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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:06Alternative Definitions
0:06–0:23Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence.
0:23–0:36Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid.
0:36–0:48Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid.
0:48–0:54In the illusion, this shell is silver because the thisness component and silverness component are separate.
0:54–1:01The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension.
1:01–1:06Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct.
1:06–1:13In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs.
1:13–1:16Both definitions apply properly.
1:16–1:23But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities.
1:23–1:34When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not.
1:34–1:44Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended.
1:44–1:54Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition.
1:54–2:03Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition.
2:03–2:09This specific objecthood is not self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing.
2:09–2:16Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended.
2:16–2:22Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity.
2:23–2:27The relation is itself the nature of cognition.
2:27–2:33Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition?
2:33–2:38Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition.
2:38–2:43In the case of Qualificative Status or Objecthood 2, the mere relation of the thing to cognition
2:43–2:50constitutes the nature of cognition. If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows.
2:50–2:54In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground and there
2:54–2:58is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence
2:58–3:04and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise,
3:04–3:09ground, half-pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific
3:09–3:12objecthood would become impossible.
3:12–3:16In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inherent
3:16–3:20unknown, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or
3:20–3:23an inference concerning a pot?
3:23–3:26This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general
3:26–3:29cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition.
3:29–3:33Therefore, Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature
3:33–3:37of cognition becomes objecthood.
3:37–3:40Conclusion
3:40–3:44Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition,
3:44–3:47these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificant cognition,
3:47–3:50there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object
3:50–3:54had a pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier
3:54–4:01qualificant cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence
4:01–4:06and ground, can also apprehend the objecthood of pot absence.
4:06–4:12If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualificon cognition,
4:12–4:14infinite regress follows.
4:14–4:18The difference between qualifier, qualificon, cognition and collective cognition may arise
4:18–4:22sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes
4:22–4:24from a difference of qualifiers.
4:24–4:28It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself
4:28–4:32is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that
4:32–4:38qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means
4:38–4:43of knowledge in the perception section.
4:43–4:53The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection,
4:53–4:59invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is
4:59–5:03veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid
5:03–5:09cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in
5:09–5:13the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes
5:13–5:18invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting
5:18–5:22in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the object
5:22–5:25of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a
5:25–5:30person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite
5:30–5:36reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous
5:36–5:41condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this
5:41–5:45inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside
5:45–5:51in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition
5:51–5:55because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a
5:55–5:59mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish
5:59–6:01valid cognition.
6:01–6:06The defect of lacking an example in the inference.
6:06–6:10Objecthood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted.
6:10–6:19If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell-like cognition of a shell.
6:19–6:27Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity,
6:27–6:31Therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished.
6:32–6:36Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the object hood of silver cognition,
6:36–6:40and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the
6:40–6:46inference. One activity cannot be generalized here, if one is removed, even an irrelevant
6:46–6:50object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would
6:50–6:54be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition.
6:54–6:59The Naoyaka establishment of invalid cognition
6:59–7:06The Naoyaka replies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated
7:06–7:10by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualificant,
7:10–7:15because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being
7:15–7:19activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because activity
7:19–7:21itself is a distinct reason here.
7:22–7:25Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the
7:25–7:28qualifikan of a cognition that makes silverness its mode,
7:28–7:31produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire
7:31–7:35for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the
7:35–7:37shell like cognition of a shell.
7:37–7:41An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a
7:41–7:44specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the
7:44–7:47subsequent activity, just as deridical cognition of silver
7:47–7:50of silver does.
7:50–7:55If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction
7:55–7:59or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will
7:59–8:02alone be the subject.
8:02–8:06Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted
8:06–8:11cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing
8:11–8:17objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained.
8:17–8:21Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and
8:21–8:26the shell as qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode and the shell, the
8:26–8:29substrate of absence of silverness.
8:29–8:34Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced
8:34–8:39by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and
8:39–8:41the like.
8:41–8:45An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualifacand
8:45–8:49regularly produces activity.
8:49–8:56The Prabhupāda view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity.
8:56–9:03The Prabhupāda says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary.
9:03–9:06Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference
9:06–9:11between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver.
9:11–9:16To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension
9:16–9:21of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from
9:21–9:27a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition
9:27–9:33accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be
9:33–9:37stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver
9:37–9:42objecthood or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition
9:42–9:45that makes difference from the desired silver its mode.
