3:51:31effects of Brahman, do not change their nature in a new creation the former remains the cause
3:51:31–3:51:37of a good result and the latter of an evil result. In no creation does Brahman's slaying
3:51:37–3:51:43become a cause of merit, nor did Ashamed her a cause of sin, just as fire never wets
3:51:43–3:51:49and water never burns. Likewise, in this creation the study of the Vedda in its fixed
3:51:49–3:51:55order is a cause of welfare and liberation, while study in a contrary order is harmful
3:51:55–3:52:01and becomes the cause of a verbal fault like a thunderbolt, so it remains in other creations
3:52:01–3:52:06as well. Therefore the omniscient and omnipotent Creator composes the Vedda in conformity with
3:52:06–3:52:12the preceding creation. In this sense he does not possess arbitrary freedom. The followers
3:52:12–3:52:18of J. Y. E. Mai Neath understand by the word Aparushaya the absence of complete freedom
3:52:18–3:52:23on the part of an author. This is acceptable in our view also, though the purpose
3:52:23–3:52:30is different, nor is the objection valid that something revealed by a person cannot be accepted
3:52:30–3:52:36as scripture. A statement made by a person afflicted by many defects is unreliable, but
3:52:36–3:52:41the Word of One who knows the truth and is free from every defect is certainly trustworthy.
3:52:41–3:52:47The statements of persons enowed with de-harmot wisdom, dispassion, and lordly power such
3:52:47–3:52:53as Prajapati and the Divine Seers of the First Creation are trustworthy. Their true
3:52:53–3:52:58knowledge is certain and the faith of later people arises from their faith. Thus Brahmins
3:52:58–3:53:04being the source of scripture, the Vedas are Paurushaya character and its authority all
3:53:04–3:53:06become intelligible.
3:53:06–3:53:14Adwayah Sakkant 126 A second interpretation is this, the previously described body of
3:53:14–3:53:19scripture consisting of the Rig Veda and the rest is the source, that is, the means
3:53:19–3:53:24of valid knowledge, of true knowledge concerning Brahman. It is solely through the authority
3:53:24–3:53:29of scripture that Brahman is known as the cause of the origination and so forth of the
3:53:29–3:53:35world. In the preceding sutra, the shruti passage from which these beings are born
3:53:35–3:53:41and so forth, had been cited. If scriptures being the source had already been established
3:53:41–3:53:46there, what is the purpose of this sutra? The answer is that scripture was not explicitly
3:53:46–3:53:51stated there to be a means of knowledge. It was possible to suppose that the sutra from
3:53:51–3:53:58which the origination of the world merely indicated an inference. To remove this doubt, this sutra
3:53:58–3:54:04explicitly states because it is the source of scripture. That is, from examples of produced
3:54:04–3:54:10things in the experienced world, the existence of Brahman can be inferred, but regarding
3:54:10–3:54:15the true nature of Brahman, shrutu alone is the means of knowledge. The meaning of
3:54:15–3:54:21The commentary is clear. That is, the Gemadi Sutra does not merely indicate an inference.
3:54:21–3:54:26The succeeding Sutra, because it is the source of scripture, determines the meaning of the
3:54:26–3:54:33first by relying upon scripture. The defining characteristic has been stated from that characteristic,
3:54:33–3:54:38Brahman's existence in general may be known by inference. But knowledge of Brahman's
3:54:38–3:54:44specific and extraordinary nature comes only from scripture. Therefore scripture is
3:54:44–3:54:49the means of knowledge and Brahman is the subject of the Vedanta sentences.
3:54:49–3:54:57Advaith Sarkant 127 Again the question arises, when Brahman is the subject of scriptural
3:54:57–3:55:00testimony what is the purpose of inquiring?
3:55:00–3:55:30विचार-विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ
3:55:30–3:55:36of Vedanta is determined through the sequence of hearing, reflection and deep contemplation.
3:55:36–3:55:41Therefore the author of the sutras begins the inquiry into Brahman while remaining subordinate
3:55:41–3:55:47to scriptural testimony, not by reasoning independent of scripture.
3:55:47–3:55:53Advaishsakant 128 Again the question arises when it has been
3:55:53–3:55:58shown that scripture exists for the purpose of action and therefore a sentence that
3:55:58–3:56:03serves no purpose of action is meaningless. How can scripture be called a means of knowledge
3:56:03–3:56:09concerning Brahman? Vedanta would then have no use. What had earlier been stated merely
3:56:09–3:56:15as a thesis that scripture is a means of knowledge concerning Brahman is established in this
3:56:15–3:56:22sutra. With again, how and so forth, the commentator begins the poor vapaksha. How
3:56:22–3:56:26indicates the objection Vedanta would be regarded as meaningless because it does
3:56:26–3:56:33not enjoin a human end since it teaches Brahman, who by nature is pure conscious, and indifferent,
3:56:33–3:56:39and in whom there is nothing to be rejected or accepted. Further, because Vedanta concerns
3:56:39–3:56:45an already existent thing it would, like a secular sentence, become merely a restatement
3:56:45–3:56:50and would not remain an independent means of knowledge, but it is not proper to think
3:56:50–3:56:56so Vedanta is not fruitless, because a result follows from the injunction to study it.
3:56:56–3:57:02it may serve as an auxiliary by making known the agent, deity, and other factors required
3:57:02–3:57:08in the injunction with which it is connected, or it may enjoin some other action such as
3:57:08–3:57:09meditation.
3:57:09–3:57:15An independent instruction concerning the nature of an existent thing is impossible, because
3:57:15–3:57:20an existent thing is the object of perception and other means of knowledge.
3:57:20–3:57:24Thus the poor Vapaksha intends that the authority and utility of Vedanta would
3:57:24–3:57:30become dependent on other means of knowledge. The citation of J.Y.E. Mayniz Sutra is meant
3:57:30–3:57:36to strengthen the poor Vapakshat, not to present it as the final doctrine.
3:57:36–3:57:43Adwayah Sakkant, 129. Use here means the absence of uselessness and the production
3:57:43–3:57:49of independent knowledge, because Vedanta in the form of a restatement is opposed to depend
3:57:49–3:57:55upon another means of knowledge. From therefore through or it may enjoy some other action such
3:57:55–3:58:01as meditation is the combined statement of the poor vapaksha. From certainly impossible through
3:58:01–3:58:07or it may be understood in this way is its analysis. If the independent authority of Vedanta is not
3:58:07–3:58:13accepted it will become merely an auxiliary to an injunction or will be understood as
3:58:13–3:58:18in joining an action such as meditation, in this way it will cease to be an independent
3:58:18–3:58:24means of knowledge of Brahman. Granted that Vedanta is not an auxiliary to action, even
3:58:24–3:58:31so its purport concerning the nature of Brahman may be understood as subordinate to an injunction.
3:58:31–3:58:37The final sutra of J. Y. E. Miney's doctrine also supports this view because it forms
3:58:37–3:58:43a single sentence with the injunction. It praises the injunction. Mantras such as Agni
3:58:43–3:58:49cooks the food mention and action or its instrument accordingly. No where is any purpose established
3:58:49–3:58:55for a Vedic sentence unrelated to an injunction. There can be no injunction concerning the
3:58:55–3:59:01nature of an already existent thing because the subject of an injunction is action.
3:59:01–3:59:06Nevertheless the answer is this. Vedanta intends to reveal the nature of Brahman
3:59:06–3:59:12and its usefulness lies in this knowledge, it need not be subordinated to an injunction
3:59:12–3:59:18of action. Even though its subject is an existent thing, Vedanta reveals the previously unknown
3:59:18–3:59:24nature of Brahman. The rule concerning unity of sentence with an injunction applies only
3:59:24–3:59:29where the sentence is actually the constituent of an injunction to action. Brahman's
3:59:29–3:59:35sentences are not of this kind. Every injunction concerns some future act that does not
3:59:35–3:59:41yet exist and is to be produced. Injunctions concerning result, application, procedure
3:59:41–3:59:48and origination may be mutually related but not in relation to the already existent Brahman.
3:59:48–3:59:54Therefore it is not proper to make Vedantine auxiliary to an injunction of action, but that
3:59:54–3:59:56because of the harmonious purport.
3:59:56–4:00:00Ad-YAH Sarkont, 130.
4:00:00–4:00:30तो रहमेंग तो पोववापक्षा तो तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचा
4:00:30–4:00:35without a second, the Self alone was this one only in the beginning. This Brahman is
4:00:35–4:00:40without before and after, without within and without. This Self is Brahman, the
4:00:40–4:00:45experiencer of all. The immortal Brahman alone is in all directions. Many such
4:00:45–4:00:49sentences teach one and the same Brahman. The sentence from which these
4:00:49–4:00:53beings are born has already been quoted to state the cause of the
4:00:53–4:00:58origination, continuance, and dissolution of the world. It need not be
4:00:58–4:01:04repeated here. According to the rule of interpretation, the subject on which the beginning and end
4:01:04–4:01:10of a passage agree is taken to be its principal purport. In the context of the Upanshu sacrifice
4:01:10–4:01:16too, the purport is determined through the unity of the preceding and succeeding sentences.
4:01:16–4:01:21Thus the entire section beginning with existence alone, my dear, was this in the beginning
4:01:21–4:01:26and ending with that Thou art teaches Brahman alone, namely Brahman non-different from
4:01:26–4:01:33individual self. Therefore Vedanta's independent status as a means of knowledge of Brahman is
4:01:33–4:01:38established by this harmonious convergence. Thus when a definite harmonious convergence
4:01:38–4:01:44concerning the nature of Brahman is recognized in the sentences of these texts, it is not
4:01:44–4:01:49proper to suppose that they have some other purport for doing so would involve the fault
4:01:49–4:01:54of abandoning what is directly stated and imagining what has not been stated. Nor can
4:01:54–4:02:00it be said that the purpose of these sentences is to describe the nature of the agent, deity,
4:02:00–4:02:06and the like, because Shruti, in passages such as then by what and whom would one see, negates
4:02:06–4:02:09action, cause, and result.
4:02:09–4:02:16Advaayah Sakkant 131 Although Brahman is an already existent reality,
4:02:16–4:02:21Brahman is not the object of perception and the like, in that thou art, it is stated
4:02:21–4:02:27that Brahman is the self itself. Therefore Brahman cannot be understood without examining
4:02:27–4:02:32the preceding and succeeding sentences. When in this very context the purport of the other
4:02:32–4:02:38sentences is likewise established as Brahman, it would be an unwarranted proliferation to
4:02:38–4:02:43posit some unseen second purport. To suppose a purport concerning an agent and the like
4:02:43–4:02:49would be not merely unseen but impossible. The poor Vapakshin says that because Vedanta
4:02:49–4:02:55refers to an already existent thing, its dependence on something else must be admitted. But such
4:02:55–4:03:01dependence arises not because the thing exists already, but because a sentence is a human
4:03:01–4:03:06composition. Perception and the other means that convey knowledge of existent things
4:03:06–4:03:12also have existent things as their objects. Yet their authority is not destroyed because
4:03:12–4:03:18they arise from fixed causes such as the senses. Likewise, because the Vedda does
4:03:18–4:03:24not depend upon human intelligence. It is self-allied. Someone may say that even if the
4:03:24–4:03:30Aparushaya character of the Vedda is established, its authority regarding an existent thing
4:03:30–4:03:35is not thereby established because a person may know an existent thing through another
4:03:35–4:03:41means of knowledge and compose a sentence accordingly. But this is not possible regarding
4:03:41–4:03:46what ought to be done because duty is something new, is not the object of another means
4:03:46–4:03:51of knowledge and not having been previously experienced, does not enter the human mind
4:03:51–4:03:58of itself. Therefore the Vedda that enjoins action is regarded as a powerushaya and authoritative.
4:03:58–4:04:03To this argument we ask, O long-lived one, what exactly is this duty that cannot be known
4:04:03–4:04:08by a human being? If it is said to be an unseen potency or a perva, then how could
4:04:08–4:04:13it be understood from the loplative and other injunctive suffixes? A perva is
4:04:13–4:04:19not perceptible to the senses, and consequently the relation of the word to it is not previously
4:04:19–4:04:26known. In ordinary usage an injunctive suffix conveys only the obligaturness of an experienced
4:04:26–4:04:27action.
4:04:27–4:04:35R. Y. H. Sarkont. 132. If it is said that from one who desires heaven should sacrifice,
4:04:35–4:04:40the person desiring heaven understands that a sacrifice ought to be performed as a means
4:04:40–4:04:45to obtaining heaven, then how can a momentary act produce heaven in the future? To remove
4:04:45–4:04:51this difficulty, a pervert is postulated on the basis of the Vedas, but by the same reasoning
4:04:51–4:04:56a pervert would also have to be admitted in Buddhist statements concerning Chaitiyas
4:04:56–4:04:59and the like, and then those two would be proved up our Ruchayya.
4:05:00–4:05:04विचार-विमर्डिंग आपाषाक साहित्य, अपाषाक साहित्य, अपाषाक साहित्य,
4:05:04–4:05:08अपाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता,
4:05:08–4:05:13कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता,
4:05:13–4:05:22The answer to this objection is that the Aparushaya character of the Veda is not based solely on its disclosure of a perva.
4:05:22–4:05:30Its detailed establishment has been given elsewhere. Here it is enough to say that once its Aparushaya character has been established,
4:05:30–4:05:37Vedaanta does not depend on another means of knowledge even with respect to the already existent Brahman.
4:05:37–4:05:42Brahman. Brahman is not known by any other means. The identity of the J. E. Diva with
4:05:42–4:05:48Brahman is understood only from Vedanta. The second reason of the poor Vapaksha, knowledge
4:05:48–4:05:54of what is neither to be accepted nor rejected is fruitless, is likewise and sound. Through
4:05:54–4:05:59knowledge of the Self as Brahman, all obstruction is destroyed and the Supreme Human End is
4:05:59–4:06:05attained. Knowledge of deities and the like, though auxiliary to meditation, is
4:06:05–4:06:10not opposed to this knowledge of Brahman. It is not possible to treat Vedanta as merely
4:06:10–4:06:16an auxiliary to an injunction of meditation concerning Brahman. Meditation necessarily
4:06:16–4:06:22involves distinctions among the meditator meditation and the object meditated upon
4:06:22–4:06:28but Brahman is one alone and is devoid of all distinctions of acceptance, rejection
4:06:28–4:06:33and the like. Once knowledge of oneness has arisen, the real emergence of the cognition
4:06:33–4:06:38of duality is impossible, therefore knowledge of Brahman cannot be made a limb of an injunction
4:06:38–4:06:40to meditation.
4:06:40–4:06:48Adwayah Sarkant 133 A human purpose is of two kinds, one is to obtain something not yet
4:06:48–4:06:54obtained, the other is to experience as obtained something that is in fact already obtained
4:06:54–4:06:58but is mistakenly regarded as unobtained.
4:06:58–4:07:04to is of two kinds, rejection of something that has not actually been removed, and rejection
4:07:04–4:07:09through knowledge of something that has in fact already been removed but is mistakenly
4:07:09–4:07:15regarded through superimposition as still present. The performance of an external means obtains
4:07:15–4:07:20something not yet obtained or removes something not yet discarded. Mere knowledge does not
4:07:20–4:07:26remove a real snake actually present, but a superimposed thing where what is obtained
4:07:26–4:07:31is regarded as unobtained, or what has been discarded as undiscarded is removed by true
4:07:31–4:07:37knowledge alone. Just as a snake is superimposed on a rope, the state of being a J. E. E.
4:07:37–4:07:43E. V. born of ignorance is superimposed upon the nature of Brahman, true knowledge of
4:07:43–4:07:48that thou art destroys this superimposition. Through this knowledge, eternally attained
4:07:48–4:07:53bliss appears as though newly attained, and sorrow and suffering, eternally discarded
4:07:53–4:07:59appear as though now discarded. Through the experience the Self is Brahman. All the Jeev
4:07:59–4:08:04vahs obstructions, namely ignorance and its impressions are quickly destroyed. Then the
4:08:04–4:08:11Supreme Human End, in the form of cessation of suffering and attainment of bliss, is accomplished.
4:08:11–4:08:17It is not acceptable on the basis of meditation-related sentences such as meditate only on the
4:08:17–4:08:22Self or meditate on the Self as truth and bliss. To hold that the soul purport of
4:08:22–4:08:28Vedanta is worship or meditation. In Brahman the distinctions of worshipper object of
4:08:28–4:08:33worship and worship cannot persist because Vedanta destroys the ignorance that is the
4:08:33–4:08:42root of these distinctions. Adwaya H. Sarkant, 134, if it is admitted that Vedanta, though
4:08:42–4:08:47not injunctive in form, is nevertheless a means of knowledge, then an independent
4:08:47–4:08:51sentence such as he cried out would also have to be accepted as authoritative
4:08:51–4:08:58even though it indicates no purpose of acceptance or rejection. In fact, the fruit of a means of
4:08:58–4:09:04knowledge is not only a decision to accept or reject, sometimes the decision to remain indifferent
4:09:04–4:09:09is also the fruit of knowledge. Therefore the authority of knowledge of Brahman need not be
4:09:09–4:09:16linked to an injunction of action. No general rule can be established that elsewhere a Vedic
4:09:16–4:09:22sentence is not authoritative unless connected with an injunction. Knowledge of the self itself
4:09:22–4:09:27culminates in the supreme result. Therefore the authority of Trutie concerning the self cannot
4:09:27–4:09:33be rejected, nor can it be called unnecessary. Like the prohibitory sentence, Silver should not
4:09:33–4:09:40be given on the sacred grass. The entire Vedda is taken up under the injunction to study one's
4:09:40–4:09:46own Vedic recension and is regarded as a means to the human end. Not even one of its letters
4:09:46–4:09:51is fruitless, but merely understanding the meaning of a sentence such as he cried out
4:09:51–4:09:58does not directly accomplish any human end. Such a sentence requires another completing sentence.
4:09:58–4:09:59A prohibitory sentence
4:10:00–4:10:30अछि।
4:10:30–4:10:35Knowledge of Brahman is not obtained through any other means of knowledge, perception,
4:10:35–4:10:40inference, and the like operate only within their respective spheres. Brahman is beyond
4:10:40–4:10:46the senses. If the authority of scripture were itself held to be established by inference,
4:10:46–4:10:52there would arise a need for an example, but ultimately scripture itself is the means
4:10:52–4:10:54of knowledge concerning Brahman.
4:10:54–4:11:03Udh Sakant, 135. Some teachers say that scripture reveals Brahman only as the object of an injunction
4:11:03–4:11:10to meditation. That is, Brahman is not an independently knowable reality but merely the object for
4:11:10–4:11:16worship. This view too is not proper. An intelligent person in the world does not unnecessarily
4:11:16–4:11:21declare a special character of something that is neither to be accepted nor rejected. The
4:11:21–4:11:27The knowledge of Brahman is itself the cause of liberation, hence its description is not
4:11:27–4:11:28purposeless.
4:11:28–4:11:33Akra atapratilavastite, although scripture is the means of knowledge of Brahman, the
4:11:33–4:11:38view is presented that scripture reveals Brahman only through Brahman's being the
4:11:38–4:11:41object of an injunction to realisation.
4:11:41–4:11:45From the conduct of elders it is known that words have their purport in what ought to
4:11:45–4:11:46be done.
4:11:46–4:11:49Some words directly state what is to be done.
4:11:49–4:11:55disclose their own meanings as auxiliaries to what is to be done, but words do not have
4:11:55–4:12:00their purport in an already existent thing. That a word conveys its meaning is understood
4:12:00–4:12:05on the basis of inferring another person's knowledge of the word meaning and of the correspondence
4:12:05–4:12:11of that knowledge with the existence or non-existence of the object. But from knowledge that
4:12:11–4:12:16concerns merely the nature of an existent thing, no sign of activity or cessation
4:12:16–4:12:22is observed. In knowledge of what ought to be done, by contrast, activity or cessation
4:12:22–4:12:27is seen. Therefore the purport of words in what ought to be done is established, not in
4:12:27–4:12:32the mere statement of the nature of Brahman. Vedaanta is called scripture because it forms
4:12:32–4:12:38part of the Vedda. The definition of scripture too applies to that body of sentences which
4:12:38–4:12:44impels a person toward obligatory, occasional or desire motivated actions, or withdraws
4:12:44–4:12:50him from prohibited actions, therefore the view that Veydantar merely teaches the nature
4:12:50–4:12:55of Brahman does not accord with the well-known character of scripture.
4:12:55–4:13:03Ad-Yah Sarkont, 136, nor is the purpose clear of sentences whose purport is only to teach
4:13:03–4:13:08the nature of Brahman. On hearing a sentence such as this is a rope, not a snake, fear
4:13:08–4:13:14disappears. But even after hearing that thou art, the attributes of worldly existence
4:13:14–4:13:20pleasure, pain, fear, and the like remain as before. If the sense of worldly existence
4:13:20–4:13:25disappeared merely upon hearing, why would reflection and deep contemplation be prescribed
4:13:25–4:13:31after hearing? On this basis the poor Vapakshin says that the purpose of Vedantite is the
4:13:31–4:13:36meditation on the self as something to be performed. The injunction to meditate upon
4:13:36–4:13:41one's own self is called Nyoga because it is not known through another means of
4:13:41–4:13:47knowledge, it is a pervert. Without continuous practice of meditation on the self it will
4:13:47–4:13:52not yield its result. Therefore from knowledge of the duty both its object the self and its
4:13:52–4:13:58means meditation are understood. If it is objected that the self itself is the object
4:13:58–4:14:05of the duty, then since the self is self-established how can it become the object of an injunction?
4:14:05–4:14:11The answer is that the particular form of the Self adopted for meditation is not self-established.
4:14:11–4:14:18An injunction of the form meditated upon the Self in the form superimposed here is possible.
4:14:18–4:14:23Just as the sacrificial post, the Ahavaniya fire what other sacrificial implements, though
4:14:23–4:14:29already existent, become limbs of an injunction in scripture through a particular consecration
4:14:29–4:14:35form or relation, so too the Self can become the object of an injunction through a particular
4:14:35–4:14:41relation in the form of meditation. The obligatoriness concerns the practice of meditation. The
4:14:41–4:14:48self is its object. In support of its view, the poor Vapaksha cites many Mimamsaka statements.
4:14:48–4:14:53The purpose of scripture is the instruction of action, and injunction is a statement
4:14:53–4:14:58that impels activity. The meaning of a word that makes known an existent thing remains
4:14:58–4:15:00connected with an injunction of...
4:15:00–4:15:30आक्षिन, अछिप्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष
4:15:30–4:15:35on Brahman would be enjoined for one who desires immortality. A sentence such as the Noah of
4:15:35–4:15:40Brahman becomes Brahman, though eulogistic, would be taken as indicating the qualified
4:15:40–4:15:46person for that injunction. Here the difference between the fruits of the inquiry into Diharma
4:15:46–4:15:52and the inquiry into Brahman is made clear in the ritual section. Knowledge is sort
4:15:52–4:15:57of Diharma that is yet to be brought into being in Vedanta. Knowledge is sort of
4:15:57–4:16:03eternally established Brahman. The fruit of knowledge of Dihama depends upon performance,
4:16:03–4:16:08whereas the fruit of knowledge of Brahman is accomplished by knowledge itself. This distinction
4:16:08–4:16:14is presented by the Siddhantah side. The Siddhantah says that in sentences such as
4:16:14–4:16:20it is to be seen, the realization of the self is not itself something enjoined. The
4:16:20–4:16:26verb see signifies knowledge and knowledge is object dependent. Its form is not produced
4:16:26–4:16:32according to human choice. Even perception can never be the object of an injunction, because
4:16:32–4:16:37perceptual knowledge arises naturally. Knowledge of the Self is likewise different from the
4:16:37–4:16:43mental action of meditation. The Upi Yujnaishads teach the Self as eternal or missyant or
4:16:43–4:16:48pervading, eternally fulfilled, eternally pure, conscious, free of the nature of
4:16:48–4:16:54knowledge and of the nature of bliss. Through this true knowledge ignorance is destroyed
4:16:54–4:17:00and liberation is attained. If Vedanta were merely an injunction to meditation, the independent
4:17:00–4:17:04teaching of the nature of Brahman would become purposeless.
4:17:04–4:17:12Udvaya H. Sakhont, 138, a factual sentence such as this is a rope, not a snake removes
4:17:12–4:17:18fear born of error in the same way. Knowledge of the truth that the self does not possess
4:17:18–4:17:24the attributes of Samsara removes the error of being subject to Samsara. It may be
4:17:24–4:17:29asked why the error does not disappear merely on hearing. The answer is that hearing means
4:17:29–4:17:35the correct apprehension of the purport of the sentence. Reflection and deep contemplation
4:17:35–4:17:41remove obstructive doubt and contrary habitual notions, not produce some new result of action.
4:17:41–4:17:47The poor Vapak Chin says that pleasure, pain, and the like are still observed after hearing,
4:17:47–4:17:52and therefore knowledge alone is insufficient. The Siddhi Hantar replies that once write
4:17:52–4:17:58knowledge that destroys ignorance has arisen. The reality of being subject to Samsara comes
4:17:58–4:18:04to an end, even though bodily and other activity due to Prahrabta continues. The knower knows
4:18:04–4:18:09the Self as Brahman. There is a fundamental difference between action and knowledge of
4:18:09–4:18:15Brahman as also between their fruits. Action is performed by body, speech or mind is
4:18:15–4:18:21called Dihama by scripture and SM Riti and its result, in the form of pleasure or pain,
4:18:21–4:18:28is produced and perishable. The fruit of knowledge of Brahman is eternal, bodiless, incomparable,
4:18:28–4:18:34and established by its own nature. It becomes manifest as soon as ignorance is removed.
4:18:34–4:18:39In the fruits of Dihama and Adihama there are gradations of pleasure and pain of pleasure
4:18:39–4:18:44from the human world up to Brahma Loka and of pain down to the lower worlds. All
4:18:44–4:18:49these are produced and perishable. The fruit of knowledge of the self is not graded
4:18:49–4:18:55in this way, liberation is eternal and unproduced. Although knowledge arises through a modification
4:18:55–4:19:02of the mind, its truth depends upon the object. Hearing, reflection, and deep contemplation
4:19:02–4:19:08are means to knowledge and removers of obstacles. They do not newly produce liberation. Liberation
4:19:08–4:19:11is the natural state of the self.
4:19:11–4:19:193rd YAH Sarkant, 139. The mental impression produced by meditation concentrates the mind
4:19:19–4:19:24and may assist knowledge, but the cause of liberation is knowledge of Brahman itself.
4:19:24–4:19:30Just as practice in music increases the capacity to know notes, but the truth of the notes
4:19:30–4:19:36is not created by practice, so meditation may assist knowledge but does not produce
4:19:36–4:19:41liberation, because of the excellence of knowledge and meditation. Those who perform sacrifices
4:19:41–4:19:46and the like may travel by the northern path, but through offerings alone works for public
4:19:46–4:19:52welfare and gifts. They travel by the southern path whose sequence begins with smoke. Here
4:19:52–4:19:58too, gradation of pleasure and gradation of its means are understood from the shruti.
4:19:58–4:20:00remain there until the...
4:20:00–4:20:05इंजोमन्त इस इजोस्टिद लिक्वाश फुम विम्म भीइंज दान तु इंश्जंट फिंज,
4:20:05–4:20:12Whatever minimum degree of pleasure is possible arises from Dihama defined by injunction, and
4:20:12–4:20:13it too has gradations.
4:20:13–4:20:19The mental impression produced by meditation upon the meaning of Vedanta sentences is capable
4:20:19–4:20:26of bringing about realization of the Jeeva's nature as Brahman, for this no unseen apperva
4:20:26–4:20:27is required.
4:20:27–4:20:33Therefore, since the alleged apperva produced by meditation is not the cause of immortality,
4:20:33–4:20:38It is not proper for one desiring immortality to know it as a duty, to desire one thing
4:20:38–4:20:45and perform a means to another would be contradictory, nor can it be said that one who desires immortality
4:20:45–4:20:51would understand the act of meditation itself as the duty, not its unseen apperver, for
4:20:51–4:20:56meditation's capacity to serve as a means to immortality is known through another means
4:20:56–4:21:01of knowledge, its injunction would then be pointless, nor is the analogy of an
4:21:01–4:21:07injunction to thresh rice applicable because their dilaperva generated due to a prohibition
4:21:07–4:21:10is not known from another sentence.
4:21:10–4:21:17Ad-Y-H-Sakhont, 140, from the gradations of suffering observed above and below among
4:21:17–4:21:24embodied beaings, the gradations of their cause Adi-Hama defined by prohibitory injunctions
4:21:24–4:21:29and of those who perform Adi-Hama are likewise understood. The differences of pleasure
4:21:29–4:21:35and pain among jivas afflicted by ignorance and other defects arise from differences of
4:21:35–4:21:41merit and demerit. Bare fruit after embodiment are impermanent and constitute samsara this
4:21:41–4:21:47is well known from shruti, asemriti and reasoning. If liberation were something other than the
4:21:47–4:21:53immortality described in eulogistic statements and if the person desiring immortality were
4:21:53–4:21:59qualified for meditation. Then, on the analogy of the Rishi Session, immortality could be
4:21:59–4:22:05regarded as the fruit of meditation just as heaven is, but immortality is free from
4:22:05–4:22:11destruction and decay. Therefore no result produced by meditation can be permanent. When
4:22:11–4:22:17the covering of ignorance is removed, the state of Brahman becomes manifest. Realization
4:22:17–4:22:22of the meaning of Vedanta removes ignorance, while impressions produced by meditation
4:22:22–4:22:28merely assist the mind. Therefore a sentence such as meditate on the self is not a real
4:22:28–4:22:34injunction but only an injunction-like sentence. The complete cessation of pleasure and pain
4:22:34–4:22:40is impossible while embodied is a restatement of the nature of samsara from the truti.
4:22:40–4:22:46The pleasant and the unpleasant do not touch the bodiless. Through the denial of contact with
4:22:46–4:22:50pleasant and unpleasant it is understood that the bodiless state that is liberation
4:22:50–4:22:57is not the fruit of Dihama defined by injunction. If it were the fruit of Dihama, the denial
4:22:57–4:23:03of contact with pleasant and unpleasant would be incongruous. The bodiless state itself is not a fruit
4:23:03–4:23:10of Dihama because Trutie declares it to be natural, the wise man, even wild-welling in a body,
4:23:10–4:23:15knowing the self as bodiless, stable amidst the changing, great and all-pervading, does not
4:23:15–4:23:21grief, the self is without breath, without mind, pure, the self is unattached.
4:23:21–4:23:27Therefore bodilessness in the form of liberation, distinct from the fruit of action, is eternally
4:23:27–4:23:29established.
4:23:29–4:23:36Ardhvayah Sakant, 141, some things, though changing, are called eternal in a sequence
4:23:36–4:23:41of development because the recognition this is that is not destroyed, earth and the like
4:23:41–4:23:45or the gooners of Sankhya may serve as such examples.
4:23:45–4:23:50But Brahman's itonality is complete, immutable and or pervading like space.
4:23:50–4:23:56Brahman is free from all modification, eternally fulfilled, partless and self-luminous merit,
4:23:56–4:24:01demerit and their fruits never touch Brahman in any of the three times.
4:24:01–4:24:05This borderlessness that is liberation is established by Shruti.
4:24:05–4:24:11Another view speaks of two kinds of itonality immutable, itonality and transformational
4:24:11–4:24:18If transformational itinality is accepted as true itinality, the question arises, does
4:24:18–4:24:23the transformation occur in the whole thing or in one part of it?
4:24:23–4:24:26If in the whole, the original prakriti would be destroyed.
4:24:26–4:24:31If in one part, is that part different from the thing or non-different?
4:24:31–4:24:36If different, the transformation would not be a transformation of the original thing,
4:24:36–4:24:41if non-different, one would have to admit transformation of the whole thing.
4:24:41–4:24:46No logically coherent conclusion follows from this twofold transformation.
4:24:46–4:24:51Those who accept cognition based diversity may regard the world consisting of earth and
4:24:51–4:24:57so forth as eternal, or the sankhirs may regard the gunas as eternal, but Brahman is ultimately
4:24:57–4:25:00immutable and eternal free from every...
4:25:00–4:25:03Remodification, Partless, and Self-Luminous
4:25:03–4:25:09If liberation were attained through a means consisting of something to be done, it would be non-eternal.
4:25:09–4:25:14Shruti says, Tell me that which is different from Diharma and from Adiharma, different
4:25:14–4:25:19from what is done and what is not done, different from past and future.
4:25:19–4:25:22In this context arises the inquiry into Brahman.
4:25:22–4:25:27If Brahman were taught as an auxiliary to something to be done and liberation were
4:25:27–4:25:32regarded as produced by what is to be done, liberation would be impermanent like the fruit
4:25:32–4:25:38of action, but all who hold liberation accept it as eternal, therefore it is not proper
4:25:38–4:25:43to regard instruction about Brahman as a limb of action.
4:25:43–4:25:49Adwa H. Sarkant 142. The doctrine of difference and non-difference may say that a thing
4:25:49–4:25:55is non-different as cause and different as effect just as a bracelet is non-different
4:25:55–4:26:00insofar as it is gold, yet as a bracelet it is different from an earring. But since
4:26:00–4:26:05difference and non-difference are mutually opposed, how can both exist in one and the
4:26:05–4:26:10same thing? The reply offered is that no contradiction should be admitted in a thing
4:26:10–4:26:16established by valid commission. In a commission of co-reference such as this earring is
4:26:16–4:26:20gold, both difference and non-difference are evident.
4:26:20–4:26:24If non-difference were complete, there would not be two apprehensions in the forms
4:26:24–4:26:30of subject and predicate. If difference were complete, co-reference would be impossible,
4:26:30–4:26:36as in the case of a cow and a horse, one does not say of a pot the jujube is this, and even
4:26:36–4:26:42though Chaitra and Matra sit on one seat, one does not say Chaitra is Matra. Therefore
4:26:42–4:26:48cognition of both non-difference and difference between effect and cause is said to be unobstructed,
4:26:48–4:26:53doubtless and universal. Since the effect has the nature of its cause, wherever the
4:26:53–4:26:57The cause exists there is the existence of the effect but as effects.
4:26:57–4:27:01Cow, pot and so forth in the world are mutually different.
4:27:01–4:27:07The question for this doctrine is what in reality is different such that it resides in the same
4:27:07–4:27:09locus as non-difference.
4:27:09–4:27:15If difference is mutual non-existence, does this non-existence obtain between the bracelet
4:27:15–4:27:16and gold or not?
4:27:16–4:27:19If it does not, there is only non-difference.
4:27:19–4:27:22If it does, there is only difference.
4:27:22–4:27:27and non-existence cannot occur together. If it is said that there is non-difference in
4:27:27–4:27:33so far as there is gold, but difference from an earring and so forth in so far as it is
4:27:33–4:27:38a bracelet, be the answer is this. If the bracelet is non-different from gold, then
4:27:38–4:27:44wherever gold recurs, the bracelet too ought to recur, but goldness is present in an
4:27:44–4:27:50earring, whereas braceletness is not, therefore the bracelet is different from gold.
4:27:50–4:28:20R-D-Y-H-S-R-C-O-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T
4:28:20–4:28:25from gold, then as soon as gold was known the particular form too would be known.
4:28:25–4:28:30Because difference exists, even when gold is known in earing and the like may remain
4:28:30–4:28:31unknown.
4:28:31–4:28:35If non-difference also exists, why should it remain unknown?
4:28:35–4:28:39The general rule of non-difference is that knowledge of the cause gives knowledge of
4:28:39–4:28:40the effect.
4:28:40–4:28:44Therefore, that which is not known through knowledge of another is different from
4:28:44–4:28:48it just as knowing a camel does not amount to knowing a donkey.
4:28:48–4:28:54a distance gold is known but the earring is not known, therefore the earring is different from gold.
4:28:54–4:28:59Why then do we have co-reference in a statement such as the earring is gold?
4:28:59–4:29:05The supporter says, because of a relation of substratum and superstratum, or because both
4:29:05–4:29:11have the same locus, the answer is that no such co-reference is observed between a pot and a
4:29:11–4:29:17jujube, or between cheitra and matris seated on the same seat. Therefore merely occupying
4:29:17–4:29:23one locus is not a sufficient cause of co-reference. If difference depended on non-difference
4:29:23–4:29:28and non-difference depended on difference, there would be the defect of mutual dependence.
4:29:28–4:29:34In reality, cognition of non-difference requires nothing else, cognition of difference. In
4:29:34–4:29:39the form not this but that, depends upon knowledge of the leposed object. Therefore
4:29:39–4:29:44it may be that accepted that an indefinable difference is superimposed upon a basis
4:29:44–4:29:50of non-difference, establishing non-difference on the basis of difference is not logically
4:29:50–4:29:51coherent.
4:29:51–4:30:00Adwaiah Succont 144, Shruti 2 says, clay alone is real, therefore only immutable.
4:30:00–4:30:30नचेंचिंग इटनालतिन इस आल्टमट्ट्ट्ट्रिल नच्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्
4:30:30–4:30:35capable of refinement. Shruti clearly states that liberation follows immediately upon knowledge
4:30:35–4:30:41of Brahman, with no intervening action remaining. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, when
4:30:41–4:30:46the higher and lower Brahman is seen. His actions perish. The knower of the bliss of
4:30:46–4:30:51Brahman fears nothing from anywhere, O Jannaka, you have attained fearlessness. He knew
4:30:51–4:30:57the Self as I am Brahman, thereby he became this whole universe. The word eternally fulfilled
4:30:57–4:31:01indicates Brahman's character as the human end.
4:31:01–4:31:06Fulfillment signifies pleasure free from suffering, the pleasure accompanied by the ending of
4:31:06–4:31:08desire and suffering is fulfilment.
4:31:08–4:31:14If pleasure is not experienced, it cannot be the human end, therefore Brahman is called
4:31:14–4:31:15self-luminous.
4:31:15–4:31:20Thus, after establishing through Shruti and the like that liberation is eternal, the
4:31:20–4:31:26impermanence of a liberation produced by an action is explained in detail.
4:31:26–4:31:31Knowledge serves as a means to liberation only by removing the two kinds of obstruction
4:31:31–4:31:33in the form of ignorance.
4:31:33–4:31:38Knowledge does not itself produce, refine, transform or attain liberation.
4:31:38–4:31:39Shruti says,
4:31:39–4:31:41He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.
4:31:41–4:31:42The knot of the heart is cut.
4:31:42–4:31:46All doubts are destroyed and actions become exhausted.
4:31:46–4:31:49The knower of the bliss of Brahman has fear from none.
4:31:49–4:31:50O Janaka,
4:31:50–4:31:51You have attained fearlessness.
4:31:51–4:31:54He knew the self as I am Brahman.
4:31:54–4:31:59he became this whole universe. From these sentences it is clear that no other act, a
4:31:59–4:32:05pervert or fruit of action intervenes between knowledge of Brahman and liberation.
4:32:05–4:32:14Udh-Sakhandt 145. The expression eternally fulfilled conveys pleasure free from suffering.
4:32:14–4:32:18Pure pleasure is fulfillment, and pleasure that is not itself manifest could not be
4:32:18–4:32:25a human end. Therefore Brahman is self-luminous. Liberation becomes manifest immediately after
4:32:25–4:32:31knowledge arises. Liberation is not an effect produced by the activity of knowledge, but
4:32:31–4:32:36merely the manifestation of one's own nature when ignorance has been removed.
4:32:36–4:32:41Trutti further strengthens this point for one who sees the homogeneous nature of Brahman,
4:32:41–4:32:47what delusion and what sorrow can remain. The Siva Vamadva on seeing Brahman immediately
4:32:47–4:32:53understood. I became Mahayu. I became the Son." Just as in the sentence, while standing,
4:32:53–4:32:59he sings, there is no separate duty intervening between standing and singing. So there is no
4:32:59–4:33:03intervening action between seeing Brahman and the state of being the Self of all.
4:33:03–4:33:09You are our Father who carry us beyond ignorance. I have heard from persons who know the Self,
4:33:09–4:33:14that the knower of the Self crosses beyond sorrow. I am in sorrow. Carry me beyond
4:33:14–4:33:20sorrow, Sanat Kumara carried him beyond darkness. Such shruti passages state that the fruit of
4:33:20–4:33:26knowledge of Brahman consists merely in the cessation of ignorance that obstructs liberation.
