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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Timestamped machine output

0:07–0:10नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:37–0:44Who tied that invisible cord between that sound and that animal, and how is it known?
0:44–0:48And when a word stands for a thing which the hearer has never seen, an animal of the forest,
0:48–0:55a custom of a distant land, a deity of the Vader, how then is that cord to be grasped?
0:55–1:00The first answer bears the name Upamana, knowledge from similarity.
1:00–1:04The second bears the name Sharpta, knowledge from trustworthy speech.
1:04–1:08It both must stand before their respective opponents.
1:08–1:12And keep your attention on that second figure placed upon the table, the animal that is like
1:12–1:15a cow but is not a cow.
1:15–1:18No one in this assembly yet knows its name.
1:18–1:22By the time the evening ends, everyone will know it, and how they will come to know
1:22–1:29it, that is the entire debate of tonight.
1:29–1:31Gangasar is seated.
1:31–1:35A forest-dweller enters and makes his abasance.
1:35–1:39A chaya, I have come from the forest of the north.
1:39–1:43A merchant of my village sent this message for your assembly.
1:43–1:49Yesterday, in the forest, he saw an animal which he had never seen before, and yet the moment
1:49–1:52he saw it he cried out, this is a gavaya.
1:52–1:57Although he had heard that word only once, a year earlier, from my own mouth, when
1:57–2:01I had said, a gavaya is like a cow.
2:01–2:06He asks, by which prominent did this knowledge arise in him?
2:06–2:11And tonight's debate could not have opened more fittingly than this.
2:11–2:16Hear this story again, slowly, for three events lie hidden within it, and upon each of them
2:16–2:19some school will stake its claim.
2:19–2:24The first, in the village, the merchant heard a sentence, a gavaia is like a cow.
2:24–2:29The second, in the forest, he saw an animal and perceived in it the similarity of the
2:29–2:30cow.
2:30–2:36The third, in that very moment this determination arose, this is the animal which the word Gavaya
2:36–2:38denotes.
2:38–2:41Whence came this third cognition?
2:41–2:47Not from perception, for the eye shows only horns and hooves, not the meaning of a word.
2:47–2:51Not from the mere memory of the sentence, for to one who has never seen a cow-like
2:51–2:55animal, that sentence never yields that determination.
2:55–3:02This is the cognition which our Shastra calls Upamidhi, and its instrument, Upamana.
3:02–3:08And this is the very place, Gangesa, where your school and mine part ways, so let me
3:08–3:10speak first.
3:10–3:15I accept Upmana, but I accept more than you do.
3:15–3:20That similarity which the merchants saw in the forest, the similarity of the cow, residing
3:20–3:23in the Gavaya, what is it?
3:23–3:31It is not substance, not quality, not motion, not universal, not particular, not inheritance,
3:31–3:32not absence.
3:32–3:36Into none of the seven categories does it fit.
3:36–3:42Therefore it is the eighth, similarity is in its own right and independent category, and
3:42–3:49the unobstructed usage of the word, the cow-like animal is a gavaya, is its proof.
3:49–3:56bold claim, and I shall give it an examination worthy of its boldness. Tell me first, is
3:56–4:03this similarity one, or many? If one, a single similarity recurring in all things, as a single
4:03–4:08countess recurs in all cows, then the very similarity which joins the cow and the gavaia
4:08–4:12would join the pot and the cloth as well, and everything in the world would become
4:12–4:17like every other thing. And what the world says, this resembles the cow greatly, this
4:17–4:24This resembles the cow a little, how can there be more and less in a single, partless entity?
4:24–4:32Then say many infinite similarities, like conjunction, each residing in its two substrates.
4:32–4:36Then the second snare, more bitter than the first.
4:36–4:41If similarity, like conjunction, resides in both its substrates, then the similarity
4:41–4:45residing in the gavaya resides also in the cow.
4:45–4:50Now place the merchant in the forest, where there is no cow, only the gavaia.
4:50–4:53His eye touches the gavaia, not the cow.
4:53–4:58If he sees the similarity, and that similarity resides in the cow as well, then he ought also
4:58–5:03to have perception of the absent cow, which never happens to anyone.
5:03–5:09And if he does not see it, then your perceived similarity has gone dark in the forest.
5:09–5:13Your bull is caught upon both horns, my friend.
5:13–5:20Why kumarila skarika gives a subtle answer, similarity is no new category, but a collection
5:20–5:28of many shared properties of parts, of qualities, and of motions, which together are called similarity.
5:28–5:33Just as many trees taken together are called forest.
5:33–5:40Resembles greatly means more shared properties, resembles a little means fewer.
5:40–5:44Now you have come half the road toward my house, in saying collection you have abandoned
5:44–5:50the eighth category, but where you have halted, even there it is hard to stand.
5:50–5:54Take two lotus flowers of the same species, between which there is no countable difference
5:54–5:59of parts, and yet the world says, this flower is like that flower.
5:59–6:02What collection is there?