9:45–9:50Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition
9:50–9:55such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference
9:55–9:58too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference.
9:58–10:02Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell
10:02–10:05before one as mutually unrelated objects.
10:05–10:10Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition
10:10–10:14identity with unknown silver is impossible.
10:14–10:19Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause.
10:19–10:22Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference,
10:22–10:27the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object,
10:27–10:33he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object.
10:33–10:38Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity.
10:38–10:42Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of
10:42–10:45a subsequent veridical inference of difference.
10:45–10:49Therefore, the Nyayayika 2 must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause
10:49–10:50of activity.
10:50–10:55If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition
10:55–10:59of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common
10:59–11:04to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views.
11:04–11:10view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause.
11:12–11:16An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the
11:16–11:21desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an
11:21–11:26object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical
11:26–11:30cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced
11:30–11:34cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that difference as its
11:34–11:38object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity.
11:39–11:44Objection. On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause,
11:44–11:48because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the
11:48–11:53shell. Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver,
11:53–11:58also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of
11:58–12:02of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition
12:02–12:06of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously
12:06–12:11known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness,
12:11–12:16the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore,
12:16–12:20by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and
12:20–12:25its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means
12:25–12:29of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression respectively
12:29–12:33apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness.
12:33–12:38Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition.
12:38–12:42Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately
12:42–12:48remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together.
12:48–12:52Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different
12:52–12:57times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of a post alternatives
12:57–13:00remembered at two different times.
13:00–13:05It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or
13:05–13:07a person?
13:07–13:11Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at
13:11–13:14the time of cognition of both alternatives.
13:14–13:19Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because
13:19–13:24through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence.
13:24–13:29After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does
13:29–13:35not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however,
13:35–13:38activity also does not arise.
13:38–13:41Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may
13:41–13:47have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake.
13:47–13:53The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently
13:53–13:58remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt
13:58–14:03nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required.
14:03–14:08If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the
14:08–14:14perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ.
14:14–14:18In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, in the
14:18–14:22latter there is such recollection.
14:22–14:28The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object.
14:28–14:33Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired
14:33–14:37shell causes withdrawal from silver.
14:37–14:40Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual
14:40–14:45absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise
14:45–14:50the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, an invalid
14:50–14:53cognition would again become unavoidable.
14:53–14:57If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then
14:57–15:02after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw
15:02–15:07from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension
15:07–15:12of different causes withdrawal. In the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor
15:12–15:15invalid cognition is required.
15:15–15:20In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal
15:20–15:25from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective
15:25–15:31illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions,
15:31–15:36apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise
15:36–15:42the doubt is the silver or shell would have to be admitted. Activity and withdrawal arise
15:42–15:47from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects.
15:47–15:55The partial msaka view that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualificand.
15:55–15:59Some partial msakas say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which
15:59–16:05negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension.
16:05–16:10Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established,
16:10–16:13being sublated is not established.
16:13–16:18A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension
16:18–16:22of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference.
16:22–16:27In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted.
16:27–16:30The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making
16:30–16:36silverness its mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell.
16:36–16:41If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a
16:41–16:46collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition. When the
16:46–16:52shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant. Cognition making silverness its mode
16:52–16:56without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant.
16:56–17:01And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes
17:01–17:05impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity.
17:05–17:10Nor is it correct that confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced
17:10–17:15by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows,
17:15–17:19and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common
17:19–17:24property cognition hood. Thus the learned Niai Yika commits a great error in accepting
17:24–17:29invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence
17:29–17:33in it be possible through any means?
17:33–17:37Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension
17:37–17:43If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established?
17:43–17:46If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamika theory of apprehension of
17:46–17:53the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available.
17:53–17:57The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause
17:57–18:04invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively.
18:04–18:09Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required
18:09–18:14fitness or markhood is absent, only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an
18:14–18:18unapprehended non-relation arises there.
18:18–18:21The recognition-like view that the eye apprehends remembered sylvanus in a shell
18:21–18:26has already been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects.
18:26–18:30Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory
18:30–18:34defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect.
18:34–18:38A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a
18:38–18:43defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested,
18:43–18:47it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire
18:47–18:49is destroyed.
18:49–18:55may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition
18:55–19:00with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by
19:00–19:05veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory
19:05–19:14of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone.