4:33:26–4:33:31A reason Sutra of the teacher likewise says, through the successive destruction,
4:33:31–4:33:36in reverse order of false knowledge, defects, activity, birth, and suffering,
4:33:36–4:33:42each preceding member is destroyed and liberation is finally accomplished. When false
4:33:42–4:33:48False knowledge is destroyed, defects are destroyed, when defects are destroyed, activity is destroyed,
4:33:48–4:33:53when activity is destroyed, birth, when birth is destroyed, suffering.
4:33:53–4:33:57False knowledge, that is Avila idea, is the root cause of samsara.
4:33:57–4:34:01It gives rise to attachment, aversion and the like.
4:34:01–4:34:06Its opponent is true knowledge, the direct realization of the unity of Brahman and the
4:34:06–4:34:07self.
4:34:07–4:34:13Liberation is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman, not a result produced by knowledge
4:34:13–4:34:16or meditation of the Sutra.
4:34:16–4:34:18Only this much is accepted here.
4:34:18–4:34:20True knowledge destroys false knowledge.
4:34:20–4:34:25Other special meanings assigned to it by the Naya school are not accepted here.
4:34:25–4:34:29Advaah Sakant 146.
4:34:29–4:34:34The poor Vapachin may say that knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ahd Mun is
4:34:34–4:34:40not knowledge of the actual state of things but merely an imagined identity, then being
4:34:40–4:34:46dependent on volition, it can become something enjoined, just as through a similarity to
4:34:46–4:34:51the mind's innumerable modifications. The conception of the universal deities may
4:34:51–4:34:56be imposed upon the mind, so the nature of Brahman may be the imagined in the jayee
4:34:56–4:35:00and meditated upon but knowledge of the identity.
4:35:00–4:35:04यो व ब्रामन अछिद मुन यस नाटक आजिंग यदेंटिटि
4:35:04–4:35:09यन मेटितेषन नाटक यस माझिद यस ब्रामन अछिद यस ब्रामन
4:35:09–4:35:12The qualities of one thing are superimposed on another.
4:35:12–4:35:18Sentences such as that thou art, I am Brahman, and this self is Brahman's state the real
4:35:18–4:35:21unity that is the actual condition of the thing.
4:35:21–4:35:26If the identity were merely imagined, it would contradict the shruti fruit.
4:35:26–4:35:27The knot of the heart is cut.
4:35:27–4:35:32All doubts are destroyed, and the sentence the Noah of Brahman becomes Brahman would
4:35:32–4:35:35also become incongruous.
4:35:35–4:35:41cognition of the identity of Brahman and A. H. T. Mun is neither an imagination nor a superimposed
4:35:41–4:35:48meditation in the context of looking at clarified butter. The act of looking is an auxiliary
4:35:48–4:35:53action serving to purify the clarified butter. But a sentence such as the self is to be
4:35:53–4:35:58seen does not occur within the context of any single action. It is difficult to
4:35:58–4:36:04call knowledge of the self a limb of sacrifice by positing an incongruous relation
4:36:04–4:36:10between the self and sacrifice. If knowledge of the self is the principal action, it is not a
4:36:10–4:36:16purificatory auxiliary. If it is an auxiliary, it is not clear of what action it is a limb.
4:36:16–4:36:22The meditation on absorption in Prana or Veyu is likewise based on a specific relation of qualities
4:36:22–4:36:29the external air absorbs fire and the like into itself, and the internal Prana gathers speech
4:36:29–4:36:36sight and the other senses into itself at death. In such meditation the basis of the quality is
4:36:36–4:36:42clear. Imagining the J. E. D. Vaat as Brahman is not based on any such similarity of qualities.
4:36:43–4:36:51Aadvaya Sarkant, 147, in meditation on mind the sun or prana, the object meditated upon
4:36:51–4:36:57and the supporting basis remain different. The qualities of Brahman are superimposed on that
4:36:57–4:37:03basis, but the Jeeva is in reality Brahman in this knowledge there is no distinction
4:37:03–4:37:08of support and supported. Therefore it is not proper to regard knowledge of the identity
4:37:08–4:37:14of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun as meditation, refinement, a limb of action, or a purific
4:37:14–4:37:19attria act. If cognition of the identity of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun were regarded
4:37:19–4:37:25as merely imagined, the syntactic relation of the words in that Thou art, I am Brahman,
4:37:25–4:37:28this self is Brahman would be destroyed.
4:37:28–4:37:33Truty passages such as the knot of the nose heart is cut and the knower of Brahman becomes
4:37:33–4:37:38Brahman could not yield their stated result from an imagined identity.
4:37:38–4:37:42Therefore knowledge of Brahman does not depend upon human action.
4:37:42–4:37:47Just as knowledge arising from perception and other means of knowledge is object dependent
4:37:47–4:37:51so knowledge of Brahman too depends solely upon the object.
4:37:51–4:37:56There is no logically coherent way to bring Brahman or knowledge of Brahman within the
4:37:56–4:37:58sphere of what is to be done.
4:37:58–4:38:01Nor is Brahman the object of an act of knowing.
4:38:01–4:38:06The Kineshruti says, It is different from the known and also beyond the unknown, by
4:38:06–4:38:09what can one know that by which all this is known.
4:38:09–4:38:14Know that alone as Brahman which speech does not reveal, but by which speech itself
4:38:14–4:38:18is revealed, not that which people worship as an object.
4:38:18–4:38:23If Brahman is not an object, how can scripture be its means of knowledge?
4:38:23–4:38:28The purpose of scripture is to remove the difference imagined through a viva idea.
4:38:28–4:38:32Scripture does not present Brahman as an object called this or that.
4:38:32–4:38:37It reveals Brahman as the inner self, not objectifiable, and removes the duality of
4:38:37–4:38:39knower and known.
4:38:39–4:38:45Ad-Y-H Sarkant 148 Even with regard to worldly objects, words
4:38:45–4:38:50cannot express every particular difference completely the difference of sweetness among
4:38:50–4:38:56sugarcane juice, milk, and jaggery cannot be fully expressed in words. The inner self is
4:38:56–4:39:02beyond the senses. Therefore scripture removes distinctions, born of avil idea through
4:39:02–4:39:08negation, secondary indication, and harmonious interpretation. He by whom this is thought
4:39:08–4:39:13does not know him. He who says I know does not know. You cannot see the sea out of
4:39:13–4:39:18hear the hearer of hearing, think the thinker of thought, or know the knower of knowledge
4:39:18–4:39:23such shruti passages establish that the self is altogether non-objectifiable, when the
4:39:23–4:39:29distinctions of knower known and knowledge produced by avil idea come to an end, the
4:39:29–4:39:35nature of the self is again manifest, the state of being subject to samsara ceases and
4:39:35–4:39:37eternal liberation is accomplished.
4:39:37–4:39:42Therefore liberation is not subject to the defect of impermanence.
4:39:42–4:39:48One who regards liberation as something produced must accept some mental, verbal or bodily action
4:39:48–4:39:54as necessary if liberation is a transformation. Action is still required. On either view liberation
4:39:54–4:40:00would be impermanent because a transformed thing such as curd and a produced thing
4:40:00–4:40:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� �
4:40:30–4:40:36meaning the isolated state of the self. Therefore liberation is a kind of transformation, just
4:40:36–4:40:41as milk abandons its first condition and acquires another condition as curd, so the
4:40:41–4:40:47self abandons the state of samsara and obtains the state of isolation. On both these views
4:40:47–4:40:54liberation would not remain eternal because a produced thing like curd or a pot is impermanent.
4:40:54–4:40:57Adwayah Sakant, 149.
4:40:57–4:41:03From shruti passages such as then the light that shines beyond heaven, one may understand
4:41:03–4:41:08differences of location for Brahman, a changing location and an unchanging location.
4:41:08–4:41:13Hence an objection is raised that through an injunction to meditation and the like,
4:41:13–4:41:18Brahman may be brought to an unchanging place and may then become something to
4:41:18–4:41:19be attained.
4:41:19–4:41:24The answer is that even a something to be attained Brahman requires no duty.
4:41:24–4:41:30A sailor remaining in a boat leaves behind the changing sea short masses of foam and
4:41:30–4:41:36waves and reaches a waveless, calm, clear, stable and unchanging middle region.
4:41:36–4:41:37But the J.E.D.
4:41:37–4:41:39Eva is not different from Brahman.
4:41:39–4:41:40The J.E.D.
4:41:40–4:41:42Eva is Brahman itself.
4:41:42–4:41:43What then would the J.E.
4:41:43–4:41:46Eva attain and by what means?
4:41:46–4:41:48Attainment presupposes difference.
4:41:48–4:41:54Even if the J.E.D.iva were regarded as different from Brahman, all pervading Brahman is eternally
4:41:54–4:41:59attained. Therefore the objection is removed by the words even though different from one's
4:41:59–4:42:05own nature. Liberation is not something to be purified either, for otherwise a Purificatory
4:42:05–4:42:11Act would be required. Purification occurs in two ways by the addition of equality or
4:42:11–4:42:16by the removal of a defect. Liberation is the nature of Brahman, no excellence
4:42:16–4:42:22can be added to Brahman. Brahman is eternally pure, therefore no defect can be removed from
4:42:22–4:42:28Brahman either. An example of purification by the addition of equality is this, when
4:42:28–4:42:34a China rose flower is dyed with lac juice. It produces the effect of that colour. An
4:42:34–4:42:39example of purification by removal of a defect is this, when a mirror is rubbed with brick
4:42:39–4:42:45powder. Its dirt is removed and it becomes bright. Neither of these two methods applies
4:42:45–4:42:46to Brahman.
4:42:46–4:42:50Udh-i-ah-sakhont, 150.
4:42:50–4:42:56If it is said, liberation is the nature of the self, but it is covered by ignorance
4:42:56–4:43:01when the self is purified through action it becomes manifest, just as the brightness of
4:43:01–4:43:06a mirror becomes manifest when the mirror is rubbed the answer is that the self cannot
4:43:06–4:43:08be the locus of action.
4:43:08–4:43:13Whatever is the locus of action cannot remain and changed by that action.
4:43:13–4:43:19produces some alteration in it. If the self is regarded as changeable, truity passages
4:43:19–4:43:25such as this is said to be imperishable would be contradicted. Is the quality to be added
4:43:25–4:43:30to Brahman the very nature of Brahman or something different? If it is Brahman's
4:43:30–4:43:35own nature, being eternal it cannot be added. If it is different, then because
4:43:35–4:43:41it is produced liberation would be impermanent. Nor is a relation of quality and qualified
4:43:41–4:43:47possible between mutually different things, any more than a relation of that kind between
4:43:47–4:43:48a cow and a horse.
4:43:48–4:43:54The combined doctrine of difference and non-difference has already been shown to be contradictory.
4:43:54–4:43:59Therefore no excellence can be added to liberation, which is the nature of Brahman.
4:43:59–4:44:03The doctrine of removing a defect is likewise incoherent.
4:44:03–4:44:07Dirt is present on a mirror and therefore can be removed.
4:44:07–4:44:10No impurity is ever present in Brahman.
4:44:10–4:44:16is eternally pure. There can be no question of removing what is entirely absent from the
4:44:16–4:44:22beginning. The objection is, liberation is the nature of the Self but is covered by beginningless
4:44:22–4:44:28impurity in the form of abhidh idea. When the Self is purified through the act of meditation,
4:44:28–4:44:34liberation becomes manifest rather than being produced. The answer is that the Self cannot
4:44:34–4:44:40be regarded as the locus of action. Action changes its locus, the self would then become
4:44:40–4:44:42impermanent.
4:44:42–4:44:45Aadvaiya Hsarkant 151
4:44:45–4:44:52Aviv idea is said to reside not in Brahman but in the Jeeva. Yet the Jeeva itself is
4:44:52–4:44:58merely Brahman limited by indefinable Aviv idea. Brahman is eternally pure. If a defect
4:44:58–4:45:00were admitted in Brahman.
4:45:00–4:45:30आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आ
4:45:30–4:45:36into the self. Therefore action residing in the self is impossible. Action residing elsewhere
4:45:36–4:45:42cannot purify the non-objectifiable self. The poor Vapakshin again says, through bodily
4:45:42–4:45:48actions such as bathing, sipping water, and wearing the sacred thread, the embodied self
4:45:48–4:45:53is seen to become pure. The answer is that what becomes purified is the self regarded
4:45:53–4:45:58through avila idea as connected with the body and the like. The occurrence of bathing,
4:45:58–4:46:04sipping water and so forth in the body is directly perceived. The fruit of bodily action
4:46:04–4:46:10applies to the J.E.E.Eva connected with that body and regarding the body as I. Just as,
4:46:10–4:46:16when equilibrium of the bodily constituents is produced by treatment applied to the body,
4:46:16–4:46:22the body identifying J.E.E.Eva has the cognition I am free from disease, so through bathing,
4:46:22–4:46:26sipping water, wearing the sacred thread, and the like there arises the cognition
4:46:26–4:46:33I am pure. This purity is the empirical purity of the Jee Eva connected with the body, not
4:46:33–4:46:39of the Supreme Self. The Jee Eva is the object of the cognition I, an agent of knowledge
4:46:39–4:46:46and the enjoyer of the fruits of action. The mantra says, one bird eats the sweet fruit,
4:46:46–4:46:52the other does not eat but merely looks on. The bird that eats the fruit is the individual
4:46:52–4:46:56the bird that does not eat is the witnessing supreme self.
4:46:56–4:47:00Adwa H. Sarkont 152
4:47:00–4:47:05The J.E.Liva is connected with the gross and subtle bodies, the senses,
4:47:05–4:47:09and the inner organ situated in the midst of this aggregate.
4:47:09–4:47:14It is regarded as non-different from it and becomes the object of the cognition eye.
4:47:14–4:47:18Therefore the body's purity is empirically superimposed upon the self.
4:47:18–4:47:23the self, just as the heroine's fragrance is said to be transferred to her companion.
4:47:23–4:47:28Ultimately, there is neither action nor purification in the self.
4:47:28–4:47:34Shruti says, the wise call the self connected with body senses, and mind the enjoyer, the
4:47:34–4:47:40one God hidden in all beings, or pervading, the inner self of all, overseer of actions,
4:47:40–4:47:46dwelling in all beings, witness, conscious, one, and without qualities.
4:47:46–4:47:52He pervades all radiant, bodiless, woundless, without sin-us, pure, and untouched by sin.
4:47:52–4:47:57From these mantras it is established that no excellence can be added to Brahman and
4:47:57–4:48:00that Brahman is eternally pure.
4:48:00–4:48:02Attainment of the state of Brahman is liberation.
4:48:02–4:48:07Therefor liberation itself is not something to be purified.
4:48:07–4:48:12Apart from these four kinds what is to be produced, attained, transformed, and purified
4:48:12–4:48:18there is no fifth route by which action can enter into liberation. Therefore, apart from
4:48:18–4:48:24knowledge, not even the shadow of action gains entry into liberation. Objection. Knowledge
4:48:24–4:48:29too is a mental activity. Answer. Knowledge and action are different. Action is that in
4:48:29–4:48:35which an injunction operates without regard to the actual nature of the object and which
4:48:35–4:48:41depends upon a person's will. A person may perform worship, meditation, and the like
4:48:41–4:48:46may refrain from performing them or may perform them otherwise. Knowledge, although a mental
4:48:46–4:48:53modification, is object dependent. Its result is not Brahman because self-luminous Brahman
4:48:53–4:48:58cannot be apprehended as an object standing in a relation to an act of knowledge. True
4:48:58–4:49:03knowledge arises from a means of valid knowledge, not from a person's will.
4:49:03–4:49:10Udhsakont 153 In sacrifice, whatever form of a deity
4:49:10–4:49:16is to be held in mind while making an offering may be made the object of meditation. In sentences
4:49:16–4:49:22such as meditate on the evening deity meditation, though mental, this person dependent, a person
4:49:22–4:49:28may do it, not do it, but do it differently. Knowledge is not of this kind. True knowledge
4:49:28–4:49:32knowledge takes as its object, the thing exactly as it is.
4:49:32–4:49:38Therefore it cannot be produced, left hand produced, or produced in a different form according
4:49:38–4:49:39to one's wish.
4:49:39–4:49:46It depends neither upon an injunction nor upon a person, it depends only upon the object.
4:49:46–4:49:51Hence, although mental, knowledge is by nature entirely different from action.
4:49:51–4:49:57In meditations such as mind indeed is fire, gotama and woman indeed is fire, gotama
4:49:57–4:50:00a person produces the cognition of fire with
4:50:00–4:50:30विचार-विमर्चना, विचार-विमर्चना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कव
4:50:30–4:50:35So through the power of a new Panishadic sentence arises the knowledge that the self is Brahman.
4:50:35–4:50:40Human will cannot make this knowledge otherwise, nor can it prevent it.
4:50:40–4:50:44Therefore it is not an enjoyable action like meditation on a deity.
4:50:44–4:50:51The same applies in relation to man and woman, but that is merely an action and depends upon a person.
4:50:51–4:50:55Because its origination occurs solely through an injunction.
4:50:55–4:51:02By contrast, cognition of fire with regard to well-known fire depends neither upon an injunction nor upon a person.
4:51:02–4:51:03What then is it?
4:51:03–4:51:11Because it depends solely upon the object that is the subject of perception, it is determinate knowledge, not action.
4:51:11–4:51:18The same should be understood with regard to all objects that are the subjects of means of valid knowledge.
4:51:18–4:51:26Adwae H. Sarkont 154 In such a situation, knowledge that takes Brahman and the self exactly as
4:51:26–4:51:32they really are likewise does not depend upon an injunction. Although, Optative forms and
4:51:32–4:51:37the like occur in passages concerning this subject, because their subject is something
4:51:37–4:51:42not enjoyable they become blunted like the edge of a knife drawn over stone for the
4:51:42–4:51:47subject is something that is neither to be rejected nor accepted. What then is the
4:51:47–4:51:52The purpose of injunction-like sentences such as the self is to be seen, to be heard.
4:51:52–4:51:58Our answer is that they serve to turn a person away from the natural objects of action.
4:51:58–4:52:03A person turned outward, who remains engaged in action thinking may pleasant things come
4:52:03–4:52:08to meet, may painful things not come to meet, does not thereby attain the supreme human
4:52:08–4:52:09end.
4:52:09–4:52:15For such a person who seeks the supreme human end, sentences such as the self is to
4:52:15–4:52:20be seen withdraw him from the aggregate of cause and effect that is, from the objects
4:52:20–4:52:26of natural activity in the form of objects and senses and direct him inward into the
4:52:26–4:52:31current of the self, for one thus engaged in the inquiry into the self.
4:52:31–4:52:35The following sentences teach the true nature of the self as something that is neither
4:52:35–4:52:39to be rejected nor accepted, whatever all this is.
4:52:39–4:52:47is the self alone, bryhadayu anyaka upi uh nishad 2.4.6 when all this is the self alone,
4:52:47–4:52:51then by what and whom would one see? By what and whom would one know? By what would one
4:52:51–4:53:00know the know? bryhadayu anyaka upi uh nishad 4.5.15 this self is brahman bryhadayu anyaka
4:53:00–4:53:05Kautu Puh Nyshad 2.5.19 and so on.
4:53:05–4:53:12Ad-Yah Sakant 155, again, as for the statement that knowledge of the Self, because it is
4:53:12–4:53:18not primarily connected with something to be done, assists neither acceptance nor rejection
4:53:18–4:53:19we'll accept it.
4:53:19–4:53:25Indeed, it is an ornament to our position that when Brahman is realized all duties
4:53:25–4:53:30come to an end and everything that had to be accomplished has been accomplished." Shruti
4:53:30–4:53:362 says, If a person knows the Self as I am he, then desiring what and for whose sake would
4:53:36–4:53:43he suffer along with the suffering of the body? Vrayhadayu-inyaka-upi-uh-nyshad 4.4.12
4:53:43–4:53:50As Samriti 2 says, Knowing this, a person may become wise and one whose task is accomplished.
4:53:50–4:53:53Oberata Bhagavad Gita 15.20.
4:53:53–4:53:58Therefore the teaching of Brahman is not a limb of an injunction to meditation.
4:53:58–4:54:03Some say there is no part of the Vedda that merely discusses an existent thing.
4:54:03–4:54:09The Vedda teaches only injunctions to activity and cessation and the things auxiliary to them.
4:54:09–4:54:10This is incorrect.
4:54:10–4:54:16The self taught in the Upayush Naisads is not a limb of anything else.
4:54:16–4:54:22the Self, known only from the Upayush Nishads, free from samsara of the nature of Brahman,
4:54:22–4:54:28distinct from the four kinds of things what is produced, attained, transformed, and purified,
4:54:28–4:54:34described in an independent context and auxiliary to nothing else, cannot be said not to exist
4:54:34–4:54:39or not to be known for in the sentence that Self is not this. Not this Brihada Ayunyaka
4:54:39–4:54:47Puh Nyshad 3.9.26 the word self is present and negation of the self is impossible since
4:54:47–4:54:51even the one who negates remains in-out with selfhood.
4:54:51–4:54:59Hard YAH Sarkont 156, if in the usage of elders there were a rule that words reveal only
4:54:59–4:55:00what
4:55:00–4:55:30आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रा
4:55:30–4:55:36through consideration of preceding and succeeding Upanishadic sentences, as their purport, nor
4:55:36–4:55:41can a duty be imagined in Brahman's place, for otherwise there would be the fault of
4:55:41–4:55:46abandoning the directly stated meaning and taking up an unstated one. A relation of words
4:55:46–4:55:51to a non-duty meaning would be impossible only if no usage with such a purport were
4:55:51–4:55:56found in experience and if knowledge of that meaning could not be inferred in a
4:55:56–4:56:02a person who knows the meanings of words, but in experience there is widespread use
4:56:02–4:56:07of groups of sentences that speak of existent things and produce joy or remove fear and
4:56:07–4:56:14the like without teaching anything to be done. For example, the King of Mountains, Sumeru,
4:56:14–4:56:20is the dwelling place of Indra and the other guardians of the worlds of Siddhas, Vidyadhara,
4:56:20–4:56:25Ganharvas and hosts of Apsarazes. It is formed of gold and rocks washed by the streams
4:56:25–4:56:30of the man Hini descending from Brahmaloka and is delightful with the voices of crystal-like
4:56:30–4:56:37birds sporting in lovely groves resembling Nanana or this is not a snake, it is a rope, and so
4:56:37–4:56:38forth.
4:56:38–4:56:42Adwaeh Sakkant, 157.
4:56:42–4:56:47Nor is it true that knowledge of an existent thing cannot be inferred in a person who knows
4:56:47–4:56:53word meanings, joy and the like provide a basis for such an inference.
4:56:53–4:56:58Here is an example. A Dravidian who does not know the meaning of the Arya language is
4:56:58–4:57:04sitting at Devadatta's house beside the royal road on his way to the city. He knows that
4:57:04–4:57:09the birth of a son is a cause of joy for a father. He goes with a messenger to Devadatta
4:57:09–4:57:14in the city. The messenger offers a cloth moistened with saffron water in which the
4:57:14–4:57:19infant's feet have been washed and says, Devadatta, may your prosperity increase
4:57:19–4:57:25a son has been born to you. I once the Dravidian sees Dvadahtta's hair stand on end and his
4:57:25–4:57:32eyes and face bloom like a fully opened lotus. He infers the joy that has arisen in Dvadahtta,
4:57:32–4:57:38and he also infers that since this joy was not present before and arose immediately upon
4:57:38–4:57:43hearing the words, these words are its cause. He understands that the sentence conveys
4:57:43–4:57:48a meaning that is the cause of joy because the statement itself could not produce joy
4:57:48–4:57:52without communicating the meaning that causes joy.
4:57:52–4:57:58No other cause of joy is visible, and the birth of a son is known to be a cause of joy, therefore
4:57:58–4:58:02he determines that the messenger communicated precisely this fact.
4:58:02–4:58:08The same kind of example should be understood with regard to fear, grief, and the like.
4:58:08–4:58:14Adwaah Sakkant 158 Thus, because sentences that state
4:58:14–4:58:21existent things can be fruitful, their use by a discerning inquirer is entirely reasonable.
4:58:21–4:58:26Knowledge of the nature of Brahman is the cause of the supreme human end, and although Vedanta
4:58:26–4:58:32neither impels a person to action nor withdraws him from action, it teaches what is beneficial
4:58:32–4:58:39to him. Therefore Vedanta's status as scripture is established. On this basis it is proved
4:58:39–4:58:44that the disputed sentences have existent things as their objects, because they produce
4:58:44–4:58:50valid cognition regarding existent things. Whatever produces valid cognition has as its
4:58:50–4:58:55object the object of that cognition just as the eye and the like have colour and other
4:58:55–4:59:00qualities as their objects. The same is the case with these sentences.
4:59:00–4:59:06Therefore it has rightly been said, this view is incorrect, because the self taught in
4:59:06–4:59:12the UPUH Nyshads is not a limb of anything else. The word UPUH Nyshads is formed from
4:59:12–4:59:19the root sad with the prefixes upa and nai and with the kvip suffix in the sense of destruction.
4:59:19–4:59:24It is a name for knowledge of brahman for by bringing nandu all brahman near it destroys
4:59:24–4:59:30a vil idea and its impressions. Because Vedanta is the cause of this knowledge, Vedanta
4:59:30–4:59:362 is called upuh nishad and the person who is known through it is the person taught
4:59:36–4:59:38by the Upuh Nishads.
4:59:38–4:59:46Adwaya Hsarkhant, 159, this point is analysed in the words that Self who is known only from
4:59:46–4:59:54the Upuh Nishads and so forth, by saying who does not undergo Samsara Brahman is distinguished
4:59:54–4:59:59from the Jeeva that is the object of the Iconition, because Brahman is by nature not
4:59:59–4:59:59an object.
5:00:00–5:00:07आच्छन, ब्रामन इस दिस्टिंक्त फ्रम दोग खाएन्जाव फिंज भिचार-विमर्शक आच्छन, ब्रामन इस दिस्टिंक्त फ्रम दोग खाएन्जाव फिंज भिचार-विमर्शक रेक।
5:00:07–5:00:13Therefore Brahman is auxiliary to nothing else. An existent thing that is auxiliary to something
5:00:13–5:00:19else is desired in relation to what is to be done and is accomplished through production and the
5:00:19–5:00:25like for example make the sacrificial post. But that which is auxiliary to nothing else is an
5:00:25–5:00:31existent reality and leaves no further purpose to be accomplished just as in contexts such as
5:00:31–5:00:36gold should be worn and an offering of flower should be made. The gold or the flower is
5:00:36–5:00:40not itself accomplished through production and the like.
5:00:40–5:00:45Now an objection is raised. The self is the object of the cognition night. How then can
5:00:45–5:00:52it be said that the self can be known only through the upuh nishads? The answer is no.
5:00:52–5:00:56This objection has already been removed by showing that the Upanishadic self is the
5:00:56–5:01:02witness of the object of that I-cognition. The object of the I-cognition is the individual
5:01:02–5:01:08self, an agent limited by the aggregate of body and senses, but no one has been able to
5:01:08–5:01:13know either through the ritual section of the Vedda or by mere reasoning and disputation,
5:01:13–5:01:18the Supreme Self who is its witness present in all, the same everywhere one, immutably
5:01:18–5:01:21eternal and the self of all.
5:01:21–5:01:25Lord YAH Sarkont, 160.
5:01:25–5:01:27On this the commentator says,
5:01:27–5:01:29And because the self cannot be negated,
5:01:29–5:01:32In reality, the self, whose nature is light,
5:01:32–5:01:38Is the self of all, because the delusion in the form of the world rests upon that very self.
5:01:38–5:01:41Without a substratum, delusion is impossible.
5:01:41–5:01:46If there were no rope, there could never be an error there of taking the rope for
5:01:46–5:01:48a snake or a stream of water.
5:01:48–5:01:53The world is illuminated by the very light of the self-self luminosity.
5:01:53–5:01:58Truti too says, by his light all else is illumined, by his light this entire world
5:01:58–5:01:59shines.
5:01:59–5:02:04If the luminous nature of the self were denied, the manifestation of the world itself would
5:02:04–5:02:06become incoherent.
5:02:06–5:02:12Therefore because the self cannot be negated, Vedanta brings about realization of that
5:02:12–5:02:16Brahman nature which is not the object of any other means of knowledge and is
5:02:16–5:02:22free from all limiting adjuncts. One who does not accept the limitation expressed in the
5:02:22–5:02:28self is known only from the Upi U.H. Nyshads raises another objection. The self is the
5:02:28–5:02:35object of every person's cognition, i.e. it is agent, enjoyer and subject to samsara.
5:02:35–5:02:41Both ordinary people and inquirers into the self use the word self in precisely this sense.
5:02:41–5:02:48used in ordinary usage are also used in the Vedda and have the same meanings in both places.
5:02:48–5:02:54Therefore in the Upayush Naisads the word self ought to apply in this familiar sense
5:02:54–5:02:59and not in some contrary second sense this is the purport of the objection.
5:02:59–5:03:05Adwayah Sakkant 161 The answer is that no one can negate the self
5:03:05–5:03:12taught in the Upi-U-H Naisads, nor can that self be made an auxiliary limb of any injunction.
5:03:12–5:03:18Because the self is the self of all, it is neither to be rejected nor accepted. The entire
5:03:18–5:03:23aggregative perishable modifications extending up to the self comes to an end but because
5:03:23–5:03:29there is no cause that can destroy the self. The self is imperishable and because there
5:03:29–5:03:35is no cause of transformation, the self is immutably eternal. For this very reason
5:03:35–5:03:41the Self is by nature eternally pure, conscious and free. In statements such as there is nothing
5:03:41–5:03:46higher than the Self, He is the limit and the supreme goal, and I ask about that Self
5:03:46–5:03:54who is taught in the UPUH Nyshads. The qualification taught in the UPUH Nyshads is meaningful only
5:03:54–5:04:00if the Self is the principal subject taught by the UPUH Nyshads. Therefore the statement
5:04:00–5:04:06no part of the Vedha teaches an existent thing is merely a careless insistence.
5:04:06–5:04:12The commentator replies, No, the person taught by the UPUH Nishads is not the object of the
5:04:12–5:04:18ordinary cognition eye. The object of the igniton is the agent J. E. Eva, limited by
5:04:18–5:04:24the aggregated body and senses. The supreme self taught by the UPUH Nishads is the
5:04:24–5:04:29witness of the J E Giva. Thus the view that the J E Giva, the object of the
5:04:29–5:04:34Icognition, is the Supreme Self is rejected in sentences such as having
5:04:34–5:04:40entered as the J E Giva into its own true nature. The Self, the unit of J E Giva
5:04:40–5:04:45and Supreme Self is ultimate. The form limited by adjuncts is called the J
5:04:45–5:04:50E Giva while its pure form is the witness. This pure witness is not
5:04:50–5:04:56known through another means of knowledge. It is the subject of the UPUH Nyshads. This
5:04:56–5:05:00very point is elaborated by saying its witness different from
5:05:00–5:05:30नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप ना
5:05:30–5:05:36rejected nor accepted. In the entire world Brahman alone is the real self. One's own
5:05:36–5:05:42nature cannot be abandoned and therefore it is not to be rejected and it is already attained,
5:05:42–5:05:48and therefore it is not to be accepted. The subject of injunction and prohibition is something to
5:05:48–5:05:54be rejected or accepted. Therefore the true nature of the self cannot be their subject.
5:05:54–5:06:00Consequently, in the entire world the self alone is real. This very point is clarified by this
5:06:00–5:06:06statement. The whole aggregate of perishable modifications comes to an end in the self.
5:06:06–5:06:13The self is ultimately real, this is established by Shruti, S.M.R.I.T., Itihasa, Purana and reasoning
5:06:13–5:06:19that does not conflict with them. The world manifested through beginningless avi idea
5:06:19–5:06:25is not ultimately real. The ultimately real self is the material basis of this false world,
5:06:25–5:06:31just as the real rope is the material basis of the illusory snake. The world, indefinable
5:06:31–5:06:38and unstable in nature, comes to an end. The self is ultimately real, and even a thousand
5:06:38–5:06:44causes cannot make the self unreal. Even a thousand craftsmen cannot make Tlof out of a pot.
5:06:44–5:06:50Therefore the destruction of all modifications terminates in the imperishable self, just as
5:06:50–5:06:56the destruction of silver seen in Naka and of a snake seen in a rope terminates respectively
5:06:56–5:07:02in the real Naka and the real rope. In all the modifications of the world, the self alone is
5:07:02–5:07:07real. Because the self is infinite, its destruction is impossible.
5:07:07–5:07:14Advaayah Sarkont 163 For one who supposes that destruction of the
5:07:14–5:07:19self is possible, it is said, because there is no cause of the self's destruction, it
5:07:19–5:07:25is imperishable. Even a thousand causes cannot make one thing into another thing, if it is
5:07:25–5:07:31said that although the self's essential nature is neither to be rejected nor accepted,
5:07:31–5:07:36some quality of it may be abandoned or acquired, the answer is, because there is no cause
5:07:36–5:07:42of transformation. It is immutably eternal. In the Self there is none of the three kinds
5:07:42–5:07:48of transformation, transformation of property, characteristic or state. Since even the qualities
5:07:48–5:07:53of the ultimately real Self are ultimately real, like the Self itself they cannot be
5:07:53–5:08:00transformed by any cause. Apart from transformation of qualities there is no other transformation,
5:08:00–5:08:03Therefore the self is completely and changing.
5:08:03–5:08:08The citations of those who know the purport of scripture such as the purpose of scripture
5:08:08–5:08:14is the instruction of action, are to be understood with reference to scripture consisting of
5:08:14–5:08:16injunctions and prohibitions.
5:08:16–5:08:20Because the context there is the inquiry into Diharma.
5:08:20–5:08:25If the statement the purpose of scripture were applied everywhere without qualification,
5:08:25–5:08:29instruction concerning existent things would have to be declared meaningless.
5:08:29–5:08:35scripture teaches existent things in addition to activity and cessation. Then an existent
5:08:35–5:08:40thing can be stated as a means to what is to be produced, and there is no reason to
5:08:40–5:08:46say that scripture cannot teach the immutably eternal Brahman. Teaching an existent thing
5:08:46–5:08:49does not turn it into an action.
5:08:49–5:08:51Adwaya H. Sarkont
5:08:51–5:08:58164 Someone may say, although an existent thing is not itself an action, it can be
5:08:58–5:09:02means to action. Therefore instruction concerning it is only for the sake of
5:09:02–5:09:07action. The answer is that a thing capable of accomplishing an action
5:09:07–5:09:12certainly exists even if it is taught for the sake of action. Its existence is
5:09:12–5:09:17not destroyed nor does instruction concerning it become meaningless. To
5:09:17–5:09:21the question what benefit is there to you in teaching such an existent thing?
5:09:21–5:09:26The answer is that instruction concerning the previously unknown reality of the
5:09:26–5:09:31This self is certainly fruitful as well, through knowledge of it, the false knowledge
5:09:31–5:09:34that is the cause of samsara ceases.
5:09:34–5:09:38Therefore from the standpoint of purpose, instruction concerning the reality of the
5:09:38–5:09:44self is in no way inferior to instruction concerning a thing that serves as a means
5:09:44–5:09:45to action.
5:09:45–5:09:51In the context of the inquiry into Diharmat, because Diharmat is of the nature of action,
5:09:51–5:09:55instruction of action is spoken of but this statement does not obstruct instruction
5:09:55–5:10:00concerning the existent Brahman, describing Sama Shama's verse.
5:10:00–5:10:30विच्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्�
5:10:30–5:10:37165. If the word meaning indicated only the direct denotation of a word, then substance,
5:10:37–5:10:42quality, and action which are not themselves things to be done would by not being directly
5:10:42–5:10:49denoted as duties become meaningless. In answer it is said, even according to those who take
5:10:49–5:10:54the scriptural statement in question as universally invariable, being meaningful through
5:10:54–5:11:00connection with what is to be done does not mean making what is to be done itself the direct
5:11:00–5:11:05denotation, rather, it means being beneficial to what is to be done.
5:11:05–5:11:11Words denoting substances and qualities reveal existence substances and qualities as auxiliaries
5:11:11–5:11:17to what is to be done, even while remaining in their own nature, they are denoted.
5:11:17–5:11:23The authorities on scripture say an injunctive sentence can make known things already existent,
5:11:23–5:11:29presently existing things to be produced and so forth. That is, while making known what
5:11:29–5:11:35ought to be done, an injunctive sentence also reveals already existent things required for
5:11:35–5:11:41its purpose. Although the meaning of a word may be an existent thing, its semantic relation
5:11:41–5:11:46is not limited merely to the role of assisting what is to be done, nor does the purport
5:11:46–5:11:51of words terminate only in their separate individual meanings. If each word had its
5:11:51–5:11:57purport solely in its own independent meaning, knowledge of sentence meaning would be impossible
5:11:57–5:12:04for sentence unity cannot arise among independently principal word meanings devoid of a mutual relation
5:12:04–5:12:10of principle and subordinate. Even while communicating their respective meanings, words have as their
5:12:10–5:12:16purport a single shared and fruitful sentence meaning. It is for this reason that knowledge
5:12:16–5:12:21of one sentence meaning qualified by each word meaning is possible.
5:12:21–5:12:29Adwaah Sakant, 166, the authorities on scripture say, although phonemes directly convey word
5:12:29–5:12:34meanings, they do not end fruitlessly their knowledge of word meanings is a necessary
5:12:34–5:12:40intermediate stage in the process of generating valid cognition of the sentence meaning just
5:12:40–5:12:43as the flame of fuel in cooking food.
5:12:43–5:12:48Therefore words have as their purport a sentence meaning connected with the meanings of other words,
5:12:48–5:12:55but this does not establish a rule that the purport of every sentence must necessarily be connected with something to be done.
5:12:55–5:13:03Consequently, there is no fault in taking the immutable, eternal nature of Brahman as the purport of a sentence.
5:13:03–5:13:07Bhavya, that which is to be produced, is what ought to be done.
5:13:07–5:13:11The objection is that an existent thing taught for the sake of what ought to be done is not
5:13:11–5:13:17really existent because in its form connected with the duty it too becomes something to be
5:13:17–5:13:18produced.
5:13:18–5:13:22The answer is, it is in fact an existent thing that is taught.
5:13:22–5:13:27The meaning of relation is not identity, its relation with what ought to be done
5:13:27–5:13:32is the relation between the result to be accomplished and its means.
5:13:32–5:13:37an existent thing enters into a process of production. Its relation is that of action
5:13:37–5:13:43and causal factor for this reason the existent thing itself does not become an action. The
5:13:43–5:13:49poor Vapakshin says, although it is not an action that is, it is difficult to understand
5:13:49–5:13:54scriptural teaching concerning Brahman, who is not an auxiliary to action and is immutably
5:13:54–5:13:59eternal. The answer is, there is no difficulty here, even though taught for the sake
5:13:59–5:14:04Think of action an existent thing, even when taught for the purpose of an action, does
5:14:04–5:14:09not thereby become other than existent, on the contrary, a thing capable of accomplishing
5:14:09–5:14:12an action must certainly exist.
5:14:12–5:14:20Udwh Succont 167, in some cases words that denote existent things are seen to have as
5:14:20–5:14:26their objects existent things established in themselves without any syntactic relation
5:14:26–5:14:27to an action.
5:14:27–5:14:33It is not proper forcibly to twist such words into a meaning connected with action.
5:14:33–5:14:39Even if a limited use is seen a hundred times, that does not make an unlimited use seen elsewhere
5:14:39–5:14:40disappear.
5:14:40–5:14:46In ordinary usage, many sentences are found such as descriptions of forests, in which
5:14:46–5:14:52there is only a relation to the verb to be, but which are not auxiliaries to any duty.
5:14:52–5:14:57Even a sentence related to an action sometimes terminates merely in conveying a relation
5:14:57–5:14:59to the question, who's is this man?
5:14:59–5:15:00The ar-
5:15:00–5:15:06Answer is the Kings. Likewise, sometimes only a qualification of the nominal meaning is asked.
