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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.997805)
Duration: 23:29
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:12An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances.
0:12–0:24A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandom is possible.
0:24–0:32Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the ablative case which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative provision,
0:32–0:42does not state the probandom, and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition.
0:42–0:51This definition also applies to the purely negative reason if possessing affirmative provision is replaced by devoid of affirmative provision.
0:51–0:56In a Nyaya statement one should say merely because of smoke, not because of possessing smoke.
0:56–1:00Use of the possessive suffix mat up is pointless.
1:00–1:06The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent.
1:06–1:1416. Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally perceptible while devoid of universalhood.
1:14–1:19a qualifier possessing universal hood cannot be related to reason status expressed by the
1:19–1:25ablative case because universal hood is constrained by the genitive case. This objection is not
1:25–1:31sound. Within the property being externally perceptible, a qualifier possessing universal
1:31–1:34hood can be connected through collocation expressed by the locative case. Hence the
1:34–1:39semantically fit relation is established with reason status expressed by the ablative case.
1:39–1:4617. After the reason statement, the expectancy arises, how is this reason a cause of inference?
1:46–1:51It is therefore necessary to state first the perversion and then subject propertyhood.
1:51–1:59Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood, the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason.
1:59–2:05The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion,
2:05–2:09expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion residing
2:09–2:14in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes a cause of the sentence cognition
2:14–2:19that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark.
2:19–2:23The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition
2:23–2:27of the perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion
2:27–2:32relation of the absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason.
2:32–2:38From this, separate definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained.
2:38–2:42A sentence merely expressing an instance does not become an example simply because it is
2:42–2:48a member of nyaya, since the use of an instance is only a customary practice, not a universal
2:48–2:49rule.
2:49–2:54The probation statement, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood
2:54–2:57even though no instance is named.
2:57–3:01An alternative definition of the example.
3:01–3:06The particular expression denoting the specified provision and the cognition of provision produced
3:06–3:11by a sentence cannot alone be called the example, because such a definition would over extend
3:11–3:15to the application statement as well.
3:15–3:21Some scholars say that the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application.
3:21–3:26This is the general definition of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or
3:26–3:31negative provision is added, the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples
3:31–3:34are obtained.
3:34–3:37repetition of the relative pronoun
3:37–3:42the teachers hold that in the sentence, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, repetition
3:42–3:48of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent deviation of the reason from the probandom.
3:48–3:53but where the provision of reason by probandom is known through collocation, repetition of
3:53–3:56the relative pronoun is unnecessary.
3:56–4:01In purely affirmative inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the
4:01–4:06reason from the probandom does not arise, this is our view.
4:06–4:11Repetition occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with the correlative pronoun.
4:11–4:16A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative pronouns bearing different
4:16–4:21case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning retained in the mind without
4:21–4:24violating linguistic rules.
4:24–4:28Examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions,
4:28–4:32devoid of the probandom, devoid of the reason,
4:32–4:35devoid of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus,
4:35–4:37possessing an unstated affirmative provision,
4:37–4:40presenting affirmative provision in reverse,
4:40–4:42possessing an unstated negative provision,
4:42–4:46and presenting negative provision in reverse.
4:46–4:49Definition of the application.
4:49–4:5220, after the example statement has been uttered,
4:52–5:00The following expectancy arises, the perversion has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in the subject or not?
5:01–5:07The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason pervaded by the probandom is displayed.
5:09–5:19In general, the application is that member of Nyaya which produces the cognition that generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition.
5:19–5:23The application has two special definitions.
5:23–5:31First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a reason pervaded by the probandum.
5:31–5:41Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the absence of the probandum.
5:41–5:51For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so-to-this-mountain produces the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire.
5:51–6:04In purely negative inference, the expression so-to-this-earth produces the cognition, this earth possesses odor, which is the counter-positive of absence of odor that pervades the absence of difference from the other eight substances.
6:04–6:10Certain saccas say that the use of nyaya ends with the three members thesis, reason, and
6:10–6:15example, and that application and conclusion are unnecessary.