6:02–6:06And here my favorite example, which I have given in my own work, a baby elephant and
6:06–6:08a donkey.
6:08–6:13In the build of the body there is no match anywhere, neither parts, nor qualities, nor
6:13–6:15shape.
6:15–6:20And yet people laugh and say, this donkey eats like a baby elephant.
6:20–6:24What collection of shared properties is there in that?
6:24–6:29Only a similarity in the manner of eating, a single property, not a collection.
6:29–6:33Your definition does not even reach the places where the tongue of the common people
6:33–6:36reaches every day.
6:36–6:40And what is similarity, Acharya, if it is neither an eighth category nor a collection
6:40–6:43of properties?
6:43–6:46It requires no new entity at all.
6:46–6:49The Gavya is like a cow means only this.
6:49–6:53In the Gavya there are many of those properties which are also in the cow, and yet the Gavya
6:53–6:55is different from the cow.
6:55–7:00Being possessed of many of its properties while remaining different from it.
7:00–7:04Seven categories were sufficient, the eighth was an unnecessary guest, whom we see
7:04–7:10are from the very door, with respect, but without dinner.
7:10–7:13The category I have lost, I concede it.
7:13–7:16But the Praman is still mine.
7:16–7:21That cognition which arose in the merchant, and beyond it, the cognition that will arise
7:21–7:27when he returns to the village, my cow is like that gavaya, by which Praman will you
7:27–7:29deliver that.
7:29–7:34Not by perception, for the cow is in the village, and the gavaya in the forest, the
7:34–7:38You are never before one pair of eyes together.
7:38–7:45Not by inference, for the reason of an inference must reside in the subject, and your reason
7:45–7:50the similarity located in the gavaya is in the gavaya, not in the kao.
7:50–7:57Therefore this cognition is the separate province of upmana itself, as we hold.
7:57–8:03Gently, friend, you have pronounced inference impossible far too quickly.
8:03–8:09for the provision, and it is found, at home. I have seen two elephants standing face to
8:09–8:14face, each like the other, with one and the same glance, and from that this general provision
8:14–8:19comes to hand, whatever is the counterpart of a similarity residing in something, is
8:19–8:26like that thing. Now erect the inference, the subject, the cow, the target property,
8:26–8:30similarity to the gavaya, the reason, being the counterpart of the similarity residing
8:30–8:37in the Gavaya, the example, the brother-elephant-sister-elephant. The cognition is obtained and without
8:37–8:42any new Pramana. What you call presumption or an independent
8:42–8:48Upamana is in my reckoning and inference by difference in disguise.
8:48–8:56Then have you cut Upmana away altogether? The third Pramana of your own school.
8:56–9:01the opposite, I have not cut it away, I have given it its own proper work, which until this
9:01–9:04day no one had rightly recognized.
9:04–9:09And before recognizing it, I must pull down an old wall of my own house.
9:09–9:14My predecessor, John Tabata, used to say, the memory of the sentence and the perception
9:14–9:19of the similarity together yield the determination, this is a gavaia, and that determination
9:19–9:21is opomity.
9:21–9:24Beautiful, but far too narrow.
9:24–9:26Here Another Story
9:26–9:31A traveler of the south, before setting out for the north, asked, What is a donkey like
9:31–9:32there?
9:32–9:35I have never seen one.
9:35–9:41A man of the north told him, and this description is no eulogy, the lowest creature among beasts,
9:41–9:47whose neck is absurdly long, whose lips are long and quivering, who choose twigs both hard
9:47–9:50and soft, and whose body is covered with lice.
9:50–9:55The traveler reached the north, saw such an animal, and the determination arose, this
9:55–9:57is the donkey.
9:57–10:00Now apply Jaunta's definition.
10:00–10:02Where is the similarity?
10:02–10:08This is an identification made through dissimilarity, through a contemptible peculiarity.
10:08–10:12And without knowledge of perversion there can be no inference either.
10:12–10:19Jaunta's Upamana cannot stand here, and yet the cognition arose, and it was veritical.
10:19–10:22And what is the true work of Appamana?
10:22–10:27Gangasar lifts both the figure of the cow and the figure of the gavaya and sets them before
10:27–10:30the assembly.
10:30–10:33Listen carefully, for this is the fruit of this act.
10:33–10:37When the merchant in the forest said, this is a gavaya, he learned nothing new about
10:37–10:41the animal, the animal was before his eyes.
10:41–10:45He learned something new about the word, that the sound gavaya is the denoter of
10:45–10:48an animal of this species.
10:48–10:54That cord between word and meaning, which we call power, that is what Upamana grasped.
10:54–10:59And that cord cannot be tied to any one individual animal, otherwise the word Gavaaya would not
10:59–11:04apply to a second Kavya at all, it is tied through Gavaaya hood, through that species,
11:04–11:08which was recognized by the pointing of similarity.