5:15:06–5:15:11What are these trees like? The answer is fruit bearing. The questioner does not wish to know
5:15:11–5:15:17the existence or non-existence of the man or trees, but the man's particular owner or
5:15:17–5:15:23the tree's particular kind. The person who knows answers precisely the desired qualification,
5:15:23–5:15:29not existence. From this it is established that words can be meaningfully used concerning
5:15:29–5:15:35fruitful existent things. Again the question is, if an existent thing is taught, what benefit
5:15:35–5:15:41does the teacher or listener gain from it? Therefore only a fruitful existent thing should
5:15:41–5:15:46be taught, not a fruitless one. Brahman appears fruitless because Brahman is free from all
5:15:46–5:15:52action and indifferent. No action can be assisted by Brahman. The answer is, Instruction
5:15:52–5:15:58concerning me a known reality of the self is certainly of this kind as well, namely
5:15:58–5:16:04fruitful. The word and here has the sense of also. Brahman is actionless. Nevertheless,
5:16:04–5:16:10knowledge concerning Brahman, produced by verbal testimony and culminating in realization,
5:16:10–5:16:15destroys its opposite. Avil idea, the root cause of samsara. Therefore this knowledge
5:16:15–5:16:18is entirely fruitful.
5:16:18–5:16:25Adwaah sarcont, 168. Moreover, even those who hold that the purport of every word is
5:16:25–5:16:31solely what ought to be done, couch show what duty is taught in prohibitory sentences such
5:16:31–5:16:36as a Brahmin should not be killed and liquor should not be drunk. What ought to be done
5:16:36–5:16:42is delimited by volition, pervaded by volition, and ceases when volition ceases, just as
5:16:42–5:16:48Shamsharpahudh ceases when tree had ceases. Volition is a person's effort, and its determination
5:16:48–5:16:54depends on its object. Since the object of volition is something to be accomplished,
5:16:54–5:17:00It must be a process of production, one possessing a sequence of prior and posterior and producing
5:17:00–5:17:02some further result.
5:17:02–5:17:05It can be neither a substance nor a quality.
5:17:05–5:17:09For volition directly pervades only that which is its object.
5:17:09–5:17:13Existence substances and qualities are not pervaded by volition.
5:17:13–5:17:15Hence the author of the Shastra says,
5:17:15–5:17:20A verbal root conveys the meaning of production through it action is known.
5:17:20–5:17:26The discussion of words denoting substances and qualities continues below.
5:17:26–5:17:31Substance and quality become connected with what ought to be done when they occur contextually.
5:17:31–5:17:36But Bhavana, the productive activity, is connected with duty by its very nature.
5:17:36–5:17:42The connection of words denoting substance and quality with duty arises only through
5:17:42–5:17:44their conjunction with Bhavana.
5:17:44–5:17:49Therefor knowledge of a new sacrifice and the like comes from words expressing Bhavana,
5:17:49–5:17:55from words expressing substance or quality. In sentences such as an offering should be
5:17:55–5:18:00made with curd or continuous, sprinkling should be performed. Curd and the like are not the
5:18:00–5:18:06object of the duty. Here too the true object of duty is only the Bhavana action making
5:18:06–5:18:11the offering or performing the sprinkling. Nor does it follow that because an offering
5:18:11–5:18:17qualified by curd or sprinkling qualified by continuity is enjoined, a sentence such
5:18:17–5:18:23as the Agni-Hotra offering should be made or sprinkling should be performed with clarified
5:18:23–5:18:26butter becomes a mere repetition of it.
5:18:26–5:18:30Ad-YAH Sarkant, 169.
5:18:30–5:18:35Here too the object of duty is the Bhavan-action, nevertheless substance and quality, though
5:18:35–5:18:40not themselves the object, are enjoined as completing elements of Bhavana.
5:18:40–5:18:47Bhavana, as the unspecified activity of causal factors, becomes qualified and determined
5:18:47–5:18:53by particular factors such as substances, therefore substance and the like are its limbs.
5:18:53–5:18:58When Bhavana is enjoined, it is enjoined together with its limbs, hence substances
5:18:58–5:19:02and qualities, though not the object, become enjoined as limbs.
5:19:02–5:19:07In this way the injunction applies to substance and quality through Bhavana, for fear of
5:19:07–5:19:12prolixity when the principal duty has been established elsewhere, its restatant
5:19:12–5:19:19takes the completing fact as such a substance as its purport. Consequently, in every context
5:19:19–5:19:24the object of injunction is only the Bhavana action. From this the view is refuted that
5:19:24–5:19:30in sentences such as the Adnaya Sacrifice with eight poachers, the relation of the
5:19:30–5:19:35sacrifice to its substance and deity is the object of the injunction. The object
5:19:35–5:19:41of an injunction cannot be mere being if the agent of Bhavana already exists. An
5:19:41–5:19:46accomplished thing cannot again become the agent of production, and if the agent does
5:19:46–5:19:52not exist, an injunction cannot apply to a non-existent thing like a flower in the sky.
5:19:52–5:19:57Therefore the object of the injunction is the activity of the productive agent that
5:19:57–5:19:59by which it produces.
5:19:59–5:20:00The word
5:20:00–5:20:30बीडिंग यन्दिकेट्स दियाक्टिडिल अगिण भीडिंग प्रजूँस्ट, दिस आक्टिडिडि इस कोलग भावाना अप्फलिष्ण वो अप्फफ्फफ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्�
5:20:30–5:20:35activity in the form of an action, applied to an actionless relation between substance
5:20:35–5:20:40and deity. Even in make a pot, the person's effort does not apply to the pot, the direct
5:20:40–5:20:45meaning of the noun, but through the hands to the activity of instrumental factors such
5:20:45–5:20:51as the stick. Therefore the sentence communicates an effort whose object is an activity directed
5:20:51–5:20:56toward the purpose of the pot. The pot is not the direct object, but only the
5:20:56–5:21:03intended end. In the same way, in sentences such as that Agnaya Sacrifice, what is enjoined
5:21:03–5:21:09is only the sacrifice to be performed, indicated through the relation of substance and deity.
5:21:09–5:21:14The meaning of the Agnaya Sacrifice that is performed is, the desired result should
5:21:14–5:21:20be produced by means of the Agnaya Sacrifice. Therefore sentences such as Ehu, knowing
5:21:20–5:21:25thus performs the full moon sacrifice and Ehu, knowing thus performs the new moon
5:21:25–5:21:32sacrifice become restatants of the six sacrifices enjoined in sentences such as that agnus sacrifice.
5:21:32–5:21:38In the sentence one who desires heaven should perform the darsha and pernamasa sacrifices,
5:21:38–5:21:44the relation to the result occurs only through this restatement of the enjoined actions.
5:21:44–5:21:47Adwayah Sarconte, 171.
5:21:47–5:21:53Therefore in every case the object of an injunction through effort is only an activity in the
5:21:53–5:21:59form of action. If some duty is admitted in do not kill, do not drink, and the like, then
5:21:59–5:22:05one must also admit the volition or effort that pervades it and the barbuna that becomes
5:22:05–5:22:11its object. If, on the analogy of the Prajapati vow, the meaning of prohibition is taken by
5:22:11–5:22:16secondary indication from a volition such as I shall not kill, I shall not drink,
5:22:16–5:22:21then the meaning of the negative would end in prohibition of an action that has become
5:22:21–5:22:27occasioned. Secondary indication is not proper when a direct meaning is possible. A sentence
5:22:27–5:22:32such as do not look at the rising sun begins with this is his vow, and therefore a different
5:22:32–5:22:38arrangement involving prohibition of an occasioned act of seeing is possible there. A sentence
5:22:38–5:22:44such as a Brahmin should not be killed teaches withdrawal from an activity. This withdrawal
5:22:44–5:22:50is itself neither an action nor a means to action. If instruction that serves no purpose
5:22:50–5:22:55of action is regarded as meaningless, then an instruction to desist such as a Brahmin
5:22:55–5:23:01should not be killed would become meaningless. This is not acceptable, nor can the negative
5:23:01–5:23:06particle be regarded as conveying some unaccomplished action, because the meaning of the act of
5:23:06–5:23:12killing is naturally established. The negative conveys its absence, not some new action
5:23:12–5:23:14concerning killing.
5:23:14–5:23:18Adway H. Succont, 172.
5:23:18–5:23:23The nature of the negative particle is to convey the absence of that with which it is
5:23:23–5:23:24connected.
5:23:24–5:23:29Knowledge of absence is the cause of indifference, and this cognition, when its causal work has
5:23:29–5:23:35been completed, subsides of itself like a fire whose fuel has been exhausted.
5:23:35–5:23:41Therefore, except in special contexts such as the Prajapati Vowt, the meaning of prohibition
5:23:41–5:23:46such as a Brahmin should not be killed is merely indifference in the form of withdrawal
5:23:46–5:23:51from an action that has become occasioned. Consequently, statements about fruitlessness
5:23:51–5:23:56in narratives and the like that merely praise an existent thing and do not serve a human
5:23:56–5:24:02end up to be understood in this light. On this it is said that knowledge of absence
5:24:02–5:24:07is the cause of establishing indifference. Hearing when fever occurs, eat wholesome
5:24:07–5:24:13food or do not give you a ring to a snake, an elder takes wholesome food or if he had
5:24:13–5:24:16an inclination to give the ring withdraws from it.
5:24:16–5:24:21Seeing this, a child who is learning infers that the causes of the elder's activity
5:24:21–5:24:25and cessation are respectively desire and aversion.
5:24:25–5:24:30The elder's activity and cessation are voluntary and arise from desire and aversion
5:24:30–5:24:33just like our own activity and cessation.
5:24:33–5:24:39Desire to desire and aversion there is knowledge that the same object serves as a means to
5:24:39–5:24:42obtaining a desired result or an undesired result.
5:24:42–5:24:48Through self-observation we find that desire and aversion do not arise merely from knowledge
5:24:48–5:24:54of words, knowledge of action, the speaker's intention, or an unseen injunctive force transcending
5:24:54–5:24:56the three times.
5:24:56–5:25:00arise after knowledge of a relation of means to a desired or
5:25:00–5:25:30वो नदिशावड रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� �
5:25:30–5:25:36a sacrifice should be performed produces activity. The sentence itself conveys knowledge of the
5:25:36–5:25:42action to be performed, its being a means to the desired result and its necessity. These
5:25:42–5:25:47two cognitions are not obtained by another means, and a meaning not obtainable by another
5:25:47–5:25:53means is the specific meaning conveyed by words. But in do not kill, do not drink,
5:25:53–5:25:58and the like, necessities already present in another form as an activity produced by
5:25:58–5:26:03attachment or impulse. Here the injunctive suffix joined with the negative restates that
5:26:03–5:26:09situation and communicates that killing or drinking is a means to harm something not
5:26:09–5:26:15otherwise established. It's being a means to a desired result is directly known, otherwise
5:26:15–5:26:20it would not have become an object of desire. Therefore a prohibitory sentence conveys
5:26:20–5:26:25knowledge of being a means to harm, not an injunction of duty. Knowledge that the
5:26:25–5:26:31The prohibited act is a means to harm performs the same function as knowledge of its absence.
5:26:31–5:26:37An intelligent person, even when there is an external occasion for action, reflects on
5:26:37–5:26:43future harm, understands the absence of that action, withdraws and remains in a state
5:26:43–5:26:44of indifference.
5:26:44–5:26:48If knowledge of absence is the cause of indifference, then that cognition ought to
5:26:48–5:26:53remain as long as the indifference remains, but this is not so.
5:26:53–5:26:58The indifferent person may have his mind engaged elsewhere, and then there is no continuous
5:26:58–5:27:01cognition of the absence of the prohibited act.
5:27:01–5:27:07There is no universal rule that an effect must cease the instant its cause is removed
5:27:07–5:27:13when a pillar is removed the structure above does not necessarily remain, yet when a protective
5:27:13–5:27:19cause is removed the protected thing does not always perish immediately either.
5:27:19–5:27:26Hardway H. Succont 174 Therefore it has been said that this cognition subsides of itself
5:27:26–5:27:30like a fire whose fuel is exhausted.
5:27:30–5:27:35Activity toward the act remains only until knowledge that it is a means to harm arises
5:27:35–5:27:41that knowledge approves the basis of the activity and then itself subsides.
5:27:41–5:27:45Knowledge of absence is the cause that establishes indifference, not the basis
5:27:45–5:27:52that sustains it, it is like armour that protects against an external destructive cause. When
5:27:52–5:27:58the armour is removed, if no arrow attacks, the warrior's life is not immediately destroyed.
5:27:58–5:28:03Thus the meaning of prohibition is indifference in the form of withdrawal from an occasioned
5:28:03–5:28:08action. Knowledge of its beating air means to harm is only an incidental indicator of
5:28:08–5:28:14it. The objection that, unless it enters into an injunction of duty, mere mention
5:28:14–5:28:19of an existent thing would be fruitless like saying the earth has seven continents has now
5:28:19–5:28:25been refuted. Even a mere factual statement such as this is a rope, not a snake removes
5:28:25–5:28:31fear. It had also been said that even after hearing a Brahman sentence, being subject
5:28:31–5:28:36to samsara is seen as before and therefore such a sentence does not have the purpose
5:28:36–5:28:41of true knowledge of a rope. The answer is that one cannot show being subject to
5:28:41–5:28:46Samsara in a person who has directly realized Brahman as the Self.
5:28:46–5:28:55Advaah Sakhand, 175, being subject to Samsara cannot be shown in that person as before because
5:28:55–5:29:00it is opposed to the knowledge of Brahman as the Self produced by the Vedat which is
5:29:00–5:29:02a means of valid knowledge.
5:29:02–5:29:07In a person who takes body and the like to be the Self suffering, fear, and the like
5:29:07–5:29:13are observed, but when in that very person direct realization of Brahman as the self
5:29:13–5:29:19arises from the Vedda as a valid means of knowledge and such self-identification comes to an
5:29:19–5:29:25end, it is impossible to suppose that those bonds of suffering and fear-born of false
5:29:25–5:29:30knowledge still remain. A wealthy householder identifies wealth as his own, and therefore
5:29:30–5:29:35fears that it may be stolen, but when the same person renounces the wealth and is
5:29:35–5:29:41free from identification with it, that fear of its beating stolen no longer remains.
5:29:41–5:29:47Similarly, a person wearing earrings experiences pleasure through identification with the wearing
5:29:47–5:29:53of the earrings, but when that same person removes the earrings and is free from identification
5:29:53–5:29:57with wearing them, the pleasure produced by wearing them does not remain.
5:29:57–5:29:58Shruti says,
5:29:58–5:29:59The pleasant and the ill-
5:29:59–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
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5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:00I'm sorry.
5:30:00–5:30:30नप्लेशन्त दू नाटक तूछ तूछ नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना
5:30:30–5:30:35Dihama acquired by the Self are the cause of embodiment, that too is incorrect for the
5:30:35–5:30:40Self's relation to the body has not been established, nor has it been established that the Self
5:30:40–5:30:46acquires Dihama and Adihama, and a defect of mutual dependence arises between bodily
5:30:46–5:30:52relation and the acquisition of Dihama and Adihama. To call this relation beginningless
5:30:52–5:30:56is baseless, like a chain of blind men.
5:30:56–5:31:00Udwh Succont 176
5:31:00–5:31:06Action does not inhere in the self, and therefore agentsilve the self cannot be understood.
5:31:06–5:31:12If it is said that in the case of kings and others agency is admitted merely from proximity,
5:31:12–5:31:13that too is not so.
5:31:13–5:31:18Their agency is understood through the relation with servants produced by giving wealth and
5:31:18–5:31:19the like.
5:31:19–5:31:25cause analogous to the giving of wealth can be imagined to establish a master-servant
5:31:25–5:31:30relation between the self and body and the like. The direct cause of the self's relation
5:31:30–5:31:36to the body is false identification. This also explains the empirical treatment of the
5:31:36–5:31:42self as the performer of sacrifice. Here some say that the cognition I in one's body
5:31:42–5:31:47and the like, with respect to a self different from them, is figurative, not false. This
5:31:47–5:31:49This view is incorrect.
5:31:49–5:31:54Primary and figurative usage are possible only for a person who clearly knows the difference
5:31:54–5:31:56between the two things.
5:31:56–5:32:01One who knows their difference can understand the distinction between primary and figurative
5:32:01–5:32:02meanings.
5:32:02–5:32:08For example, in an animal possessing a mane and a distinctive form, the primary meaning
5:32:08–5:32:13of the word lion and the cognition of a lion are established through positive and
5:32:13–5:32:14negative concomitance.
5:32:14–5:32:20with regard to a man endowed with qualities common to the lion such as ferocity and courage.
5:32:20–5:32:26The same knowledgeable person uses the word lion and the cognition of a lion figuratively,
5:32:26–5:32:32but in one who does not know the difference between lion and man. The word and cognition
5:32:32–5:32:37belonging to one thing arise with regard to another not figuratively but through error.
5:32:37–5:32:43In the dusk, when its distinctive features are unclear, a pillar is taken to be a man.
5:32:43–5:32:48the pillar becomes the object of the word man and the cognition of a man. Similarly, because
5:32:48–5:32:54of an unknown cause, the statement and cognition this is silver rise with regard to NACA.
5:32:54–5:33:02R-Y-H Succonte, 177, in the same way, through failure to discriminate self and non-self
5:33:02–5:33:07in the aggregate of body and the like. The word I and the cognition I arise, how
5:33:07–5:33:12can this be called figurative? Even learned persons who possess discriminative knowledge
5:33:12–5:33:18of the Self as different from the non-self, because of habitual worldly usage. Like a shepherd
5:33:18–5:33:24tending goats may fail to distinguish clearly the word and cognition I. Therefore, for one
5:33:24–5:33:29who accepts the Self as different from body and the like, the I-cognition in the body
5:33:29–5:33:35is false, not figurative. Because immodiment is produced by false knowledge, the wise
5:33:35–5:33:42person is bodiless even while alive. With regard to the note of Brahman, Shruti says,
5:33:42–5:33:48as a snake's discarded slough lies dead and cast away upon an antel, so this body lies,
5:33:48–5:33:52then this bodiless immortal prana is brahman alone for your light.
5:33:52–5:33:57And it is said, though having eyes, it is as though without eyes, though having ears,
5:33:57–5:34:02as though without ears, though having speech, as though without speech, though having mind,
5:34:02–5:34:05as though without mind, though having prana, as though without prana.
5:34:05–5:34:11SM-RT2 by The Question, what is the description of one of steady wisdom and the ensuing
5:34:11–5:34:17marks of such a person shows that the Noah has no real relation to engagement in action.
5:34:17–5:34:22Therefore bethings subject to samsara does not remain as before in one who has realised
5:34:22–5:34:27Brahman as the self, one in whom it remains as before has not realised Brahman as the
5:34:27–5:34:33self. There is no defect in this position. It had also been said that reflection and
5:34:33–5:34:38deep contemplation are seen after hearing, and therefore Brahman is a limb of some
5:34:38–5:34:44injunction and the teaching does not terminate in Brahman's independent reality. This is
5:34:44–5:34:50not correct because, like hearing, reflection and deep contemplation are undertaken for the
5:34:50–5:34:52purpose of realisation.
5:34:52–5:34:56Ad-YAH Sarkant, 178.
5:34:56–5:35:00Therefore Brahman does not become merely the object of scripture.
5:35:00–5:35:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आप आप
5:35:30–5:35:35starts with therefore, now the desire to know Dihama, and if another beginning were
5:35:35–5:35:40still required, it would take a form such as therefore, now the inquiry into the remaining
5:35:40–5:35:46portion of Dihama, just as it is said, now the inquiry into the means serving the purpose
5:35:46–5:35:52of sacrifice and the means serving the human end. In that Shastra of Dihama there
5:35:52–5:35:57is no thesis of realization of the unity of Brahman and A. H. D. Man, therefore
5:35:57–5:36:01for this purpose the beginning of a second Shastra in the form therefore.
5:36:01–5:36:07Now the desire to know Brahman is reasonable. Thus in the knowledge I am Brahman, all injunctions
5:36:07–5:36:12and all other means of knowledge come to an end. When the non-dual self has been realised,
5:36:12–5:36:18the self that is neither to be rejected nor accepted an injunction or means of knowledge,
5:36:18–5:36:23left without an object and without a knower, is no longer capable of functioning as a means
5:36:23–5:36:29of knowledge. The poor Vapakshin again says, when the figurative and false self are no
5:36:29–5:36:34longer there, then after sun, body, and the like have been sublated, how can the knowledge
5:36:34–5:36:40I am the real nature of Brahman arise as something to be accomplished? Prior to knowledge
5:36:40–5:36:45of the self that is being sought, knowhood remains in the self. The thing sought is
5:36:45–5:36:50only the knower free from sin, defect, and the like, just as cognition of the
5:36:50–5:36:56self in the body is regarded as valid for practical purposes, so this empirical knowledge
5:36:56–5:37:00too is regarded as valid until the self is determined.
5:37:00–5:37:04Aadvaiah Sakkant, 179.
5:37:04–5:37:08The commission of the self in son and the like is figurative.
5:37:08–5:37:13A person is distressed by his own suffering and pleased by his own pleasure.
5:37:13–5:37:18He likewise experiences distress and pleasure from suffering and pleasure present in his
5:37:18–5:37:24son and the like, and therefore this is figurative usage. But here there is no commission of identity
5:37:24–5:37:30because difference is clearly experienced. Hence this is a figurative commission like
5:37:30–5:37:36the vahika is an ox. The commission of the self in bodied senses and the like is not figurative
5:37:36–5:37:42because none difference with them is experienced, like the commission of silver in naka. It is
5:37:42–5:37:49an error. Through these two kinds of identification with the self, the affairs of Samsara proceed.
5:37:49–5:37:55If these identifications did not remain, worldly affairs would not proceed, nor would experience
5:37:55–5:38:01of the identity of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun arise, because its means hearing, reflection,
5:38:01–5:38:06and the like would not remain. The purport of sun, body, and the like being sublated
5:38:06–5:38:11is this when figurative self-cognition is destroyed, the cognition mine with regard
5:38:11–5:38:18to son, wife, and the like is sublated when false self-cognition is destroyed, body senses,
5:38:18–5:38:23and the like are sublated, and along with them hearing and the other means are also sublated.
5:38:23–5:38:28For this reason not only would worldly activity come to an end, how then could the knowledge
5:38:28–5:38:34to be accomplished in the form of awakening, I am the real nature of Brahman, that is,
5:38:34–5:38:37the realization of non-duality arise.
5:38:37–5:38:43the reason for this impossibility, it is said, prior to knowledge of the self-being sought,
5:38:43–5:38:48no-hood remains in the self. Here no-hood is indicative, the distinctions of means of
5:38:48–5:38:54knowledge, object of knowledge, and instruments of knowledge are also to be understood.
5:38:54–5:39:01R-D-Y-H Sarkont, 180. These distinctions are the cause of realization of non-duality
5:39:01–5:39:05because they necessarily remain before that realization.
5:39:05–5:39:10Therefore if these distinctions do not remain, their fruit too cannot arise.
5:39:10–5:39:15The self-bealing sort is not different from the self that is the knower.
5:39:15–5:39:20Therefore it is said the sort self is merely the knower free from sin, defect, and the
5:39:20–5:39:21like.
5:39:21–5:39:27The example of the necklace already worn around once own neck has already been given, granted.
5:39:27–5:39:32But how can the supremely true experience of non-duality arise from something that is
5:39:32–5:39:33not ultimately valid?
5:39:33–5:39:39The answer is, just as cognition of the self in the body is regarded as valid, so this
5:39:39–5:39:42empirical knowledge too is regarded as valid.
5:39:42–5:39:48Its limit is stated until the self is determined, that is, until realization of the nature
5:39:48–5:39:49of Brahman.
5:39:49–5:39:54Even those who hold the world to be ultimately real accept that the cognition of the
5:39:54–5:39:59self in body and the like is false, because knowledge produced by a valid means sublim-
5:40:00–5:40:30ये तिस वेरी वोझाद कविनिष्यन ये रेकूर्ज़ा वोझाद कविनिष्यन ये नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� �
5:40:30–5:40:36is no income gruity in one Ovi idea destroying or producing another Ovi idea.
5:40:36–5:40:42Truti2 says one who knows both Vidya and Ovi idea together crosses death through Ovi idea
5:40:42–5:40:47and attains immortality through Vidya. Therefore everything is clear.
5:40:47–5:40:50Here ends the Chutu Sutri bar MUHD.

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Chapter 3 The Bahram-UHD Full Translated Text Chapter 4 Appendix Pure Mithaili Translation of Bahram-UHD Bahram-UHD Vachu-Sputty's commentary on Shankara's Brahma-Sakrabharsha, Original Sanskrit Vachu-Sputty-Misraha Sanskrit-Mithaili Translation, Gajendra Thakkar, the Fields of the Two Notions. You and I, the object and the subject, are, by their very natures, opposed to one another like darkness and light. When it is established that the nature of one cannot intelligibly be that of the other, it is even less intelligible that the attributes of one should become united in the substratum of the other. Therefore the superimposition upon the conscious self, the subject that is the field of the notion I, of the object that is the field of the notion you and of its attributes, and conversely, owing to error in this matter, the superimposition of the subject and its attributes upon the object can in truth occur only as false superimposition. Nevertheless, because the distinction between mutually and completely different attributes, and likewise between their different substrata, is not apprehended, there arises the natural usage I am this and this is mine, through the superimposition of each upon the other both in nature and in attributes. In this usage, truth and falsehood are mingled and its cause is erroneous cognition. Salutations to that immortal Brahman, whose nature is immeasurable bliss and knowledge who, as Lord, makes the two kinds of indefinable of the idea his ministers and brings about the false manifestation of ether, air, fire, water, and earth, and from whom this entire world of the moving and the moving, the high and the low, has arisen. The Vedas are his breath, the five great elements are his sight. The moving and unmoving world is his smile, and his sleep is the great dissolution. Salutations to the Eternal Vedha and to Bhava. The Vedha is endowed with six limbs, and Bhava is possessed of many imperishable qualities or aviayas. Salutations to Martanda, Tila Kaslamin and Mahagena Pati. All are worthy of universal worship and grant the fruits of every desire. Salutations to Biasa, the author of the Brahmasutras, the second creator, and an incarnation of the power of knowledge of Lord Hari. Chapter 3 The Bahram-UHD Full Translated Text Cont. 2. Having bowed to Shankara, whose nature is stainless knowledge and who is a notion of compassion, I begin the analysis of the lucid yet profound Basha composed by him. as water from the royal road becomes pure when it falls into the stream of the Ganges, so the trifling words of people such as myself become sanctified when joined to the work of the Acharya. Advaayahsa, now an object about which there is no doubt, or knowledge of which serves no purpose, cannot become an object that a discriminating inquirer desires to know. For example, a pot present in bright light and brought into contact with the visual organ accompanied by the mind or the teeth of a crow. The case of Brahman is just the same because the knowledge opposed to the condition in which the prop is pervaded by inquiry doubt and purpose are present is already available here. The point is this, only the self is called Brahman because it is great or because it makes everything grow. This self is known through the undisputed, anerring and immediate experience of I as distinct from the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect, their objects, and in brief everything capable of being denoted by the word this. This experience is present in all living beings from worms and insects up to gods and sages. Therefore the self cannot be an object of the desire to know. Indeed no one doubts is this I or not, nor does anyone make the error. This is absolutely not I. Nor is it proper to say that because judgments such as I am thin, I am fat and I am going are seen to be used in coordination with attributes of the body. The body is the substratum of the word I. If the body were its substratum, there could be no recognition such as I, who enjoyed myself with my parents in childhood. Now in old age enjoy myself with my grandchildren. There is in fact not the slightest mark of recognition between the youthful body and the aged body by which their identity could be ascertained. Therefore, that which remains continuously the same amid changing things is different from them just as the thread that strings flowers together is different from the flowers. In the same way, the principle denoted by the word I which persists through the bodily changes of childhood, youth and so forth is distinct from those bodies. अद्वाय आच्शाखंट, तू, वोरोवा अपर्सन, विन अद्विमर्श्विम्स अद्वाई भाषिए आद्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर despite the difference of body. Therefore the body is not the substratum of Ines. Nor are the senses its substratum because despite the senses being different, recognition of the substratum of Ines occurs in the statement, what I myself saw, I am now touching. That the self is distinct from objects is exceedingly direct. The intellect and the mind are merely instruments. Therefore these instruments cannot in reality be the substratum of the cognition I which apprehends the agent. Although the body and the self are not identical, statements such as I am thin and I am blind are made. In my view, their meaning should be understood figuratively. Just as the statement the long haul is shouting means that the people seated in the long haul are shouting. Thus it is established that the self, distinct from the body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, and in brief from everything capable of being denoted by this, is known through the exceedingly clear experience ofight, and because there is no doubt, it is not an object of the desire to know. The self is not an object of inquiry also because inquiry into it serves no purpose. The point is this, liberation, in the form of cessation of transmigration, is the intended fruit to be taught here. None experience of the true nature of the Self is the cause of transmigration and that transmigration is to cease through knowledge of the true nature of the Self. Ad-Y-H-Sak-Kant 3. If beginningless transmigration continues together with beginningless knowledge of the true nature of the Self, then since there is no opposition between the two, how can the former cease? And how can there be non-experience of the true nature of the Self, apart from the experience of I, there is no other cognition of the true nature of the Self. This Self, distinct from the bodied senses, and so forth, is established by the exceedingly clear experience of I that is equally present in all human beatings because it would contradict experience. Even a thousand UPUH nishads cannot negate it. Even a thousand scriptures together cannot turn a pot into cloth. Therefore, because they would contradict experience, in my view the statements of the Upuh Nishads should be understood in a secondary sense. Keeping these considerations in mind, an objection is raised and the commentator answers it with the words. The Fields of the Two Notions and so forth. From the Fields of the Two Notions, Ruken in truth occur only as false superimposition is the statement of the objection. The answer begins with nevertheless. In relation to the nevertheless of the answer, the word although should be understood as supplied in the statement of the objection, where the fields of the two notions this and I were to be stated, the word you has been used in place of this in order to show the complete difference between these two sides of experience, the word you is more opposed to the word I than the word this is, because usages such as I am this and I am that are widely found. Advaayah Sakant, for, the self, whose nature is consciousness, is the subject. The inert intellect, senses, body, and external objects are objects of commission, for they delimit the conscious self, that is, they present it in determinate and limited forms through their own respective forms. The complete difference that forms the basis for the impossibilities of mutual superposition is illustrated by the words like darkness and light. No one can ever understand utterly different things such as light and darkness as being the nature of one another. This is what the sentence says when it is established that the nature of one cannot intelligibly be that of the other. For one to be the other means that the nature of one is present in the other. That is, that the two are identical. This is unintelligible. Very well, the different substratas the self and the non-self may not be mutually identical. Nevertheless, their attributes such as inertness and consciousness, permanence and impermanence, may be mutually superimposed. Even when substratas are known to be different, the superimposition of their attributes is observed. For example, a crystal is known to be different from a flat आप येप पिकोज़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़� reflection of another coloured substance, even though that other substance is known to be different from it. But the conscious self is a colourless subject, it cannot receive the reflection of an object. Followers of the batter school also say, in what way could there be a reflection of sound, smell, taste, and so forth. Udwh Succont. 5. Therefore when the remaining alternatives are eliminated, the conclusion is that mutual transference of the attributes eternally connected with the object and the subject could occur only on the basis of a mutual relation between these two substratas. If these two substratas were known as completely different and remained mutually unrelated, their attributes would be still more clearly unrelated because, with their respective substratas intervening, those attributes would be even farther removed from one another. This is what is expressed by the words even less and so forth. The cause of error in this matter means the cause of error concerning the object. The word false conveys concealment. What is beaming said is this superimposition is dependent upon non-apprehension of difference. Conversely, apprehension of difference is present here. This apprehension removes the non-apprehension of difference. And it also removes the superimposition dependent upon that non-apprehension. The syntactic connection of the sentence is although this could in truth occur only as false superimposition, nevertheless the implied intention of this statement is as follows. All this would be correct only if the true nature of the self were manifested in the experience of I. But that is not so. The point is this. In shruti, asamriti, itihasa and purana, the true nature of the self is said to be free from all limiting adjuncts, a homogenous reality of infinite bliss and consciousness in different one and non-dual. Statements whose purport is to teach the self in this form cannot be reduced even by Indra to a secondary meaning because of their opening middle and concluding statements and their purposeful repetition. For repetition establishes the importance of the subject as in our beautiful, our beautiful, its insignificance, and secondary meaning is still farther removed from it. Adwaah Sakkant 6. The experience of my presence the self as limited and mixed with many kinds of suffering and grief. How then can this experience have the true nature of the self as its object? Or how can it be an unknowing experience? Nor can it be said that shruti conflicts with perception, and since perception is an older and senior means of knowledge, Truti, which depends upon perception, should be considered invalid or secondary. Truti is awfulous, entirely free even from the possibility of defect, and the very fact that it produces cognition makes its validity self-revealing, therefore with respect to its fruit, namely true knowledge. Truti is independent of other means of knowledge. If it is said that although Shruti is independent with respect to the cognition it produces, it depends upon perception with respect to its own origination, and because perception contradicts it, the cognition from Shruti will not arise so that the invalidity of Shruti follows the answer is no, because there is no contradiction with its origination. Knowledge born of Shruti does not destroy the practical validity of perception, otherwise, through absence of its own cause, it would not arise at all. It negates only the ultimate validity of perception, nor is the cause of scriptural knowledge a perception that is ultimately true, because true knowledge is observed to arise from instruments that are valid at the practical level even though they are not ultimately valid. For example, the properties of shortness and length belong not to letters but to sounds, yet they are superimposed upon letters and become causes of correct comprehension of meaning, in ordinary usage, people who understand different objects such as a tree and an elephant respectively from the words naga and naga are not in fact regarded as deluded. Udwh Sarkont 7. It is not proper to regard a word that has no other purport as being used secondarily with respect. नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ The later cognition whose very essence is the sublation of the earlier could not intelligibly arise, and it has already been shown that the ultimate validity of perception is not independently established. The sutra of the great sage J.Y.E. Meini says only this much, where the earlier and the later are connected. The earlier alternative is weaker, as in the case of a Prakriti rite. There is also a verse to this effect, where two cognitions arise successively without depending upon one another. The superiority of the later cognition over the earlier is known. Moreover, even according to those who take the self to be the substratum of Ines, the truth of the cognition I cannot be accepted, for in the judgment I am in this dwelling and cognize, the all-pervading self is cognized as limited just as to a person standing on level ground, the huge trees on the summit of a high mountain appear like blades of grass, nor can it be said that the experienced limitation belongs to the body and not to the self. If that were so, the experience would not take the form I am and so forth, and if the word I were taken as being used secondarily for the body, the experience would not take the form I cognize either. Udhsakont 8. Only when both the speaker and the hearer who understands the meaning except that a word denotes some other thing is its use secondary, such use arises after knowledge of difference. For example, the word Agnihotra ordinarily denotes the obligatory right bearing that name, but in the context of a right of a different nature connected with the kundapayinamayana. In the sentence he offers the month long Agnihotra. The word Agni-Hotra is used secondarily on the basis of similarity in the end achieved by the two rites. Likewise, the word Lion is used secondarily for a pupil known from experience to be different from a lion, but here the primary referent of the word Eye is not experienced as definitely and clearly distinct from the body and so forth. Only after such an experience could the word Eye be used secondarily for the body and so on. How can it be maintained that through long usage a word may become conventionally established in a secondary meaning so that its secondary character is no longer known as with Taylor, whose literal meaning is Sesame Oil, but which is used for mustard oil, for even there, only after Difference has first been established with respect to extraction from Sesame or another seed, oiliness, and so forth? the supposition arise that mustard oil and the like are principally tailor, and they are denoted by that word. But the identity of sesame oil and mustard oil is not thereby established. The conclusion, therefore, is that in the case of those who know both the primary and secondary meanings, secondary usage is invariably accompanied by knowledge of difference. When the pervader, namely knowledge of difference, is absent here, secondary usage pervaded by it also disappears. Ad-YAH Sarkont 9. Nor can it be said that although the youthful and aged bodies are different, in the judgment I am that same one there is recognition of one and the same self, and thus experience of a self distinct from the body and so forth is established. In fact such a judgment belongs to a critical inquirer engaged in reflection on reality, not to ordinary people. In practical life even critical inquirers do not rise above the level of ordinary people. The revered commentator later says this very thing in the words there is no difference from animals and so forth adherents of other schools also say only those who reflect upon scriptural instruction make this distinction, not those who merely receive the text. Therefore when the other alternatives are eliminated. It is proper to accept that the ordinary person who says I am in this dwelling and so forth understands the self itself as limited, just as space is understood as limited by a pot, jar, vessel and so on. In order to preserve the validity of the use of the word I, it is not proper to say that the self, like the body and so forth, is also limited. Its size would then have to be either like an atom or like the body. If if it were atomic, usages suck. चज़ायम खविश्विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आ in opposite directions and the body would be thrown into disorder or no action would occur at all. If consciousness were held to belong to the aggregate of parts, then when one part were injured the conscious self would not understand itself to be partially injured nor is any stable relation of coexistence among the many parts observed. When any one part is destroyed the aggregate lacking that part cannot cognize. If cognition itself is taken to be the substratum of the notion I, its falsity still remains, because the notion I apprehends a permanent substance, whereas cognitions are momentary. Thus statements such as I am fat, I am blind, I am going would have to be understood as arising from superimposition. Thus, when the basis of the notion I has been shown to be groundless like rotten soil, the revered shruti can unobstructedly remove from the self the notions of agency, enjoy a ship, pleasure, pain, grief, and so forth that arise as consequences of the experience of I. Therefore, in the words superimposing each upon the other and so forth, the nature cause and result of the notion I have been elaborated, its faucet is well known from all authoritative true-ty, esmeriti, itihasa and purana of the two substratas, body and self, the nature of one is superimposed upon the other. For example, in I am this body, identification with this is an event of practical usage, not a cognitive judgement. Ordinary usage means worldly conduct, that is, an expression such as I am this. The word iti in the statement I am this indicates such actions as accepting or abandoning things understood by valid cognition to be beneficial or harmful to the body. Aadvayah Sakant 11. The attribute of one substratum is also superimposed upon the other. For example, upon the self on which the body and so forth have been superimposed are superimposed the bodily properties of birth, death, old age, disease, and so forth. And upon the body and so forth on which selfhood has been superimposed are superimposed the attributes of the self such as consciousness. As a result there arises ordinary usage or verbal expression such as this old age, death, sun, cow, ownership, and so forth is mine. The word E.T. in the statement this is mine indicates action and the like in conformity with the experience just described. The statement that ordinary conduct takes place after superimposition is reasonable because the agent of both acts superimposition and ordinary conduct is taken to be the same person. By showing that superimposition is temporarily prior to ordinary conduct, it becomes clear that superimposition is the cause of ordinary conduct. This alone is intended by the statement ordinary conduct together with its cause in the form of false cognition and so forth. False cognition is superimposition with it as the cause. The existence or non-existence of ordinary conduct follows the existence or non-existence of superimposition. Having thus stated the nature of superimposition and its fruit, namely ordinary conduct, the commentator states its cause with the words because the distinction between one and the other is not apprehended, that is, because their separateness is not understood. A question arises here, if there were absolutely no difference between the two, failure to apprehend difference would be natural, but then how could superimposition occur? The answer is given by the words completely different attributes and substratas from the ultimate standpoint. Difference means non-identity of the substratas and non-mixture of their attributes. R-Y-H Succont, 12, Granted, the illusion of identity produced by failure to understand the distinction between two real things is intelligible as in the illusion of silver in a shell when the distinction between the shell and silver is not understood, but here, apart from the conscious self that is the supreme reality, there is no real thing such as the body. Wents then comes the failure to understand its distinction from the conscious self, and wents the illusion of identity? answer is because truth is joined with विश्विद तो च्विद तो विचार-विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आ� आप आप आप rather than a literal union, conveying the sense that something becomes as though what it is not. What is being said is this superimposition of something that does not appear at all is impossible, therefore commission of the superimposed thing is necessary, not its real existence. Granted, when there is commission of the thing to be superimposed, what was previously seen is superimposed but that commission itself is conditioned by superimposition, It therefore seems difficult to avoid the defect of mutual dependence. The answer lies in the word natural. This ordinary conduct is natural and beginningless. By stating the beginninglessness of conduct, the beginninglessness of its cause superimposition is also stated. Thus intellect senses, body, and so forth continue to appear in each preceding false commission and at each subsequent occasion superimposition occurs again. Since this process is beginningless like the succession of seed and sprout, there is no defect of mutual dependence here. Udwa Hsakont, 13, very well. Superimposition requires only the prior appearance. It does not require the ultimate reality of the appearing object, but if body senses and so forth were utterly unreal, like a lotus lake in the sky, even their appearance existence would be unintelligible. Even the reality of the conscious self consists only in its luminosity. There is no principle distinct from that, such as inheritance in a class called existence or causal efficacy, for admitting such a principle would produce duality. Again, if another existence and another causal efficacy were required to establish the reality of this existence and causal efficacy, there would be infinite regress. Therefore luminosity alone must be accepted as the nature of reality. Consequently, because body and so forth appear, they would not be unreal. They too would become real like the conscious self. If they are unreal, they cannot appear. How then can truth and falsehood be joined? Here it may be asked, what is this thing called superimposition? The answer is, the appearance elsewhere, in a form resembling memory of something previously seen. Some Some say that superimposition is the attribution elsewhere of the properties of one thing. Others hold that when one thing is superimposed upon another, superimposition is the illusion produced by failure to apprehend the distinction between the two. Still others say that when one thing is superimposed upon another, contrary properties are imagined in the latter. But whatever the view, none falls outside the characteristic that one thing appears as though enowed with the properties of another. Our ordinary experience is also precisely this, a shell appears like silver, and one moon appears together with another, that is, as two. Udwh Succont, 14, the words previously seen and so forth in this definition are further explained as follows. The appearance of what was seen before means the manifestation of an object previously seen. False appearance is impossible without a conjunction of the superimposed element and that upon which it is superimposed, therefore the words previously seen indicate the superimposed and unreal element. The word seen is intended to show that the superimposed element is only empirically real, not ultimately real. Yet what is presently being seen cannot be what is superimposed, therefore the word previously is used. Though the thing previously seen is true in its own form, in its superimposed form it is indefinable and therefore false. The true substratum of superimposition is expressed by the words elsewhere, this elsewhere is the shell and the like, which is ultimately real. In this way the conjunction of truth and falsehood is stated. Granted, the definition, the appearance elsewhere of something previously seen is too broad because in the cow named Calachi there is the perception of cowhood previously seen in the Kausvas dimati. Likewise, when Dvadatta previously seen at Patalipatra is seen at Mahishmati, there is the perception elsewhere of that same Dvadatta. Both are valid cognitions. The word appearance is also well known in Kana... नाटक आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन आप्चिन विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप्चिन आप memory also falls under this definition. In a dream, owing to the defect of sleep, attention is not given to the present absence of remembered parents and others, therefore the time and place in which they had previously been seen as present are superimposed upon the present experience. Udwa Hsakont 15. The same definition also applies to experiences such as the shell is yellow and sugar is bitter. The process is this, the yellow colour situated in bile that has come into contact with an exceedingly clear ray issuing from the eye is experienced as separate from the bile, the shell too is experienced, but owing to a defect of the sense organ its whiteness remains concealed. The non-relation of the yellow colour to the shell is not experienced. Because this non-apprehension