6:15–6:17This view is not sound.
6:17–6:22The third subsumptive reflection, combining provision and subject propertyhood, is produced
6:22–6:26by no other member, but only by the application.
6:26–6:29Although the msaka does not accept the third subsumptive reflection as the cause
6:29–6:34of inferential cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application
6:34–6:37cannot be omitted.
6:37–6:40The application is necessary.
6:40–6:4521. It should not be said that the subject propertyhood of the reason can be understood
6:45–6:48from the reason statement itself.
6:48–6:52The reason statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause
6:52–6:58of the probandom, it is not uttered to convey the presence of the reason in the subject.
6:58–7:01nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason
7:01–7:03statement.
7:03–7:08Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject propertyhood.
7:08–7:12Otherwise pervasion, the reason, and subject propertyhood would all be implied by the thesis
7:12–7:16alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless.
7:16–7:20Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood
7:20–7:22on his own.
7:22–7:25Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible to understand
7:25–7:27everything unaided.
7:27–7:32The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that is, employ the application.
7:32–7:36Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible.
7:36–7:40The conclusion statement.
7:40–7:43After the application, the conclusion is stated.
7:43–7:48The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the probandom on the basis of
7:48–7:55the subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of pervasion and subject propertyhood.
7:55–7:59The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound.
7:59–8:04The first four members yield cognition of pervasion and subject propertyhood, but unless
8:04–8:08the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason
8:08–8:13are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition.
8:13–8:17The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences.
8:17–8:21Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion.
8:21–8:2723, an objection may be raised, once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the
8:27–8:31reason is complete, and no expectancy for another member remains.
8:31–8:36Any doubt concerning the absence of the probandum should be removed by those very members, otherwise
8:36–8:40the conclusion 2 cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not a special sensory
8:40–8:42perception.
8:42–8:46Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as
8:46–8:49endowed with an established probandum.
8:49–8:54If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom and not its established status,
8:54–8:59then the ablative meaning, because of such a reason, cannot be related to the probandom.
8:59–9:04The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known, cognition
9:04–9:08of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason and
9:08–9:11of an equally strong counter reason.
9:11–9:15Only after the absence of a defeater and of a counter reason is known as the intended
9:15–9:21inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses this result fully.
9:21–9:26Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary.
9:26–9:31An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong
9:31–9:36counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because
9:36–9:43no means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished.
9:43–9:45This objection is not sound.
9:45–9:49The rule of pavazian is, that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something
9:49–9:51arises from cognition of that thing's absence.
9:51–9:56Therefore, cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong
9:56–9:58counter-reason is necessary.
9:58–10:02It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the
10:02–10:05probandom as established.
10:05–10:10Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom from further expectancy,
10:10–10:15That is, its established status is cognized, this cognition arises only after the ablative
10:15–10:17relation is established.
10:17–10:24Consequently, the establishment of the probandom is known precisely from the conclusion.
10:24–10:26So refers to the reason.
10:26–10:2725.
10:27–10:32Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason
10:32–10:35side in view, not the probandom side.
10:35–10:39Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reasoned provision, subject
10:39–10:44propertyhood, absence of a defeater, and so forth.
10:44–10:47This view, however, is not sound.
10:47–10:54It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reasons nature, qualifier, or similarity.
10:54–10:59The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with therefore, so, if
10:59–11:03the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning would become
11:03–11:06disconnected.
11:06–11:11The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject in general is also unsound,
11:11–11:15because relating the subject in doubt with the reason merely to a general subject would
11:15–11:17be incoherent.
11:17–11:21The alternative of similarity is likewise incoherent.
11:21–11:27In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot
11:27–11:29be apprehended in the conclusion.
11:29–11:35Objection, the relation between, therefore, and, so, would be incoherent.
11:35–11:4126, an objection may be raised, when, so, refers to the various intended features of the reason,
11:41–11:45therefore, cannot be related to a general qualifier of the probandom.
11:45–11:49If in the opponent's statement, therefore, so, therefore, is also held to connect with
11:49–11:55a contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results.
11:55–12:00The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason.