11:08–11:13Hence my doctrine, Hopamiti is this cognition, the animal possessing Gavaaya hood is the
11:13–11:19The denotation of the word gavaaya and upamana is its instrument, the cognition of similarity
11:19–11:23assisted by the memory of the meaning of the general statement, whether that similarity
11:23–11:29be of common properties, of contrary properties, or of an extraordinary property.
11:29–11:34Among the means of grasping the power of a word, grammar, lexicon, the sentence of
11:34–11:39a trustworthy person, usage, and the rest, upamana is the one that carries you to
11:39–11:43the word for a thing which the hearer has never seen at all.
11:43–11:48This is its own kingdom, and in this kingdom it is the soul king.
11:48–11:54You have taken my category, taken the domain of my Praman, and in exchange you have set
11:54–11:59upmana upon a throne on which it had never sat before.
11:59–12:03I shall go home and ponder this bargain.
12:03–12:06No despotent can ask for more than that.
12:06–12:11And do not leave just yet, for upon the tale of that court of the word which I have just
12:11–12:14told rests the remainder of this assembly's evening, and the other branch of your school
12:14–12:22has come this very day to fight me over it.
12:22–12:28The Buddhist and the Vaiseshika come forward. The lamp is trimmed.
12:28–12:33Last night, Gangesa, I admitted defeat on the unseen maker, not a complete defeat, but
12:33–12:39an honest one. Today I have come with a simple claim, and this time the scales are in
12:39–12:45my hand. You say that the word is a pramana in its own right, that upon hearing trustworthy
12:45–12:51speech, veritical cognition arises. I say, only that is to be called a Pramana which is the
12:51–12:57extraordinary cause of cognition. But even when the word is present, even when it reaches the year,
12:57–13:03if there is no expectancy and no fitness, no understanding of meaning arises at all.
13:04–13:09Pot, fire, sprinkles, hear all three words, nothing will be understood.
13:09–13:15That in whose presence the effect remains uncertain is no extraordinary cause.
13:15–13:18Therefore the word is not an independent Pramana.
13:18–13:24Give one moment's attention to the very medium through which you sent me your claim.
13:24–13:28The word is not a Pramana, this sentence is itself made of words.
13:28–13:35If it is true, then a sentence has given me veritical cognition, and the word stands proved a Pramana.
13:35–13:39If it is false, then your objection has collapsed.
13:39–13:42Both roads arrive in my own courtyard.
13:42–13:48And as for auxiliaries, the eye needs light, is the eye, then, no pramana.
13:48–13:56Every instrument needs auxiliaries, the need for an auxiliary does not destroy instrumentality, it completes it.
13:56–14:00Expectancy and fitness are the words light, not its rivals.
14:00–14:05Then hear my attack, which is subtler than the Buddhists.
14:05–14:10I accept the word as a premona, but not an independent one.
14:10–14:12It is absorbed within inference.
14:12–14:17The cognition that arises upon hearing bring the cow arises from this inference.
14:17–14:21This group of words is the informer of mutually connected meanings, because it possesses
14:21–14:27expectancy, fitness, and proximity, like a sentence heard before.
14:27–14:33The word is a mark, like smoke, and verbal understanding is an inferential cognition.
14:33–14:38Three pramanas instead of four, parsimony is on my side.
14:38–14:43Parsimony is a beautiful argument when both roads reach the same village, but your road
14:43–14:46does not arrive at all, as I shall show.
14:46–14:50For inference, one first needs the memory of the provision, then the knowledge that
14:50–14:56the subject possesses the reason, then reflection, only then the inferential cognition.
14:56–15:01Now watch any child to whom his mother says, eat your rice.
15:01–15:03Does that child first recall a provision?
15:03–15:09Whatever group of words possesses expectancy and arrest is an informer of syntactic connection.
15:09–15:12Then infer the trustworthiness of the speaker.
15:12–15:15Then perform reflection.
15:15–15:19In all that time the rice will have gone cold.
15:19–15:24The moment the sentence is heard, the meaning is understood, that very instant, without
15:24–15:26any intermediate stare.
15:26–15:30This immediacy is itself the proof that the word possesses its own independent power of
15:30–15:32illumination.
15:32–15:38Where experience shows no staircase, to thrust a staircase into the theory is not parsimony
15:38–15:41but prolixity, a useless burden.
15:41–15:43Granted.
15:43–15:47But then you tell me, a bare heap of words does not thereby become a sentence.
15:47–15:53Pot, objecthood, bringing, volition, throw down these four words, and nothing will
15:53–15:54be understood.
15:54–15:59That is required for bring the pot to be understood.
15:59–16:03For things, and I shall give the definition of each as tightly as I gave the definition
16:03–16:05of Provision yesterday.
16:05–16:10The first, expectancy, that incompleteness of one word by which it cannot establish
16:10–16:14its syntactic connection without another word.
16:14–16:19Mark well, this is not invariable co-occurrence, in blue lotus neither is every lotus blue
16:19–16:25nor every blue thing a lotus, and yet the two words possess expectancy.
16:25–16:30Nor is it the hearer's curiosity, as certain mimum-sakas have said, a sentence is understood
16:30–16:32even without curiosity.