of non-relation resembles earlier experiences such as a heap of yellow gold or a yellow bale fruit. The relation of collocation previously seen there is superimposed upon yellowness and shellhood, and the person says yellow shell. The experience sugar is bitter is to be explained in the same way. In the same way, the ray of the visual organ comes into contact with a clear mirror or sheet of water in front, but overpowered by the stronger rays of the sun, it is reflected from there, comes into contact with the face and produces cognition of the face. Owing to a defect, it does not apprehend the face in its real location that is, in the direction opposite itself but superimposes upon the face the property previously seen in the mirror or sheet of water of facing toward itself. Thus the definition applies also to the illusion of reflection. In the same way should be explained the illusion of seeing two moons, era concerning direction, the circle of a firebrand, a mirage in the form of a celestial city, and the illusion of seeing a snake inside a bamboo. Ad-Y-H-Saconte 16. What is beading said is this mere manifestation is not reality otherwise the body senses, and so forth would become real merely because they appear. It is not that a rope and the like do not appear as a snake, or that a crystal and the like do not appear as endowed with redness, yet despite appearing in such forms, they do not actually become a snake and so forth, nor are they really endowed with those attributes. If they were, then one would have to accept that in a mirage the man d'Kenea itself, with constantly moving high and low waves, had descended nearby, and a person who ran there could drink that water and quench his thirst. Therefore, even though a superimposed object appears. Its ultimate reality cannot be accepted, however unwelcome that conclusion may be. Nor is it proper to ask, the water of a mirage is unreal, but the mirage itself is ultimately real in its own form, whereas the body senses, and so forth are unreal even in their own form and therefore cannot be objects of experience, how then can they be superimposed? If an unreal object can never be an object of any experience, how How does the unreal mirage become an object of experience as water and so forth? Even though a mirage is real in its own form, it cannot be real in the form of water and the like. It may be said that there is no entity called absence distinct from positive beading. One existing thing is called absent with respect to the form of another existing thing while in its own form it is positive being. It has been said, absence is merely another positive entity considered in relation to another thing. Thus, absence can be regarded as another mode of positive being and made an object of experience. But how can a world that is utterly unreal devoid of all efficacy and without any real essence become an object of experience? And how can it be superimposed upon the conscious self? 17. Nor can it be accepted that although the objects of experience are utterly devoid of any capacity to manifest themselves, their respective cognitions, through a power residing within cognition itself as cognition, produce the appearance of unreal objects as a particular kind of transformation, and that this power of cognition which manifests नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आ its relation to a fresh cognition would then have to be explained, leading to infinite regress. If it is said that manifesting the unreal is simply the nature of cognition, then what is this relation between truth and falsehood? If it is said that the relation between valid cognition and an unreal object is such that the former, namely valid cognition, is determined under the control of the unreal object R. What extraordinary good fortune for for poor cognition, that it acquires determinacy even from the unreal, nor does cognition perform any action upon that unreal object, because it is improper to suppose that an unreal object can be the substratum of such an action. If it is said that cognition is not subordinate to the unreal, but that it is simply the nature of cognition never to appear apart from the unreal are, what unfortunate partiality in favor of the unreal, by which cognition is always bound to it, although cognition is neither produced by the unreal nor of the same nature as it. Therefore the bodied senses, and so forth, which are utterly unreal and devoid of real existence, cannot be objects of experience. Udwaahsakont, 18, our answer here is this, if what lacks real existence cannot enter the field of experience, are these rays then really watered so that they may become objects of experience. The opponent says, There is no real existence of water in the rays, because the rays are not of the nature of water. The existence of a thing is twofold, true with respect to its own nature and false with respect to something different from itself. It has been said, At any time a person apprehends the existence of a thing as true or false either with respect to that thing's own nature or with respect to another thing, Our answer is, does the cognition of water in the rays fall within the sphere of truth? Then being valid, it would be neither erroneous nor sublated. The Leponin Tugend says certainly it would not be sublated if the rays were understood not as water but as something different from water. But when the rays are understood as water, how can that cognition be annoying or unsublated? Our answer then is, the waterness superimposed upon rays whose nature is non-water is not true because those Reys, being identical with non-Waterness, cannot intelligibly be of the nature of Waterness, but that Waterness is not false either because you yourself admit that absence is nothing but a positive entity in another form, not anything else since no such separate entity is established. That is, the falsity of one thing is only another thing, yet the superimposed form is not another thing either, if it were. It would be either the ray or water of the Ganges. On the first alternative the cognition would take the form ray, not water. On the second it would take the form water of the Ganges, not water here. Even if the particular place were not remembered, the cognition should be merely water, not here. Nor can it be accepted that it is utterly false, an illusory object devoid of all existence, because it has already been said that such a thing cannot intelligibly enter the field of experience. Therefore the water superimposed upon the rays must be regarded as indefinable. It is neither true nor false nor both true and false because the last alternative is self-contradictory. Thus the superimposed water appears like ultimately real water and for that reason seems like water previously seen, but in reality it is neither water nor the water previously seen. It is false and indefinable. In the same way, the body senses, and the entire world are indefinable. Though new, they are superimposed upon another substratum, the Conscious Self, as though they were objects presented in preceding erroneous commission. The definition of superimposition given above applies perfectly here. The sublation of the world consisting of body senses, and so forth will be explained later. Conscious self is the subject matter of Shruti, Esmeriti, Itihasa and Purana when ascertained by reasoning based upon and not opposed to these. Its nature is purity, consciousness and freedom and it is de... अछि। अछि। आपने आपने अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। in a class called existence or causal efficacy. Thus everything is clear. Udwh Succont 19. All inquirers accept the indefinable superimposition defined above, but there is considerable disagreement regarding its finer details. Therefore, in order firmly to establish its indefinability, the commentator says some people describe it thus and so forth. of another's attribute means here the attribute of a cognition whose object is silver or the form of the cognition. Superimposition occurs elsewhere. That is, in an external object. According to the Sortran Ticca view, external existence is real. Superimposition is the attribution of the form of cognition to that external object. According to the Vayna Navada view, though there is no external reality, an external falsity is produced by the impressions of beginningless of Elydia, and the form of commission is superimposed upon that. The support for this view is as follows, the general rule is that whatever is experienced in a particular form should be accepted in precisely that form, because difference from that form is established only when a stronger commission sublates it. Although it is possible to interpret the sublating condition this is not silver as sublating only the element this. It is not proper to extend its sublation to the silver element. If the substratum silver were sublated, then both silver and its attribute of thisness would be sublated. Therefore it is more reasonable to hold that only the attribute of thisness is sublated, not the substratum silver. Consequently, when the externality of silver is sublated, silver is inferentially taken to be confined within our cognition. Thus the external superimposition of an object that is the form of cognition is established. Udwh Succonte 20 But some others that is, those not satisfied with the doctrine that the form of cognition is superimposed say that when one thing is superimposed upon another, there is an illusion arising from non-apprehension of the distinction between the two. They state the reason for their dissatisfaction thus, that silver and the Leica forms of cognition must be established either by experience, namely perception or by inference. The inference on this matter will be refuted later, as for perception, it would have to be either the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. The experience of silver does not indicate that silver is of the form of cognition because it reveals silver as an external object situated on the substratum, this, not as an internal object. Otherwise, because Noah and cognition would be identical, the cognition would take the form I am silver. The proponent of Atma-Kyati may say, erroneous cognition determines its own form as external, therefore its object is not the substratum of the word I. Its being the form of cognition is understood from the sublating cognition. To this we reply, R, let the long lived gentleman examine this sublating cognition. Does it distinguish the object present before us from silver or does it also tell us that its nature is a form of cognition? Let the gods praise the intelligence of the person who says that the sublating cognition reveals the previously experienced object as beating of the nature of cognition. If it is said that from the denial of the presence of silver before us its beating a form of cognition is inferred, that too is incorrect, for from denial of failure to apprehend remoteness, the object would be established as distant from the knower how then would the extreme nearness of the knower's own nature follow. The sublating cognition negates neither silver nor thisness, it negates only the practical usage concerning silver that arose from failure to apprehend their difference. Nor does the cognition of silver in a shell itself produce silver because it is contrary to experience to say that the manifestation of silver can have the shell as its substratum. Nor can it be said that the shell is the substratum merely as an existent thing, not as a known thing, for then the definition of substratum would be overextended, since existence is common to all things and anything could become the substratum. Nor is the shell the substratum as a cause of cognition, because the sense organ too is a cause. Thus the word substratum can mean only that which is manifest, but in the cognition of silver the shell is not manifest. How then is it the substratum? If it's manifestation नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक � Again, if cognition were not restricted to its proper object, confidence in everything would be destroyed. Therefore it must be accepted that every cognition is valid. Udwh Sarkont 21. Thus the two cognitions, silver and this, are of two kinds, memory and experience. Here this is the apprehension merely of the object present before us, owing to a defect. the shellhood present there is not apprehended. The mere that which had previously been apprehended because of similarity, awakens the impression of the former experience of silver and produces a memory of silver. Although that memory is of the nature of apprehension of an object previously apprehended, it remains merely as apprehension because of the defect. The aspect previously apprehended belonging to its object disappears. For this reason the distinction between the memory of silver and the apprehension of the mere object present before us whether in their own cognitive forms or in relation to their objects is not apprehended. Consequently because they resemble a cognition of silver actually produced by sense contact these two cognitions call this and silver though different as perception and memory produce practical usage and coordinate predication as though they were one. In some cases there are two perceptions whose mutual difference is not apprehended as in the shell is yellow. In this situation, as in the example of a transparent crystal, the yellowness of bile present in the ray of light issuing from the eye is apprehended but the bile itself is not apprehended. Owing to some defect the shell too is apprehended merely as existing, while its whiteness is not apprehended. Because non-apprehension of the non-relation between quality and qualified resembles the cognition of a heap of yellow gold, here too there arises practical usage in the form of identity and coordinate predication. At the time of sublation, this practical identity produced by non-apprehension of difference is sublated, therefore the sublating force of the cognition of difference in the form not this is understood. Understood in this way, even the erroneous character of the earlier cognition, well known in the world, is established. Thus all cognitions whose doubtful or erroneous nature is disputed up because they are cognitions, true like the cognition of a pot. This view is explained in the words when one thing is superimposed upon another. The worldly superimposition of silver and the like upon a shell and the like is not governed by some other cognition. Rather, on one side there is the memory of silver in which the aspect of its object has disappeared and only apprehension remains. And on the other side there is the mere object present before us in the form this and its cognition. The illusion arises from non-apprehension of the separateness of these two. The erroneous character consists only in speaking of memory and apprehension as co-ordinate with one another and in practical usage as silver and the like. Ad-YAH Sarkont, 22, but others, who are not satisfied even with this view, say, when one thing is superimposed upon another, contrary attributes are imagined in the latter. The basic consideration is this, everyone has the same experience that the commission this is silver causes a person seeking silver to act toward the object before him and to use coordinate predication. This cannot arise merely from memory and apprehension or from non-apprehension of the mutual difference between their respective objects for how could the action and speech of an intelligent being which depend upon apprehension arise merely from non-apprehension. It has been said here that they arise not from mere non-apprehension but from memory and apprehension in which the difference of their forms and objects is not apprehended because of their resemblance to a valid cognition of silver present before one. They produce practical usage in the form of identity and coordinate predication. To this the proponent of any affect Kiati replies. The resemblance of this cognition to valid silver cognition as a cause of practical usage must either itself be apprehended or without being apprehended operate merely by its existence. अछि। difference between these two is apprehended is self-contradictory for if there is non-apprehension of difference. The cognition cannot take the form between these two, and if between these two is apprehended, how can difference remain unapprehended? Thus it must be said that non-apprehension of difference, without itself being apprehended, becomes a cause of practical usage merely by its existence. The question is, does it cause practical usage by producing superimposition or does it itself become the cause without producing superimposition? Our view is that practical usage by an intelligent being cannot intelligibly be the direct result of ignorance, therefore non-apprehension of difference becomes effective only by producing a superimposed cognition. An objection may be raised, the action of an intelligent being is not the result of ignorance but of an apprehension and memory whose mutual difference is not known. Our answer is, not so. Mere memory of the primary meaning of the word silver is not a cause of action, because it is indisputable that a person seeking silver acts toward the substratum of thisness. Without desire regarding the substratum of thisness, how could the person act toward it? To say that one desires one thing but acts for another is self-contradictory. Again, if it is not known that the substratum of thisness is silver, how can a person seeking silver desire it? If it is said that desire arises because the substratum of thisness has not been apprehended as different from silver, the reply is, when it has not been apprehended as being silver, why does the person not remain indifferent to it? Pulled in opposite directions by acceptance and indifference, this intelligent person would remain undecided, finally, through the superimposition of silver upon the substratum of thisness. His mind settles on acceptance. Therefore, non-apprehension of difference causes the action of an intelligent person by producing superimposition. The sequence is this because difference is not understood. The property of silver is superimposed upon the substratum of thisness. Then the fact that an object of the class silver is beneficial is remembered next that beneficialness is inferred of the silver superimposed upon the substratum of thisness because it belongs to the class silver. Thereafter the person seeking silver acts toward that superimposed silver. Thus the sequence is established. A general memory of silver cannot help infer that the substratum of thisness is beneficial because it would not be known that the Proben's silverhood resides in the subject. Influence arises from seaming the subject and probens in the same locus, not in different loci. It has been said, inference arises when one who knows the pervasion sees the subject and the reason in the same locus. Ad-Yh Succont 23. Pervasion in superimposition, this perception of one locus occurs. Therefore, this inference is established. The cognition of silver and the like that is under dispute has the object present before one as its object, because a person seeking silver and the like invariably acts toward that present object. A cognition that invariably causes a person seeking an object to act toward that object has that very object as its object, as with the valid cognition of silver admitted by both you and us. The cognition in question is of that kind, therefore its object is the substratum of thisness itself. When it is said that the shell is not the substratum because it is not directly present. You must clarify whether by saying the shell is not the substratum of the cognition, this is silver you mean shellhood or merely the bright, shining substance present before one. If shellhood is not the substratum we too accept this, but if the bright, shining substance before one is not the substratum then in saying so you stand alone against direct experience. The fact is that a person who experiences this is silver while having that experience points with a finger and so forth toward the object before him. It is also observed that when, because of a defect, a causes production of its ordinary effect is obstructed, that cause acquires a capacity to produce a different kind of effect for ex... For example, from a sugar cane seed scorched in a forest fire there arises a plantain shoot and the digestive fire of a person afflicted with the disease bas-marca digests a great quantity of food. An inference of the truth of an illusion that has been established by sublating perception to be objectless is defective, like an inference that fire is not hot. Be it objection that confidence in all means of knowledge would collapse if erroneous cognition were regarded as unrestricted to its own object has been answered. Udwaah Sakhont, 24, by me in the Nyayakoneka. In my view, the validity of cognition is intrinsic because of its own capacity to make known, not because of a fixed relation to its object. Therefore the matter is not elaborated here. The doctrine that memory loses its character as memory has been criticised briefly here, its detailed discussion should be seen in the Brahmatattva Samic Shra. Therefore it is said, but others say that when one thing is superimposed upon another, contrary attributes are imagined in the latter. When silver and the like are superimposed upon a shell and the like, those attributes of silver and the like that are contrary to the attributes of that very shell and the like are superimposed, this is the syntactic connection of the sentence. Let this disagreement among the inquirers remain, what use has it in the present context? The commentator answers with the words in whatever way it may be and so forth. The imagining of one thing's attribute in another thing is falsity, above we have made clear that this falsity is indefinability. From this it follows that in the view of every inquirer there must necessarily be the place for the indefinable superimposition of the attributes of one thing upon another, therefore indefinability is a doctrine accepted by all views. This is their intention, even those who hold the theory of non-apprehension of the difference between memory and experience must unwillingly accept it because they accept coordinate predication and the regularity of action. Rdwh Succont 25 Again, how can an object and its attributes be superimposed upon the inner self, which is not an object? Everyone superimposes one object upon another object present before him, and you say that the inner self, lying outside the field of the notion you, is not an object. The answer is, it is not wholly non-objective, because it is the object of the notion eye and the experience of the inner self is immediate, nor is there a rule that superimposition occurs only upon another object present before one, though space is not perceptible and discriminating people superimpose upon its surface, impurity, and so forth. In the same way there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the non-self upon the inner self. This falsity It is established not only according to the views of inquirers into reality, but also in ordinary experience. Therefore, the common tater says, Our experience in the world is such, a shell appears like silver. But this is not silver completes the first sentence. Granted, experience proves an illusion in which one thing is of the nature of another, but in what is actually one and undivided, an illusion of difference is not observed. then comes the illusion of difference among jivas who are in reality none different from the conscious self. The commentator answers, though there is one moon, it appears as though accompanied by another moon. Udh-H Sarkant 26. In the words again, How and so forth, an objection is once more raised against superimposition upon the conscious self. The intention is this, is the conscious self manifest or not? If it is not manifest, how can an object and its attributes be superimposed upon it? Silver all the attributes of silver are not superimposed upon and a manifest substance standing before us. If the self is manifest, then, if it were inert, it would not reasonably be illuminated by a light dependent upon another. As a pot and the lycar, a manifest self must either be self-luminous or illuminated by another. The second alternative is impossible, and the first two is not acceptable on your view. Because of contradiction, one and the same thing cannot be both agent and object. An object is that which bears the result of an action residing in another. The act of cognition does not reside in anything other than the self. How then can the self be its object? Because of contradiction, same thing cannot be both self-luminous and something illuminated by another, if the act of cognition is taken to inhibit. ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये नाद्षाः आप ये ना� Just as Chaitra, although he bears the fruit of his own action, is not an object because he does not bear the fruit of an action in herring in another, so too the self is not an object. Chaitra reaches the city through an action in herring in himself. Adwaeh Sakant, 27, the result of that action belongs both to Chaitra and to the city, yet objected belongs only to the city because the city possesses the property of bearing the fruit of an action residing in another, namely Chaitra. Chaitra too obtains the fruit of the action, but since the act of going in here is only in Chaitra, he is not the object. This view is unreasonable because it contradicts scripture. Shruti clearly says Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite. The same is also clear through reasoning, is the result called manifestation of the object that in which both object and self are manifest inert or self-luminous. If it is inert, both object and self would be inert. Then, when there is no difference among the three, by what would what be illuminated? Consequently, the entire world would remain a manifest, nor would mutual dependence among the three be of any help, as the saying goes, the blind holding the hand of the blind fall at every step, nor can it be said that although cognition itself is a manifest, it manifests both object and self like the eye and other senses for to manifest means to produce cognition, and since the cognition produced would be inert, it could not remove the aforesaid defect of one blind person showing the way to another. Subsequent cognitions would also be inert, consequently there would be an infinite regress. Therefore consciousness must necessarily be accepted as manifest by itself without dependence on another. Even if this is accepted, what advantage have you gained concerning the object and self which are by nature inert? You may say, the advantage is that their consciousness is not inert. Adwayah Sakant, 28, but it does not follow from this that because consciousness is not inert, the object and self are also not inert. If the sun is learned, does the father also become learned? You may say that it is the very nature of self-luminous consciousness to be related to object and self. Then the parallel reply is that it is also the nature of a learned son to be related to his father. You may define the relation thus. The manifestation of consciousness co-exists with the manifestation of object and self. It never exists without their manifestation. This is its nature. Then the question is, is consciousness different on one side from its own manifestation and on the other from the manifestation of object and self. If it is different consciousness will no longer be self-luminous and will not constitute the manifestation of object and self. You will then say that the manifestation of consciousness and the manifestation of object and self are not different from consciousness but are the very nature of consciousness. If so, by the statement consciousness exists together with object and self nothing more has been said than the manifestation of consciousness exists together with the manifestation of object and self. No progress has been made in the position. Therefore what you wish to prove that the self, itself inert, is the substratum of self-luminous consciousness is not established. Nor do past and future objects coexist with the consciousness whose objects they are, although this coexistence has so far been granted for the sake of argument. You may say, cognition of rejection, acceptance. R-d-y-h-s-a-cont, 29, or indifference toward that object arises, and therefore the object coexists. Our answer is, no, because cognition of rejection and so forth, like the object consciousness itself cannot intelligibly take that past or future thing as its object. If it is said that because it produces rejection and so forth, the cognition of rejection and so forth makes the thing its object and because it produces an object directed cognition of rejection and so forth, the object consciousness likewise makes the object its object, then we ask the cause of b- विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग और चिष्चिंग भाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित the example of the learned son and his father. Nor, as the Bane and Avedyns hold, are objects themselves of the nature of luminosity. Objects are experienced as limited, long, gross, and so forth. But luminosity reveals itself as internal, neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long. Therefore an object distinct from the self-luminous self is certainly in definable, like the second moon experienced together with the one moon. In this luminosity no difference is naturally experienced, therefore there is no obstacle to its identity with the one self, nor can the differences among indefinable objects. Udwa hsarkhant 30. Produce difference in determinate luminosity, otherwise there would be overextension. It will also be shown later that mutual difference does not enter the field of valid commission. Therefore this luminosity itself which is self-luminous, one, changeless, eternal and without parts is the inner self. That is, it is the self that cognizes as the determinate self distinct from mere indefinable body senses and so forth. The self that does not depend upon another for its illumination and is without parts cannot be an object of commission. How then can the attributes of objects such as the body and senses be superimposed upon it? In the Baasha the word how expresses the objection, such superimposition, is not reasonable. Why is it not reasonable? The answer is, everyone superimposes one object upon another object present before him. The intention is this, a thing that is illuminated independence upon another and has parts. apprehended in its general form may, because of a defect of a sense organ, fail to be apprehended in its specific form and thus appear as though different from its true nature, but the inner self does not depend upon another for its illumination. No sense organ is required to know it, whose defect could make cognition of the self defective, nor does it have parts, some of which might be apprehended and others not. It is impossible for one and the same thing at the same time to be both apprehended and unapprehended by itself. Therefore, on the doctrine of the self's self-luminosity, superimposition cannot occur, and if the self were never manifested at all, then. Udwh Sarkant 31. Superimposition could not occur because it would not be present before one, that is, immediately experienced. When a shell is not present before one, silver is not superimposed in the form this is silver. Thus superimposition is shown to be impossible both in complete apprehension and in total non-apprehension. Granted, if the conscious self were not an object, superimposition could not occur upon it, but it is the object of the notion I. Why then could superimposition not occur? The commentator answers with the words which is always outside the field of the notion you. If the conscious self were an object, the subject would be different from it, but the real subject is the conscious self itself. An object is different from it and falls within the field of the notion you. Therefore the qualification outside the field of the notion you is intended to remove the possibility that the self might be non-self and to avoid infinite regress. Consequently, The self must necessarily be called non-objective, and for this reason there is no superimposition upon it. This is the intention. The common tater answers. The answer is, it is not wholly non-objective. Why? Because it is the object of the notion I. The intention is this. It is true that the inner self, being self-luminous, is not an object and is without parts. Nevertheless, having assumed the condition of J. Leave Up, although in reality it is not limited by the properties of the particular intellect, mind, subtle, and gross body's senses, and so forth imagined by beginningless and indefinable of E. L. I. D. Y. O. It appears as though limited, though non-different, as though different, though non-agent, as though an agent. Ud-Y. H. Succont. 32. Though a non-enjoyer, as though an enjoyer, and though non-objective, as though the object of the notion I, it is like space which appears divided and possessed of diverse properties. तिस ओएग तो दिफरन्सिज अगिंटिंग आजिंट्च शच्च पोट जार अव्वेसल. When the principle of consciousness has been apprehended in the self whose nature is homogeneous consciousness, in reality nothing at all remains unapprehended, bliss, itonality, or pervasiveness, and so forth are not different from its nature as consciousness so that they might remain unapprehended when consciousness is apprehended, though all these have been apprehended with certainty because of imagined difference they appear as though not separately discriminated and are therefore called unapprehended, nor is the difference between the self and intellect and so forth real such that that difference too would necessarily be apprehended together with the apprehension of the conscious self, for intellect and so forth are indefinable and therefore their difference from the self is also indefinable and false, thus in the self-luminous and a mixed conscious self. Non-apprehension of the difference is that limit it as intellect and so forth, and the consequence superimposition of those limiting factors produce the condition of J. Diva. It is intelligible that this J. Diva participating in the nature of both not this, namely the non-objective conscious self and this, namely the inert object, should become the object of the Notion Eye. The sequence is this, in the Notion Eye, the conscious self appears as agent and enjoyer. In an indifferent self there can be no capacity to act or enjoy, and the aggregate of the activities of body and senses that is, intellect and so forth in which. R-D-Y-H-S-R-C-O-N-T 33. There is capacity to act and enjoy, lacks consciousness, therefore the conscious self, joined with the aggregate of the body as effect and the senses as instruments, acquires the capacity for agency and enjoyership. Though self-fluminess, through association with objects such as the intellect, it somehow becomes the object of the notion I, the substratum of egoity, and is called J. E. D. Vuk creature, or Noah of the field K. Shetrajna and so forth. The J. E. D. Vuk is in reality not different from the conscious self. Shruti says, its own nature, as that very J. E. V. and so forth. Therefore the J. E. D. V. though self-luminous and non-different from the conscious self, is fitted in ordinary usage by the notion I to appear as agent and enjoyer for this reason it is called the substratum of the notion I. Nor is it proper to say that there is mutual dependence here that when superimposition occurs the J. E. D. V. becomes an object and when the J. E. V. comes an object, superimposition occurs. For this process is beginningless like the relation of seed and sprout, and there is no contradiction in each subsequent superimposition having as its object that which has already been made an object by each preceding superimposition and its impression. This has already been made clear in the Barshav by the words this natural ordinary usage. Therefore the statement it is not Not wholly non-objective is entirely reasonable, though the Je-Diva, being non-different from the conscious self and self-luminous, is not an object in itself. It is an object in its form conditioned by limiting adjuncts. This is their intention. Ud-Yah-Succont 34. Granted, we do not deny superimposition on the ground that the Je-Diva is not an object because its illumination does not depend upon another. Rather, our position is that the inner self is illuminated neither by itself nor with the help of another, and therefore is not an object. How then is superimposition possible upon an inner self that is never manifested at all? The common tater answers, the experience of the inner self is immediate. Pratha is the realization of the inner self, because that realization is immediate, although in the inner self realization is not anything different from the self. The distinction suggested in the phrase realization of the self is secondary just as in the phrase consciousness of the self. The essence of the statement is this, the conscious self must necessarily be accepted as immediately experienced because if it remained a manifest all things would remain a manifest and the world would become dark. This has already been stated. Trutie 2 says to this effect, when it shines, everything shines by its light all this is illumined. Having given this real answer, the commentator, in the manner of a mature dilictician, grants for arguments sake the indirectness of the conscious self and gives another answer. And there is no such rule in this matter. And so forth. Why should there not be a rule that superimposition occurs only upon another? अब्चिक्त प्रज़न्त बफोवाश्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्विमर्च्� from that superimposition knowledge. In such a condition, when therefore space cannot be known by an external sense organ, nor is it known by the mind, because without the aid of a sense organ the mind does not operate with respect to external objects. Thus space is not perceived upon it children, that is, people devoid of discriminative knowledge who see merely what others point out sometimes superimpose blueness, a quality of earth, sometimes brightness, a quality of fire, and they determine it to be blue like the petal of a blue lotus or white like a row of royal swans. Here too, in the form of memory, there appears a property of light or darkness previously seen. In this way those people superimpose a surface upon space and compare it to a huge inverted bowl made of sapphire. The commentator concludes, in the same way that is, after answering all objections in the manner stated above, there is no contradiction in the superimposition upon the inner self of the non-self, namely intellect and so forth. Superimposition is of thousands of kinds why then elaborate this particular superimposition by stating objection and answer. Why not describe merely the general nature of superimposition, the commentator answers, this superimposition of the form described above. Ad-YAH Sakhont 36 When one thing is superimposed upon another, not even the slightest effect of a merit or defect arising from the form a thing falls upon the latter, it is only after the mutual superimposition of self and non-self described above which is called Avila idea that the means of knowledge, the instruments of those means, an ordinary conduct connected with them, as well as all scriptural instruction concerning injunction, prohibition, and liberation become operative. The wise call the superimposition of the form described above Aviv idea from Shruti, Asemriti, Itihasa Purana, and so forth, it is well known that Aviv idea is the seed of every evil. It will be said later that Vedanta operates for the removal of this of Ilaidea. The superimposition of the non-self upon the inner self alone is the sole cause of all evil, not the illusion of silver in a shell. Therefore this alone is called Avalidea because it cannot be destroyed in the absence of knowledge of one's own nature. For this reason, not superimposition in general but this one in particular has been described. The words of this form indicate its character as a cause of evil because it is such. It is the cause of evil, by superimposing upon the inner self, which is free from desire and so forth, the attributes of the adverse inner organ, which is inowed with desire and so forth. It makes the sorrowless inner self sorrowful, for this reason it is the cause of evil, adherents of other views to accept superimposition in this form, otherwise there would be no need to describe it. Therefore it is said, the wise hold, and so forth. 3. Now, for one who thinks that this beginningless, RV-ID art firmly rooted and possessed of dense impressions cannot be removed because there is no means for its removal, the means of its removal is stated thus, and the ascertainment of the nature of a thing distinct from it, that is, doubt-free knowledge of the nature of the thing is called knowledge by the wise, in the inner self, which is completely different from intellect and so forth. nature and attributes of intellect and so forth are superimposed because the difference from intellect and so forth is not apprehended when, through hearing that is, the study of Vedanta reflection and so forth, knowledge of difference arises and the non-apprehension of difference is removed, the ascertainment of the nature of the thing that sublates of Ilaidea, namely knowledge whose nature is the conscious self appears in its real form. This is the intention, granted, even after Avila idea, firmly rooted and enowed with dense impressions, has been sublated by knowledge. It may appear again owing to its impressions and may produce effects favourable to itself, such as fresh impressions. The commentator answers in such a condition. नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� inner organ and so forth. The meaning is this, the very nature of repeated ascertainment of truth is such that it removes erroneous cognition endowed with beginningless, firmly rooted, dense impressions. The nature of the intellect is to incline toward truth. Adherents of other schools to say, the real nature of a thing unaffected by error is not sublated because even without effort the intellect naturally inclines toward it. In particular, the question is how could true knowledge whose nature is the conscious self, holier inward and immediate, ever be sublated by indefinable avid idea, in the statement by joining truth and falsehood, because there is no mutual discrimination. Ordinary conduct such as I am this and this is mine occurs. Ordinary conduct in the form of verbal expression was explicitly stated. The ordinary worldly conduct indicated by the word E.T. is shown in the statement after the mutual superimposition of self and non-self described above which is called Avila-i-Dian so forth. This is self-evident. Advaah Sakant 39 Again, why do means of knowledge such as perception and scriptural instructions have an Avila-i-Dia flitted person as their subject? The answer is this. It is unintelligible that a person devoid of the notions I and mine with respect to body, senses, and so forth could be the knower, therefore the operation of the means of knowledge to would be unintelligible. Ordinary conduct connected with perception and so forth is impossible without employing the senses. The operation of the senses is impossible without control, and no action can be brought about by a body upon which the nature of the self has not been superimposed. In the absence of all these, it is also unintelligible that the unattached self could be the knower. In the absence of a knower, the means of knowledge cannot operate. Therefore, means of knowledge such as perception and scriptural instruction have an avil idea afflicted person as their subject. Here the objection is raised. Then how do means of knowledge such as perception have an avil idea afflicted person as their subject. Vidya that is valid knowledge, this ascertainment of truth, how then can the means of knowledge which are instruments of that true knowledge find their locus in something afflicted by avil idea, the fruit of the means of knowledge is knowledge which is opposed to avil idea, therefore those means cannot have their locus in something afflicted by avil idea. This is their intention, what according to your statement, let perception and so forth be admitted as means of knowledge in ordinary conduct, but scripture which teaches what is beneficial to human beings is opposed to a viideo, so how can it have an viideo-flated person as its subject? For this reason the commentator says, and scriptural instruction. Advaayah Sakant, 40, the answer is, when a person is devoid of the notions I and mine with respect to the body, senses, and so forth. That is, devoid of superimposition of the nature and attributes of the self, it is unintelligible that he could be the Noah and the operation of the means of knowledge to his unintelligible. The intention is this to be the Noah means to be the agent of the act called cognition, and such agency is independence with respect to the cognitive act. This independence consists in all causal factors other than the Noah being impelled by him while he is not impelled by them. Therefore the means of knowledge, that is, the instruments of cognition, must be impelled by the Noah. No instrument can be set in motion without an act of the Noah himself. The immutable, eternal, conscious self, incapable of change, cannot by itself become active. Therefore, becoming active through superimposition of the properties of the active intellect and so forth. can control the means of knowledge. Thus the means of knowledge have their locus in a person afflicted by a vile idea, granted that the means of knowledge do not operate what loss is there to us. The commentator answers, indeed, without the employment of the senses and so forth. Ordinary conduct connected with perception and नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ without staffs as well. In this way the use of and so forth in the expression perception and so forth becomes intelligible. The word conduct denotes an action and requires an agent. Therefore conduct and without employing have the same agent. The syntactic connection is ordinary conduct that would occur without employment. Why should the know employ the means of knowledge? Why do the means of knowledge not operate by themselves? The The commentator answers, and the operation of the senses, that is, the operation of the means of knowledge, is impossible without control. An instrument not controlled by an agent never operates with respect to its object, otherwise cloth would be produced by the shuttle and the like without the control of a weaver. Why then should the body itself not be the controller? If this were accepted, superimposition of the self would become pointless. The answer is, no action can be brought about by a body upon which the nature of the self has not been superimposed, otherwise action would occur even in deep sleep. This is the intention, granted, just as a weave-up without superimposing his own nature upon the shuttle and the like moves them and becomes the maker of cloth. So the self, without superimposing its own nature upon body senses, and so forth, may move them and become their knower. The commentator answers, and when none of these, that is, when mutual superimposition of nature and attributes. Ad-Y-H-Saconte, 42, is present then it is unintelligible that the unattached self, which is in every way and at all times distinct from all attributes and substrata, could become a knower. A weaver and others control and move the shuttle and so forth, but the self whose selfhood has not been superimposed upon body and so forth, being and attached cannot perform any action. This is the intention, therefore the very existence of the means of knowledge necessarily rests upon superimposition. Hence the common tater says, and without knowerhood, no operation of the means of knowledge can occur, that which is independent with respect to valid knowledge, the fruit of the means of knowledge becomes the Valid knowledge is a particular modification of the inner organ directed toward the object to be known and is of the nature of consciousness present in the agent. If the conscious self were not superimposed upon the inert inner organ, how could the modification of the inert inner organ be of the nature of consciousness? Again, if the active inner organ were not superimposed upon the conscious self, how could the conscious self be the agent of this modification? Therefore, from mutual superimposition there arises the fruit called valid knowledge, which abides in the conscious self as agent. When that fruit arises, knowhood arises, with that valid knowledge as its object, the operation of the means of knowledge begins. By the use of the word knowhood, valid knowledge itself is also intended. If the fruit of the means of knowledge were not valid knowledge, the means of knowledge knowledge would not become active consequently they would not be means of knowledge at all. This is their intention. Finally the common tater says, therefore means of knowledge such as perception have only a person afflicted by avid idea as their subject. Udhsarkant 43 and there is no difference from animals and the like. Indeed when animals and the like bring their auditory sense and other senses into relation with sound and other objects. If a cognition of those sounds and so forth as unfavorable arises, they withdraw from them, and if a favorable cognition arises, they advance toward them. Seeing a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, they understand he wants to strike me and begin to run away, but seeing green grass in his hand, they go toward him. In the same way, human beings in out with cultivated intelligence, seeing fierce looking strong men shouting with raised swords in their hands, withdraw from them and approach people of the opposite disposition. Therefore, with respect to human beings, ordinary conduct concerning means of knowledge and objects of knowledge is similar to the conduct of animals. In the case of animals and the like it is well known that KONDUCT CONNECTED WITH PERCEPTION AND THE OTHER MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE ALWAYS FOLLOWS NON-DISCRIMINATION. BECAUSE THE SAME PATTERN IS OBJERVED IN THEM, IT FOLLOWS THAT EVEN IN THE CASE OF LEARNED PERSONS, KONDUCT CONNECTED WITH PERCEPTION AND THE LIKE IS AT THAT VERY MOMENT OF THE SAME KIND. UD YAH SAKKONT 44. GRANTED. LET THIS BE SO IN THE CASE OF IGNORANT PEOPLE, BUT EVEN IN THOSE WHO HAVE UNDERSTOOD the true nature of the inner self as taught by Shruti and reasoning consistent with it, ordinary conduct connected with means of knowledge, the instruments of those means, and the objects known by them is observed. How then can the means of knowledge have only a person qualified by Aviv idea as their subject? The commentator answers, and there is no difference from animals and the like, though through Shruti and reasoning they know the inner self to be distinct from body senses, and so forth. In conduct concerning means and objects of knowledge they do not rise above the characteristics of living beings that merely sustain life. The actions even of such learned persons are seen to be like the actions of animals and birds, whose lack of discrimination is undisputed. Because of this similarity, at the time of ordinary conduct, Aviv idea is inferred even in the learned person. The particle and joins this reason to the one already stated. The intention is that the reasoning given above and the answer to the foregoing objection together establish that the subject of the means of knowledge is a person qualified by Aviv idea. This is analysed in the words indeed, animals and so forth. The statement when their auditory sense and so forth are related to sound and so forth illustrates perception as a means of knowledge. Cognition of sound and so forth is its fruit. The words if it is unfavorable state the fruit of inference. First the nature of the sound is cognized, then remembering the unfavorableness of that kind of sound. Unfavorableness is inferred in the perceived object belonging to that class. The example is seeing a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand and so forth. The rest of the meaning is clear. Adwai H. Succont, 45, but