19:14–19:16Conclusion of the Prima-Facey Theory of Non-Apprehension
19:16–19:23Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a
19:23–19:28sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition.
19:29–19:33In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference.
19:34–19:39The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and,
19:39–19:43because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the
19:43–19:49the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing
19:49–19:54objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness. Cognitionhood resides
19:54–19:59only in cognition, like veridical cognitionhood. The counter-inference, the
19:59–20:03eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different
20:03–20:06from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of
20:06–20:10cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition.
20:10–20:18Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell.
20:18–20:22On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form
20:22–20:23of difference.
20:23–20:27Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object,
20:27–20:31these two become the cause of uncoroperated activity.
20:31–20:34Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity
20:34–20:38toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition,
20:38–20:43This is silver, concerning real silver before one.
20:43–20:47Cognition is called, veridical, or non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence
20:47–20:51of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition.
20:51–20:55The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within different
20:55–20:59produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical.
20:59–21:06Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section.
21:06–21:11Just a view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition.
21:11–21:13The decisive doctrine is this.
21:13–21:18In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver,
21:18–21:22is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity.
21:22–21:26Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the object heard
21:26–21:30of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition,
21:30–21:34this avoids overextension in the cause of activity.
21:34–21:38When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because
21:38–21:41it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition.
21:41–21:47Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too.
21:47–21:51Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is
21:51–21:54the cause.
21:54–21:57It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver
21:57–22:02causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended,
22:02–22:07limits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition
22:07–22:11to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may
22:11–22:16be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since
22:16–22:19its causality is required in both.
22:19–22:25But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified
22:25–22:31cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore,
22:31–22:36When the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality
22:36–22:41of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection.
22:41–22:47Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition.
22:47–22:51It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces
22:51–22:54needless complexity.
22:54–22:58Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that
22:58–23:03But complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered
23:03–23:06a defect when admitting a means.
23:06–23:12That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof.
23:12–23:16Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it
23:16–23:20too is activity, like corroborated activity.
23:20–23:25An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition
23:25–23:30is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable.
23:30–23:34Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too
23:34–23:38becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition.
23:38–23:43To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest
23:43–23:44proof of the doctrine.

Plain text

Alternative Definitions Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence. Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid. Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid. In the illusion, this shell is silver because the thisness component and silverness component are separate. The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension. Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct. In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs. Both definitions apply properly. But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities. When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not. Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended. Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition. Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition. Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of Qualificative Status or Objecthood 2, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition. If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows. In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground and there is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, ground, half-pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inherent unknown, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot? This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore, Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood. Conclusion Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificant cognition, there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object had a pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificant cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the objecthood of pot absence. If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualificon cognition, infinite regress follows. The difference between qualifier, qualificon, cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section. The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the object of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish valid cognition. The defect of lacking an example in the inference. Objecthood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell-like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, Therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the object hood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized here, if one is removed, even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition. The Naoyaka establishment of invalid cognition The Naoyaka replies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualificant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because activity itself is a distinct reason here. Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualifikan of a cognition that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as deridical cognition of silver of silver does. If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained. Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and the shell as qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode and the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualifacand regularly produces activity. The Prabhupāda view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhupāda says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver objecthood or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition identity with unknown silver is impossible. Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause. Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore, the Nyayayika 2 must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views. view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity. Objection. On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell. Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness. Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition. Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together. Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of a post alternatives remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or a person? Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives. Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence. After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however, activity also does not arise. Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ. In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, in the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver. Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, an invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension of different causes withdrawal. In the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise the doubt is the silver or shell would have to be admitted. Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects. The partial msaka view that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualificand. Some partial msakas say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension. Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference. In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted. The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silverness its mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell. If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition. When the shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant. Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Niai Yika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means? Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established? If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamika theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available. The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively. Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or markhood is absent, only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition-like view that the eye apprehends remembered sylvanus in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect. A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed. may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey Theory of Non-Apprehension Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition. In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference. The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and, because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness. Cognitionhood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognitionhood. The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell. On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncoroperated activity. Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, This is silver, concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within different produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section. Just a view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the object heard of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too. Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause. It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, limits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both. But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore, When the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection. Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that But complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting a means. That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof. Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity, like corroborated activity. An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable. Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition. To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof of the doctrine.

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