12:00–12:05Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation beyond
12:05–12:08the knownness of the reason.
12:08–12:13On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason, therefore is connected with the qualified
12:13–12:15probandum.
12:15–12:20In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent, the established status of the probandum impermanence
12:20–12:23is specifically cognized in sound.
12:23–12:28Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandum impermanence,
12:28–12:32The matter stated as probandom and the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion by establishing
12:32–12:35its relation to the reason.
12:35–12:39Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members.
12:39–12:4427. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members of nyaya.
12:44–12:47They possess none of the characteristics of a member of nyaya.
12:47–12:52Their use in nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement of the number
12:52–12:54of members.
12:54–13:00such as does it possess fire or how does smoke indicate fire are not universally necessary,
13:00–13:06they are useful only in special contexts. With this, the section on the members of Nyaia in
13:06–13:12the inference division of Tatvassant Mayans. Phalacious reasons.
13:14–13:18Phalacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory,
13:18–13:24therefore they are explained here. General definition of a phalacious reason.
13:24–13:292. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of valid
13:29–13:34cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition, obstructs
13:34–13:38inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inference is fallacious
13:38–13:44reasonhood. For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance,
13:44–13:48substancehood is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the
13:48–13:52veritical cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood.
13:53–13:58An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition of the
13:58–14:04reason becomes an obstruction to inference as fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference,
14:04–14:08the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the cognition concerning the reason,
14:08–14:13fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire is fallacious.
14:13–14:20According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inferential
14:20–14:26cognition is fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain possesses smoke,
14:26–14:30when the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs inference of fire.
14:32–14:38These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general. Fallacious reasons as grounds
14:38–14:44of defeat will be discussed later. The general definitions include the fallacious reasons.
14:46–14:52In some contexts an uncommon reason and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons,
14:52–14:59cognition of them obstructs inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason
14:59–15:03and an equally strong counter reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only
15:03–15:09perceptual and verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition
15:09–15:16obstructs cognitions of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious
15:16–15:22reasons. For, according to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions
15:22–15:27a defeated reason and an equally strong counter reason do not prevent the production of
15:27–15:33cognition, but merely render the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however,
15:33–15:38These two defects of a reason prevent the very production of cognition.
15:38–15:44Phalacious reasons are of five kinds, one, deviating or inconclusive, two, contradictory,
15:44–15:50three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, four, unestablished, and, five, defeated.
15:50–15:56The five corresponding defects are deviation, contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment,
15:56–15:58and defeat.
15:58–16:03With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends.
16:03–16:05The deviating or inconclusive reason
16:05–16:085.
16:08–16:14A deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive.
16:14–16:18The definition that which establishes both the probandom and its absence is deviating
16:18–16:23does not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish
16:23–16:28both the probandom and its absence, nor can it make both doubtful.
16:28–16:33Here is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general
16:33–16:39definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions.
16:39–16:44A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs
16:44–16:49in neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandom
16:49–16:52and its absence and produces doubt.
16:52–16:57Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the probandom and its absence.
16:58–17:03One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render both indeterminate.
17:04–17:08Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both,
17:08–17:13and invariable connection with both probandom and its absence are found respectively only in common,
17:13–17:15uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons.
17:17–17:19The Ancient Scholar's Definition of Deviation
17:19–17:26The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject
17:26–17:32propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives
17:32–17:39that produces doubt concerning the probandom. But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent
17:39–17:43or not, is itself neither the object of cognition of subject propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting
17:43–17:49two opposed alternatives. Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced out respectively
17:49–17:53because of occurrence in both similar and counter instances, absence from both, and invariable
17:53–17:57connection with both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom.
17:57–18:01The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are knowable because
18:01–18:05they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar because it is this object,
18:05–18:07a sometimes faultless.
18:07–18:12A person's failure to understand such a faultless reason is a defect of that person's ignorance,
18:12–18:13not of the reason.
18:13–18:17Otherwise even faultless uses of common reasons and equally strong counter reasons would
18:17–18:22have to be treated as fallacious owing to ignorance.