the situation is different with conduct connected with scriptural instruction. A reflective person does not regard himself as entitled to a scriptural right until he understands the self's relation to the next world. Nevertheless, the true Self-knowable only from Vedanta, beyond hunger and so forth, free from distinctions such as Brahmin and Kshatriya, and liberated from transmigration, is not required for eligibility, because it is of no use for eligibility and is contrary to it. No scriptural instruction that becomes operative before realization of such a nature of the Self can avoid having a person qualified by Aviv idea as its subject. For example, a statement such as a Brahmin should sacrifice becomes operative on the basis of superimposition upon the Self of distinctions of vana, ashrama, age, and so forth. Adwayah Sakant 46. Granted that means of knowledge such as perception have a person unqualified by Avil idea as their subject. But how will scripture, which gives instructions such as he who desires heaven should perform the Jaya Tishtoma sacrifice, produce activity through superimposition of the body upon the self? Here the person entitled to the right is held to be one capable of enjoying the fruit in the next world. Hence the sutra of the great Ichariyya says, the fruit of an act enjoined by scripture accrues to the person instructed, because such is the nature of the instruction, that is, the injunction known through verbal testimony. He who desires heaven should perform the gyatishtoma sacrifice, appels that person toward the act enjoined by it. The body and so forth, which will turn to ashes, are not capable of enjoying the fruit in the next world. therefore scripture by postulation assumes some eligible person distinct from body and so forth. Knowledge of that person is video. How then does scripture have a person qualified by other idea as its subject? Raising this objection, the commentator says, but in the case of conduct connected with scriptural instruction and so forth. The particle but shows the difference between scriptural conduct and ordinary conduct connected with perception and so forth. Unless the person who desires heaven is accepted as related to the next world, the scripture concerning eligibility cannot operate. Therefore scripture must by postulation assume this much alone. It need not assume विम्द पर्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम्द प्र्सन्स लिबरेशिन फ्रम्द चाप्ष्विम reduced by action, therefore scripture consisting of injunction and prohibition operates with respect to a person who, through beginningless avil idea has the notions of agency, enjoyership, brahminhood and so forth. Adway hsarkant, 47, in the same way vedanta 2 has only a person qualified by avil idea as its subject without the distinction among no knowledge and known comprehension of its meaning is impossible, Vedanta instructs the person qualified by Avala idea and establishes him in the very nature it teaches, in which all Avala idea is erased. Its difference from injunctive scripture is that injunction does not bring about this final establishment. Thus it is established that scripture has only a person qualified by Avala idea as its subject. Granted, because the person taught in the UPUH Nyshads is contrary to and useless for eligibility, heed is not required for eligibility, but in the prescribed course of study heed is known from the UPUH Nyshads, and that knowledge may obstruct the path of eligibility. Then, because the meaning of one part of the Vedda destroys the meaning of another part, the entire Vedda would lose its status as a means of knowledge. commentator answers, and any scriptural instruction that becomes operative before realization of such a nature of the self and so forth. Knowledge of the person taught in the Upayush Nishads is indeed opposed to eligibility but before that knowledge arises. The injunction to action produces the appropriate ordinary conduct, and Brahma knowledge that has not yet is and cannot sublate it. If their relation is taken to be with different persons, one qualified by knowledge and the other by abhidhi, the other difference in their respective fields becomes intelligible, therefore they do not mutually sublate one another. For example, although from the standpoint of duty there is the prohibition do not injure any living being, a scriptural instruction such as one who wishes to kill his enemy by an a Pichara right should perform, the Shayena sacrifice is not sublated by do not commit violence. The reason is the difference in the person addressed. One who has conquered the enemy called Anger is entitled to the prohibition, but one who remains under the control of that enemy called Anger is entitled to the instruction concerning the Shayena and the like. I have already said that superimposition is cognition of a thing in a form in which it does not actually exist. When a son, wife, and so forth are well or unwell, a person superimposes upon himself the property of the external object and says, I myself am well, I myself am unwell. Likewise, by superimposing properties of the body he says, I am fat, I am thin, I am fair, I am standing, I am going, I am jumping. I superimpose properties of the senses, he says. I am mute, I am one-eyed, I am impotent, I am deaf, I am blind. In the same way he superimposes upon himself the properties of the inner organs such as desire, resolve, doubt and determination. Thus he superimposes upon the inner self, the witness of all his activities, the inner organ denoted by the Notion I, and then in the reverse direction Superimposes the inner self, witness of all, upon the inner organ and so forth. The meaning of the answer because of the difference in the person addressed has been made clear above, by the words in this way. It is again made clear that the subject of scripture is a person qualified by Avila idea, superimposition of Vana, a king should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice and so forth, superimposition of a shrama. A householder should marry a woman of the same vana, and so forth, superimposition of age. One whose hair is black should tend to sacred fire, and so forth, superimposition of condition. One whose disease is incurable should enter the water and abandon life, and so forth. The word and so forth includes a mixture of vana, major sins, secondary sins, and other such superimpositions that produce disqualification or impurity. Having thus described the mutual superimposition of self and non-self through objection and answer, and having confirmed it by an examination of means and objects of knowledge, the commentator again recalls its previously stated nature so that its character as the cause of evil may be discussed in detail, I have already said that superimposition. Ad-Y-H-Saconte 49. Superimposition is cognition of a thing in a form in which it is not is a concise statement of what was said earlier, the appearance elsewhere, in a form resembling memory of something previously seen. Here the superimposition of I, the nature of the substratum, cannot become a cause of evil until it produces the superimposition of mine, the nature of an attribute. the superimposition of an attribute the sense of mine is the direct cause of all the evils of the cycle of transmigration. This is elaborated by the words son, wife, and so forth. Having superimposed identity with the body upon the self, and then having superimposed upon that body the property of ownership regarding son, wife, and so forth, a person, just as in the superimposition of bodily qualities such as fatness says, I myself am well, myself am unwell when property is intact. Ownership is intact and the owner regards himself as complete when property is lacking. Ownership is incomplete and the owner regards himself as incomplete. Through ownership a person superimposes upon the self external properties such as the well-being or ill-being that attach to the body. This is their intention. If this is the case with an externally conditioned property such as ownership, what need is there to speak of bodily properties such as thinness which do not depend upon an external adjunct. For this reason the common tater says, likewise, the properties of the body and so forth. Advaith Sarkant. 50. The nature of the self is superimposed upon the senses which are more inward than the body. A person then superimposes upon the self such properties of those senses as deafness. The nature of the self is superimposed upon the inner organ, which is still more inward. He then superimposes upon the self properties of that inner organ such as desire and resolve. This is the syntactic connection. After describing the superimposition of attributes, the commentator states its basis, the superimposition of the substratum in the words thus superimposing that which is denoted by the notion I and so forth. in which a modification of the form arises. Namely the inner organ is what is denoted by the Notion Eye. That inner organ is superimposed upon the inner self by reason of its consciousness and indifference. The inner self is the witness of all modifications of the inner organ. Thus agency and enjoyership have been explained. Consciousness is explained by the words in the reverse direction. The inner organ and so forth are inert. Consciousness is the opposite of that. Through that consciousness, that is, in this manner, he superimposes the inner self, witness of all, upon me inner organ and so forth. The intention here is this. The J.E.D. Vaid is consciousness delimited by the inner organ and so forth. A mixture of this and not this. It is the agent and enjoyer, the locus of both kinds of Avila idea as effect and cause, the substratum of egoity, the transmigrating being, the receptacle of the entire mass of suffering, and the material cause of mutual superimposition. Its material cause in turn is superimposition itself. Therefore, like seed and sprout, this process is beginningless, and there is no defect of mutual dependence here. Udwa Hsakont, 51, thus this beginningless, endless and natural superimposition whose nature is erroneous cognition and which produces agency, enjoyership and so forth, is directly experienced by everyone. The whole of Vedanta begins for the removal of this cause of evil and for the attainment of knowledge of the oneness of the self. How this is the purport of the entire Vedanta will be shown by us in this Shari-Yiraka-Mimamsa. Adva-I-Hsakkant 52. After confirming superimposition by examining means and objects of knowledge, the commentator for the benefit of the student states its nature again and makes it still firm up because everyone experiences it, thus this beginningless and endless and so forth. Endless means that it is not destroyed in the absence of valid knowledge. Because it is beginningless and endless it is called natural. Whose nature is erroneous cognition? Nature of Erroneous Commission is Indefinability, what possesses that nature is referred to here, namely, superimposition is Indefinable. The explanation of in the reverse direction has also made clear that the inner organ and so forth are inert and that consciousness is their opposite. Through that consciousness the inner self is superimposed upon the inner organ and so forth. The common tater concludes the topic, for the removal of this cause of evil and so forth. How can it be removed in the absence of opposed commission? The answer is for the attainment of knowledge of the oneness of the self. Attainment means realisation. The purpose is not merely manta-ricitation or performance of ritual action. The oneness of the self is its complete non-association with the entire world while beating of the nature of bliss Vedantap which unfailingly produces this realization, destroys superimposition at its root. The intention is this, if the notion I concerning the self were valid, the self would already be known and inquiry into Brahman would be fruitless, consequently no desire to know Brahman would arise. In the absence of that desire, there would be no study of Vedantap for the sake of Brahman knowledge, it would merely be used incidentally for mantra-acitation. Then the Upanishadic conception concerning the self would not acquire the status of a means of knowledge. Such an invalid conception, however often repeated, could not remove the real agency, in joyouship, and so forth of the self. In truth, valid knowledge removes an attributed form, not a real nature. Udwh Succont 53. And false cognition cannot remove a real nature. Even the continuous cognition of a rope as a snake thousands of times cannot sublate the rope's nature as a rope. But a form produced by erroneous cognition is sublated by valid cognition. And even though the impression of erroneous cognition may be very strong, it is destroyed by the impression produced through concentrated, uninterrupted and long-continued repetition of valid cognition. Granted, in Vedanta too, instructions concerning meditations on Prana and the like are seen in many places. How then can the sole purport of all Vedanta sentences be the teaching of the oneness of the Self? The commentator answers in the words, the purport of the whole of Vedanta lies in this and so forth. The body itself is called Sharaqa, the one dwelling in it. The Sharaqa is the individual self. What is referred to here is the inquiry whose purpose is to show that the nature of the self indicated by the word T-Vam in the sentence Tat, T-Vamasi is precisely the nature of the Supreme Self indicated by the word Tat. Udh-Hsukhant, 54, the substance of what is intended here is as follows. 1. The injunction to study one's own Vedic branch commands study of the entire Vedda up to the fruitful comprehension of its meaning, therefore just as ritual injunctions and prohibitions indicated by the expression one's own Vedic branch. Vedanta 2 is an object of study for producing fruitful knowledge of its meaning. 2. According to the principle that the meaning of a sentence is not separate from the meaning found in ordinary usage. The power of Vedanta to convey meaning, like that of mantras, is admitted everywhere. Free Vedanta produces knowledge of the One in a self, unrelated to the world, a homogeneous mass of consciousness and bliss, free from agency and enjoyorship. Nevertheless, this Vedanta conflicts with the notion, I a notion, that appears doubtless and unsublated and apprehends the self as endowed with agency, in joyouship, suffering, grief, and delusion. Because of this, Vedanta would have to depart from its direct literal meaning and yield only a figurative meaning, or remain merely an instrument for mantricitation. Then its meaning would differ from the meaning it intends to declare. Consequently, there would be no need to begin the four chapters. Shari-yirakam imamsa whose purpose is inquiry into its meaning. Ad-YAH Sakhonth 55 If it is held that the self directly present in every person's experience of I is not doubtful and that knowledge of it yields no fruit, then no inquiry would begin from a desire to know it. This is the poor vapaksha. The Siddhi hantai is this. If the notion I were valid, the foregoing objection would be proper. this notion cannot sublate scriptural statements, and neither scripture nor the entire tradition of acharyas regards it as valid. Therefore it is superimposed. The purport of Vedaantai is not a meaning different from what it declared. नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, बआषाक साहित्य, नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, नाडविगिर तिव मेझिंग, नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब नाडविगिर जब � The desire to know Brahman by the expression desire to know, the common tater indicates the existence of both doubt and fruit. Here knowledge of Brahman is explicitly called the fruit because it is directly the object of desire. Unlike ritual action that follows knowledge of a right and the result of the action, no other thing following Brahman knowledge is the principal fruit. Brahma knowledge, free from every doubt, is itself the supreme fruit. It is the end of all suffering and is of the nature of homogeneous bliss. The object of this knowledge taught by Vedanta is known through the method of reasoning called Brahma-Mimamsa. A competent inquirer proceeds toward this goal with greatest certainty. Although that goal is already attained because of of beginningless Avila idea it appears as though unattained and becomes an object of desire, just as a person who fails to notice a necklace already hanging around his own neck regards it as absent and when another person points it out obtains it although the necklace was already possessed so too is Brahma knowledge attained. Advayah Sakkant 56 In this sutra the word Atha is taken to mean immediately Atha, let there be the beginning because the desire to know Brahman is not itself something that can be initiated. The desire to know arises from doubt and therefore indicates doubt as its cause. Doubt makes the beginning of inquiry meaningful because it indicates both the cause that impels a competent inquirer to undertake this scriptural inquiry doubt and the fruit. It is proper that the sutra be placed at the very beginning of the treatise. For this reason the revered commentator says, this is the first sutra of the Vedanta inquiry whose exposition is proposed. The word Mimamsa denotes inquiry worthy of respect. This inquiry is worthy of respect because its fruit is ascertainment of an exceedingly subtle meaning which becomes the cause of the highest human end. A Mimamsa Shastra is a treatise that teaches this inquiry. It is called Shastra because by it this inquiry is taught or correctly expounded to students. A sutra is a statement which, though composed with few syllables and few words, indicates much meaning and is full of substance. After explaining the purport of the sutra in this way, the commentator explains the first word, affa. Here the word affa is understood in the sense of immediate succession. The syntactic connection is that the word atha occurring among the words of the sutra conveys the sense of immediate succession. The meaning or suspiciousness has no grammatical connection with the meaning of the sentence. In fact, when the word atha is used in another sense, it can produce auspiciousness by its mere sound. Reference to a preceding topic is, in effect, not different from immediate succession, when the meaning immediately after it accepted. Then, just as the desire to know Dihama is necessarily connected with the preceding act of study of one's Vedha, some preceding cause must likewise be accepted for the desire to know Brahman. Immediate succession to the study of one's own Vedic branches common to both the inquiry into Dihama and the inquiry into Brahman. Why? 57. Now a question arises. The word atha is also seen in the sense of beginning. For example, in the Vedat atha toryam jayatishtama that is, now this jayatishtama begins and in ordinary usage, atha shabhanusha sanam wa atha yoganusha sanam that is, now the science of words or the science of yoga begins. Why then should atha not be understood here in the sense of beginning? The answer is not in the sense of beginning. Why? Because the desire to know Brahman is not a thing that can be initiated. In the wording of this sutra, desire to know appears as more prominent than Brahman or Brahman knowledge, nor can it be said that, just as in the sentence the staff bearer recites the permission and responds the staff, though subordinate, is intended so here Brahman and Brahman knowledge, though subordinate may be intended, for here the desire to know, by indicating Doubt and Fruit, assists the scripturally prescribed activity in the form of inquiry. निद ब्रामन अछि। अछि। निद ब्रामन अछि। not intended doubt and fruit would not be intended i that consequently a discriminating inquirer would not inquire into something pointless, like examining the teeth of an arrow. Brahman and Brahman knowledge could then not be the subject matter and fruit of the treatise. In near absence of superimposition upon a subject contrary to the notion i, the status of Vedanta as a means of knowledge would also become unintelligible, a figurative meaning that impels one toward action or a meaning useful in mantra recitation like the syllable hum can remain dependent upon the injunction to study one's Vedic branch, therefore the prominence of the desire to know which indicates doubt and fruit through both the word and the complete sentence is intended. Advaayah Sakkant 58. Nor can the word Jainasabith understood in the sense to be begun so that the neighbouring word atha might also indicate a beginning, because in every section the beginning of the desire to know is not itself the topic to be examined. The knowledge of Brahman that qualifies the desire to know might be regarded as something that can be begun, but even that is not connected with the word atha because Brahman knowledge is not principle here. Desire to know and inquiry are not one and the same thing, so that beginning of inquiry could be understood as in the beginning of the Yogashastra. The word mimamsa is derived from the root man in the sense of inquiry, whereas the word jenasa means desire to know. The desire to know impels a person toward inquiry. The impeller and that into which one is impelled cannot be won. If they were won, the relation of mover and moved would be unintelligible. When a word's own meaning is appropriate, imagining another meaning meaning would also be an improper extension. Therefore the statement is proper because the desire to know Brahman is not a thing that can be initiated. Ad-YAH Sarkant 59 Why, then, should the meaning of the word athenaught be auspiciousness? The sutra would then mean because it produces auspiciousness. The desire to know Brahman should be undertaken daily. The answer is the meaning auspiciousness has no grammatical connection with the meaning of the sentence. Only that meaning of a word becomes a constituent of the sentence meaning which has a grammatical relation to it. Such a meaning is either explicitly stated or implied. Here auspiciousness is neither the explicit nor the implied meaning of affa. It is merely an effect produced by hearing the sound of the word, just as by hearing the sound of a drum or conch. In verbal usage, effect produced or recalled by the sound of a word is not seen to have a grammatical connection with the meaning of the sentence. Objection. Here and elsewhere the word atha indicates auspiciousness. As Semri Ti Tu says, Om and atha these two words first emerged from the throat of Brahmat, therefore both are auspicious. Answer when the word atha is used in another sense, it produces auspiciousness by its mere sound. Atha used in the sense of immediate succession and so forth also produces auspiciousness merely through its sound, like the sound of a flute or veener, or like the sight of a water-filled pitcher brought for some other purpose. Therefore there is no conflict with the statement of SM Riti. Even while retaining the meaning of immediate succession, auspiciousness is obtained merely by hearing the sound. This is their intention. Udh Sakhont 60. Granted. Even without conveying the meaning of immediate succession, the word affa may depend upon some preceding cause. Understand this as follows. Is the word affa used in the sense of immediate succession or in the sense of beginning? In this interrogative sentence the second affa presents the second alternative after the first alternative has been stated. Here the second occurrence of atha does not mean immediately atha because the statement of the opponent intervenes between the first atha and the second. Nevertheless, it depends upon the topic previously stated. If there were no dependence, the subject of the question would become different from the first subject and the framing of an alternative would be impossible. No one asks, is the self eternal or is the intellect impermanent? Therefore, even if the meaning immediately after is not accepted, why should the word after not depend upon a preceding topic? The answer is, reference to a preceding topic is, in effect, not different from immediate succession. The intention is this, we do not insist on the meaning immediately after merely for the sake of temporal proximity, our purpose is to ascertain a preceding cause that becomes Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो � is proper. UD-YH SACCANT 61. Granted that the meaning is immediately after what is thereby established, the answer is when the meaning is immediately after immediate succession must be succession after some definite thing simply saying after is not enough. After doing something a person necessarily does something else but mere succession is seen to yield neither a perceptible benefit nor an unseen benefit. One must identify a thing immediately after which the desire to know Brahman occurs, such that in its absence that desire does not arise and in its presence it necessarily arises. This is stated in the words some preceding thing with which the desire to know Brahman is necessarily connected. Advaishsakant 62. Granted, like the desire to know Dihama, the desire to know Brahman too arises immediately after study of one's own Vedic branch because Brahman, like Dihama, is known only through scripture. When scripture is not known, knowledge of its own subject, Dihama and Brahman does not arise and because of the injunction to study, a person should study his own Vedic branch. Knowledge of scripture necessarily occurs. Therefore, even in the case of inquiry into Brahman. The word Athamins only immediate succession to Vedic study. The commentator says, immediate succession to the study of one's own Vedda is common to both the desire to know Dihama and the desire to know Brahman. Here, by one's own Vedda, the subject matter of the Vedda is intended and study of that subject matter is implicitly understood. This succession also follows from the first sutra, Atharthodharma Jnasa. There would be no need to begin the present sutra separately because the word Dihama used in that sutra indicates the meaning of the entire Vedda and Brahman too. Like Dihama there's a meaning of the Vedda. Therefor succession to Vedic study applies equally to both. This is the intention. Now an objection arises. What distinction does the desire to know Brahman have here in In comparison with the desire to know Dihama, the answer is immediate succession specifically to knowledge of ritual action. Note because the desire to know Brahman is possible in a person who has studied Vedanta even before the desire to know Dihama. In the context of cutting the knot of the heart and the like, a rule of immediate sequence is indeed present because their unordered sequence is intended to be taught but here no such sequence is intended. There is no evidence of a subordinate principle relation between Inquiry into Diharmat and Inquiry into Brahman, nor of a renewed relation of eligibility in one who is already eligible. Ad-Yah Sakant 63 The meaning is this, the distinction of the desire to know Brahman, in comparison with the desire to know Diharmat consists in its occurring immediately after knowledge of ritual action, in statements such as they desire to know through sacrifice. The explicit use of the instrumental case connects sacrifice and the like as auxiliaries to Brahma knowledge. For the principal object of desire is knowledge alone. What is not principal must be related to the principal thing. But even here sacrifice and the like are not auxiliaries to the production of knowledge of the sentence meaning because the sentence itself produces that knowledge. Nor is it reasonable that a sentence should require the assistance of action. A person who knows the relation between words and their meanings understands the true nature of the principles governing the use of sounds, remembers the relations of subordinate and principle earlier and later among things, and the requirements of expectancy, proximity and semantic fitness obtains an obstructed knowledge of the sentence meaning even without performing any action. If such knowledge knowledge did not arise, knowledge of the meaning of injunctive and prohibitive sentences would also not arise consequently performance and abstention which are the meanings of those sentences would fail. If performance and abstention are held to arise from knowledge of them, there would be mutual dependence when there is knowledge, performance and abstention according to the Sentence meaning occur, and from that performance and abstention knowledge of it again arises, nor can it be maintained that only Vedanta sentences depend upon action for making their meaning understood while other sentences do not because there is no special reason for such a distinction. Ad-YAH Succont 64 Now a person whose intellect is initially impure cannot immediately comprehend the validity of the identity taught by the sentence Tat Tivam-a-Seed but when the Jeeva denoted by Tivam whose nature is that of agent and enjoyer and the Supreme Self denoted by Tat which is eternally pure conscious and unattached because incompatibility in the literal meanings of the two words appears certain but one whose impurities of the inner organ have been diminished by sacrifice, gift, austerity, fasting, and the like, and who possesses faith will understand the compatibility of tat and tivam and know their identity. If this is said, we'll ask, is the ascertainment of the compatibility that is a cause of valid cognition itself produced by action which is not a means of knowledge, or is action, in addition to perception and other means, also a means of knowledge. If compatibility is ascertained through reasoning that does not conflict with Vedanta and is based upon Vedanta, action is unnecessary. Therefore, by hearing tat, tivamasi and similar statements, one obtains the knowledge that the nature of the jediva is the nature of the supreme self. Having strengthened that knowledge by reasoning consistent with it, one then realises Brahman by long, uninterrupted contemplation of the truth, that is, by Nidhadiya Suhna. Sacrifice and the like assist this Nidhadiya Suhna, as it has been said, discipline of mind practiced for a long time, continuously and with reverence, acquires a firm foundation, celibacy, austerity, faith, sacrifice, and so forth constitute that reverence. For this reason scripture says, having known that one, the learned Brahmin should practice wisdom. After knowing through verbal testimony and reasoning one should engage in nided dire SUHNAR. R-Y-H Sarkant 65 Some hold here that sacrifice and the like merely destroy the impurities of the inner organ, which are enemies of liberation. This alone is their utility. Others hold that they purify the aspirant, a person purified by sacrifice and the like, through devotional and long continued uninterrupted contemplation of Brahman, approves all impressions of beginningless of ill-id, consequently the inner self becomes stainless, pure and luminous. Hence, SM Riti says, through Brahmiyajna, Divyajna, Pitriyajna and the other great sacrifices and sacrifices generally, a person produces fitness for the attainment of Brahman and one in whom these 48 purificatories and scars have been completed. Others say that action aids Brahman knowledge by discharging the three debts. SM Riti says, having discharged the three debts, a person should fix his mind on liberation. Still others hold that although various actions are enjoined for their own respective fruits, because of statements such as Brahman's desire to know it through Vedic study, sacrifice, and so forth, they assist contemplation of Brahman through a relation of conjunctive separateness. Just as Kādhīra would while serving the purpose of a sacrifice as a sacrificial post also produces virility in the sacrifice up because the rule is, when one thing serves two purposes, the relation is called conjunctive separateness. Adwaya hsākānt, 66. For this very reason there is also the sutra of the great sage Badawayana because of scriptural statements concerning sacrifice and the like, all are required for contemplation of Brahman as in the case of a horse. Here the word all indicates sacrifice, gift, austerity and so forth. The meaning is that all these are required for contemplation of Brahman, therefore whether one takes authoritative scripture or the sutra of the great sage, in every case only contemplation of Brahman joined with sacrifice and the like and are now with the three qualities of devotion, long duration and uninterruptedness is capable of destroying beginningless avil idea and its impressions and producing realization of Brahman, that is, liberation. For this purpose the performance of action is necessary, but performance of these actions is impossible without knowledge of their many distinctions, their seen and unseen fruits, the relation of things connected with them as inherent or remote causes. Auxiliary rights directly prescribed are obtained by extension also. शजरी कमपनेच डान तो देर अड़ा और आद दिखण्ध क्विली परसन सब दिखण्ध राइटश नाटज नाटज नाटड़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ नाट़ ना� desire to know Brahman is possible in one who has studied his Vedda. Adwaya H. Sarconte 67, the implied meaning of this statement is as follows. It is said that action is necessary for contemplation of Brahman, that is, Nididhira Suhna. The question is, in what manner is action necessary? Is it necessary for producing the fruit, just as in an Agni-rite and the Lycoccillaries such as fuel sticks are required for producing the final unseen fruit, or is action necessary for its own existence? Just as a cake split in two and the deity Agni are required, the view that action is necessary for the production of the fruit does not withstand examination. It must be accepted that contemplation of Brahman produces realization of Brahman's nature. But this realization is not a product like a lump made by kneading flour, not a modification like rice produced by pounding paddy, not a purification like the cleansing of a mortar by sprinkling, and not an acquisition like milk obtained by milking. First it is not a product. The realization of Brahman produced by contemplation is not an inert thing distinct from Brahman, like a sense born cognition of a pot distinct from the pot. Brahman is not manifested in dependence upon another light, its realization is its own eternal nature. Therefore its production is unintelligible. Any different kind of experience produced by contemplation would be doubtful like an imagined thought and therefore could not be authoritative because such thoughts produced with the aid of contemplation are often seen to be unstable. For example, if a person whose body has become numb from extreme cold while repeatedly contemplating a fire known by inference, experience is a huge blazing fire that experience does not accord with other authoritative cognition because contrary results of such experiences are widely observed in the world. Therefore the distinctive character of valid realisation is not produced by this process and action is not required for producing any fruit through contemplation. In the changeless, eternal and all-pervading Brahman contemplation can produce neither modification, purification, nor acquisition. Udhvayah Sukhant 68. Granted that realization of Brahman is not produced, but perhaps purification occurs through removal of the covering of twofold indefinable avid idea. Just as a stage jahan raises the curtain concealing a dancer and she becomes an object of direct perception for the audience. Perhaps action serves to remove the covering, but there is this difference. When the curtain is raised, the dancer becomes an object of the audience's perception. Here only the cessation of abil ideas covering is produced, nothing else, because realization of Brahman cannot be produced. Brahman's nature is eternal. Here the question arises, what is contemplation of Brahman? Is it the successive repetition of what has been understood from verbal testimony, or a continuous sequence of doubtless cognitions obtained from authoritative words. If it is repetition of what has been understood from verbal testimony, even repeated practice cannot remove original of elidea. Only ascertainment of truth and its continuous repetition destroy error and its impressions at the root, not repetition of doubt or merely repetition of general knowledge. Even if the cognition opposed to a man or some tall large object is repeated a hundred times, in the absence of specific knowledge it will not be ascertained that the object is a man. Adwai H. Sarkont 69. It has now been said that after the cognition born of hearing has revealed the J. E. Eva's real nature as the supreme self. Cognition born of reflection confirms it. Therefore a continuous sequence of doubtless cognitions based in due form upon verbal testimony, when contemplated with the assistance of action, becomes the cause of destruction of twofold avil idea. But this destruction is impossible without producing the experience of Brahman. The cessation of an error whose nature is immediate experience occurs only through immediate valid cognition, not through an indirect अछि। The experience of the Jeeva denoted by T. Vamas afflicted by suffering, grief and so forth ceases. This realization does not arise merely from verbal testimony, even when accompanied by reflection it arises from perception, because realization is the necessary fruit of perception, otherwise one would have to accept the impossible conclusion that a Bangian sprout could arise from a cut cutajah seed. Therefore it is proper that the inner organ, refined by contemplation of the doubtless meaning of the great sentences, negates the adjunct conditioned forms of the immediately experienced J.E.D.Va denoted by T.Vam and manifests its true nature as Brahman denoted by Tatt. This experience is not a production of Brahman because Brahman is not a produced thing, it is itself a particular modification of the inner organ concerning Brahman. Brahman is not illuminated by another light through that modification. Verbal testimony reveals Brahman, but Brahman does not thereby become other illuminated like the non-self. That which is free from all limiting adjuncts is called self-luminous consciousness, not an adjunct conditioned object. The commentator himself says, it is not necessarily wholly non-objective. Udvah Sarkant 70 Even at the time of realization of Brahman there is not yet complete freedom from limiting adjuncts, because the modification of the inner organ is itself a limiting adjunct, standing at the boundary where it destroys itself and other adjuncts. If the modification of the inner organ were not related to consciousness as an adjunct, the self-luminosity of an inert modification would be unintelligible, because there would be no reflection of consciousness there and the modification could not produce knowledge, nor is it unacceptable that an inferred thought or contemplation of inferred fire produces an experience of fire because there the nature of fire is indirect, whereas here the J. E. D. Vaub skewered by limiting adjuncts, whose nature is Brahman, is immediately experienced from the outset. Purity, consciousness, and the other qualities are not in reality outside the jadeiva, they are not different from it. The jadeiva free from limiting adjuncts is called Brahman, whose nature is purity, consciousness, and so forth. Freedom from limiting adjuncts to is not some other thing different from the jadeiva, just as with the aid of impressions produced by repeated practice of the science of music. The auditory sense directly experiences the distinct notes such as Shajja in different ascending and descending sequences, so through the inner organ endowed with impressions produced by repeated contemplation of the meaning of Vedanta sentences, the Jeeva directly experiences its own nature as Brahman. If it is said that the cooperation of action is required to produce the modification of the inner organ, namely realization of Brahman, the answer is no, because action does not coexist with contemplation, a person who understands without doubt from sentences such as tativamasi that he is the self distinct from the body pure conscious, an attached, a non-agent, and a non-enjoyer how can he understand himself to be eligible for action, and one who understands such eligibility how can he be the non-agent or non-eligible? R.D.Y.A.H. Sarkant. 71. It may be said, even after truth has been ascertained, behaviour produced by error continues. For example, although a person knows that sugar is sweet, one afflicted by a disorder of bile experiences it as bitter, he tastes the sugar, spits it out and rejects it. Therefore, because impressions of a v idea remain, ritual performance continues and action. Assisting knowledge destroys those impressions. It is proper to accept this, but the question is how can action, which is itself of the nature of avi idea destroy avi idea and by what will the action that destroys it itself be destroyed. Many things are seen to destroy themselves and other things of their own class. For example, Cow's milk digests itself and helps digest. अछि। नाटक पोझन दिस्ट्ट। आप नूट्रलाईजिद अछि। and powder of nomali placed in muddy water settles to the bottom together with the impurities and clears the water. In the same way, action of the nature of Avel idea removes other Avel idea and then itself ceases. In reply to this it is said, it is true that repeated hearing of the sentences beginning in the beginning, dear one, there was only beaming and ending in tat-tive amnesty, aided by inquirer Inter-Brahman, produces doubtless valid knowledge concerning the inner self distinct from the body and so forth. This inner self is not the material cause of the physical body and the like, but beginningless avidya alone is their material cause. Nevertheless, because impressions of avidya remain, the notion of transmigration and the corresponding ordinary conduct continue, but the knower understands this conduct and these notions to be false and does not place trust in them, just as a person afflicted by bile, though sugar tastes bitter to him, does not believe that bitterness to be real. Udwa H. Sarkont 72 How then can a person who knows with certainty that action, agent, instrument, injunction, and fruit all these things are unreal be qualified for action, Only one who regards all these as real is qualified. Otherwise it would be difficult to prevent animals, children, and the like from being qualified. In a section concerning ritual injunction, the person who knows the distinctions among action, agent, and so forth is called knowledgeable. For this very reason the revered commentator says that scriptural instruction has a person afflicted by avi idea as its subject, thus just as the Rajasuya is performed only by one who identifies himself with the royal class, not by one who identifies himself as Brahmin or Vaisyartha, so only a person possessing the cognition of distinction such as twice-born status, agency, action, and instrument is qualified for ritual action. One who has no notion of these distinctions has no eligibility, As in the case of a Vajipya performed by a Brahmin or Kshatriya, an unqualified person does not obtain the fruit of a Vedic right even though capable of performing it skillfully and of enjoying the fruit. Thus, in actions with perceptible fruits, attainment of the fruit is observed when capacity and commencement of action are present, but in actions with unseen fruits, the fruit is known only from scriptural instruction, and therefore the right does not apply to an unqualified person, for this reason action is not required in Nididaya Suhna. Udhya Hsarkant 73. Granted, just as the notion I am a human, beading is required for eligibility for an enjoined act, so too in the case of prohibition only one who has this notion is qualified as its subject. One who has no notion of beading human has no eligibility with respect to a prohibition, just like an animal and so forth. Consequently such a person, even if he performs a prohibited act would not be more sinful than a low animal, this would violate scripture. The answer is no. A person who has attained realization in the present life is not completely free from the notion I am a human beading because the impressions of avid idea remain. A subtle trace of it persists. Nevertheless, he does not have genuine conviction in what continues only falsely. What follows from this? The conclusion is one who has faith in an injunction is qualified, one without faith is not. Therefore, one who does not believe in notions such as human status is not qualified for injunctive scripture. SM Riti 2 says, an offering or gift made without faith With prohibited scripture does not require faith, it applies of itself to a person who engages in a prohibited act. Therefore, even after knowing the true nature of Brahman, if a person, like one bound in worldly bondage, violates prohibitions, he incurs sin. Hence no doctrine that accepts conduct contrary to scripture is admissible, for this reason action is not necessary in nided diaries you age enough for producing the fruit, Nor is action necessary for the arising of nided dire SUH nut because once doubtless knowledge has arisen from verbal testimony. There is no eligibility for action. Scripture says, not by action, not by progeny, not by wealth. Immortality is attained only by renunciation. Udwh Succont 74. Then is action of no use at all here? so, a statement such as they desire to know through sacrifice. विचार-विमर्शक बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता the king's man. It is not the king who is brought but the person qualified by the word man. Although the king is in reality principal in the expression he is merely the qualifier of the word man. Grammatically the principal entity is the man. In the same way sacrifice and Vedic study are enjoined as means to the desire to know Brahman. Fasting as austerity is enjoined in the same manner. Udh-i-ah-sakhont 75. Mere abstention from food is not austerity, one in whom the desire to know Brahman arises while eating pure, wholesome, measured food at the proper time and according to need is an ascetic, not one who observes complete fasting because he would die, nor are vows and fasts such as chandrayana the real nature of austerity because the balance of bodily humours may be disturbed in such a person. Daily and occasional duties diminish sin and purify the aspirant. Scripture says, An atme adjinn is one who understands, By this act my body is purified, By this act my body is nourished. Hear the words, By this act indicates sacrifice and the like. SMR 82 says, One in whom these 48 purificatory samskaras have been completed. A statement of the Afar Vaveh also shows that after sin has been diminished by performance of daily, occasional and desire-motivated actions, a person whose intellect is purified and in whom inquiry has arisen sees Brahman through meditation, a person of purified intellect sees Brahman through meditation, S.M. Riti 2 says, when sin has been diminished, knowledge arises. UD-YAH Succont, 76. Action and so forth. It is certain that daily rights destroy previously accumulated sin and purify a person. Once the indirect assistance of daily action in the arising of knowledge has thus become clear, it is not proper to imagine its direct assistance through the doctrine of conjunctive separateness because that would require many many unnecessary assumptions. The point is this performance of daily rites produces merit. The world is by nature impermanent, impure and full of suffering, but erroneous cognitions of permanence, purity, happiness and so forth defile satva, that is, be intellect. The cause of this defilement is sin. When sin is diminished, the doors of perception and reasoning open, and through perception and inference a person unobstructedly knows the impermanence, impurity and painfulness of the world, from that arises dispassion in the form of non-attachment to the world, from that awakens the desire to remove worldly existence, from that follows a search for the means of its cessation. Hearing that knowledge of the true nature of the self is the means of that cessation. The person desires to know it. Then, through the sequence of hearing, study, and so forth, he obtains that knowledge. Therefore it is reasonable that action is a remote auxiliary to the arising of knowledge through purification of satva in the form of the intellect. The Bhagavad-Gita 2 repeats this meaning for the sage who wishes to attain yogat action is said to be the cause for one established in yogat tranquility is said to be the cause. 77. If this is so, a person whose intellect is already pure because of action performed in a previous birth, even though he performs no action in this life, and in whom dispassion has arisen from understanding the lack of essence in worldly existence, does not need to perform action in order to produce dispassion, for dispassion is already obtained by him through the actions of a previous birth. In this context, Scripture says concerning the superior person or he may renounce directly even from the stage of student-ship. Here it has been said, even before knowledge of ritual action, the desire to know Brahman is possible in one who has studied Vedanta. Therefore a person remaining in the student stage has no such debt whose discharge would require him to perform action. Accordingly, the statement of Brahmin is born with three debts should be understood as referring to one who becomes a householder. Otherwise it would conflict with the scriptural statement or he may renounce directly from the householder. नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक � presence it necessarily arises. Knowledge of ritual action is not such a thing, hence it is clear that here the word ather does not state a sequence immediately after knowledge of ritual action. Udwa Hsarkhant 78 Granted that no sequence is fixed by force of meaning, as there is between the Agnahotra and preparing the gruel for it, but perhaps sequence is fixed by direct shruti here by the suffix ktva. The Jabala statement says having become a householder, then become a forest weller, having become a forest weller, then renounce. Here having become a householder indicates performance of sacrifice and the like. There is also an SM Riti statement to the same effect, having studied the Vedda according to rule, produced a sun, and performed sacrifices according to one's capacity, one should direct the mind toward liberation. There is also a condemnatory statement, the twice-born who desires liberation without studying the Vedic producing progeny and performing sacrifice goes downward. The answer is, in the context of cutting the heart, there is a rule of immediate sequence. That is, in a statement such as first cut the heart, then the tongue, then the side, words first and then are intended to teach sequence. Here no such sequence is intended because later in this same scripture it is said, or he may renounce from any stage student ship, householder life, or forest life. All these statements indicate the indispensability of dispassion. Therefore scripture says, on the very day that dispassion arises one should renounce. The condemnatory statement is addressed to a person of impure intellect. such a person does not remain steadier in the means to liberation. Out of laziness he also fails to perform the daily and occasional duties of a householder and, under the burden of sin increasing at every moment, falls into a lower state. This is its meaning. Udwh Succont. 