16:32–16:38The second, fitness, the absence of the cognition of a contradiction.
16:38–16:44He sprinkles with fire, expectancy is present, proximity is present, but fire has no capacity
16:44–16:48for sprinkling, hence no understanding arises.
16:48–16:53When the subtlety is this, it is the certainty of contradiction that blocks understanding,
16:53–16:59not the doubt of contradiction, even while doubt remains, verbal understanding does arise.
16:59–17:04The third, proximity, the utterance of the words without delay, and the unbroken memory
17:04–17:07of their meanings.
17:07–17:11Say pot today and bring tomorrow, and the sentence has died.
17:11–17:15The fourth, intention, the speaker's purpose.
17:15–17:22In the middle of a meal, brings Sain Hava, the hearer understands salt, not a horse.
17:22–17:26The word has the power for both, but intention selects one.
17:26–17:31And where the primary meaning is blocked, a hamlet on a ganga, there it is intention
17:31–17:36itself that opens the door of figurative sense, the bank of the ganga.
17:36–17:40These four together make a heap of sounds into a sentence, just as four legs together
17:40–17:43make a stool a stool.
17:43–17:48All for accepted, ganges are, but on one deep matter my school stands apart from you, and
17:48–17:51I shall set it down here.
17:51–17:55Our doctrine is that the power of words extends only to meaning connected with action, meaning
17:55–17:58joined to a verb.
17:58–18:01How does a child come to learn words at all?
18:01–18:06An elder says, bring the cow, and the child sees the bringing, tie the cow, and he
18:06–18:10sees the tying, every time, the word together with an act.
18:10–18:15the meaning of a word is always connected with action, and a solitary word, without a verb,
18:15–18:18is meaningless.
18:18–18:24Then poetry would die, my friend, and drama, and story, and this is not my sentimentality,
18:24–18:26it is argument.
18:26–18:31The moon has risen, in this sentence there is no task for the hearer, no command, and
18:31–18:36yet its meaning is understood, and delight arises besides.
18:36–18:40If the power lay only in the action connected, whence this understanding?
18:40–18:45And the child's schooling of which you spoke, that is one door of grasping the words power,
18:45–18:50not the boundary of that power, yesterday I proved up a manna, too, to be just such
18:50–18:52a door.
18:52–18:57The power belongs to each word in its own right, expectancy, fitness, and intention
18:57–18:59join them together.
18:59–19:04The words independent, the sentence conjoined, this accords with the experience of the
19:04–19:10world. Then let us march to the true battlefield, for all of this was but its prelude.
19:11–19:18The Veda. Our two branches, Bhattah and Prabhikara, are one on this, the Veda has no author.
19:19–19:25No composer, never had one. The teacher-pupil tradition of recitation is beginningless,
19:25–19:30like seed and sprout, with no first link. Therefore the validity of the Veda rests upon
19:30–19:37the intention of no person, neither man nor God. It is valid of itself. And this is its
19:37–19:42glory, into a speech that issued from no one's mouth, no one's fault can enter.
19:42–19:48A grave doctrine, and I shall not laugh it away, I shall cut it with that very weapon
19:48–19:54of yesterday which you also witnessed. First, to say beginningless tradition is not an
19:54–20:00answer, it is the postponement of an answer. Every recitation rests upon a previous recitation,
20:00–20:06and that upon the one before it, this chain is either an infinite regress or self-dependence.
20:06–20:10And that which we established last night, that the cycle of creation and dissolution
20:10–20:16turns, granted, and then in the dissolution every throat falls silent, every memory is
20:16–20:17erased.
20:17–20:20The court of the tradition is broken.
20:20–20:23In the new creation, who retied it.
20:23–20:29Second, and deeper, for the veritical composition of a sentence, veritical knowledge of
20:29–20:35sentences meaning is required. Composition without a knower, utterance without intention,
20:35–20:41is like handwriting without a hand. Therefore the faultlessness of the Veda does not come from its
20:41–20:47authorlessness, it comes from the omniscience of its author. The Veda is the work of that person
20:47–20:53whose knowledge is eternal and faultless, the Divine. And for any custom that is universally
20:53–20:59accepted in society but whose Vedic text is not found today, we infer a lost branch.
20:59–21:04The original injunction existed, was lost in a dissolution or in the abyss of time, and
21:04–21:08in the new creation the omniscient one teaches it again.
21:08–21:12Yesterday's inference of the divine in today's chapter on the word are two pillars of a
21:12–21:17single edifice, neither stands without the other.
21:17–21:23One final question remains, Gangesa, and it is the oldest heirloom of my house.
21:23–21:30him who desires heaven perform the sacrifice. The sacrifice ends today, heaven comes after
21:30–21:38death, who carries one across this long interval in between. Our answer, an unseen potency,
21:38–21:44born of the sacrifice, arising in the self, which endures until the fruit, and it is
21:44–21:52precisely this that the injunctive suffix denotes. Will you cut this away as well?