18:22–18:28Refutation of under extension 7. An objection may be raised, the foregoing
18:28–18:33definition of deviation does not include a common reason. In the inferences, this object
18:33–18:36is identical with this object because it is knowable, and sound is impermanent because
18:36–18:40it is either sound or something else, the common reason is not present in the subject
18:40–18:45as in doubt with the probandom and therefore appears contradictory. This objection is
18:45–18:51not sound. Even if the common reason is not cognized as a property in the subject, cognition
18:51–18:54of the universality of the individual reason and the demonstration of that universality
18:54–18:59can obstruct both inference for oneself and inference for another. To establish the defect
18:59–19:03of a common reason, both the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood
19:03–19:07and commoness must be demonstrated, the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect
19:07–19:11of the reason. The ancient scholars reject this objection
19:11–19:16of under extension, saying that common reasons such as no ability or being sound or something
19:16–19:20else are not situated in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appear contradictory,
19:20–19:26nevertheless, the generality of the individual reason and its demonstration obstruct inference.
19:26–19:29The commoness of a common reason consists in the occurrence of the reason in both similar
19:29–19:34and counter instances, this is its defect.
19:34–19:38of the argument for an alternative definition.
19:38–19:438. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject
19:43–19:49and undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating.
19:49–19:54Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness
19:54–19:59are respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive
19:59–20:04these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes.
20:04–20:16A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating, but the special conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be separately explained below.
20:16–20:22Occurrence in both similar and counter-instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness,
20:22–20:27these three relations of deviation opposed to inference occur separately in common, uncommon,
20:27–20:30and non-exclusive reasons respectively.
20:30–20:34A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense, but
20:34–20:40the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not mutually
20:40–20:41intermixed.
20:41–20:47The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained below.
20:47–20:51Reason for rejecting the alternative definition.
20:51–20:539.
20:53–20:58Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such as commonness,
20:58–21:03uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of the foregoing
21:03–21:05forms of deviation.
21:05–21:10Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless in the definition of a deviating
21:10–21:12reason.
21:12–21:17For the same reason, the following definitions are also rejected, a fallacious reason not
21:17–21:22pervaded by the probandom, when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom, or a reason
21:22–21:27occurring only in a subject distinct from similar instances endowed with the probandom.
21:27–21:32In the first definition, not pervaded by the probandom is an unnecessary qualifier,
21:32–21:37in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known.
21:37–21:41These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason, as
21:41–21:46in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound.
21:46–21:50Refutation of another definition.
21:50–21:5110.
21:51–21:56Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both similar and
21:56–22:01counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason.
22:01–22:08These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason.
22:08–22:11When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as
22:11–22:15a similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as, all knowable
22:15–22:21things are impermanent, because here no separate similar or counter instance is established.
22:21–22:25And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is
22:25–22:29improperly included in the definition.
22:29–22:32Refutation of yet another definition.
22:32–22:3711, nor is either of the following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring
22:37–22:42only in counter instances distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or
22:42–22:47a reason occurring only in similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter
22:47–22:48instances.
22:48–22:54The first formulation does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends to a faultless common
22:54–22:59reason, the second becomes intermixed with contradictory and uncommon reasons.
22:59–23:04The definition present in the subject, distinct from a contradictory reason, and devoid of
23:04–23:09a relation assisting inference likewise contains pointless qualifiers.
23:09–23:14The successive refutation of these definitions establishes that no single recurrent definition
23:14–23:18covering all deviating reasons is possible.
23:18–23:23Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects.
23:23–23:25This, the prima facie discussion of Deviation Ends.