79. Granted that sequence is not established by direct trutial by force of meaning, why then should sequence not be accepted on the basis of textual or deposition, principle subordinate relation or procedure? The answer is, there is no evidence for a subordinate principle relation. Auxiliary components such as fuel sticks and principle rights such as the ani produce one and the same fruit, are taught by one procedural sentence, are performed by the same qualified person, and are connected with one and the same time full moon on you moon, because their simultaneous performance is impossible, sequence is required and for determining the particular sequence, textual order position and so forth become evidence but where there is no subordinate principle relation nor a rule of one fruitful performance by the same qualified person as in separate rites such as Soria, Arianna and Prajapati that there is no need for a specific sequence, therefore textual order and the like do not become evidence determining a particular sequence, although because all words cannot be uttered simultaneously, some sequence necessarily occurs. There is no direct statement or other evidence establishing a subordinate principal relation between the desire to know Diharma and the desire to know Brahman. Ad-Yh Sakhont 80 An Objection is Raised Even where there There is no subordinate principle relation. A rule of sequence is observed. For example, for a person desiring cattle, a milking vessel is used in the carrying of water. An auxiliary of the Darshapornaymahsa sacrifice or in the injunction having performed the Darshapornaymahsa, he should perform the Somersacrifice sequence is fixed between Darshapornaymahsa and the so must sacrifice although they are not subordinate and principle. The answer is, nor is there evidence for renewed eligibility in a person already eligible. A person desiring heaven is eligible for Darsha Pornayma Epsa, the same person when desiring cattle is eligible for the milking vessel in the carrying of water, because that vessel assists an auxiliary of Darsha Pornayma Epsa. The milk vessel does not itself directly produce cattle, nor is there a... श्क्रिठ्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट्ट् as the same sequence through the sequence of the carrying of water which it assists. As for the sequence between the Soma Sacrifice and the Darshapornimahsut offering, its application here has already been excluded by denial of a direct injunction. Udhvahsutkont 81. Even without a subordinate principal relation or renewed eligibility of a person already eligible if actions were defined by one One and the same fruit or sequence could be accepted. For example, the six sacrifices beginning with the Agni have one goal, attainment of heaven and therefore their sequence is accepted. Or if Dihama were a limb of Brahman, a sequence could be accepted in the four chapters of the Brahma Satras, because some aspects of Brahman taught in the four chapters would be mutually connected and the identity of the object to be known would create a sequence. Then because the desires to know Dihama and Brahman had the same object to be known sequence between the two could be accepted. But neither situation exists here. Therefore it is said, the fruit and the object of the desires to know are also different. The fruit of knowledge of Dihama is a peculiar worldly prosperity and it depends upon performance. The fruit of Brahman knowledge is Nishrayasa, the highest good and it does not depend upon any further performance. Their fruit of knowledge means fruit of the desire to know. The difference is not merely in the nature of the fruits but also in the process of attaining them. Hence it is said, and this depends upon performance. Adwaah Sakant 82. De-harm up which is the object of the desire to know has to be brought into being. At the time of knowledge it is not present because it depends upon human action, but hear the object of the desire to know is eternally existent Brahman. It exists without beginning or end and does not depend upon human action. The modes of operation of the means that provide knowledge of these two objects are also different. Scripture that teaches Diharma instructs a person by impelling him to action. Scripture concerning Brahman merely teaches because knowledge arises from the scriptural sentence. No action is commanded of the person with respect to knowledge. Just as knowledge of an object arises automatically from contact between sense organ and object, so to hear. A thing that is to be produced is produced by the action of an agent, depends upon that action, and does not exist before its production. What exists eternally is always true, it is never false at any time. This difference between the objects of knowledge is not not merely a difference of nature but also a difference in the mode of operation of their corresponding means of knowledge. Therefore it is said there is also a difference in the function of scripture. Ad-YAH Sarkant 83. Here the word Qudana means scriptural instruction, not merely an injunctive sentence. A general meaning is secondarily conveyed by a word that ordinarily denotes a particular kind. In awfulous scripture there is no place for an utterance expressing a commander's will because a command is an expression of human desire. Therefore here Kedana means teaching or instruction. For this very reason it has been said, the means of knowing Dihama is instruction. This instruction concerns Bavana that is human action taught by scripture and its objects, sacrifice and the like. Sacrifice and the like are objects of Bavana because the activity in the form of effort is determined independence upon them. Even the derivation of the word object is understood from a root meaning binding, that is, that to which effort is bound. Scripture makes known Dihama in the form of sacrifice and the like by impelling a person to employ the means conducive to attaining the desired fruit. It makes actions known and thereby presents sacrifice as the means to attain the desired fruit. The Harmasastra does not operate in any other way, but instruction concerning Brahman merely tells a person the truth. It does not impale him to action because the instruction produces cognition without prescribing an act. YAH Sarkont 84. It may be the objected Vedanta teachers Brahm विचार-विमर्विमर्शक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आप आप आप eternal and unproduced, nor can an action be commanded with respect to Nidid-Dhira-Suh-Not because Nidid-Dhira-Suh-Not being established by the observation of positive and negative concomitance as the sole cause of knowledge cannot become the object of an injunction, nor is there an injunction with respect to knowledge produced by verbal testimony because this knowledge arises unobstructedly in one who has studied the Vedda knows the relation between word and meaning and understands the proper rules of verbal cognition. It is as with knowledge of an object arising from contact between sense and object. The commentator connects the example to the matter at hand by saying, So to hear, and if prescribing knowledge of the self were taken to be the purport of Vedanta sentences, ascertainment of the true nature of the self would no longer be knowledge produced by verbal testimony because the purport of those sentences would then be an injunction to know the self, not the nature of the self itself. It cannot be said that because knowledge depends upon the object to be known, an object taught by a sentence whose purport lies elsewhere can nevertheless be ascertained in its real nature, for even superimposed commission is said to depend upon an object although it is not commission of the object's real nature. it is established that the purport of Vedanta is not an injunction to know. Adwaya Sarkant 85 The conclusion of the present discussion is stated thus, therefore let some such means be specified immediately after which the desire to know Brahman arises. That means, in whose absence Inquiry into Brahman does not arise and in In whose presence it necessarily arises, is this discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, dispassion toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next possession of the disciplines beginning with Shama and Dharma and desire for liberation. When these means are present, the desire to know Brahman and knowledge of Brahman are possible either before inquiry into Diharmoh or after it, but not in their absence. the word aphor indicates immediate succession to the acquisition of the qualifications just stated. Udh. Hsarkhant. 86. If this discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things were to determinate, Brahman would already be known and the desire to know Brahman would become pointless. And if it were merely general knowledge, not ascertainment, it could contain doubt or error distinct from a determination of truth, such knowledge could not produce dispassion. If dispassion is not produced, how could this become the cause of inquiry into Brahman? Therefore the matter should be understood thus, by eternal and non-eternal things their qualities are intended. Discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things means discrimination of their qualities together with the eternal and non-eternal It is not necessary to make specific judgments concerning each separate eternal and non-eternal substratum such as this is true and eternal and this is false and non-eternal, a general ascertainment of the distinction of eternal and non-eternal between the substratum and their qualities is sufficient. To be eternal means to be true, that in which truth is present is eternal and true, and therefore becomes an object of desire. be non-eternal means to be false, that in which falsity is present is non-eternal and false, and therefore does not become an object of desire, among things experienced as object and subject, as the fields of the notions you and I what is established as true, eternal, and of the nature of happiness enters the sphere of desire but what is impermanent, false, and filled with the three kinds of suffering should be abandoned. In a person whose intellect has been purified by actions performed in a previous birth or in this birth. This discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things arises through experience and reasoning. Udhsakont 87. It cannot be said that there is no such thing as truth because in the absence of truth even the false that appears with truth as its substratum would be unintelligible. for the nihilist emptiness itself is ex- Sceptid as true, reflecting discriminately in the light of the experience and reasoning of the finest persons in the human world, and seeing oneself together with the rest of the conscious world undergoing continuous birth and death surrounded by the three kinds of suffering in all worlds from satyr loka down to avasite, helplessly wandering among the waves of the ocean of transmigration one contemplates the impermanence, impurity and painfulness of this worldly existence through every division of time. Instant moment watch date night, fortnight month, season, half year, year, yuga, the period of four yugas, manvantara dissolution, and great dissolution. From this contemplation born of discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things arises dispassion toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next. Arthur means a fruit that is desired. Indifference toward it after recognising it as unfit for enjoyment is dispassion. From this comes abundant possession of the disciplines beginning with Sharma and Dhamma. The mind, intoxicated by the liquor-like impurities of attachment and the rest, sends the various senses running toward higher and lower objects, causes many actions to be performed, and produces fruits in the form of merit and sin. Into the terrible fire of transmigration it offers the self as an oblation and thus produces a vast mass filled with names of many sufferings. Ad-Y-H Sarkont. 88. This frenzy of the mind produced by the liquor of attachment and the rest comes to an end through the ripening of dispassion acquired by continuous practice of the contemplation described above. Then the mind, brought under the control of the self, becomes restrained. This restraint of mind born of dispassion is called Shama or mastery in the form of Shama. Making the restrained mind fit to be applied to the investigation of truth is Dharma or Samadhana just as a quiet and trained calf becomes fit to pull a plow or cart. The word and so forth in the Bhāshā includes the desire to withdraw from objects, namely Uparati, endurance, namely Titicca and faith in truth. Therefore Shruti says, Enowed with Shama, Dharma, Uparati, Titicca, Samadhana and faith, a person sees the self in the self and sees all things in the self. Possession of the disciplines beginning with Shama and Dharma means abundant acquisition of these disciplines. After this arises the desire to be free from the bondage of worldly existence, hence the common Tata says desire for liberation. In a person who has heard that knowledge of Brahman, eternally pure and conscious, is the cause of liberation. The desire to know Brahman can arise either before inquiry into Dihama or after it. Therefore the immediate succession conveyed by the word affa is only succession to this acquisition of qualifications, not succession to inquiry into Dihama. 8. 89. The word Atta indicates a cause. Vedic statements such as just as enjoyment obtained by an action in this world is exhausted, so enjoyment obtained by diharma in the next world is exhausted teach the impermanence of the fruits of prosperity producing actions such as Agnihokra and statements such as the Noah of Brahman attains the supreme state teach that knowledge of Brahman accomplishes the highest human end. For this reason, immediately after abundant acquisition of the qualifications stated above, the desire to know Brahman should arise. Not only inquiry, but knowledge too arises from that inquiry. Therefore the commentator says and to know, and at the end concludes with therefore. The word atta, occurring in sequence, is explained thus. It conveys the meaning of cause. The commentator makes its causal meaning clear by in the Vedda itself and so forth. Here a question arises, granted that inquiry into Brahman arises when the qualifications described above have been acquired, but this itself is inconsistent, because dispassion toward enjoyment of fruits in this world or the next is impossible. A fruit is an object of desire and is therefore understood as beneficial. How can there be dispassion toward something that itself generates attachment? Udwaah Sarkont 90 It may be said that there is dispassion toward pleasure because suffering is joined to it. But then pleasure too is joined to suffering. Why should there not be the attachment to suffering? Therefore a person should accept pleasure and try to remove suffering, even if suffering inevitably comes. He should treat it and enjoy only the pleasure. In this way one who wants fish brings fish together with bones and scales takes the edge. विबल पूशिन अविशार-विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक विप्विमर्शक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना� or sexual pleasure is joined with suffering caused by exhaustion, but this reasoning does not apply to heavenly and other pleasures of the next world, because Shruti calls them imperishable. We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal, and it is also said the merit of one who performs the Chathamassya sacrifice is not exhausted, nor can perishability be inferred here from the fact that produced things are perishable, because Shruti sublates such an inference. Just as as an inference of the purity of a human skull from its similarity to a conch is sublated. Adwai H. Succont, 91, thus the qualifications described above would prove non-existent, and there would be no occasion for the desire to know Brahman to refute this conclusion. The revered sutra author uses the word atta, and the commentator explains its meaning within the Vedda itself and so forth. The purport is this. The many kinds of suffering caused by animals, beggars, and so forth may obstruct the fruits of agriculture or cooking, but remedies for them are possible. Dependence upon the external means over long periods and continual diminution, these two are inseparably joined to every kind of produced pleasure. Even the finest cook cannot separate poison from food in which poison has been mixed with honey and eat the honey alone. Thus statements such as enjoyment obtained by action in this world which teach diminution, determine the secondary sense of statements such as having drunk Soma we have become immortal because the primary meaning of the latter is impossible. A proranic statement says, Continuance until dissolution is called immortality. Hear the word Brahman brings to mind the means of knowledge of Brahman, namely the Vedda. The relevant statements such as enjoyment obtained by action in this world uptaken by the pronoun Atta as the cause, the ablative suffix Tas indicates their causal status. Advaayah Sakkant 92. Brahmajigvayah sum means the desire to know Brahman. Brahman is that whose characteristic will be stated later by the sutra from which the origination and so forth of this world proceed. there is no doubt here that the word Brahman might mean a class or something else. The word Brahmana in the genitive case has an objective meaning, not the meaning of some residual general relation because a desire to know necessarily requires an object to be known and no other thing has been stated as the object to be known. The pronoun atta takes up the cause stated in the preceding sentence and the ablative case with the suffix tas indicates causality. Granted that the bliss of Brahman, like produced pleasures such as heaven, might be accompanied by suffering, the answer is that scripture teaches. Through knowledge of Brahman a person attains the supreme goal. Trutie declares the exhaustion of enjoyments such as heaven and calls Brahman knowledge the highest human end. Therefore abundant acquisition of the qualifications stated above will occur and inquiry into Brahman will certainly arise. The meaning of the compound Brahmajigvayah site is desire to know Brahman. It is taken as a genitive tapyashya compound. The interpretation of earlier commentators as a dative compound, Brahman-Jenasa inquiry for Brahman is to be understood as rejected here. Katiayana's rule is that in a dative compound the relation between a basic substance and its modification is understood. 98. 93. A dative compound occurs only where there is a relation between an original substance and its modification, as in wood for a sacrificial post or a stake for tying the sacrificial animal where the members of a compound do not stand in such a substance modification relation. There is no dative compound. Expressions such as fodder for a horse are accepted as genitive compounds. Even in the genitive compound the prominence of Brahman in relation to the desire to know is intelligible because the desire to know has been stated as principle in the sentence. Granted that in desire to know Brahman the word Brahman is used in many meanings then a doubt may arise inquiry into which Brahman is intended. In Brahma-hati-late means the Brahmin class. In Brahmajam it means the Brahmin class. विचार-विमर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� should be understood not objectively but as expressing a residual general relation. Such a relation indicates general connection, not only an object relation. Desire to know concerning Brahman could therefore mean a desire to know everything related to Brahman. Adwaya H. Sarkant 94. Things auxiliary to the desire to know Brahman-Brahman's nature. The means of knowing it, reasoning, the means of attainment, and the fruit being directly or indirectly related to Brahman could all be understood within the expression Brahma jigwayahsa. But if the genitive is taken objectively, Brahman will indicate only the object, namely the nature of Brahman. The means of knowledge and so forth will not be the included, and then inquiry would arise into topics not yet introduced. To The one who holds such a view, the answer is given. The word brahmana in the genitive has an objective meaning. The reason is stated for a desire to know. An object fit to be known is required. The accomplishment of inquiry is connected with knowledge and the object of knowledge is brahman. In the absence of an object to be known, knowledge is not determined. And in the absence of knowledge, inquiry is not determined. primary requires an object, not a general relation. Even without a general relation, when an object is present, inquiry is determined. After seeing the sun or moon, one does not ask to what is this related. But upon hearing the word knowledge, why should one not ask knowledge of what? That is, what is its object? Therefore, because it is what is principally required, Brahman is connected only as the object, not through a general relation. The The general relation would be secondary. Consequently, the compound is a genitive tat brahse in which the genitive is objective. Advaith Sarkant 95. Granted that the genitive is accepted in the general sense of residual relation, even then there is no contradiction of the fact that Brahman is the object of inquiry because a general relation itself rests upon some specific relation. Nevertheless, the effort of one who abandons Brahman's direct objected and accepts indirect objected by way of a general relation is pointless. Now an objection is raised true. Inquiry cannot be determined in the absence of an object to be known, but inquiry might have some other object, while Brahman is connected with it through a residual relation. The common tater answers, no other thing has been stated as fit to be known, to abandon direct objecthood, which is what inquiry primarily requires and is first fit to be connected, and to make some general relation, required only later in some way, principle this would make the secondary primary and the primary secondary. Even the terms direct and indirect relation are based upon this order, but this is not pointless, it may be said, because its purpose would be to include by presupposition inquiry into all the remaining topics depend upon Brahman. The answer is no, because when the principle is accepted all the topics dependent upon it are automatically included by postulation. Brahman, the thing most desired to be attained through knowledge, is principle. Once that principle is accepted as the object of the desire to know, all those matters without separate desire to know which inquiry into Brahman would nevertheless be impossible are automatically included by postulation. No separate mention of them in the Sutra is necessary, just as when it is said the king is going here. The going of his entire retinue together with the king is understood, so should it be understood here. This is also in accordance with Shruti. Adwai H. Sarkont 96. Dil expressions used in the Barshat principle and subordinate correspond to explicit and implicit. Dil object estates his view thus. This is not pointless because its purpose would be to presuppose Inquiria into all remaining matters dependent upon Brahman. This has been explained above. The Sidhantin states his position with note because when the principle is accepted and so forth, though not explicitly present in the sentence, Brahman has real primacy. the room. मैणिंग मीणिंग अव दबाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, आप श्विष्विमर्शक रेक। The shruti passage beginning from which these beelings are born and the statement desire to know that Brahman, that is, Brahman clearly show that Brahman is the object of the desire to know. When the genitive case is accepted in the objective sense, this fully agrees with the sutra. Therefore the word Brahmana in the genitive has an objective meaning. Jainasa is the desire to know. The object of the desire expressed by the desiderative suffix is the knowledge that culminates in direct realisation because a fruit is the object of desire. In fact, Brahman is what is to be directly realised through knowledge produced by a means of knowledge. Direct realisation of Brahman is a human end because it uproots a v idea and all other evils and the entire seed of transmigration. Therefore Brahman itself is fit to be the object of the desire to know. Udhsakont 97 Having thus established the compound accepted by him, the commentator explains the meaning of the word Jnasa by saying, Jnasa is the desire to know, granted, but knowledge is not an object of desire, the real sphere of desire is attainment of pleasure or removal of suffering, or the means to these is desired. Brahma knowledge is not of this kind. Its experience is neither like the gain of pleasure nor like the cessation of something and desirable, nor is it a means to either for after knowledge arises. No special pleasure is seen and suffering continues. Still, it does not follow merely from the Sutra-Orpha's statement that knowledge is an object of desire. In answer to this objection it is said, knowledge that culminates in direct realization. Their knowledge is not desired, rather the knowledge that culminates in realization or experience is desired. The object of the desire expressed by the desiderative suffix is that knowledge which culminates in realization. Because the fruit is the object of desire should be understood in the sense that desire continues to operate toward the means until the fruit is obtained. Granted that knowledge culminates in direct realization, does it thereby become desirable? Knowledge of an unnecessary thing does not become desired even if it culminates in direct realisation. The answer is, in fact, Brahman is what is to be directly realised through knowledge produced by a means of knowledge. Granted that there is direct realisation concerning Brahman, why is it desired? The answer is, direct realisation of Brahman is indeed a human end. Is it prosperity? No. supreme bliss that is the nature of Brahman and divided and manifest when all impurities of suffering have been removed. Therefore it is the highest human end. Advaayah Sarkant 98. Granted that direct realization of Brahman is not a human end because a human end is something pervaded by human effort. In realization that is of the nature of Brahman there is none of production, modification, purification or acquisition Brahman is eternal and therefore cannot be pervaded by human action. How then is realization of Brahman a human end? The answer is, because it uproots evil such as Avali idea and the entire seed of transmigration. It is true that there is no production and so forth in realization of Brahman's nature but under the influence of beginningless and indefinable Avali idea, the nature of Brahman. Though not illuminated by another light and though itself luminous appears as though a manifest and as though illuminated by another although distinct from bodied senses and so forth. It appears as though non-different from them. Thus before destruction of Aviya-Idyya and the other seeds of transmigration, Brahman is as though unattained and after their destruction it is as though attained. In this form a person desires it. Therefore it is is properly called a human end. Advaitha Sarkant 99. In Avila idea and so forth, the words and so forth include the impressions of Avila idea, the cessation of Avila idea and the rest occurs through the force of direct realisation born of reflection and experience in the form of a Brahman shaped modification of the inner organ. Therefore, for a seeker of liberation endowed with the qualifications stated above, Brahman alone is the proper object of the desire to know. Without such knowledge, Abhilaideya and its impressions the root cause of many sufferings are not destroyed and without their destruction, the experience of the supreme bliss that is the Jeeva. विवाश नाच्य अजिद ब्रामन, अजिद नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य नाच्य ना� our sentences because that purpose has already been accomplished by the Sutra, Atharva, Dharma, Jainasa which indicates the injunction to study one's Veda and the understanding of its meaning. Inquiry into Dihama indicates inquiry into the meaning of the Veda and knowledge of Dihama. Being a part of the complete meaning of the Veda secondarily it includes knowledge of Brahman and Adihama as well. Thus inquiry into Brahman, like inquiry into Dihama, may be indicated by inquiry into the meaning of the Vedic, but there is no rule that it must begin immediately after inquiry into Dihama, nor does inquiry into Brahman begin merely immediately after Vedic study. Therefore this sutra is stated in order to begin inquiry into Brahman and to show that it follows immediately upon qualifications such as discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, hence there is no repetition. Ad-YAH Sarkont 100 Granted that this sutra states inquiry to be the means of Brahman knowledge, but this is not reasonable because it cannot be examined, therefore the question arises. Then Brahman-Brahman must be either known or unknown. If it is known, there should be no desire to know it, and if it is unknown, a desire to know it is altogether impossible. Their answer is Brahman, eternal, pure, conscious, free, omniscient and omnipotent certainly exists. One who considers the derivation of the word Brahman understands in accordance with the meaning of the root-bree, meaning such as itonality and purity. Because Brahman is the self of all, its existence is well known. Every person knows his own existence. No one knows I do not exist. If the existence of the self were not well known, the entire world would cognize I do not exist. And the self itself is Brahman. The awfulest sentences of Vedanta are intrinsically valid. Brahman must be either known or unknown. If it is known, it has already become the object of determinate cognition produced by Vedanta sentences. Therefore there should be no further desire to know it, because a means of knowledge that has produced its fruit does not operate again upon its object, otherwise the definition of a means of knowledge would be violated. And if Brahman is not known from Vedanta, Vedanta does not teach it, consequently Brahman would remain forever unknown and no desire to know it could arise. Desire concerns something experienced and dear, never something wholly unexperienced, Granted that it may be dear still in the absence of a means of knowledge, knowledge of it is impossible. Verbal testimony must be said to be the means of its knowledge. This will be taught later by Shastray on it that, if scripture does not make Brahman known whence comes its validity concerning Brahman, and no other means of knowledge applies to Brahman. Therefore a known object is not the object of a desire to know, while an unknown object can be neither desired nor known, consequently inquiring into Brahman is impossible. This is the objection. Advaith Sarkant 101 The solution is Brahman, eternal, pure, conscious, and free. Certainly exists. The intention is that even before inquiry into Brahman begins, a person who has studied the Vedas, studied Narkata, Gramma, and so forth, understood the relation between words and meanings, and grasped the general meaning of the sentences from in the beginning there was only being to tat, tiv ammasi, obtains a general cognition of Brahman as eternal and so forth. This is possible even without inquiry, by referring to the object of knowledge with words such as Brahman in the Bharsha. Knowledge concerning Brahman is secondarily indicated as well for at the beginning of inquiry Brahman's existence is not altogether unknown, but only doubtful. The word eternal negates suffering caused by decay, pure removes suffering caused by limiting adjuncts such as body, conscious shows, Brahman as the blissful self that is not illuminated by another light but is itself luminous because bliss and luminosity are non-different. Ad-YAH Succont 102, Granted, If Liberation Already Exists ब्रामन्झ क्विली श्च्च आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आजिट आ its form conditioned by a vitha-dhya omniscient and omnipotent. This is established on the basis of being the cause of the world because whether something becomes a cause or not depends upon the presence or absence of power and knowledge. Again, whence comes realisation of Brahman in this form? The answer is one who analyses the meaning of the word Brahman experience of Brahman in this form comes not only from considering the sequence and context of sentences such as in the beginning there was being alone, but also from the derivation of the word Brahman itself. The root-brier indicates growth or excellence, because of this excellence. Qualities such as itonality, purity, and consciousness taught by other expressions are fitting in Brahman. Ad-YAH Sarkant 103 Having thus shown purity and the like to be well known in the literal meaning of tat. The commentator speaks concerning the literal meaning of t-van because Brahman is the self of all. Its existence is well known. The existence of Brahman is well known to everyone, even an ordinary farmer with dust-covered feet. Wents. Because it is his very self. Hence it is said, every person knows his own existence. Then by saying not not, ignorance of the self is negated and knowledge of the self is confirmed. A person does not fail to know I exist, but knows it with certainty. Someone may say, even while knowing I exist, one may not know the self. The answer is, if the existence of the self were not well known if he did not know the self in the form of the J. E. Diva, the substratum of I-ness, there would be no cognition of I either. Granted that everyone knows the self, the substratum of I-ness, what connection does that have with Brahman. The answer is, and the Self itself is Brahman. Because of the coordinate relation between Tatt and Tivam from shruti purity consciousness and the like belonging to the literal meaning of Tatt are known from direct experience. The Jeeva denoted by Tivam is known and knowledge of the word meanings precedes knowledge of the sentence meaning. Therefore from the sentence Tatt Tivam see the Jeeva denoted by Tivam is experienced as beading of the nature of Brahman. If Brahman as the Self is well known in ordinary life, then it is already known there should therefore be no desire to know it. The answer is no, because there are many mutually contradictory views concerning its specific nature. Ordinary people and Lokeatas regard the Self as merely the conscious body. Some others call only the conscious senses the Self. Some regard the mind as the Self. Some take me a momentary cognition as the self and some emptiness. Still others accept a self distinct from the body, passing from one body to another, an agent and enjoyer. Udh Sakant 104 The objecter points out the defect in the first of these alternatives. If in ordinary tradition here ordinary tradition means the teacher pupil succession. If from the sentence Tat T. Vamasi Brahman is well known as the self where one should say the self whose nature is Brahman then this is stated for the purpose of teaching identity, it would follow again that because it is known, Brahman is not an object of inquiry. The answer is no, why? Because there are many mutually contradictory views concerning its specific nature. Such contradictory views, in the absence of proof, become the cause of uncertainty. Therefore, although the general existence of Brahman is known, its true specific nature is doubtful for this reason inquiry is necessary. According to some, the self is only an enjoyer, not an agent. Others say that there is an omniscient and omnipotent Lord distinct from that self. Still others hold that the Lord is the self of that enjoying Jea'i'i'va. In this way many people adopt different views on the basis of reasoning and scriptural statements that are either established by valid means or erroneous. One who accepts any one of these views without inquiry will be deprived of the highest good and obtain evil. Therefore, beginning with the statement of the desire to know Brahman, respectful inquiry into the sentences of Vedanta, आविचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विच and supported views cannot contradict one another. Views concerning different substratas are likewise not mutually contradictory. The intellect is impermanent and the self is eternal do not contradict one another. Therefore all systems accept that the purity and other properties of the referent of Tat, known from Vedanta, reside in some substratum and that the Jeeva denoted by T.Vam is established by experience. Difference of opinion concerns only the manner in which it is manifest or unmanifest and its various states. Thus, even when the substratum is generally known, doubt concerning its specific nature is entirely proper because contradictory views exist. Among these views, the commentator first shows contradictory conceptions concerning the referent of T-Vam beginning with ordinary people and continuing through only an enjoyer, not an agent. If the self is regarded as the conscious body, the senses, the mind, or momentary cognition, the properties such as itonality belonging to the referent of tat cannot belong to the referent of T-Vam because the two are mutually incompatible. As for the nihilists, how can that which they regard as inexpressible and as the meaning of no word be taken as the referent of tat and T-Vam, a self that is agent and enjoyer also because it is subject to modification, does not accord with the itinality and other properties of the referent of tat. In the doctrine at takes the self not as agent but only as enjoyer, enjoyership still indicates modification so incompatibility with itinality and the like remains. In a view that regards selves as many, even if they are not taken to be itinjoyers, plurality gives rise to defects such as impermanence and abandon's non-duality. Udwh Sarkont 106 Just as there are contradictory views concerning the referent of T.Vam, there are differences of opinion concerning the referent of Tat as well. Lokeyartas and those who reject the Vedda as a means of knowledge regard cognition of the referent of Tat as false. Even among those who accept the Vedda as valid, some say that the referent of Tat is only figurative or is not the principal subject taught by Vedanta sentences. Thus, in showing differences of view concerning the referent of Tivam, the commentator also indicates differences concerning the referent of Tatt. Now a contradictory view directly concerning the referent of Tatt is stated. Some say that there is an omniscient and omnipotent Lord distinct from the Jeevas. Here Tatt is used in contrast to the individual selves. The Lord is distinct not only from the body and so forth but also from the Jeavers and is the ruler of the entire world, omniscience and omnipotence. His two natural qualities are stated to establish his rulership, but this Lord, distinct from the Jeavers, cannot stand in a relation of coordinate predication with the Reference of Tivan. Therefore the final view is stated, some say that the Lord is the self of the enjoyer. is, the Lord denoted by Tatt is the self of the enjoying Je Deva conditioned by Aviv I Deva, therefore the Je Deva is in reality non-different from the Lord, just as Pot Space is non-different from Great Space. Udvaiah Sukkant 107 Having finished mentioning the contradictory views, the commentator states their cause, in this way many people some views are based on sound reasoning, on for a spacious reasoning, some on scriptural statements understood in their correct sense, some on scriptural statements given an improper interpretation. Granted that contradictory views exist and thereby produced out, why nevertheless should inquiry into Brahman be begun, the answer is, the person who accepts any one of these views without inquiry the highest good is attained by true knowledge, not by false knowledge. Because false knowledge destroys faith and leads to evil, it is said, and he will obtain evil." Finally, with the word therefore, the purport of the sutra is concluded. In inquiry into Vedanta, reasoning concerned with the meaning of Vedanta sentences is primary. Other reasoning consistent with it is also auxiliary for example, सम्पल पर्वा मिमंश्ः इन दिएज्चमनेशन अव दिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटिटि� Brahman, the revered Sutra author says, from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed. Udhvayah Sarkhant, 108, having established in the first Sutra that beginning inquiry is proper, the Sutra author now begins the investigation of Brahman, from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed. Introducing this Sutra, the commentator says, it has been said that one should desire to know Brahman. What now is the defining characteristic of this Brahman? Although by taking knowledge of Brahman's nature as the principal subject, the auxiliary topics of means of knowledge and so forth are also pledged, Brahman's own nature is principal, therefore it is first established through objection and resolution. Whatever comes within experience is limited, impure, inert, and perishable. Brahman's nature cannot be characterized by knowledge of these things, because Brahman is their opposite eternal, pure, and of the nature of consciousness. No one characterizes an eternal thing by means of a produced thing. Norcan Brahman be characterized by its own qualities such as itonality, because these qualities are not already known. A characteristic is given through something well known, not through something wholly unknown. Norcan mere verbal testimony establish the characteristic here, for if Brahman is altogether unknown. cannot be the meaning of any word and consequently cannot be the meaning of a sentence. Therefore, in the absence of a defining characteristic, Brahman cannot become an object of the desire to know. This is the objector's position. The revered sutra author answers this objection from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed. The world established by experience is not itself a defining characteristic of Brahman because it is Brahman's quality or identical with it rather because it arises from Brahman. The world can characterize Brahman just as a rival in different regions is a mark of the sun's motion. Birth and so forth means origination, continuance and dissolution. For brevity the sutra or for uses the neuter expression gematic to make this clear the common tater gives the the Coordinate New to Terms Birth, Continuance and Destruction. Rdwh Succont 109 The primacyl of origination among origination, Continuance and Dissolution is established both by the statement of Shruti and by the nature of things. Shruti says from which these beings are born, the sequence of origination, Continuance and Dissolution is also natural. Continuance and Destruction belong to a substratum that has come into existence through origination. In the expression of this world, the word this indicates the world known through perception and other means of knowledge, the genitive case shows its relation to origination and so forth, from which designates the cause. The ordered construction of this world divided by name and form filled with many agents and enjoyers, and definitely arranged by place, time, cause, action, and fruit is difficult even to imagine mentally. The cause from which the origination and so forth of such a world proceed is omniscient and omnipotent Brahman. The sentence of the sutra is completed thus, that from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed is Brahman. The expressions divided by name and form and so forth are self-explanatory. that many possible causes of the world are under discussion, primordial, prakriti time, planetary deities or the activity of directional guardians such as Indra, chance, the inherent nature of things, or non-being. Why then should a missiant and omnipotent Brahmin be accepted as the cause of the world's origination and so forth? The answer is, divided by name and form, filled with many agents and enjoys the qualifications beginning with divided, establish an intelligent cause and exclude the causality of incension, Pradhana imagined causes, non-being and the like. Adwa H. Sarkant, 110, things such as pots, divided by name and form, are observed to be produced by intelligent makers. The world under dispute too is divided by name and form. वो उन अईटिलिच्ण मेखा मुस्भील इक्षेटिद फो तुटू पोट तुटू फुर्ष्ट कन्सिदः सिन लिएजिंच तुटू नाटक आप पोट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप पुट आप प imagined as creating the world. It may be said that intelligent planetary deities or guardians of the directions conceive name and form in their intelligence and make the world. Then Brahman of the nature described above is unnecessary. The answer is filled with many agents and enjoyers. Some persons, like cooks and priests at a sacrifice, are agents but not enjoyers. Others, like the ancestors in Ashradha and the sun in Avaishnara offering are enjoyers but not agents. Therefore the Sutra mentions both agents and enjoyers, place, time, cause, action, and fruit form and it are a divan for compound and each term should be taken separately. This world is the dwelling place of these agents and enjoyers. In this world some creatures arise in definite places such as the Black Antelope. Some occur at definite times such as the call of the cuckoo, some through definite causes such as the conception of a heron caused by thunder at the beginning of the rainy season, some perform definite actions such as only a brahmin and not another being entitled to perform a sacrifice for someone else. Likewise some experience definite fruits, some are happy and some unhappy, and one who is happy here may be unhappy elsewhere. Udwaah Succont, 111, such subtle order does not accord with chance, mere inherent nature, or a limited agent lacking omniscience and omnipotence. The knowledge and power of planetary deities and guardians of directions are limited, therefore they cannot know and construct the entire world. Even the complete design of a single body cannot at any one time be easily imagined by the mind much less the design of the entire universe. Therefore Brahman alone is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origination, continuance, and dissolution of the world. Thus the remaining sentence of the Sutra is completed. That is Brahman, granted. But why Why should the expression birth and so forth be understood as referring only to origination, continuance, and dissolution? Why not to such modifications of being as growth, transformation, and decay? The answer is that all the other modifications of being are included within these three. Therefore only origination, continuance, and dissolution are stated here. Ghasca enumerates six modifications of being. It is born, it exists, it grows, it changes form, it declines, and it perishes. But growth and the like occur during the period in which the world continues to exist, hence a doubt might arise that the world's origination, continuance, and dissolution from the primal cause are not clearly indicated. In order to remove this doubt, the three origination from Brahman, Continuance in Brahman and Dissolution into Brahman are principally intended. Growth is the increase of parts, just as from two threads a large cloth having many parts is produced, so growth is in fact included under origination. Transformation is said to be of three kinds according to the characteristics of Dharma. 3rd Y. H. Sarkont 112. Change of state and change of characteristic are likewise fundamentally forms of origination. For example, when a bracelet is made in the substratum that is gold, this is a change in the characteristic of the dharma, it is simply the origination of the bracelet. Similarly, the present existence and the like of the bracelet constitute change of characteristic, this too is origination. Difference is As such as newness and oldness constitute change of state, this also is origination. Decay is the diminution of parts and therefore is included under destruction. Thus as appropriate, growth and the like are included within origination and the rest, hence they are not mentioned separately. Even if it be granted that these are not included within origination and the rest, it would still be proper to mention only origination, continuance and dissolution because the Vedic sentence from which these beings are born and so forth, would thereby be recalled and Brahman would be ascertained as the primal cause of the world, otherwise by taking origination exist. नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप ना cannot be admitted to proceed from any cause other than unconscious Pradhana, Atoms, Non-Existence, an embodied J.E.D.Va or the Omniscient and Omnipotent Lord, nor can it arise merely from the intrinsic nature of things, because dependence upon a particular place, time and cause is observed here. Those who infer the Lord's causal agency regard this inference as proof of the existence and other attributes of a Lord distinct from embodied Jeevas. Granted that if origination alone is stated, continuance and dissolution are necessarily understood, then what is the purpose of the word's birth and so forth in the sutra? The answer is, Brahman is the cause of birth and so forth and so on. By this expression Brahman's status as the material cause is indicated, mere origination is common also to an efficient cause and therefore does not make material causality clear. The purpose of the previously mentioned special cause and effect has been stated in the sentence, the world endowed with the characteristics described above, and so forth. By this passage the nature of the Brahman proposed in the thesis has been established in the form of a defining characteristic, the means of knowing it will be stated subsequently. R. Y. H. Sarkont, 114. Nor is it the case that in the sutra from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed the very same subject has again merely been stated as a thesis. The purpose of the sutras is to string together the Vedanta sentences on one thread like a garland of flowers. For the inquiry, inter and confirmation of the realization of Brahman proceed precisely on the basis of those Vedanta sentences which are made the subject of the sutras. The Nayakas say that a subject admitted as possible in a thesis can be established by proof, but no proof can save a thesis that is contradicted the moment it is stated, as in a barren woman is a mother. For this reason origination and so forth are taken as the ground of the thesis. The Vaisheshikas and others also infer the Lord on this basis. The commentator says this in order to establish firmly these grounds as reasons supporting the thesis by this inference, and so forth. By saying here also, the question is raised when the subject under discussion has been concluded by this context. Why is a question about the subject of the next context raised through the example of a friend's capacity? The answer is that the Sutras are intended to arrange In order the purport of the Vedanta Sentences, through Inquiry into the Vedanta Sentences, the twofold of Eidia concealment and latent impression is destroyed and the manifestation of Brahman, that is, Realization, is accomplished. Udvayah Sukhant 115 at the end of the Treaties, as soon as the Inquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta Sentences is completed, the manifestation of Brahman is accomplished, It is not accomplished by inference or other independent means of knowledge. Nevertheless, in order to confirm the meaning of the Vedanta sentences that declare the cause of the world's origination, inference too is a means of knowledge so long as it does not contradict Vedanta because scripture itself regards reasoning as an aid. Truti says, It is to be heard and reflected upon, and the learned and intelligent man reaches the country of Gannhar that is one who has a teacher receive assistance from his own intelligence. If it is said that in regard to this Brahman there is no means of knowledge other than verbal testimony, then whence would reflection arise, and whence realization of Brahman, the answer is that there are the Vedanta sentences. Here inference is to be understood as of the kind that does not conflict with Vedanta and depends upon Vedanta. A reasoned determination that does not contradict fervourable testimony and proceeds on its basis is called reflection. Reasoning may take the form either of inference or of postulation. Aadwaya H. Sukhant 116. It is not the case with the desire to know Brahman as it is with the desire to no de-harm up where shrewd. श्रूथि आन्दलाएक लोगना, मेंजाव नोलज़, फिर्ष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्विष्व particular modification of the inner organ, namely realization of Brahman. The fruit of this means of knowledge is the manifestation of Brahman's own nature when Avila idea has been removed. The word fruit is used figuratively because this is not something newly produced or refined. In the inquiry into de-harmat perception and other forms of experience function as auxiliary aids, not directly but in the inquiry into Brahman. Experience that is, realization functions directly. The subject of the Inquiry into Brahman is Brahman itself which is accessible to experience. Therefore it is said knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience. Experience of Brahman, that is, realization of Brahman, is the supreme human end because after all suffering has been destroyed it is of the nature of supreme Udhsakont 117 and the object of Brahma knowledge is an existent thing. In the case of what ought to be done only scripture has authority because it does not depend upon experience and the existence of what ought to be done depends upon a person's action. A worldly or Vedic action may be done, not done, or done otherwise as one may go on horseback, on foot, in another way, or not go at all. Likewise injunctions and prohibitions such as use 16 vessels in the Ataratra do not use 16 vessels offer after sunrise, offer before sunrise are meaningful as alternatives, general rules and exceptions. Granted that the object of inquiry is the experience of Brahman but the objection that Brahman cannot be its object is answered by, and the object of Brahma knowledge is an existent thing. The relation of Noah and known is a false form of a mental modification belonging to the realm of the world. Knowledge of Dihama does not culminate in such experience, because experience of Dihama is not itself a human end. The fruit attained by observing Dihama is the human end. Verbal testimony determines the performance of de-harm-up experience is unnecessary. Ad-Y-H Sarkont 118 An object does not admit alternatives such as in this way or not in this way exists or does not exist. Alternatives depend upon human intelligence but knowledge of the true nature of an object depends not upon human intelligence but upon the object itself. Regarding one and the same post, true cognition cannot be both this is a post and this is a man. This is a post or some other man is erroneous cognition. This is certainly a post is true cognition because it depends upon the object. Therefore the validity concerning an existent object is object-jubbant. What is to be done is not presently existent as such because it is not yet determined. The existence of what ought to be done depends upon the person who performs the action. Agency in worldly and Vedic action depends upon the person, and therefore the act may be done or not done. Going by horse and the like shows the indeterminacy of worldly action, while provisions concerning vessels in the Ataratra and the like show the indeterminacy of Vedic action. A person has freedom concerning what ought to be done, therefore injunction and prohibition are meaningful because doing or abandoning an act is under his control. It should be used as an injunction, it should not be used as a prohibition. The rule of offering before or after sunrise, the prohibition against touching a human bone, and the special rule that one guilty of Brahmin killing should wear an ornament made of such bone, these are injunctions and prohibitions of this kind. They are meaningful as alternatives, general rules and exceptions. If two mutually contradictory rules of equal force apply in one place, an alternative is unavoidable. The general prohibition against touching human bone is overridden by the special rule concerning an ornament for one guilty of Brahmin killing. Therefore here there is not an alternative but an exception. Only through injunction and prohibition is established such a previously unattained but producible state of affairs regarding which a person is free to act or Refrain. UD. UDWH Succont 11919. It is not so with existence things, hence it is said an object does not admit alternatives this way or that way. Existent or non-existent. Here alternative concerning the existence of a substance is denied. that alternatives are also seen regarding an existent thing, as in this is a post or a man. How then can it be said that the object does not admit alternatives? The answer is, the alternative occurs in a person's inner organ. Doubt and error depend upon the inner organ and its impressions, like a dream upon the mind alone, or upon the combined activity of mind, senses, and impressions. Doubt whether a post is a man, or the illusion of a man in a post does not depend upon the actual post or man, it depends upon apprehension of a substratum possessing common features. Therefore doubt and error do not alter the object's nature. True cognition depends not upon the intellect but upon the object. Therefore the nature of the object is determined by valid cognition, not by doubt and the like. Y. H. Sarkont. 