21:52–21:57Cut Cut Away, Put in its proper place, and Mark the Difference, for this is the final
21:57–21:59lesson of this evening.
21:59–22:04I too accept the need for an intermediate link, between the momentary sacrifice and
22:04–22:09the heaven of a later time something is needed, and let it be unseen, on this there is no
22:09–22:10dispute.
22:10–22:15The dispute is here, what is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix?
22:15–22:18You say, an unseen potency.
22:18–22:24I say, that this act is the means to your desired end, and together with it, that it is achievable
22:24–22:28by effort, and that it does not entail a stronger evil.
22:28–22:30Why all three?
22:30–22:32Listen.
22:32–22:37The drinking of poison is achievable by effort, yet no healthy man drinks it, because it is
22:37–22:41not a means to what is desired.
22:41–22:45Rain is a means to what is desired, yet no one sets about making rain, because it
22:45–22:48is not achievable by effort.
22:48–22:53In a forbidden right for slaying an enemy, a means to the slaying, achievable by effort
22:53–22:59as well, yet the discerning man does not perform it, because a stronger evil is bound to it.
22:59–23:03The knowledge of all three together begets activity, and the injunctive suffix expresses
23:03–23:05all three.
23:05–23:07An Unseen Potency.
23:07–23:12When the direct link appears impossible, then it is brought in, through the side door,
23:12–23:15not onto the seat of honor.
23:15–23:20The end is heaven, not the unseen potency, to give the means the throne and to stand
23:20–23:25the end at the door, that is, prolixity and parsimony, which yesterday was the Vaisya Shikha's
23:25–23:29argument, today is mine.
23:29–23:33Yesterday you told the Buddhist that you had not come to win by speaking last.
23:33–23:39Today I bear witness that you have kept your word, my category, my Pramana, my authorlessness,
23:39–23:45my unseen potency, all for you removed not by shouting, but by counting.
23:45–23:49And in the place of each of the four I set something, that is the difference between demolishing
23:49–23:51and building.
23:51–23:56In the place of similarity, the possession of many shared properties, in the place of
23:56–24:01an independent opumity, the grasping of the words power, in the place of authorlessness,
24:01–24:05the speech of the omniscient, in the place of the unseen potency, being the means
24:05–24:07to what is desired.
24:07–24:14I sent no one away empty-handed.
24:14–24:19The stage director returns and lifts the figure of the Gavaya.
24:19–24:24At the beginning of the evening, no one in this assembly knew this figure's name.
24:24–24:29Now all know it, and they also know by which stairs that name climbed up to reach them,
24:29–24:34a forest-dweller's sentence, a vision of a similarity, the grasping of a power.
24:34–24:39The tale of Gangasauapadyo's four pramanas is complete today, perception, inference,
24:39–24:44comparison, word, and at the end of all four, one and the same lesson returned again and
24:44–24:50again, no Pramana received its throne without examination, and none was sent into exile without
24:50–24:52a hearing.
24:52–24:56The words you carry away from here tonight, the chord by which they reached their meanings
24:56–25:01was also, you now know, tied at some time by someone.
25:01–25:06May that chord never break, this is the entire prayer of this science.
25:06–25:10the characters depart. The lamp goes out at the last.

Plain text

नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। Who tied that invisible cord between that sound and that animal, and how is it known? And when a word stands for a thing which the hearer has never seen, an animal of the forest, a custom of a distant land, a deity of the Vader, how then is that cord to be grasped? The first answer bears the name Upamana, knowledge from similarity. The second bears the name Sharpta, knowledge from trustworthy speech. It both must stand before their respective opponents. And keep your attention on that second figure placed upon the table, the animal that is like a cow but is not a cow. No one in this assembly yet knows its name. By the time the evening ends, everyone will know it, and how they will come to know it, that is the entire debate of tonight. Gangasar is seated. A forest-dweller enters and makes his abasance. A chaya, I have come from the forest of the north. A merchant of my village sent this message for your assembly. Yesterday, in the forest, he saw an animal which he had never seen before, and yet the moment he saw it he cried out, this is a gavaya. Although he had heard that word only once, a year earlier, from my own mouth, when I had said, a gavaya is like a cow. He asks, by which prominent did this knowledge arise in him? And tonight's debate could not have opened more fittingly than this. Hear this story again, slowly, for three events lie hidden within it, and upon each of them some school will stake its claim. The first, in the village, the merchant heard a sentence, a gavaia is like a cow. The second, in the forest, he saw an animal and perceived in it the similarity of the cow. The third, in that very moment this determination arose, this is the animal which the word Gavaya denotes. Whence came this third cognition? Not from perception, for the eye shows only horns and hooves, not the meaning of a word. Not from the mere memory of the sentence, for to one who has never seen a cow-like animal, that sentence never yields that determination. This is the cognition which our Shastra calls Upamidhi, and its instrument, Upamana. And this is the very place, Gangesa, where your school and mine part ways, so let me speak first. I accept Upmana, but I accept more than you do. That similarity which the merchants saw in the forest, the similarity of the cow, residing in the Gavaya, what is it? It is not substance, not quality, not motion, not universal, not particular, not inheritance, not absence. Into none of the seven categories does it fit. Therefore it is the eighth, similarity is in its own right and independent category, and the unobstructed usage of the word, the cow-like animal is a gavaya, is its proof. bold claim, and I shall give it