MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part10_RadioPlay.mp4

Collection

Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.997885)

Duration

21:27

Source

Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:02–0:32यद मेथिली बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित
2. 0:32–0:36from the eight substances is established on the basis of an obstructive property.
3. 0:38–0:43In other words, only after being the substratum of desire or the occurrence of desire has been
4. 0:43–0:48established in the substance that is the self does negative inference established the determinant
5. 0:48–0:53form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative.
6. 0:55–1:00Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances
7. 1:00–1:05because it occurs in that substance, once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative.
8. 1:07–1:12Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative
9. 1:12–1:17provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commoness is defective
10. 1:17–1:22only when it produces a counter reason, in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical
11. 1:22–1:28reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, in inferences
12. 1:28–1:33such as gold is light because it is luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses
13. 1:33–1:39soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally.
14. 1:39–1:42Negative inference is not unnecessary.
15. 1:42–1:44Objection.
16. 1:44–1:49Once the absence of desire in the Eighth Substances has been established, desires residence in
17. 1:49–1:53the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore
18. 1:53–1:55negative inference is unnecessary.
19. 1:55–2:02Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides
20. 2:02–2:03in the self.
21. 2:03–2:07The specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances, is not established
22. 2:07–2:10without negative perversion.
23. 2:10–2:14If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject,
24. 2:14–2:17the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established
25. 2:17–2:21only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis
26. 2:21–2:24of a pervasive property.
27. 2:24–2:29That concomitance with the Eight Substances need not be established separately.
28. 2:29–2:35Objection, God's desire does not occur in the Eight Substances but does occur in the
29. 2:35–2:39Self, therefore the Self differs from the Eight Substances.
30. 2:39–2:44But how is the substratum that is the Self directly known?
31. 2:44–2:48The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire
32. 2:48–2:53may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other
33. 2:53–2:59eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as
34. 2:59–3:04sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge.
35. 3:05–3:10Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self.
36. 3:12–3:15Views of some scholars concerning negative inference.
37. 3:17–3:21Fifty, some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight
38. 3:21–3:25substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight
39. 3:25–3:30substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference the substratum
40. 3:30–3:33of desire differs from the eight substances.
41. 3:33–3:37Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter
42. 3:37–3:38reason.
43. 3:38–3:45Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger.
44. 3:45–3:49Another view, absence is the probandom.
45. 3:49–3:54Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely
46. 3:54–3:56negative inference.
47. 3:56–4:02A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference.
48. 4:02–4:07Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water,
49. 4:07–4:12therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth.
50. 4:12–4:16In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is
51. 4:16–4:20already directly known.
52. 4:20–4:25Selfhood can be established in a living body.
53. 4:25–4:29In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects
54. 4:29–4:34such as jars, or desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of
55. 4:34–4:37desire.
56. 4:37–4:41Therefore, selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire.
57. 4:41–4:45The absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example.
58. 4:45–4:5152. The absence of desire in inert objects such as jah serves as the negative example.
59. 4:51–4:56But a living body does not delimit the counterpositiveness determined by that absence, because desire
60. 4:56–4:59is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum
61. 4:59–5:04of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is
62. 5:04–5:08regarded as pervading inertness, inertness in turn delimits being the substratum of
63. 5:08–5:13the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the
64. 5:13–5:17consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body because
65. 5:17–5:20consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum
66. 5:20–5:23of the continuous absence of desire.
67. 5:23–5:27Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus.
68. 5:27–5:3453, in this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative
69. 5:34–5:38inference invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent
70. 5:38–5:43person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the
71. 5:43–5:48activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing
72. 5:48–5:54property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is
73. 5:54–5:59directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property
74. 5:59–6:05is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is
75. 6:05–6:08called the validity of cognition.
76. 6:08–6:12It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established, how can cognition
77. 6:12–6:17qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason. This objection is
78. 6:17–6:21untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the
79. 6:21–6:25subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and
80. 6:25–6:29the subject the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground,
81. 6:29–6:33absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier.
82. 6:33–6:38Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment
83. 6:38–6:41of the probandum in negative inference.
84. 6:41–6:45This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandum
85. 6:45–6:50is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence
86. 6:50–6:54pervading the absence of the probandum.
87. 6:54–6:58Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the
88. 6:58–7:01probandum is necessary.
89. 7:01–7:0654, may be objected that recollection of the probandum, Earth's difference from
90. 7:06–7:11the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established.
91. 7:11–7:14Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject earth
92. 7:14–7:18possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading
93. 7:18–7:22the absence of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative
94. 7:22–7:24inference would be impossible.
95. 7:24–7:26This objection is untenable.
96. 7:26–7:31In earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established
97. 7:31–7:34by the absence of the absence of earthhood.
98. 7:34–7:38The Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom difference
99. 7:38–7:42from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate
100. 7:42–7:47from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom.
101. 7:47–7:52This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference
102. 7:52–7:57for others, when the probandom Earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar
103. 7:57–8:01to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore
104. 8:01–8:07inference for others is impossible by the specified method. With this, the established conclusion
105. 8:07–8:12concerning purely negative inference comes to an end.
106. 8:12–8:22The theory of presumption. Objection, presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. One,
107. 8:22–8:27once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no
108. 8:27–8:32need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is
109. 8:32–8:36achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through
110. 8:36–8:40purely negative inference itself.
111. 8:40–8:44The Mtsaka view of presumption based on doubt.
112. 8:44–8:502. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Mtsaka view is as follows.
113. 8:50–8:54That Devdutta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another
114. 8:54–8:57scientifically accepted cause.
115. 8:57–9:01Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdutta, who lives for
116. 9:01–9:07a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter positive, namely
117. 9:07–9:13the living Devdatta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained.
118. 9:13–9:18This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdatta's presence outside the house.
119. 9:18–9:23His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta
120. 9:23–9:25alive or not?
121. 9:25–9:30According to the Memsaka, Devdatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning
122. 9:30–9:35his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, devadatta's being alive
123. 9:35–9:40and his necessary presence. Without supposing devadatta's presence outside the house, the
124. 9:40–9:44relative strength of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta
125. 9:44–9:50is outside the house, arises only after the entire specified causal complex.
126. 9:50–9:53Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through
127. 9:53–9:57affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being
128. 9:57–10:02alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary
129. 10:02–10:06cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's
130. 10:06–10:10being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption, because the extraordinary
131. 10:10–10:15cause of cognition is generally some mental operation.
132. 10:15–10:19Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being
133. 10:19–10:24alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause
134. 10:24–10:30of presumption. On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaaka
135. 10:30–10:35inference, Devdutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But
136. 10:35–10:40because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is
137. 10:40–10:44uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted
138. 10:44–10:50as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition,
139. 10:50–10:53refutation of the objection.
140. 10:53–10:573. It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives
141. 10:57–11:01of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition
142. 11:01–11:04of one alternative would also become inevitable.
143. 11:04–11:08Nor is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition.
144. 11:08–11:13If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and
145. 11:13–11:18if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference.
146. 11:18–11:22If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises
147. 11:22–11:28on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary.
148. 11:28–11:32Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation,
149. 11:32–11:36this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence.
150. 11:36–11:39But this argument is untenable.
151. 11:39–11:44Doubt about dead-dutters being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the
152. 11:44–11:46cause of presumption.
153. 11:46–11:50For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce
154. 11:50–11:55that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's
155. 11:55–11:57presence outside.
156. 11:57–12:01The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive,
157. 12:01–12:06the living dev-dut-ta, is not itself doubt about dev-dut-tas being alive.
158. 12:06–12:10Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent.
159. 12:10–12:15For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of dev-dut-tas
160. 12:15–12:19being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then is
161. 12:19–12:22supposition of external presence possible?
162. 12:22–12:26No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed.
163. 12:26–12:30If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and
164. 12:30–12:34preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external
165. 12:34–12:37presence preserves his known being alive.
166. 12:37–12:42As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal.
167. 12:42–12:46of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view.
168. 12:46–12:535. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger
169. 12:53–12:59negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead does not arise.
170. 12:59–13:03Therefore devduttas' presence outside is supposed only when his being alive and his absence
171. 13:03–13:07inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of
172. 13:07–13:10doubt about being alive.
173. 13:10–13:14For this reason, cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising
174. 13:14–13:19through purely negative inference, living devadatta is outside the house because he is the counter
175. 13:19–13:23positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house.
176. 13:23–13:27Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through
177. 13:27–13:31presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive.
178. 13:31–13:35Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both
179. 13:35–13:39cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external
180. 13:39–13:43presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause
181. 13:43–13:46ascertainment of that same object.
182. 13:46–13:50Mutual contradiction of the two ascertainments.
183. 13:50–13:516.
184. 13:51–13:54This position is unacceptable.
185. 13:54–13:59A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex
186. 13:59–14:04reasons as follows, the absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible
187. 14:04–14:08through non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta
188. 14:08–14:14in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory
189. 14:14–14:19ascertainments, devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house, must be
190. 14:19–14:25sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid.
191. 14:25–14:30Therefore either the ascertainment of devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death,
192. 14:30–14:34or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external
193. 14:34–14:40presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the
194. 14:40–14:45house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for
195. 14:45–14:49a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house,
196. 14:49–14:55are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta
197. 14:55–15:00who lives for a hundred years remains in the house, will necessarily be sublated.
198. 15:00–15:117. Devduttas being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period,
199. 15:11–15:17and long period, as in Devduttas is alive today and Devduttas will be alive tomorrow. If such
200. 15:17–15:22temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning
201. 15:22–15:28time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the pervasion of Devduttas
202. 15:28–15:33presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive.
203. 15:34–15:39Devadatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than
204. 15:39–15:44supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative,
205. 15:44–15:48is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction
206. 15:48–15:53with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive
207. 15:53–15:57in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves
208. 15:57–16:04being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Dev Dutta's external
209. 16:04–16:09presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption.
210. 16:10–16:15Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical
211. 16:15–16:20reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Dev Dutta's external presence.
212. 16:20–16:328. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical
213. 16:32–16:36meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning
214. 16:36–16:41an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's external
215. 16:41–16:45presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering
216. 16:45–16:50economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines
217. 16:50–16:56the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical
218. 16:56–17:01reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge.
219. 17:02–17:06When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than
220. 17:06–17:12presumption can establish dev.ta's external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning
221. 17:12–17:16is a cooperative cause of presumption.
222. 17:16–17:21Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt.
223. 17:21–17:279. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning,
224. 17:27–17:30produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific
225. 17:30–17:34nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced
226. 17:34–17:39from a doubt in which Devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical.
227. 17:39–17:41But this objection is untenable.
228. 17:41–17:46A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory
229. 17:46–17:47illusion.
230. 17:47–17:51In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic
231. 17:51–17:57power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence.
232. 17:57–18:01It may be said that cognition resembling supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious
233. 18:01–18:04and produced by beneficial cognition.
234. 18:04–18:05This is true.
235. 18:05–18:09In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the
236. 18:09–18:13necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality
237. 18:13–18:16of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest.
238. 18:16–18:21Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity
239. 18:21–18:25to produce foridical cognition of deva datas presence outside the house.
240. 18:25–18:31With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end.
241. 18:31–18:34Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt
242. 18:34–18:4210. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated.
243. 18:42–18:47The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory
244. 18:47–18:51meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning,
245. 18:51–18:56sublates devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas' being
246. 18:56–19:01alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes
247. 19:01–19:09Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence
248. 19:09–19:14for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from
249. 19:14–19:20a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently,
250. 19:20–19:25both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta
251. 19:25–19:30who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated.
252. 19:30–19:35When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's
253. 19:35–19:40being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation
254. 19:40–19:44joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the
255. 19:44–19:50inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house.
256. 19:50–19:54The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it
257. 19:54–19:59does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition
258. 19:59–20:04of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence
259. 20:04–20:08inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment
260. 20:08–20:13of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion
261. 20:13–20:17of being alive, cognition of dev-dupt as external presence is obtained solely through
262. 20:17–20:22inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required.
263. 20:22–20:261. Objection, presumption is necessary.
264. 20:26–20:3111. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house,
265. 20:31–20:35even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years
266. 20:35–20:40remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But
267. 20:40–20:44once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition
268. 20:44–20:49of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference
269. 20:49–20:55of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption,
270. 20:55–20:59the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise.
271. 20:59–21:03Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside
272. 21:03–21:10the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption,
273. 21:10–21:14being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition
274. 21:14–21:21of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house.
275. 21:21–21:22Recutation of the Objection