120. Then Brahman knowledge too is object governed because its object is an existent thing. If it is an existent thing, Brahman must be the object of other means of knowledge would inquire into Vedanta sentences then not become pointless. No, because Brahman is not an object of the senses and therefore its relation is not apprehended through other means of knowledge. The senses naturally apprehend their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, the senses would apprehend its causal relation. Here the question arises. Sentences about existent things are often mere statements, as in there is fruit on the riverbank. Vedanta sentences to concern an existent thing would they then be only repetitions of what is known through other means? No. An inference based on the origination and so forth of the world has been mentioned as another means concerning Brahman, but it does not reveal Brahman's complete nature. The purpose of Vedantai is direct knowledge of the non-dual nature of Brahman, which is impossible through the senses or independent inference. When it has not been understood whether the relation is with Brahman or with something else, no determination can be made. Therefore the sutra from which the birth and so forth of this world proceed is not intended to indicate an inference, but to point out Vedanta sentences. Which Vedanta sentence is indicated by this sutra? Brih, the son of Varuna, approached his father Varuna and said, revered sir, teach me Brahman. Beginning from this, it is said, desire to know that from which these beings are born, by which when born they live and into which they finally enter. That is Brahman. This is the decisive statement concerning the matter. From bliss indeed these beings are born by bliss when born they live. Into bliss they enter is also a decisive statement. Other Vedanta passages can likewise be cited that teach Brahmins eternally pure, eternally conscious, eternally free nature and its character as the omniscient cause. Udhya Hsukhant, 121. We have already discussed this matter in detail in the Naya Akhanika. It will also be made clear later that because they have an existent thing as their subject, Vedanta sentences are not mere repetitions. Thus everything is clear. Shruti shows origination by from which continuance by by which when born they live and dissolution by into which they enter. The statement this is the decisive sentence on the matter removes the possibility that Pradhana or the like might be intended. The decisive statement is from Bliss indeed. That is, just as a rope together with Avitha idea is the material cause of the snake. The snake appears while the rope exists and dissolves into the rope. So Brahman together with Avitha idea is the material cause of the world. world abides in Brahman and dissolves into Brahman. Because it is the source of Scripture, I describe in causality with respect to the world, it has been indicated that Brahman is omniscient. To make this firm it is said, because it is the source of Scripture. Brahman is the source, that is, the cause of the vast body of Scripture consisting of the rigvila and the rest, filled with innumerable branches of learning and illuminating all things like a torch, a body of scripture that is comparable to an un-missint being. Such a body of scripture, consisting of the riggedet and the rest and possessing the quality of a missience, can arise only from an un-missint लोव भीझिंख, विमन भीझिंग, दिस्टिंक्छनजद वाशाना अश्रामा, अद्विश्ख़न्चद, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक आश्रामा, नाटक � through funeral rites and teach truths concerning Brahman. It is great because it concerns great subjects and also because it is complete with many limbs and subsidiary limbs. Hence it is said filled with innumerable branches of learning, Purana, Naya, Mimamsa and the rest constitute ten branches of learning each in its own way supplements the Vedas. This also removes doubts concerning the authority of Scripture because all competent persons accept it. The authors of the Puranas and the rest are great sages by elaborating the meaning of the Vedda in their respective works and practicing it with faith. They accept the authority of the Vedda. This scripture does not fail to instruct, nor does it give obscure instruction, otherwise its authority would be doubtful. Therefore it is said, illuminating all things like a torch. It illuminates every subject in every way, therefore it neither fails to instruct nor instructs obscurely. For this reason it is like an omniscient being. The knowledge of an omniscient being reaches all subjects, and the subject matter of scripture likewise extends to all things, therefore the comparison is appropriate. by H. Succonte, 123, having stated the co-presence of cause and effect. The corresponding co-absence is now stated, indeed, of such a scripture. The distinctive feature of an omniscient being is knowledge of all subjects. Scripture too has this quality because its subject matter reaches everything. This is established by example when a treatise with an extensive subject matter arises from a particular person, that person possesses knowledge more extensive than that treatise. Even today, when someone writes a treatise covering many subjects, the speaker's knowledge is broader than what he states. Subtle distinctions among things can be experienced but cannot be fully expressed in words, just as the difference in sweetness among sugarcane juice, milk, and jaggery is experienced but cannot be clearly stated in speech. The word extensive shows that the subject matter of a statement may be broad but cannot equal the speaker's knowledge. The conclusion is drawn by the application what need is there to say, what need is there to state the unique omission and omnipotence of that great person from whom the Vedda arises as effortlessly at his breath. The expression divided into many branches applies from divided in diverse forms through origination. The conclusion begins with of that great person and continues through omnipotence. With very little effort means almost without effort, as in the saying, barley pudding is not salty. What divine sages cannot accomplish even with great effort. Brahman accomplishes playfully with almost no effort, from this his incomparable omniscience and omnipotence are established. Trutti concerning the effortless origination of the Vedda is also cited of this great person and so forth. Ad-Y-H Sarkhant, 124 Even the Mimamsakas who hold phonemes to be eternal must accept the non-eternality of words and sentences. A word consists of phonemes in a particular sequence and a sentence of words in a particular sequence. Sequence is a property of manifestation, not of the phonemes themselves, since phonemes are eternal and all-pervasive. No temporal or spatial relation of earlier and later is possible among them. Manifestation is non-eternal. Then even if the manifestation of phonemes be eternal, how can wordhood be eternal? Once words are non-eternal, sentences and the rest are likewise proved to be non-eternal, the repetition of words is like the imitation of a dance. The pupil follows the sequence. तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो तो � those who hold phonemes eternal and those who hold them non-eternal. The difference of opinion concerns only whether complete human freedom is to be admitted with respect to Vedic sentences. The follows of J. Y. E. M. I. N. E. who do not accept creation and dissolution, hold Vedic study through an eternal and uninterrupted succession of teachers and pupils. Followers of Vyasa hold, in accordance with the doctrine of creation and dissolution established by Shruti, Asemriti, Itihasa and the like, that the Supreme Self, omniscient and omnipotent as the cause associated with the beginningless of Eidia, is the creator of the eternal Vedda nevertheless, he preserves the sequence of the Vedda in conformity with the preceding creation. Adwa H. Sarkant, 125 This is just as sacrifice and Brahmin slaying, though they are illusory effects of Brahman, do not change their nature in a new creation the former remains the cause of a good result and the latter of an evil result. In no creation does Brahman's slaying become a cause of merit, nor did Ashamed her a cause of sin, just as fire never wets and water never burns. Likewise, in this creation the study of the Vedda in its fixed order is a cause of welfare and liberation, while study in a contrary order is harmful and becomes the cause of a verbal fault like a thunderbolt, so it remains in other creations as well. Therefore the omniscient and omnipotent Creator composes the Vedda in conformity with the preceding creation. In this sense he does not possess arbitrary freedom. The followers of J. Y. E. Mai Neath understand by the word Aparushaya the absence of complete freedom on the part of an author. This is acceptable in our view also, though the purpose is different, nor is the objection valid that something revealed by a person cannot be accepted as scripture. A statement made by a person afflicted by many defects is unreliable, but the Word of One who knows the truth and is free from every defect is certainly trustworthy. The statements of persons enowed with de-harmot wisdom, dispassion, and lordly power such as Prajapati and the Divine Seers of the First Creation are trustworthy. Their true knowledge is certain and the faith of later people arises from their faith. Thus Brahmins being the source of scripture, the Vedas are Paurushaya character and its authority all become intelligible. Adwayah Sakkant 126 A second interpretation is this, the previously described body of scripture consisting of the Rig Veda and the rest is the source, that is, the means of valid knowledge, of true knowledge concerning Brahman. It is solely through the authority of scripture that Brahman is known as the cause of the origination and so forth of the world. In the preceding sutra, the shruti passage from which these beings are born and so forth, had been cited. If scriptures being the source had already been established there, what is the purpose of this sutra? The answer is that scripture was not explicitly stated there to be a means of knowledge. It was possible to suppose that the sutra from which the origination of the world merely indicated an inference. To remove this doubt, this sutra explicitly states because it is the source of scripture. That is, from examples of produced things in the experienced world, the existence of Brahman can be inferred, but regarding the true nature of Brahman, shrutu alone is the means of knowledge. The meaning of The commentary is clear. That is, the Gemadi Sutra does not merely indicate an inference. The succeeding Sutra, because it is the source of scripture, determines the meaning of the first by relying upon scripture. The defining characteristic has been stated from that characteristic, Brahman's existence in general may be known by inference. But knowledge of Brahman's specific and extraordinary nature comes only from scripture. Therefore scripture is the means of knowledge and Brahman is the subject of the Vedanta sentences. Advaith Sarkant 127 Again the question arises, when Brahman is the subject of scriptural testimony what is the purpose of inquiring? विचार-विचार-विमर्शक नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ of Vedanta is determined through the sequence of hearing, reflection and deep contemplation. Therefore the author of the sutras begins the inquiry into Brahman while remaining subordinate to scriptural testimony, not by reasoning independent of scripture. Advaishsakant 128 Again the question arises when it has been shown that scripture exists for the purpose of action and therefore a sentence that serves no purpose of action is meaningless. How can scripture be called a means of knowledge concerning Brahman? Vedanta would then have no use. What had earlier been stated merely as a thesis that scripture is a means of knowledge concerning Brahman is established in this sutra. With again, how and so forth, the commentator begins the poor vapaksha. How indicates the objection Vedanta would be regarded as meaningless because it does not enjoin a human end since it teaches Brahman, who by nature is pure conscious, and indifferent, and in whom there is nothing to be rejected or accepted. Further, because Vedanta concerns an already existent thing it would, like a secular sentence, become merely a restatement and would not remain an independent means of knowledge, but it is not proper to think so Vedanta is not fruitless, because a result follows from the injunction to study it. it may serve as an auxiliary by making known the agent, deity, and other factors required in the injunction with which it is connected, or it may enjoin some other action such as meditation. An independent instruction concerning the nature of an existent thing is impossible, because an existent thing is the object of perception and other means of knowledge. Thus the poor Vapaksha intends that the authority and utility of Vedanta would become dependent on other means of knowledge. The citation of J.Y.E. Mayniz Sutra is meant to strengthen the poor Vapakshat, not to present it as the final doctrine. Adwayah Sakkant, 129. Use here means the absence of uselessness and the production of independent knowledge, because Vedanta in the form of a restatement is opposed to depend upon another means of knowledge. From therefore through or it may enjoy some other action such as meditation is the combined statement of the poor vapaksha. From certainly impossible through or it may be understood in this way is its analysis. If the independent authority of Vedanta is not accepted it will become merely an auxiliary to an injunction or will be understood as in joining an action such as meditation, in this way it will cease to be an independent means of knowledge of Brahman. Granted that Vedanta is not an auxiliary to action, even so its purport concerning the nature of Brahman may be understood as subordinate to an injunction. The final sutra of J. Y. E. Miney's doctrine also supports this view because it forms a single sentence with the injunction. It praises the injunction. Mantras such as Agni cooks the food mention and action or its instrument accordingly. No where is any purpose established for a Vedic sentence unrelated to an injunction. There can be no injunction concerning the nature of an already existent thing because the subject of an injunction is action. Nevertheless the answer is this. Vedanta intends to reveal the nature of Brahman and its usefulness lies in this knowledge, it need not be subordinated to an injunction of action. Even though its subject is an existent thing, Vedanta reveals the previously unknown nature of Brahman. The rule concerning unity of sentence with an injunction applies only where the sentence is actually the constituent of an injunction to action. Brahman's sentences are not of this kind. Every injunction concerns some future act that does not yet exist and is to be produced. Injunctions concerning result, application, procedure and origination may be mutually related but not in relation to the already existent Brahman. Therefore it is not proper to make Vedantine auxiliary to an injunction of action, but that because of the harmonious purport. Ad-YAH Sarkont, 130. तो रहमेंग तो पोववापक्षा तो तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचाज़ा तो विचा without a second, the Self alone was this one only in the beginning. This Brahman is without before and after, without within and without. This Self is Brahman, the experiencer of all. The immortal Brahman alone is in all directions. Many such sentences teach one and the same Brahman. The sentence from which these beings are born has already been quoted to state the cause of the origination, continuance, and dissolution of the world. It need not be repeated here. According to the rule of interpretation, the subject on which the beginning and end of a passage agree is taken to be its principal purport. In the context of the Upanshu sacrifice too, the purport is determined through the unity of the preceding and succeeding sentences. Thus the entire section beginning with existence alone, my dear, was this in the beginning and ending with that Thou art teaches Brahman alone, namely Brahman non-different from individual self. Therefore Vedanta's independent status as a means of knowledge of Brahman is established by this harmonious convergence. Thus when a definite harmonious convergence concerning the nature of Brahman is recognized in the sentences of these texts, it is not proper to suppose that they have some other purport for doing so would involve the fault of abandoning what is directly stated and imagining what has not been stated. Nor can it be said that the purpose of these sentences is to describe the nature of the agent, deity, and the like, because Shruti, in passages such as then by what and whom would one see, negates action, cause, and result. Advaayah Sakkant 131 Although Brahman is an already existent reality, Brahman is not the object of perception and the like, in that thou art, it is stated that Brahman is the self itself. Therefore Brahman cannot be understood without examining the preceding and succeeding sentences. When in this very context the purport of the other sentences is likewise established as Brahman, it would be an unwarranted proliferation to posit some unseen second purport. To suppose a purport concerning an agent and the like would be not merely unseen but impossible. The poor Vapakshin says that because Vedanta refers to an already existent thing, its dependence on something else must be admitted. But such dependence arises not because the thing exists already, but because a sentence is a human composition. Perception and the other means that convey knowledge of existent things also have existent things as their objects. Yet their authority is not destroyed because they arise from fixed causes such as the senses. Likewise, because the Vedda does not depend upon human intelligence. It is self-allied. Someone may say that even if the Aparushaya character of the Vedda is established, its authority regarding an existent thing is not thereby established because a person may know an existent thing through another means of knowledge and compose a sentence accordingly. But this is not possible regarding what ought to be done because duty is something new, is not the object of another means of knowledge and not having been previously experienced, does not enter the human mind of itself. Therefore the Vedda that enjoins action is regarded as a powerushaya and authoritative. To this argument we ask, O long-lived one, what exactly is this duty that cannot be known by a human being? If it is said to be an unseen potency or a perva, then how could it be understood from the loplative and other injunctive suffixes? A perva is not perceptible to the senses, and consequently the relation of the word to it is not previously known. In ordinary usage an injunctive suffix conveys only the obligaturness of an experienced action. R. Y. H. Sarkont. 132. If it is said that from one who desires heaven should sacrifice, the person desiring heaven understands that a sacrifice ought to be performed as a means to obtaining heaven, then how can a momentary act produce heaven in the future? To remove this difficulty, a pervert is postulated on the basis of the Vedas, but by the same reasoning a pervert would also have to be admitted in Buddhist statements concerning Chaitiyas and the like, and then those two would be proved up our Ruchayya. विचार-विमर्डिंग आपाषाक साहित्य, अपाषाक साहित्य, अपाषाक साहित्य, अपाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, The answer to this objection is that the Aparushaya character of the Veda is not based solely on its disclosure of a perva. Its detailed establishment has been given elsewhere. Here it is enough to say that once its Aparushaya character has been established, Vedaanta does not depend on another means of knowledge even with respect to the already existent Brahman. Brahman. Brahman is not known by any other means. The identity of the J. E. Diva with Brahman is understood only from Vedanta. The second reason of the poor Vapaksha, knowledge of what is neither to be accepted nor rejected is fruitless, is likewise and sound. Through knowledge of the Self as Brahman, all obstruction is destroyed and the Supreme Human End is attained. Knowledge of deities and the like, though auxiliary to meditation, is not opposed to this knowledge of Brahman. It is not possible to treat Vedanta as merely an auxiliary to an injunction of meditation concerning Brahman. Meditation necessarily involves distinctions among the meditator meditation and the object meditated upon but Brahman is one alone and is devoid of all distinctions of acceptance, rejection and the like. Once knowledge of oneness has arisen, the real emergence of the cognition of duality is impossible, therefore knowledge of Brahman cannot be made a limb of an injunction to meditation. Adwayah Sarkant 133 A human purpose is of two kinds, one is to obtain something not yet obtained, the other is to experience as obtained something that is in fact already obtained but is mistakenly regarded as unobtained. to is of two kinds, rejection of something that has not actually been removed, and rejection through knowledge of something that has in fact already been removed but is mistakenly regarded through superimposition as still present. The performance of an external means obtains something not yet obtained or removes something not yet discarded. Mere knowledge does not remove a real snake actually present, but a superimposed thing where what is obtained is regarded as unobtained, or what has been discarded as undiscarded is removed by true knowledge alone. Just as a snake is superimposed on a rope, the state of being a J. E. E. E. V. born of ignorance is superimposed upon the nature of Brahman, true knowledge of that thou art destroys this superimposition. Through this knowledge, eternally attained bliss appears as though newly attained, and sorrow and suffering, eternally discarded appear as though now discarded. Through the experience the Self is Brahman. All the Jeev vahs obstructions, namely ignorance and its impressions are quickly destroyed. Then the Supreme Human End, in the form of cessation of suffering and attainment of bliss, is accomplished. It is not acceptable on the basis of meditation-related sentences such as meditate only on the Self or meditate on the Self as truth and bliss. To hold that the soul purport of Vedanta is worship or meditation. In Brahman the distinctions of worshipper object of worship and worship cannot persist because Vedanta destroys the ignorance that is the root of these distinctions. Adwaya H. Sarkant, 134, if it is admitted that Vedanta, though not injunctive in form, is nevertheless a means of knowledge, then an independent sentence such as he cried out would also have to be accepted as authoritative even though it indicates no purpose of acceptance or rejection. In fact, the fruit of a means of knowledge is not only a decision to accept or reject, sometimes the decision to remain indifferent is also the fruit of knowledge. Therefore the authority of knowledge of Brahman need not be linked to an injunction of action. No general rule can be established that elsewhere a Vedic sentence is not authoritative unless connected with an injunction. Knowledge of the self itself culminates in the supreme result. Therefore the authority of Trutie concerning the self cannot be rejected, nor can it be called unnecessary. Like the prohibitory sentence, Silver should not be given on the sacred grass. The entire Vedda is taken up under the injunction to study one's own Vedic recension and is regarded as a means to the human end. Not even one of its letters is fruitless, but merely understanding the meaning of a sentence such as he cried out does not directly accomplish any human end. Such a sentence requires another completing sentence. A prohibitory sentence अछि। Knowledge of Brahman is not obtained through any other means of knowledge, perception, inference, and the like operate only within their respective spheres. Brahman is beyond the senses. If the authority of scripture were itself held to be established by inference, there would arise a need for an example, but ultimately scripture itself is the means of knowledge concerning Brahman. Udh Sakant, 135. Some teachers say that scripture reveals Brahman only as the object of an injunction to meditation. That is, Brahman is not an independently knowable reality but merely the object for worship. This view too is not proper. An intelligent person in the world does not unnecessarily declare a special character of something that is neither to be accepted nor rejected. The The knowledge of Brahman is itself the cause of liberation, hence its description is not purposeless. Akra atapratilavastite, although scripture is the means of knowledge of Brahman, the view is presented that scripture reveals Brahman only through Brahman's being the object of an injunction to realisation. From the conduct of elders it is known that words have their purport in what ought to be done. Some words directly state what is to be done. disclose their own meanings as auxiliaries to what is to be done, but words do not have their purport in an already existent thing. That a word conveys its meaning is understood on the basis of inferring another person's knowledge of the word meaning and of the correspondence of that knowledge with the existence or non-existence of the object. But from knowledge that concerns merely the nature of an existent thing, no sign of activity or cessation is observed. In knowledge of what ought to be done, by contrast, activity or cessation is seen. Therefore the purport of words in what ought to be done is established, not in the mere statement of the nature of Brahman. Vedaanta is called scripture because it forms part of the Vedda. The definition of scripture too applies to that body of sentences which impels a person toward obligatory, occasional or desire motivated actions, or withdraws him from prohibited actions, therefore the view that Veydantar merely teaches the nature of Brahman does not accord with the well-known character of scripture. Ad-Yah Sarkont, 136, nor is the purpose clear of sentences whose purport is only to teach the nature of Brahman. On hearing a sentence such as this is a rope, not a snake, fear disappears. But even after hearing that thou art, the attributes of worldly existence pleasure, pain, fear, and the like remain as before. If the sense of worldly existence disappeared merely upon hearing, why would reflection and deep contemplation be prescribed after hearing? On this basis the poor Vapakshin says that the purpose of Vedantite is the meditation on the self as something to be performed. The injunction to meditate upon one's own self is called Nyoga because it is not known through another means of knowledge, it is a pervert. Without continuous practice of meditation on the self it will not yield its result. Therefore from knowledge of the duty both its object the self and its means meditation are understood. If it is objected that the self itself is the object of the duty, then since the self is self-established how can it become the object of an injunction? The answer is that the particular form of the Self adopted for meditation is not self-established. An injunction of the form meditated upon the Self in the form superimposed here is possible. Just as the sacrificial post, the Ahavaniya fire what other sacrificial implements, though already existent, become limbs of an injunction in scripture through a particular consecration form or relation, so too the Self can become the object of an injunction through a particular relation in the form of meditation. The obligatoriness concerns the practice of meditation. The self is its object. In support of its view, the poor Vapaksha cites many Mimamsaka statements. The purpose of scripture is the instruction of action, and injunction is a statement that impels activity. The meaning of a word that makes known an existent thing remains connected with an injunction of... आक्षिन, अछिप्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष on Brahman would be enjoined for one who desires immortality. A sentence such as the Noah of Brahman becomes Brahman, though eulogistic, would be taken as indicating the qualified person for that injunction. Here the difference between the fruits of the inquiry into Diharma and the inquiry into Brahman is made clear in the ritual section. Knowledge is sort of Diharma that is yet to be brought into being in Vedanta. Knowledge is sort of eternally established Brahman. The fruit of knowledge of Dihama depends upon performance, whereas the fruit of knowledge of Brahman is accomplished by knowledge itself. This distinction is presented by the Siddhantah side. The Siddhantah says that in sentences such as it is to be seen, the realization of the self is not itself something enjoined. The verb see signifies knowledge and knowledge is object dependent. Its form is not produced according to human choice. Even perception can never be the object of an injunction, because perceptual knowledge arises naturally. Knowledge of the Self is likewise different from the mental action of meditation. The Upi Yujnaishads teach the Self as eternal or missyant or pervading, eternally fulfilled, eternally pure, conscious, free of the nature of knowledge and of the nature of bliss. Through this true knowledge ignorance is destroyed and liberation is attained. If Vedanta were merely an injunction to meditation, the independent teaching of the nature of Brahman would become purposeless. Udvaya H. Sakhont, 138, a factual sentence such as this is a rope, not a snake removes fear born of error in the same way. Knowledge of the truth that the self does not possess the attributes of Samsara removes the error of being subject to Samsara. It may be asked why the error does not disappear merely on hearing. The answer is that hearing means the correct apprehension of the purport of the sentence. Reflection and deep contemplation remove obstructive doubt and contrary habitual notions, not produce some new result of action. The poor Vapak Chin says that pleasure, pain, and the like are still observed after hearing, and therefore knowledge alone is insufficient. The Siddhi Hantar replies that once write knowledge that destroys ignorance has arisen. The reality of being subject to Samsara comes to an end, even though bodily and other activity due to Prahrabta continues. The knower knows the Self as Brahman. There is a fundamental difference between action and knowledge of Brahman as also between their fruits. Action is performed by body, speech or mind is called Dihama by scripture and SM Riti and its result, in the form of pleasure or pain, is produced and perishable. The fruit of knowledge of Brahman is eternal, bodiless, incomparable, and established by its own nature. It becomes manifest as soon as ignorance is removed. In the fruits of Dihama and Adihama there are gradations of pleasure and pain of pleasure from the human world up to Brahma Loka and of pain down to the lower worlds. All these are produced and perishable. The fruit of knowledge of the self is not graded in this way, liberation is eternal and unproduced. Although knowledge arises through a modification of the mind, its truth depends upon the object. Hearing, reflection, and deep contemplation are means to knowledge and removers of obstacles. They do not newly produce liberation. Liberation is the natural state of the self. 3rd YAH Sarkant, 139. The mental impression produced by meditation concentrates the mind and may assist knowledge, but the cause of liberation is knowledge of Brahman itself. Just as practice in music increases the capacity to know notes, but the truth of the notes is not created by practice, so meditation may assist knowledge but does not produce liberation, because of the excellence of knowledge and meditation. Those who perform sacrifices and the like may travel by the northern path, but through offerings alone works for public welfare and gifts. They travel by the southern path whose sequence begins with smoke. Here too, gradation of pleasure and gradation of its means are understood from the shruti. remain there until the... इंजोमन्त इस इजोस्टिद लिक्वाश फुम विम्म भीइंज दान तु इंश्जंट फिंज, Whatever minimum degree of pleasure is possible arises from Dihama defined by injunction, and it too has gradations. The mental impression produced by meditation upon the meaning of Vedanta sentences is capable of bringing about realization of the Jeeva's nature as Brahman, for this no unseen apperva is required. Therefore, since the alleged apperva produced by meditation is not the cause of immortality, It is not proper for one desiring immortality to know it as a duty, to desire one thing and perform a means to another would be contradictory, nor can it be said that one who desires immortality would understand the act of meditation itself as the duty, not its unseen apperver, for meditation's capacity to serve as a means to immortality is known through another means of knowledge, its injunction would then be pointless, nor is the analogy of an injunction to thresh rice applicable because their dilaperva generated due to a prohibition is not known from another sentence. Ad-Y-H-Sakhont, 140, from the gradations of suffering observed above and below among embodied beaings, the gradations of their cause Adi-Hama defined by prohibitory injunctions and of those who perform Adi-Hama are likewise understood. The differences of pleasure and pain among jivas afflicted by ignorance and other defects arise from differences of merit and demerit. Bare fruit after embodiment are impermanent and constitute samsara this is well known from shruti, asemriti and reasoning. If liberation were something other than the immortality described in eulogistic statements and if the person desiring immortality were qualified for meditation. Then, on the analogy of the Rishi Session, immortality could be regarded as the fruit of meditation just as heaven is, but immortality is free from destruction and decay. Therefore no result produced by meditation can be permanent. When the covering of ignorance is removed, the state of Brahman becomes manifest. Realization of the meaning of Vedanta removes ignorance, while impressions produced by meditation merely assist the mind. Therefore a sentence such as meditate on the self is not a real injunction but only an injunction-like sentence. The complete cessation of pleasure and pain is impossible while embodied is a restatement of the nature of samsara from the truti. The pleasant and the unpleasant do not touch the bodiless. Through the denial of contact with pleasant and unpleasant it is understood that the bodiless state that is liberation is not the fruit of Dihama defined by injunction. If it were the fruit of Dihama, the denial of contact with pleasant and unpleasant would be incongruous. The bodiless state itself is not a fruit of Dihama because Trutie declares it to be natural, the wise man, even wild-welling in a body, knowing the self as bodiless, stable amidst the changing, great and all-pervading, does not grief, the self is without breath, without mind, pure, the self is unattached. Therefore bodilessness in the form of liberation, distinct from the fruit of action, is eternally established. Ardhvayah Sakant, 141, some things, though changing, are called eternal in a sequence of development because the recognition this is that is not destroyed, earth and the like or the gooners of Sankhya may serve as such examples. But Brahman's itonality is complete, immutable and or pervading like space. Brahman is free from all modification, eternally fulfilled, partless and self-luminous merit, demerit and their fruits never touch Brahman in any of the three times. This borderlessness that is liberation is established by Shruti. Another view speaks of two kinds of itonality immutable, itonality and transformational If transformational itinality is accepted as true itinality, the question arises, does the transformation occur in the whole thing or in one part of it? If in the whole, the original prakriti would be destroyed. If in one part, is that part different from the thing or non-different? If different, the transformation would not be a transformation of the original thing, if non-different, one would have to admit transformation of the whole thing. No logically coherent conclusion follows from this twofold transformation. Those who accept cognition based diversity may regard the world consisting of earth and so forth as eternal, or the sankhirs may regard the gunas as eternal, but Brahman is ultimately immutable and eternal free from every... Remodification, Partless, and Self-Luminous If liberation were attained through a means consisting of something to be done, it would be non-eternal. Shruti says, Tell me that which is different from Diharma and from Adiharma, different from what is done and what is not done, different from past and future. In this context arises the inquiry into Brahman. If Brahman were taught as an auxiliary to something to be done and liberation were regarded as produced by what is to be done, liberation would be impermanent like the fruit of action, but all who hold liberation accept it as eternal, therefore it is not proper to regard instruction about Brahman as a limb of action. Adwa H. Sarkant 142. The doctrine of difference and non-difference may say that a thing is non-different as cause and different as effect just as a bracelet is non-different insofar as it is gold, yet as a bracelet it is different from an earring. But since difference and non-difference are mutually opposed, how can both exist in one and the same thing? The reply offered is that no contradiction should be admitted in a thing established by valid commission. In a commission of co-reference such as this earring is gold, both difference and non-difference are evident. If non-difference were complete, there would not be two apprehensions in the forms of subject and predicate. If difference were complete, co-reference would be impossible, as in the case of a cow and a horse, one does not say of a pot the jujube is this, and even though Chaitra and Matra sit on one seat, one does not say Chaitra is Matra. Therefore cognition of both non-difference and difference between effect and cause is said to be unobstructed, doubtless and universal. Since the effect has the nature of its cause, wherever the The cause exists there is the existence of the effect but as effects. Cow, pot and so forth in the world are mutually different. The question for this doctrine is what in reality is different such that it resides in the same locus as non-difference. If difference is mutual non-existence, does this non-existence obtain between the bracelet and gold or not? If it does not, there is only non-difference. If it does, there is only difference. and non-existence cannot occur together. If it is said that there is non-difference in so far as there is gold, but difference from an earring and so forth in so far as it is a bracelet, be the answer is this. If the bracelet is non-different from gold, then wherever gold recurs, the bracelet too ought to recur, but goldness is present in an earring, whereas braceletness is not, therefore the bracelet is different from gold. R-D-Y-H-S-R-C-O-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T-E-N-T from gold, then as soon as gold was known the particular form too would be known. Because difference exists, even when gold is known in earing and the like may remain unknown. If non-difference also exists, why should it remain unknown? The general rule of non-difference is that knowledge of the cause gives knowledge of the effect. Therefore, that which is not known through knowledge of another is different from it just as knowing a camel does not amount to knowing a donkey. a distance gold is known but the earring is not known, therefore the earring is different from gold. Why then do we have co-reference in a statement such as the earring is gold? The supporter says, because of a relation of substratum and superstratum, or because both have the same locus, the answer is that no such co-reference is observed between a pot and a jujube, or between cheitra and matris seated on the same seat. Therefore merely occupying one locus is not a sufficient cause of co-reference. If difference depended on non-difference and non-difference depended on difference, there would be the defect of mutual dependence. In reality, cognition of non-difference requires nothing else, cognition of difference. In the form not this but that, depends upon knowledge of the leposed object. Therefore it may be that accepted that an indefinable difference is superimposed upon a basis of non-difference, establishing non-difference on the basis of difference is not logically coherent. Adwaiah Succont 144, Shruti 2 says, clay alone is real, therefore only immutable. नचेंचिंग इटनालतिन इस आल्टमट्ट्ट्ट्रिल नच्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च् capable of refinement. Shruti clearly states that liberation follows immediately upon knowledge of Brahman, with no intervening action remaining. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, when the higher and lower Brahman is seen. His actions perish. The knower of the bliss of Brahman fears nothing from anywhere, O Jannaka, you have attained fearlessness. He knew the Self as I am Brahman, thereby he became this whole universe. The word eternally fulfilled indicates Brahman's character as the human end. Fulfillment signifies pleasure free from suffering, the pleasure accompanied by the ending of desire and suffering is fulfilment. If pleasure is not experienced, it cannot be the human end, therefore Brahman is called self-luminous. Thus, after establishing through Shruti and the like that liberation is eternal, the impermanence of a liberation produced by an action is explained in detail. Knowledge serves as a means to liberation only by removing the two kinds of obstruction in the form of ignorance. Knowledge does not itself produce, refine, transform or attain liberation. Shruti says, He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. The knot of the heart is cut. All doubts are destroyed and actions become exhausted. The knower of the bliss of Brahman has fear from none. O Janaka, You have attained fearlessness. He knew the self as I am Brahman. he became this whole universe. From these sentences it is clear that no other act, a pervert or fruit of action intervenes between knowledge of Brahman and liberation. Udh-Sakhandt 145. The expression eternally fulfilled conveys pleasure free from suffering. Pure pleasure is fulfillment, and pleasure that is not itself manifest could not be a human end. Therefore Brahman is self-luminous. Liberation becomes manifest immediately after knowledge arises. Liberation is not an effect produced by the activity of knowledge, but merely the manifestation of one's own nature when ignorance has been removed. Trutti further strengthens this point for one who sees the homogeneous nature of Brahman, what delusion and what sorrow can remain. The Siva Vamadva on seeing Brahman immediately understood. I became Mahayu. I became the Son." Just as in the sentence, while standing, he sings, there is no separate duty intervening between standing and singing. So there is no intervening action between seeing Brahman and the state of being the Self of all. You are our Father who carry us beyond ignorance. I have heard from persons who know the Self, that the knower of the Self crosses beyond sorrow. I am in sorrow. Carry me beyond sorrow, Sanat Kumara carried him beyond darkness. Such shruti passages state that the fruit of knowledge of Brahman consists merely in the cessation of ignorance that obstructs liberation. A reason Sutra of the teacher likewise says, through the successive destruction, in reverse order of false knowledge, defects, activity, birth, and suffering, each preceding member is destroyed and liberation is finally accomplished. When false False knowledge is destroyed, defects are destroyed, when defects are destroyed, activity is destroyed, when activity is destroyed, birth, when birth is destroyed, suffering. False knowledge, that is Avila idea, is the root cause of samsara. It gives rise to attachment, aversion and the like. Its opponent is true knowledge, the direct realization of the unity of Brahman and the self. Liberation is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman, not a result produced by knowledge or meditation of the Sutra. Only this much is accepted here. True knowledge destroys false knowledge. Other special meanings assigned to it by the Naya school are not accepted here. Advaah Sakant 146. The poor Vapachin may say that knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ahd Mun is not knowledge of the actual state of things but merely an imagined identity, then being dependent on volition, it can become something enjoined, just as through a similarity to the mind's innumerable modifications. The conception of the universal deities may be imposed upon the mind, so the nature of Brahman may be the imagined in the jayee and meditated upon but knowledge of the identity. यो व ब्रामन अछिद मुन यस नाटक आजिंग यदेंटिटि यन मेटितेषन नाटक यस माझिद यस ब्रामन अछिद यस ब्रामन The qualities of one thing are superimposed on another. Sentences such as that thou art, I am Brahman, and this self is Brahman's state the real unity that is the actual condition of the thing. If the identity were merely imagined, it would contradict the shruti fruit. The knot of the heart is cut. All doubts are destroyed, and the sentence the Noah of Brahman becomes Brahman would also become incongruous. cognition of the identity of Brahman and A. H. T. Mun is neither an imagination nor a superimposed meditation in the context of looking at clarified butter. The act of looking is an auxiliary action serving to purify the clarified butter. But a sentence such as the self is to be seen does not occur within the context of any single action. It is difficult to call knowledge of the self a limb of sacrifice by positing an incongruous relation between the self and sacrifice. If knowledge of the self is the principal action, it is not a purificatory auxiliary. If it is an auxiliary, it is not clear of what action it is a limb. The meditation on absorption in Prana or Veyu is likewise based on a specific relation of qualities the external air absorbs fire and the like into itself, and the internal Prana gathers speech sight and the other senses into itself at death. In such meditation the basis of the quality is clear. Imagining the J. E. D. Vaat as Brahman is not based on any such similarity of qualities. Aadvaya Sarkant, 147, in meditation on mind the sun or prana, the object meditated upon and the supporting basis remain different. The qualities of Brahman are superimposed on that basis, but the Jeeva is in reality Brahman in this knowledge there is no distinction of support and supported. Therefore it is not proper to regard knowledge of the identity of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun as meditation, refinement, a limb of action, or a purific attria act. If cognition of the identity of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun were regarded as merely imagined, the syntactic relation of the words in that Thou art, I am Brahman, this self is Brahman would be destroyed. Truty passages such as the knot of the nose heart is cut and the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman could not yield their stated result from an imagined identity. Therefore knowledge of Brahman does not depend upon human action. Just as knowledge arising from perception and other means of knowledge is object dependent so knowledge of Brahman too depends solely upon the object. There is no logically coherent way to bring Brahman or knowledge of Brahman within the sphere of what is to be done. Nor is Brahman the object of an act of knowing. The Kineshruti says, It is different from the known and also beyond the unknown, by what can one know that by which all this is known. Know that alone as Brahman which speech does not reveal, but by which speech itself is revealed, not that which people worship as an object. If Brahman is not an object, how can scripture be its means of knowledge? The purpose of scripture is to remove the difference imagined through a viva idea. Scripture does not present Brahman as an object called this or that. It reveals Brahman as the inner self, not objectifiable, and removes the duality of knower and known. Ad-Y-H Sarkant 148 Even with regard to worldly objects, words cannot express every particular difference completely the difference of sweetness among sugarcane juice, milk, and jaggery cannot be fully expressed in words. The inner self is beyond the senses. Therefore scripture removes distinctions, born of avil idea through negation, secondary indication, and harmonious interpretation. He by whom this is thought does not know him. He who says I know does not know. You cannot see the sea out of hear the hearer of hearing, think the thinker of thought, or know the knower of knowledge such shruti passages establish that the self is altogether non-objectifiable, when the distinctions of knower known and knowledge produced by avil idea come to an end, the nature of the self is again manifest, the state of being subject to samsara ceases and eternal liberation is accomplished. Therefore liberation is not subject to the defect of impermanence. One who regards liberation as something produced must accept some mental, verbal or bodily action as necessary if liberation is a transformation. Action is still required. On either view liberation would be impermanent because a transformed thing such as curd and a produced thing नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� � meaning the isolated state of the self. Therefore liberation is a kind of transformation, just as milk abandons its first condition and acquires another condition as curd, so the self abandons the state of samsara and obtains the state of isolation. On both these views liberation would not remain eternal because a produced thing like curd or a pot is impermanent. Adwayah Sakant, 149. From shruti passages such as then the light that shines beyond heaven, one may understand differences of location for Brahman, a changing location and an unchanging location. Hence an objection is raised that through an injunction to meditation and the like, Brahman may be brought to an unchanging place and may then become something to be attained. The answer is that even a something to be attained Brahman requires no duty. A sailor remaining in a boat leaves behind the changing sea short masses of foam and waves and reaches a waveless, calm, clear, stable and unchanging middle region. But the J.E.D. Eva is not different from Brahman. The J.E.D. Eva is Brahman itself. What then would the J.E. Eva attain and by what means? Attainment presupposes difference. Even if the J.E.D.iva were regarded as different from Brahman, all pervading Brahman is eternally attained. Therefore the objection is removed by the words even though different from one's own nature. Liberation is not something to be purified either, for otherwise a Purificatory Act would be required. Purification occurs in two ways by the addition of equality or by the removal of a defect. Liberation is the nature of Brahman, no excellence can be added to Brahman. Brahman is eternally pure, therefore no defect can be removed from Brahman either. An example of purification by the addition of equality is this, when a China rose flower is dyed with lac juice. It produces the effect of that colour. An example of purification by removal of a defect is this, when a mirror is rubbed with brick powder. Its dirt is removed and it becomes bright. Neither of these two methods applies to Brahman. Udh-i-ah-sakhont, 150. If it is said, liberation is the nature of the self, but it is covered by ignorance when the self is purified through action it becomes manifest, just as the brightness of a mirror becomes manifest when the mirror is rubbed the answer is that the self cannot be the locus of action. Whatever is the locus of action cannot remain and changed by that action. produces some alteration in it. If the self is regarded as changeable, truity passages such as this is said to be imperishable would be contradicted. Is the quality to be added to Brahman the very nature of Brahman or something different? If it is Brahman's own nature, being eternal it cannot be added. If it is different, then because it is produced liberation would be impermanent. Nor is a relation of quality and qualified possible between mutually different things, any more than a relation of that kind between a cow and a horse. The combined doctrine of difference and non-difference has already been shown to be contradictory. Therefore no excellence can be added to liberation, which is the nature of Brahman. The doctrine of removing a defect is likewise incoherent. Dirt is present on a mirror and therefore can be removed. No impurity is ever present in Brahman. is eternally pure. There can be no question of removing what is entirely absent from the beginning. The objection is, liberation is the nature of the Self but is covered by beginningless impurity in the form of abhidh idea. When the Self is purified through the act of meditation, liberation becomes manifest rather than being produced. The answer is that the Self cannot be regarded as the locus of action. Action changes its locus, the self would then become impermanent. Aadvaiya Hsarkant 151 Aviv idea is said to reside not in Brahman but in the Jeeva. Yet the Jeeva itself is merely Brahman limited by indefinable Aviv idea. Brahman is eternally pure. If a defect were admitted in Brahman. आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आ into the self. Therefore action residing in the self is impossible. Action residing elsewhere cannot purify the non-objectifiable self. The poor Vapakshin again says, through bodily actions such as bathing, sipping water, and wearing the sacred thread, the embodied self is seen to become pure. The answer is that what becomes purified is the self regarded through avila idea as connected with the body and the like. The occurrence of bathing, sipping water and so forth in the body is directly perceived. The fruit of bodily action applies to the J.E.E.Eva connected with that body and regarding the body as I. Just as, when equilibrium of the bodily constituents is produced by treatment applied to the body, the body identifying J.E.E.Eva has the cognition I am free from disease, so through bathing, sipping water, wearing the sacred thread, and the like there arises the cognition I am pure. This purity is the empirical purity of the Jee Eva connected with the body, not of the Supreme Self. The Jee Eva is the object of the cognition I, an agent of knowledge and the enjoyer of the fruits of action. The mantra says, one bird eats the sweet fruit, the other does not eat but merely looks on. The bird that eats the fruit is the individual the bird that does not eat is the witnessing supreme self. Adwa H. Sarkont 152 The J.E.Liva is connected with the gross and subtle bodies, the senses, and the inner organ situated in the midst of this aggregate. It is regarded as non-different from it and becomes the object of the cognition eye. Therefore the body's purity is empirically superimposed upon the self. the self, just as the heroine's fragrance is said to be transferred to her companion. Ultimately, there is neither action nor purification in the self. Shruti says, the wise call the self connected with body senses, and mind the enjoyer, the one God hidden in all beings, or pervading, the inner self of all, overseer of actions, dwelling in all beings, witness, conscious, one, and without qualities. He pervades all radiant, bodiless, woundless, without sin-us, pure, and untouched by sin. From these mantras it is established that no excellence can be added to Brahman and that Brahman is eternally pure. Attainment of the state of Brahman is liberation. Therefor liberation itself is not something to be purified. Apart from these four kinds what is to be produced, attained, transformed, and purified there is no fifth route by which action can enter into liberation. Therefore, apart from knowledge, not even the shadow of action gains entry into liberation. Objection. Knowledge too is a mental activity. Answer. Knowledge and action are different. Action is that in which an injunction operates without regard to the actual nature of the object and which depends upon a person's will. A person may perform worship, meditation, and the like may refrain from performing them or may perform them otherwise. Knowledge, although a mental modification, is object dependent. Its result is not Brahman because self-luminous Brahman cannot be apprehended as an object standing in a relation to an act of knowledge. True knowledge arises from a means of valid knowledge, not from a person's will. Udhsakont 153 In sacrifice, whatever form of a deity is to be held in mind while making an offering may be made the object of meditation. In sentences such as meditate on the evening deity meditation, though mental, this person dependent, a person may do it, not do it, but do it differently. Knowledge is not of this kind. True knowledge knowledge takes as its object, the thing exactly as it is. Therefore it cannot be produced, left hand produced, or produced in a different form according to one's wish. It depends neither upon an injunction nor upon a person, it depends only upon the object. Hence, although mental, knowledge is by nature entirely different from action. In meditations such as mind indeed is fire, gotama and woman indeed is fire, gotama a person produces the cognition of fire with विचार-विमर्चना, विचार-विमर्चना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कव So through the power of a new Panishadic sentence arises the knowledge that the self is Brahman. Human will cannot make this knowledge otherwise, nor can it prevent it. Therefore it is not an enjoyable action like meditation on a deity. The same applies in relation to man and woman, but that is merely an action and depends upon a person. Because its origination occurs solely through an injunction. By contrast, cognition of fire with regard to well-known fire depends neither upon an injunction nor upon a person. What then is it? Because it depends solely upon the object that is the subject of perception, it is determinate knowledge, not action. The same should be understood with regard to all objects that are the subjects of means of valid knowledge. Adwae H. Sarkont 154 In such a situation, knowledge that takes Brahman and the self exactly as they really are likewise does not depend upon an injunction. Although, Optative forms and the like occur in passages concerning this subject, because their subject is something not enjoyable they become blunted like the edge of a knife drawn over stone for the subject is something that is neither to be rejected nor accepted. What then is the The purpose of injunction-like sentences such as the self is to be seen, to be heard. Our answer is that they serve to turn a person away from the natural objects of action. A person turned outward, who remains engaged in action thinking may pleasant things come to meet, may painful things not come to meet, does not thereby attain the supreme human end. For such a person who seeks the supreme human end, sentences such as the self is to be seen withdraw him from the aggregate of cause and effect that is, from the objects of natural activity in the form of objects and senses and direct him inward into the current of the self, for one thus engaged in the inquiry into the self. The following sentences teach the true nature of the self as something that is neither to be rejected nor accepted, whatever all this is. is the self alone, bryhadayu anyaka upi uh nishad 2.4.6 when all this is the self alone, then by what and whom would one see? By what and whom would one know? By what would one know the know? bryhadayu anyaka upi uh nishad 4.5.15 this self is brahman bryhadayu anyaka Kautu Puh Nyshad 2.5.19 and so on. Ad-Yah Sakant 155, again, as for the statement that knowledge of the Self, because it is not primarily connected with something to be done, assists neither acceptance nor rejection we'll accept it. Indeed, it is an ornament to our position that when Brahman is realized all duties come to an end and everything that had to be accomplished has been accomplished." Shruti 2 says, If a person knows the Self as I am he, then desiring what and for whose sake would he suffer along with the suffering of the body? Vrayhadayu-inyaka-upi-uh-nyshad 4.4.12 As Samriti 2 says, Knowing this, a person may become wise and one whose task is accomplished. Oberata Bhagavad Gita 15.20. Therefore the teaching of Brahman is not a limb of an injunction to meditation. Some say there is no part of the Vedda that merely discusses an existent thing. The Vedda teaches only injunctions to activity and cessation and the things auxiliary to them. This is incorrect. The self taught in the Upayush Naisads is not a limb of anything else. the Self, known only from the Upayush Nishads, free from samsara of the nature of Brahman, distinct from the four kinds of things what is produced, attained, transformed, and purified, described in an independent context and auxiliary to nothing else, cannot be said not to exist or not to be known for in the sentence that Self is not this. Not this Brihada Ayunyaka Puh Nyshad 3.9.26 the word self is present and negation of the self is impossible since even the one who negates remains in-out with selfhood. Hard YAH Sarkont 156, if in the usage of elders there were a rule that words reveal only what आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रामन आप्विब्रा through consideration of preceding and succeeding Upanishadic sentences, as their purport, nor can a duty be imagined in Brahman's place, for otherwise there would be the fault of abandoning the directly stated meaning and taking up an unstated one. A relation of words to a non-duty meaning would be impossible only if no usage with such a purport were found in experience and if knowledge of that meaning could not be inferred in a a person who knows the meanings of words, but in experience there is widespread use of groups of sentences that speak of existent things and produce joy or remove fear and the like without teaching anything to be done. For example, the King of Mountains, Sumeru, is the dwelling place of Indra and the other guardians of the worlds of Siddhas, Vidyadhara, Ganharvas and hosts of Apsarazes. It is formed of gold and rocks washed by the streams of the man Hini descending from Brahmaloka and is delightful with the voices of crystal-like birds sporting in lovely groves resembling Nanana or this is not a snake, it is a rope, and so forth. Adwaeh Sakkant, 157. Nor is it true that knowledge of an existent thing cannot be inferred in a person who knows word meanings, joy and the like provide a basis for such an inference. Here is an example. A Dravidian who does not know the meaning of the Arya language is sitting at Devadatta's house beside the royal road on his way to the city. He knows that the birth of a son is a cause of joy for a father. He goes with a messenger to Devadatta in the city. The messenger offers a cloth moistened with saffron water in which the infant's feet have been washed and says, Devadatta, may your prosperity increase a son has been born to you. I once the Dravidian sees Dvadahtta's hair stand on end and his eyes and face bloom like a fully opened lotus. He infers the joy that has arisen in Dvadahtta, and he also infers that since this joy was not present before and arose immediately upon hearing the words, these words are its cause. He understands that the sentence conveys a meaning that is the cause of joy because the statement itself could not produce joy without communicating the meaning that causes joy. No other cause of joy is visible, and the birth of a son is known to be a cause of joy, therefore he determines that the messenger communicated precisely this fact. The same kind of example should be understood with regard to fear, grief, and the like. Adwaah Sakkant 158 Thus, because sentences that state existent things can be fruitful, their use by a discerning inquirer is entirely reasonable. Knowledge of the nature of Brahman is the cause of the supreme human end, and although Vedanta neither impels a person to action nor withdraws him from action, it teaches what is beneficial to him. Therefore Vedanta's status as scripture is established. On this basis it is proved that the disputed sentences have existent things as their objects, because they produce valid cognition regarding existent things. Whatever produces valid cognition has as its object the object of that cognition just as the eye and the like have colour and other qualities as their objects. The same is the case with these sentences. Therefore it has rightly been said, this view is incorrect, because the self taught in the UPUH Nyshads is not a limb of anything else. The word UPUH Nyshads is formed from the root sad with the prefixes upa and nai and with the kvip suffix in the sense of destruction. It is a name for knowledge of brahman for by bringing nandu all brahman near it destroys a vil idea and its impressions. Because Vedanta is the cause of this knowledge, Vedanta 2 is called upuh nishad and the person who is known through it is the person taught by the Upuh Nishads. Adwaya Hsarkhant, 159, this point is analysed in the words that Self who is known only from the Upuh Nishads and so forth, by saying who does not undergo Samsara Brahman is distinguished from the Jeeva that is the object of the Iconition, because Brahman is by nature not an object. आच्छन, ब्रामन इस दिस्टिंक्त फ्रम दोग खाएन्जाव फिंज भिचार-विमर्शक आच्छन, ब्रामन इस दिस्टिंक्त फ्रम दोग खाएन्जाव फिंज भिचार-विमर्शक रेक। Therefore Brahman is auxiliary to nothing else. An existent thing that is auxiliary to something else is desired in relation to what is to be done and is accomplished through production and the like for example make the sacrificial post. But that which is auxiliary to nothing else is an existent reality and leaves no further purpose to be accomplished just as in contexts such as gold should be worn and an offering of flower should be made. The gold or the flower is not itself accomplished through production and the like. Now an objection is raised. The self is the object of the cognition night. How then can it be said that the self can be known only through the upuh nishads? The answer is no. This objection has already been removed by showing that the Upanishadic self is the witness of the object of that I-cognition. The object of the I-cognition is the individual self, an agent limited by the aggregate of body and senses, but no one has been able to know either through the ritual section of the Vedda or by mere reasoning and disputation, the Supreme Self who is its witness present in all, the same everywhere one, immutably eternal and the self of all. Lord YAH Sarkont, 160. On this the commentator says, And because the self cannot be negated, In reality, the self, whose nature is light, Is the self of all, because the delusion in the form of the world rests upon that very self. Without a substratum, delusion is impossible. If there were no rope, there could never be an error there of taking the rope for a snake or a stream of water. The world is illuminated by the very light of the self-self luminosity. Truti too says, by his light all else is illumined, by his light this entire world shines. If the luminous nature of the self were denied, the manifestation of the world itself would become incoherent. Therefore because the self cannot be negated, Vedanta brings about realization of that Brahman nature which is not the object of any other means of knowledge and is free from all limiting adjuncts. One who does not accept the limitation expressed in the self is known only from the Upi U.H. Nyshads raises another objection. The self is the object of every person's cognition, i.e. it is agent, enjoyer and subject to samsara. Both ordinary people and inquirers into the self use the word self in precisely this sense. used in ordinary usage are also used in the Vedda and have the same meanings in both places. Therefore in the Upayush Naisads the word self ought to apply in this familiar sense and not in some contrary second sense this is the purport of the objection. Adwayah Sakkant 161 The answer is that no one can negate the self taught in the Upi-U-H Naisads, nor can that self be made an auxiliary limb of any injunction. Because the self is the self of all, it is neither to be rejected nor accepted. The entire aggregative perishable modifications extending up to the self comes to an end but because there is no cause that can destroy the self. The self is imperishable and because there is no cause of transformation, the self is immutably eternal. For this very reason the Self is by nature eternally pure, conscious and free. In statements such as there is nothing higher than the Self, He is the limit and the supreme goal, and I ask about that Self who is taught in the UPUH Nyshads. The qualification taught in the UPUH Nyshads is meaningful only if the Self is the principal subject taught by the UPUH Nyshads. Therefore the statement no part of the Vedha teaches an existent thing is merely a careless insistence. The commentator replies, No, the person taught by the UPUH Nishads is not the object of the ordinary cognition eye. The object of the igniton is the agent J. E. Eva, limited by the aggregated body and senses. The supreme self taught by the UPUH Nishads is the witness of the J E Giva. Thus the view that the J E Giva, the object of the Icognition, is the Supreme Self is rejected in sentences such as having entered as the J E Giva into its own true nature. The Self, the unit of J E Giva and Supreme Self is ultimate. The form limited by adjuncts is called the J E Giva while its pure form is the witness. This pure witness is not known through another means of knowledge. It is the subject of the UPUH Nyshads. This very point is elaborated by saying its witness different from नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप नाटक आप ना rejected nor accepted. In the entire world Brahman alone is the real self. One's own nature cannot be abandoned and therefore it is not to be rejected and it is already attained, and therefore it is not to be accepted. The subject of injunction and prohibition is something to be rejected or accepted. Therefore the true nature of the self cannot be their subject. Consequently, in the entire world the self alone is real. This very point is clarified by this statement. The whole aggregate of perishable modifications comes to an end in the self. The self is ultimately real, this is established by Shruti, S.M.R.I.T., Itihasa, Purana and reasoning that does not conflict with them. The world manifested through beginningless avi idea is not ultimately real. The ultimately real self is the material basis of this false world, just as the real rope is the material basis of the illusory snake. The world, indefinable and unstable in nature, comes to an end. The self is ultimately real, and even a thousand causes cannot make the self unreal. Even a thousand craftsmen cannot make Tlof out of a pot. Therefore the destruction of all modifications terminates in the imperishable self, just as the destruction of silver seen in Naka and of a snake seen in a rope terminates respectively in the real Naka and the real rope. In all the modifications of the world, the self alone is real. Because the self is infinite, its destruction is impossible. Advaayah Sarkont 163 For one who supposes that destruction of the self is possible, it is said, because there is no cause of the self's destruction, it is imperishable. Even a thousand causes cannot make one thing into another thing, if it is said that although the self's essential nature is neither to be rejected nor accepted, some quality of it may be abandoned or acquired, the answer is, because there is no cause of transformation. It is immutably eternal. In the Self there is none of the three kinds of transformation, transformation of property, characteristic or state. Since even the qualities of the ultimately real Self are ultimately real, like the Self itself they cannot be transformed by any cause. Apart from transformation of qualities there is no other transformation, Therefore the self is completely and changing. The citations of those who know the purport of scripture such as the purpose of scripture is the instruction of action, are to be understood with reference to scripture consisting of injunctions and prohibitions. Because the context there is the inquiry into Diharma. If the statement the purpose of scripture were applied everywhere without qualification, instruction concerning existent things would have to be declared meaningless. scripture teaches existent things in addition to activity and cessation. Then an existent thing can be stated as a means to what is to be produced, and there is no reason to say that scripture cannot teach the immutably eternal Brahman. Teaching an existent thing does not turn it into an action. Adwaya H. Sarkont 164 Someone may say, although an existent thing is not itself an action, it can be means to action. Therefore instruction concerning it is only for the sake of action. The answer is that a thing capable of accomplishing an action certainly exists even if it is taught for the sake of action. Its existence is not destroyed nor does instruction concerning it become meaningless. To the question what benefit is there to you in teaching such an existent thing? The answer is that instruction concerning the previously unknown reality of the This self is certainly fruitful as well, through knowledge of it, the false knowledge that is the cause of samsara ceases. Therefore from the standpoint of purpose, instruction concerning the reality of the self is in no way inferior to instruction concerning a thing that serves as a means to action. In the context of the inquiry into Diharmat, because Diharmat is of the nature of action, instruction of action is spoken of but this statement does not obstruct instruction concerning the existent Brahman, describing Sama Shama's verse. विच्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्च्� 165. If the word meaning indicated only the direct denotation of a word, then substance, quality, and action which are not themselves things to be done would by not being directly denoted as duties become meaningless. In answer it is said, even according to those who take the scriptural statement in question as universally invariable, being meaningful through connection with what is to be done does not mean making what is to be done itself the direct denotation, rather, it means being beneficial to what is to be done. Words denoting substances and qualities reveal existence substances and qualities as auxiliaries to what is to be done, even while remaining in their own nature, they are denoted. The authorities on scripture say an injunctive sentence can make known things already existent, presently existing things to be produced and so forth. That is, while making known what ought to be done, an injunctive sentence also reveals already existent things required for its purpose. Although the meaning of a word may be an existent thing, its semantic relation is not limited merely to the role of assisting what is to be done, nor does the purport of words terminate only in their separate individual meanings. If each word had its purport solely in its own independent meaning, knowledge of sentence meaning would be impossible for sentence unity cannot arise among independently principal word meanings devoid of a mutual relation of principle and subordinate. Even while communicating their respective meanings, words have as their purport a single shared and fruitful sentence meaning. It is for this reason that knowledge of one sentence meaning qualified by each word meaning is possible. Adwaah Sakant, 166, the authorities on scripture say, although phonemes directly convey word meanings, they do not end fruitlessly their knowledge of word meanings is a necessary intermediate stage in the process of generating valid cognition of the sentence meaning just as the flame of fuel in cooking food. Therefore words have as their purport a sentence meaning connected with the meanings of other words, but this does not establish a rule that the purport of every sentence must necessarily be connected with something to be done. Consequently, there is no fault in taking the immutable, eternal nature of Brahman as the purport of a sentence. Bhavya, that which is to be produced, is what ought to be done. The objection is that an existent thing taught for the sake of what ought to be done is not really existent because in its form connected with the duty it too becomes something to be produced. The answer is, it is in fact an existent thing that is taught. The meaning of relation is not identity, its relation with what ought to be done is the relation between the result to be accomplished and its means. an existent thing enters into a process of production. Its relation is that of action and causal factor for this reason the existent thing itself does not become an action. The poor Vapakshin says, although it is not an action that is, it is difficult to understand scriptural teaching concerning Brahman, who is not an auxiliary to action and is immutably eternal. The answer is, there is no difficulty here, even though taught for the sake Think of action an existent thing, even when taught for the purpose of an action, does not thereby become other than existent, on the contrary, a thing capable of accomplishing an action must certainly exist. Udwh Succont 167, in some cases words that denote existent things are seen to have as their objects existent things established in themselves without any syntactic relation to an action. It is not proper forcibly to twist such words into a meaning connected with action. Even if a limited use is seen a hundred times, that does not make an unlimited use seen elsewhere disappear. In ordinary usage, many sentences are found such as descriptions of forests, in which there is only a relation to the verb to be, but which are not auxiliaries to any duty. Even a sentence related to an action sometimes terminates merely in conveying a relation to the question, who's is this man? The ar- Answer is the Kings. Likewise, sometimes only a qualification of the nominal meaning is asked. What are these trees like? The answer is fruit bearing. The questioner does not wish to know the existence or non-existence of the man or trees, but the man's particular owner or the tree's particular kind. The person who knows answers precisely the desired qualification, not existence. From this it is established that words can be meaningfully used concerning fruitful existent things. Again the question is, if an existent thing is taught, what benefit does the teacher or listener gain from it? Therefore only a fruitful existent thing should be taught, not a fruitless one. Brahman appears fruitless because Brahman is free from all action and indifferent. No action can be assisted by Brahman. The answer is, Instruction concerning me a known reality of the self is certainly of this kind as well, namely fruitful. The word and here has the sense of also. Brahman is actionless. Nevertheless, knowledge concerning Brahman, produced by verbal testimony and culminating in realization, destroys its opposite. Avil idea, the root cause of samsara. Therefore this knowledge is entirely fruitful. Adwaah sarcont, 168. Moreover, even those who hold that the purport of every word is solely what ought to be done, couch show what duty is taught in prohibitory sentences such as a Brahmin should not be killed and liquor should not be drunk. What ought to be done is delimited by volition, pervaded by volition, and ceases when volition ceases, just as Shamsharpahudh ceases when tree had ceases. Volition is a person's effort, and its determination depends on its object. Since the object of volition is something to be accomplished, It must be a process of production, one possessing a sequence of prior and posterior and producing some further result. It can be neither a substance nor a quality. For volition directly pervades only that which is its object. Existence substances and qualities are not pervaded by volition. Hence the author of the Shastra says, A verbal root conveys the meaning of production through it action is known. The discussion of words denoting substances and qualities continues below. Substance and quality become connected with what ought to be done when they occur contextually. But Bhavana, the productive activity, is connected with duty by its very nature. The connection of words denoting substance and quality with duty arises only through their conjunction with Bhavana. Therefor knowledge of a new sacrifice and the like comes from words expressing Bhavana, from words expressing substance or quality. In sentences such as an offering should be made with curd or continuous, sprinkling should be performed. Curd and the like are not the object of the duty. Here too the true object of duty is only the Bhavana action making the offering or performing the sprinkling. Nor does it follow that because an offering qualified by curd or sprinkling qualified by continuity is enjoined, a sentence such as the Agni-Hotra offering should be made or sprinkling should be performed with clarified butter becomes a mere repetition of it. Ad-YAH Sarkant, 169. Here too the object of duty is the Bhavan-action, nevertheless substance and quality, though not themselves the object, are enjoined as completing elements of Bhavana. Bhavana, as the unspecified activity of causal factors, becomes qualified and determined by particular factors such as substances, therefore substance and the like are its limbs. When Bhavana is enjoined, it is enjoined together with its limbs, hence substances and qualities, though not the object, become enjoined as limbs. In this way the injunction applies to substance and quality through Bhavana, for fear of prolixity when the principal duty has been established elsewhere, its restatant takes the completing fact as such a substance as its purport. Consequently, in every context the object of injunction is only the Bhavana action. From this the view is refuted that in sentences such as the Adnaya Sacrifice with eight poachers, the relation of the sacrifice to its substance and deity is the object of the injunction. The object of an injunction cannot be mere being if the agent of Bhavana already exists. An accomplished thing cannot again become the agent of production, and if the agent does not exist, an injunction cannot apply to a non-existent thing like a flower in the sky. Therefore the object of the injunction is the activity of the productive agent that by which it produces. The word बीडिंग यन्दिकेट्स दियाक्टिडिल अगिण भीडिंग प्रजूँस्ट, दिस आक्टिडिडि इस कोलग भावाना अप्फलिष्ण वो अप्फफ्फफ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्फ्� activity in the form of an action, applied to an actionless relation between substance and deity. Even in make a pot, the person's effort does not apply to the pot, the direct meaning of the noun, but through the hands to the activity of instrumental factors such as the stick. Therefore the sentence communicates an effort whose object is an activity directed toward the purpose of the pot. The pot is not the direct object, but only the intended end. In the same way, in sentences such as that Agnaya Sacrifice, what is enjoined is only the sacrifice to be performed, indicated through the relation of substance and deity. The meaning of the Agnaya Sacrifice that is performed is, the desired result should be produced by means of the Agnaya Sacrifice. Therefore sentences such as Ehu, knowing thus performs the full moon sacrifice and Ehu, knowing thus performs the new moon sacrifice become restatants of the six sacrifices enjoined in sentences such as that agnus sacrifice. In the sentence one who desires heaven should perform the darsha and pernamasa sacrifices, the relation to the result occurs only through this restatement of the enjoined actions. Adwayah Sarconte, 171. Therefore in every case the object of an injunction through effort is only an activity in the form of action. If some duty is admitted in do not kill, do not drink, and the like, then one must also admit the volition or effort that pervades it and the barbuna that becomes its object. If, on the analogy of the Prajapati vow, the meaning of prohibition is taken by secondary indication from a volition such as I shall not kill, I shall not drink, then the meaning of the negative would end in prohibition of an action that has become occasioned. Secondary indication is not proper when a direct meaning is possible. A sentence such as do not look at the rising sun begins with this is his vow, and therefore a different arrangement involving prohibition of an occasioned act of seeing is possible there. A sentence such as a Brahmin should not be killed teaches withdrawal from an activity. This withdrawal is itself neither an action nor a means to action. If instruction that serves no purpose of action is regarded as meaningless, then an instruction to desist such as a Brahmin should not be killed would become meaningless. This is not acceptable, nor can the negative particle be regarded as conveying some unaccomplished action, because the meaning of the act of killing is naturally established. The negative conveys its absence, not some new action concerning killing. Adway H. Succont, 172. The nature of the negative particle is to convey the absence of that with which it is connected. Knowledge of absence is the cause of indifference, and this cognition, when its causal work has been completed, subsides of itself like a fire whose fuel has been exhausted. Therefore, except in special contexts such as the Prajapati Vowt, the meaning of prohibition such as a Brahmin should not be killed is merely indifference in the form of withdrawal from an action that has become occasioned. Consequently, statements about fruitlessness in narratives and the like that merely praise an existent thing and do not serve a human end up to be understood in this light. On this it is said that knowledge of absence is the cause of establishing indifference. Hearing when fever occurs, eat wholesome food or do not give you a ring to a snake, an elder takes wholesome food or if he had an inclination to give the ring withdraws from it. Seeing this, a child who is learning infers that the causes of the elder's activity and cessation are respectively desire and aversion. The elder's activity and cessation are voluntary and arise from desire and aversion just like our own activity and cessation. Desire to desire and aversion there is knowledge that the same object serves as a means to obtaining a desired result or an undesired result. Through self-observation we find that desire and aversion do not arise merely from knowledge of words, knowledge of action, the speaker's intention, or an unseen injunctive force transcending the three times. arise after knowledge of a relation of means to a desired or वो नदिशावड रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� � a sacrifice should be performed produces activity. The sentence itself conveys knowledge of the action to be performed, its being a means to the desired result and its necessity. These two cognitions are not obtained by another means, and a meaning not obtainable by another means is the specific meaning conveyed by words. But in do not kill, do not drink, and the like, necessities already present in another form as an activity produced by attachment or impulse. Here the injunctive suffix joined with the negative restates that situation and communicates that killing or drinking is a means to harm something not otherwise established. It's being a means to a desired result is directly known, otherwise it would not have become an object of desire. Therefore a prohibitory sentence conveys knowledge of being a means to harm, not an injunction of duty. Knowledge that the The prohibited act is a means to harm performs the same function as knowledge of its absence. An intelligent person, even when there is an external occasion for action, reflects on future harm, understands the absence of that action, withdraws and remains in a state of indifference. If knowledge of absence is the cause of indifference, then that cognition ought to remain as long as the indifference remains, but this is not so. The indifferent person may have his mind engaged elsewhere, and then there is no continuous cognition of the absence of the prohibited act. There is no universal rule that an effect must cease the instant its cause is removed when a pillar is removed the structure above does not necessarily remain, yet when a protective cause is removed the protected thing does not always perish immediately either. Hardway H. Succont 174 Therefore it has been said that this cognition subsides of itself like a fire whose fuel is exhausted. Activity toward the act remains only until knowledge that it is a means to harm arises that knowledge approves the basis of the activity and then itself subsides. Knowledge of absence is the cause that establishes indifference, not the basis that sustains it, it is like armour that protects against an external destructive cause. When the armour is removed, if no arrow attacks, the warrior's life is not immediately destroyed. Thus the meaning of prohibition is indifference in the form of withdrawal from an occasioned action. Knowledge of its beating air means to harm is only an incidental indicator of it. The objection that, unless it enters into an injunction of duty, mere mention of an existent thing would be fruitless like saying the earth has seven continents has now been refuted. Even a mere factual statement such as this is a rope, not a snake removes fear. It had also been said that even after hearing a Brahman sentence, being subject to samsara is seen as before and therefore such a sentence does not have the purpose of true knowledge of a rope. The answer is that one cannot show being subject to Samsara in a person who has directly realized Brahman as the Self. Advaah Sakhand, 175, being subject to Samsara cannot be shown in that person as before because it is opposed to the knowledge of Brahman as the Self produced by the Vedat which is a means of valid knowledge. In a person who takes body and the like to be the Self suffering, fear, and the like are observed, but when in that very person direct realization of Brahman as the self arises from the Vedda as a valid means of knowledge and such self-identification comes to an end, it is impossible to suppose that those bonds of suffering and fear-born of false knowledge still remain. A wealthy householder identifies wealth as his own, and therefore fears that it may be stolen, but when the same person renounces the wealth and is free from identification with it, that fear of its beating stolen no longer remains. Similarly, a person wearing earrings experiences pleasure through identification with the wearing of the earrings, but when that same person removes the earrings and is free from identification with wearing them, the pleasure produced by wearing them does not remain. Shruti says, The pleasant and the ill- I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. नप्लेशन्त दू नाटक तूछ तूछ नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना Dihama acquired by the Self are the cause of embodiment, that too is incorrect for the Self's relation to the body has not been established, nor has it been established that the Self acquires Dihama and Adihama, and a defect of mutual dependence arises between bodily relation and the acquisition of Dihama and Adihama. To call this relation beginningless is baseless, like a chain of blind men. Udwh Succont 176 Action does not inhere in the self, and therefore agentsilve the self cannot be understood. If it is said that in the case of kings and others agency is admitted merely from proximity, that too is not so. Their agency is understood through the relation with servants produced by giving wealth and the like. cause analogous to the giving of wealth can be imagined to establish a master-servant relation between the self and body and the like. The direct cause of the self's relation to the body is false identification. This also explains the empirical treatment of the self as the performer of sacrifice. Here some say that the cognition I in one's body and the like, with respect to a self different from them, is figurative, not false. This This view is incorrect. Primary and figurative usage are possible only for a person who clearly knows the difference between the two things. One who knows their difference can understand the distinction between primary and figurative meanings. For example, in an animal possessing a mane and a distinctive form, the primary meaning of the word lion and the cognition of a lion are established through positive and negative concomitance. with regard to a man endowed with qualities common to the lion such as ferocity and courage. The same knowledgeable person uses the word lion and the cognition of a lion figuratively, but in one who does not know the difference between lion and man. The word and cognition belonging to one thing arise with regard to another not figuratively but through error. In the dusk, when its distinctive features are unclear, a pillar is taken to be a man. the pillar becomes the object of the word man and the cognition of a man. Similarly, because of an unknown cause, the statement and cognition this is silver rise with regard to NACA. R-Y-H Succonte, 177, in the same way, through failure to discriminate self and non-self in the aggregate of body and the like. The word I and the cognition I arise, how can this be called figurative? Even learned persons who possess discriminative knowledge of the Self as different from the non-self, because of habitual worldly usage. Like a shepherd tending goats may fail to distinguish clearly the word and cognition I. Therefore, for one who accepts the Self as different from body and the like, the I-cognition in the body is false, not figurative. Because immodiment is produced by false knowledge, the wise person is bodiless even while alive. With regard to the note of Brahman, Shruti says, as a snake's discarded slough lies dead and cast away upon an antel, so this body lies, then this bodiless immortal prana is brahman alone for your light. And it is said, though having eyes, it is as though without eyes, though having ears, as though without ears, though having speech, as though without speech, though having mind, as though without mind, though having prana, as though without prana. SM-RT2 by The Question, what is the description of one of steady wisdom and the ensuing marks of such a person shows that the Noah has no real relation to engagement in action. Therefore bethings subject to samsara does not remain as before in one who has realised Brahman as the self, one in whom it remains as before has not realised Brahman as the self. There is no defect in this position. It had also been said that reflection and deep contemplation are seen after hearing, and therefore Brahman is a limb of some injunction and the teaching does not terminate in Brahman's independent reality. This is not correct because, like hearing, reflection and deep contemplation are undertaken for the purpose of realisation. Ad-YAH Sarkant, 178. Therefore Brahman does not become merely the object of scripture. नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आ� आप आप starts with therefore, now the desire to know Dihama, and if another beginning were still required, it would take a form such as therefore, now the inquiry into the remaining portion of Dihama, just as it is said, now the inquiry into the means serving the purpose of sacrifice and the means serving the human end. In that Shastra of Dihama there is no thesis of realization of the unity of Brahman and A. H. D. Man, therefore for this purpose the beginning of a second Shastra in the form therefore. Now the desire to know Brahman is reasonable. Thus in the knowledge I am Brahman, all injunctions and all other means of knowledge come to an end. When the non-dual self has been realised, the self that is neither to be rejected nor accepted an injunction or means of knowledge, left without an object and without a knower, is no longer capable of functioning as a means of knowledge. The poor Vapakshin again says, when the figurative and false self are no longer there, then after sun, body, and the like have been sublated, how can the knowledge I am the real nature of Brahman arise as something to be accomplished? Prior to knowledge of the self that is being sought, knowhood remains in the self. The thing sought is only the knower free from sin, defect, and the like, just as cognition of the self in the body is regarded as valid for practical purposes, so this empirical knowledge too is regarded as valid until the self is determined. Aadvaiah Sakkant, 179. The commission of the self in son and the like is figurative. A person is distressed by his own suffering and pleased by his own pleasure. He likewise experiences distress and pleasure from suffering and pleasure present in his son and the like, and therefore this is figurative usage. But here there is no commission of identity because difference is clearly experienced. Hence this is a figurative commission like the vahika is an ox. The commission of the self in bodied senses and the like is not figurative because none difference with them is experienced, like the commission of silver in naka. It is an error. Through these two kinds of identification with the self, the affairs of Samsara proceed. If these identifications did not remain, worldly affairs would not proceed, nor would experience of the identity of Brahman and A. H. D. Mun arise, because its means hearing, reflection, and the like would not remain. The purport of sun, body, and the like being sublated is this when figurative self-cognition is destroyed, the cognition mine with regard to son, wife, and the like is sublated when false self-cognition is destroyed, body senses, and the like are sublated, and along with them hearing and the other means are also sublated. For this reason not only would worldly activity come to an end, how then could the knowledge to be accomplished in the form of awakening, I am the real nature of Brahman, that is, the realization of non-duality arise. the reason for this impossibility, it is said, prior to knowledge of the self-being sought, no-hood remains in the self. Here no-hood is indicative, the distinctions of means of knowledge, object of knowledge, and instruments of knowledge are also to be understood. R-D-Y-H Sarkont, 180. These distinctions are the cause of realization of non-duality because they necessarily remain before that realization. Therefore if these distinctions do not remain, their fruit too cannot arise. The self-bealing sort is not different from the self that is the knower. Therefore it is said the sort self is merely the knower free from sin, defect, and the like. The example of the necklace already worn around once own neck has already been given, granted. But how can the supremely true experience of non-duality arise from something that is not ultimately valid? The answer is, just as cognition of the self in the body is regarded as valid, so this empirical knowledge too is regarded as valid. Its limit is stated until the self is determined, that is, until realization of the nature of Brahman. Even those who hold the world to be ultimately real accept that the cognition of the self in body and the like is false, because knowledge produced by a valid means sublim- ये तिस वेरी वोझाद कविनिष्यन ये रेकूर्ज़ा वोझाद कविनिष्यन ये नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� � is no income gruity in one Ovi idea destroying or producing another Ovi idea. Truti2 says one who knows both Vidya and Ovi idea together crosses death through Ovi idea and attains immortality through Vidya. Therefore everything is clear. Here ends the Chutu Sutri bar MUHD.

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