an examination worthy of its boldness. Tell me first, is this similarity one, or many? If one, a single similarity recurring in all things, as a single countess recurs in all cows, then the very similarity which joins the cow and the gavaia would join the pot and the cloth as well, and everything in the world would become like every other thing. And what the world says, this resembles the cow greatly, this This resembles the cow a little, how can there be more and less in a single, partless entity? Then say many infinite similarities, like conjunction, each residing in its two substrates. Then the second snare, more bitter than the first. If similarity, like conjunction, resides in both its substrates, then the similarity residing in the gavaya resides also in the cow. Now place the merchant in the forest, where there is no cow, only the gavaia. His eye touches the gavaia, not the cow. If he sees the similarity, and that similarity resides in the cow as well, then he ought also to have perception of the absent cow, which never happens to anyone. And if he does not see it, then your perceived similarity has gone dark in the forest. Your bull is caught upon both horns, my friend. Why kumarila skarika gives a subtle answer, similarity is no new category, but a collection of many shared properties of parts, of qualities, and of motions, which together are called similarity. Just as many trees taken together are called forest. Resembles greatly means more shared properties, resembles a little means fewer. Now you have come half the road toward my house, in saying collection you have abandoned the eighth category, but where you have halted, even there it is hard to stand. Take two lotus flowers of the same species, between which there is no countable difference of parts, and yet the world says, this flower is like that flower. What collection is there? And here my favorite example, which I have given in my own work, a baby elephant and a donkey. In the build of the body there is no match anywhere, neither parts, nor qualities, nor shape. And yet people laugh and say, this donkey eats like a baby elephant. What collection of shared properties is there in that? Only a similarity in the manner of eating, a single property, not a collection. Your definition does not even reach the places where the tongue of the common people reaches every day. And what is similarity, Acharya, if it is neither an eighth category nor a collection of properties? It requires no new entity at all. The Gavya is like a cow means only this. In the Gavya there are many of those properties which are also in the cow, and yet the Gavya is different from the cow. Being possessed of many of its properties while remaining different from it. Seven categories were sufficient, the eighth was an unnecessary guest, whom we see are from the very door, with respect, but without dinner. The category I have lost, I concede it. But the Praman is still mine. That cognition which arose in the merchant, and beyond it, the cognition that will arise when he returns to the village, my cow is like that gavaya, by which Praman will you deliver that. Not by perception, for the cow is in the village, and the gavaya in the forest, the You are never before one pair of eyes together. Not by inference, for the reason of an inference must reside in the subject, and your reason the similarity located in the gavaya is in the gavaya, not in the kao. Therefore this cognition is the separate province of upmana itself, as we hold. Gently, friend, you have pronounced inference impossible far too quickly. for the provision, and it is found, at home. I have seen two elephants standing face to face, each like the other, with one and the same glance, and from that this general provision comes to hand, whatever is the counterpart of a similarity residing in something, is like that thing. Now erect the inference, the subject, the cow, the target property, similarity to the gavaya, the reason, being the counterpart of the similarity residing in the Gavaya, the example, the brother-elephant-sister-elephant. The cognition is obtained and without any new Pramana. What you call presumption or an independent Upamana is in my reckoning and inference by difference in disguise. Then have you cut Upmana away altogether? The third Pramana of your own school. the opposite, I have not cut it away, I have given it its own proper work, which until this day no one had rightly recognized. And before recognizing it, I must pull down an old wall of my own house. My predecessor, John Tabata, used to say, the memory of the sentence and the perception of the similarity together yield the determination, this is a gavaia, and that determination is opomity. Beautiful, but far too narrow. Here Another Story A traveler of the south, before setting out for the north, asked, What is a donkey like there? I have never seen one. A man of the north told him, and this description is no eulogy, the lowest creature among beasts, whose neck is absurdly long, whose lips are long and quivering, who choose twigs both hard and soft, and whose body is covered with lice. The traveler reached the north, saw such an animal, and the determination arose, this is the donkey. Now apply Jaunta's definition. Where is the similarity? This is an identification made through dissimilarity, through a contemptible peculiarity. And without knowledge of perversion there can be no inference either. Jaunta's Upamana cannot stand here, and yet the cognition arose, and it was veritical. And what is the true work of Appamana? Gangasar lifts both the figure of the cow and the figure of the gavaya and sets them before the assembly. Listen carefully, for this is the fruit of this act. When the merchant in the forest said, this is a gavaya, he learned nothing new about the animal, the animal was before his eyes. He learned something new about the word, that the sound gavaya is the denoter of an animal of this species. That cord between word and meaning, which we call power, that is what Upamana grasped. And that cord cannot be tied to any one individual animal, otherwise the word Gavaaya would not apply to a second Kavya at all, it is tied through Gavaaya hood, through