Plain text

यद मेथिली बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित from the eight substances is established on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum of desire or the occurrence of desire has been established in the substance that is the self does negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance, once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commoness is defective only when it produces a counter reason, in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, in inferences such as gold is light because it is luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally. Negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection. Once the absence of desire in the Eighth Substances has been established, desires residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self. The specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances, is not established without negative perversion. If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property. That concomitance with the Eight Substances need not be established separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the Eight Substances but does occur in the Self, therefore the Self differs from the Eight Substances. But how is the substratum that is the Self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. Fifty, some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars, or desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire. Therefore, selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire. The absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example. 52. The absence of desire in inert objects such as jah serves as the negative example. But a living body does not delimit the counterpositiveness determined by that absence, because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inertness, inertness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body because consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53, in this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition. It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason. This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier. Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the probandum in negative inference. This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandum is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum. Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary. 54, may be objected that recollection of the probandum, Earth's difference from the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject earth possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of earthhood. The Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom. This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom Earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by the specified method. With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end. The theory of presumption. Objection, presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. One, once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through purely negative inference itself. The Mtsaka view of presumption based on doubt. 2. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Mtsaka view is as follows. That Devdutta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another scientifically accepted cause. Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdutta, who lives for a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter positive, namely the living Devdatta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdatta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta alive or not? According to the Memsaka, Devdatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, devadatta's being alive and his necessary presence. Without supposing devadatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta is outside the house, arises only after the entire specified causal complex. Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption, because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption. On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaaka inference, Devdutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection. 3. It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative would also become inevitable. Nor is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition. If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence. But this argument is untenable. Doubt about dead-dutters being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive, the living dev-dut-ta, is not itself doubt about dev-dut-tas being alive. Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent. For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of dev-dut-tas being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then is supposition of external presence possible? No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal. of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view. 5. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead does not arise. Therefore devduttas' presence outside is supposed only when his being alive and his absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference, living devadatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive. Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause ascertainment of that same object. Mutual contradiction of the two ascertainments. 6. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex reasons as follows, the absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments, devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house, must be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid. Therefore either the ascertainment of devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death, or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house, will necessarily be sublated. 7. Devduttas being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period, and long period, as in Devduttas is alive today and Devduttas will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the pervasion of Devduttas presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive. Devadatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Dev Dutta's external presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption. Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Dev Dutta's external presence. 8. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's external presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish dev.ta's external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt. 9. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning, produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which Devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce foridical cognition of deva datas presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end. Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt 10. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated. The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning, sublates devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas' being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of dev-dupt as external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required. 1. Objection, presumption is necessary. 11. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise. Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house. Recutation of the Objection

← Transcript index