that species, which was recognized by the pointing of similarity. Hence my doctrine, Hopamiti is this cognition, the animal possessing Gavaaya hood is the The denotation of the word gavaaya and upamana is its instrument, the cognition of similarity assisted by the memory of the meaning of the general statement, whether that similarity be of common properties, of contrary properties, or of an extraordinary property. Among the means of grasping the power of a word, grammar, lexicon, the sentence of a trustworthy person, usage, and the rest, upamana is the one that carries you to the word for a thing which the hearer has never seen at all. This is its own kingdom, and in this kingdom it is the soul king. You have taken my category, taken the domain of my Praman, and in exchange you have set upmana upon a throne on which it had never sat before. I shall go home and ponder this bargain. No despotent can ask for more than that. And do not leave just yet, for upon the tale of that court of the word which I have just told rests the remainder of this assembly's evening, and the other branch of your school has come this very day to fight me over it. The Buddhist and the Vaiseshika come forward. The lamp is trimmed. Last night, Gangesa, I admitted defeat on the unseen maker, not a complete defeat, but an honest one. Today I have come with a simple claim, and this time the scales are in my hand. You say that the word is a pramana in its own right, that upon hearing trustworthy speech, veritical cognition arises. I say, only that is to be called a Pramana which is the extraordinary cause of cognition. But even when the word is present, even when it reaches the year, if there is no expectancy and no fitness, no understanding of meaning arises at all. Pot, fire, sprinkles, hear all three words, nothing will be understood. That in whose presence the effect remains uncertain is no extraordinary cause. Therefore the word is not an independent Pramana. Give one moment's attention to the very medium through which you sent me your claim. The word is not a Pramana, this sentence is itself made of words. If it is true, then a sentence has given me veritical cognition, and the word stands proved a Pramana. If it is false, then your objection has collapsed. Both roads arrive in my own courtyard. And as for auxiliaries, the eye needs light, is the eye, then, no pramana. Every instrument needs auxiliaries, the need for an auxiliary does not destroy instrumentality, it completes it. Expectancy and fitness are the words light, not its rivals. Then hear my attack, which is subtler than the Buddhists. I accept the word as a premona, but not an independent one. It is absorbed within inference. The cognition that arises upon hearing bring the cow arises from this inference. This group of words is the informer of mutually connected meanings, because it possesses expectancy, fitness, and proximity, like a sentence heard before. The word is a mark, like smoke, and verbal understanding is an inferential cognition. Three pramanas instead of four, parsimony is on my side. Parsimony is a beautiful argument when both roads reach the same village, but your road does not arrive at all, as I shall show. For inference, one first needs the memory of the provision, then the knowledge that the subject possesses the reason, then reflection, only then the inferential cognition. Now watch any child to whom his mother says, eat your rice. Does that child first recall a provision? Whatever group of words possesses expectancy and arrest is an informer of syntactic connection. Then infer the trustworthiness of the speaker. Then perform reflection. In all that time the rice will have gone cold. The moment the sentence is heard, the meaning is understood, that very instant, without any intermediate stare. This immediacy is itself the proof that the word possesses its own independent power of illumination. Where experience shows no staircase, to thrust a staircase into the theory is not parsimony but prolixity, a useless burden. Granted. But then you tell me, a bare heap of words does not thereby become a sentence. Pot, objecthood, bringing, volition, throw down these four words, and nothing will be understood. That is required for bring the pot to be understood. For things, and I shall give the definition of each as tightly as I gave the definition of Provision yesterday. The first, expectancy, that incompleteness of one word by which it cannot establish its syntactic connection without another word. Mark well, this is not invariable co-occurrence, in blue lotus neither is every lotus blue nor every blue thing a lotus, and yet the two words possess expectancy. Nor is it the hearer's curiosity, as certain mimum-sakas have said, a sentence is understood even without curiosity. The second, fitness, the absence of the cognition of a contradiction. He sprinkles with fire, expectancy is present, proximity is present, but fire has no capacity for sprinkling, hence no understanding arises. When the subtlety is this, it is the certainty of contradiction that blocks understanding, not the doubt of contradiction, even while doubt remains, verbal understanding does arise. The third, proximity, the utterance of the words without delay, and the unbroken memory of their meanings. Say pot today and bring tomorrow, and the sentence has died. The fourth, intention, the speaker's purpose. In the middle of a meal, brings Sain Hava, the hearer understands salt, not a horse. The word has the power for both, but intention selects one. And where the primary meaning is blocked, a hamlet on a ganga, there it is intention itself that opens the door of figurative sense, the bank of the ganga. These four together make a heap of sounds into a sentence, just as four legs together make a stool a stool. All for accepted, ganges are, but on one deep matter my school stands apart from you, and I shall set it down here. Our doctrine is that the power of words extends only to meaning connected with action, meaning joined to a verb. How does a child come to learn words at all? An elder says, bring the cow, and the child sees the bringing, tie the cow, and he sees the tying, every time, the word together with an act. the meaning of a word is always connected with action, and a solitary word, without a verb, is meaningless. Then poetry would die, my friend, and drama, and story, and this is not my sentimentality, it is argument. The moon has risen, in this sentence there is no task for the hearer, no command, and yet its meaning is understood, and delight arises besides. If the power lay only in the action connected, whence this understanding? And the child's schooling of which you spoke, that is one door of grasping the words power, not the boundary of that power, yesterday I proved up a manna, too, to be just such a door. The power belongs to each word in its own right, expectancy, fitness, and intention join them together. The words independent, the sentence conjoined, this accords with the experience of the world. Then let us march to the true battlefield, for all of this was but its prelude. The Veda. Our two branches, Bhattah and Prabhikara, are one on this, the Veda has no author. No composer, never had one. The teacher-pupil tradition of recitation is beginningless, like seed and sprout, with no first link. Therefore the validity of the Veda rests upon the intention of no person, neither man nor God. It is valid of itself. And this is its glory, into a speech that issued from no one's mouth, no one's fault can enter. A grave doctrine, and I shall not laugh it away, I shall cut it with that very weapon of yesterday which you also witnessed. First, to say beginningless tradition is not an answer, it is the postponement of an answer. Every recitation rests upon a previous recitation, and that upon the one before it, this chain is either an infinite regress or self-dependence. And that which we established last night, that the cycle of creation and dissolution turns, granted, and then in the dissolution every throat falls silent, every memory is erased. The court of the tradition is broken. In the new creation, who retied it. Second, and deeper, for the veritical composition of a sentence, veritical knowledge of sentences meaning is required. Composition without a knower, utterance without intention, is like handwriting without a hand. Therefore the faultlessness of the Veda does not come from its authorlessness, it comes from the omniscience of its author. The Veda is the work of that person whose knowledge is eternal and faultless, the Divine. And for any custom that is universally accepted in society but whose Vedic text is not found today, we infer a lost branch. The original injunction existed, was lost in a dissolution or in the abyss of time, and in the new creation the omniscient one teaches it again. Yesterday's inference of the divine in today's chapter on the word are two pillars of a single edifice, neither stands without the other. One final question remains, Gangesa, and it is the oldest heirloom of my house. him who desires heaven perform the sacrifice. The sacrifice ends today, heaven comes after death, who carries one across this long interval in between. Our answer, an unseen potency, born of the sacrifice, arising in the self, which endures until the fruit, and it is precisely this that the injunctive suffix denotes. Will you cut this away as well? Cut Cut Away, Put in its proper place, and Mark the Difference, for this is the final lesson of this evening. I too accept the need for an intermediate link, between the momentary sacrifice and the heaven of a later time something is needed, and let it be unseen, on this there is no dispute. The dispute is here, what is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix? You say, an unseen potency. I say, that this act is the means to your desired end, and together with it, that it is achievable by effort, and that it does not entail a stronger evil. Why all three? Listen. The drinking of poison is achievable by effort, yet no healthy man drinks it, because it is not a means to what is desired. Rain is a means to what is desired, yet no one sets about making rain, because it is not achievable by effort. In a forbidden right for slaying an enemy, a means to the slaying, achievable by effort as well, yet the discerning man does not perform it, because a stronger evil is bound to it. The knowledge of all three together begets activity, and the injunctive suffix expresses all three. An Unseen Potency. When the direct link appears impossible, then it is brought in, through the side door, not onto the seat of honor. The end is heaven, not the unseen potency, to give the means the throne and to stand the end at the door, that is, prolixity and parsimony, which yesterday was the Vaisya Shikha's argument, today is mine. Yesterday you told the Buddhist that you had not come to win by speaking last. Today I bear witness that you have kept your word, my category, my Pramana, my authorlessness, my unseen potency, all for you removed not by shouting, but by counting. And in the place of each of the four I set something, that is the difference between demolishing and building. In the place of similarity, the possession of many shared properties, in the place of an independent opumity, the grasping of the words power, in the place of authorlessness, the speech of the omniscient, in the place of the unseen potency, being the means to what is desired. I sent no one away empty-handed. The stage director returns and lifts the figure of the Gavaya. At the beginning of the evening, no one in this assembly knew this figure's name. Now all know it, and they also know by which stairs that name climbed up to reach them, a forest-dweller's sentence, a vision of a similarity, the grasping of a power. The tale of Gangasauapadyo's four pramanas is complete today, perception, inference, comparison, word, and at the end of all four, one and the same lesson returned again and again, no Pramana received its throne without examination, and none was sent into exile without a hearing. The words you carry away from here tonight, the chord by which they reached their meanings was also, you now know, tied at some time by someone. May that chord never break, this is the entire prayer of this science. the characters depart. The lamp goes out at the last.

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