Plain text

An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances. A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandom is possible. Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the ablative case which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative provision, does not state the probandom, and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. This definition also applies to the purely negative reason if possessing affirmative provision is replaced by devoid of affirmative provision. In a Nyaya statement one should say merely because of smoke, not because of possessing smoke. Use of the possessive suffix mat up is pointless. The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent. 16. Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally perceptible while devoid of universalhood. a qualifier possessing universal hood cannot be related to reason status expressed by the ablative case because universal hood is constrained by the genitive case. This objection is not sound. Within the property being externally perceptible, a qualifier possessing universal hood can be connected through collocation expressed by the locative case. Hence the semantically fit relation is established with reason status expressed by the ablative case. 17. After the reason statement, the expectancy arises, how is this reason a cause of inference? It is therefore necessary to state first the perversion and then subject propertyhood. Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood, the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason. The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion, expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion residing in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes a cause of the sentence cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark. The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition of the perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion relation of the absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason. From this, separate definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. A sentence merely expressing an instance does not become an example simply because it is a member of nyaya, since the use of an instance is only a customary practice, not a universal rule. The probation statement, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood even though no instance is named. An alternative definition of the example. The particular expression denoting the specified provision and the cognition of provision produced by a sentence cannot alone be called the example, because such a definition would over extend to the application statement as well. Some scholars say that the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application. This is the general definition of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or negative provision is added, the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. repetition of the relative pronoun the teachers hold that in the sentence, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, repetition of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent deviation of the reason from the probandom. but where the provision of reason by probandom is known through collocation, repetition of the relative pronoun is unnecessary. In purely affirmative inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the reason from the probandom does not arise, this is our view. Repetition occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with the correlative pronoun. A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative pronouns bearing different case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning retained in the mind without violating linguistic rules. Examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions, devoid of the probandom, devoid of the reason, devoid of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus, possessing an unstated affirmative provision, presenting affirmative provision in reverse, possessing an unstated negative provision, and presenting negative provision in reverse. Definition of the application. 20, after the example statement has been uttered, The following expectancy arises, the perversion has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in the subject or not? The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason pervaded by the probandom is displayed. In general, the application is that member of Nyaya which produces the cognition that generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. The application has two special definitions. First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a reason pervaded by the probandum. Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the absence of the probandum. For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so-to-this-mountain produces the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. In purely negative inference, the expression so-to-this-earth produces the cognition, this earth possesses odor, which is the counter-positive of absence of odor that pervades the absence of difference from the other eight substances. Certain saccas say that the use of nyaya ends with the three members thesis, reason, and example, and that application and conclusion are unnecessary. This view is not sound. The third subsumptive reflection, combining provision and subject propertyhood, is produced by no other member, but only by the application. Although the msaka does not accept the third subsumptive reflection as the cause of inferential cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application cannot be omitted. The application is necessary. 21. It should not be said that the subject propertyhood of the reason can be understood from the reason statement itself. The reason statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause of the probandom, it is not uttered to convey the presence of the reason in the subject. nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason statement. Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject propertyhood. Otherwise pervasion, the reason, and subject propertyhood would all be implied by the thesis alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless. Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood on his own. Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible to understand everything unaided. The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that is, employ the application. Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible. The conclusion statement. After the application, the conclusion is stated. The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the probandom on the basis of the subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of pervasion and subject propertyhood. The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound. The first four members yield cognition of pervasion and subject propertyhood, but unless the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition. The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences. Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion. 23, an objection may be raised, once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the reason is complete, and no expectancy for another member remains. Any doubt concerning the absence of the probandum should be removed by those very members, otherwise the conclusion 2 cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not a special sensory perception. Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as endowed with an established probandum. If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom and not its established status, then the ablative meaning, because of such a reason, cannot be related to the probandom. The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known, cognition of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason and of an equally strong counter reason. Only after the absence of a defeater and of a counter reason is known as the intended inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses this result fully. Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary. An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because no means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished. This objection is not sound. The rule of pavazian is, that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something arises from cognition of that thing's absence. Therefore, cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong counter-reason is necessary. It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the probandom as established. Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom from further expectancy, That is, its established status is cognized, this cognition arises only after the ablative relation is established. Consequently, the establishment of the probandom is known precisely from the conclusion. So refers to the reason. 25. Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason side in view, not the probandom side. Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reasoned provision, subject propertyhood, absence of a defeater, and so forth. This view, however, is not sound. It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reasons nature, qualifier, or similarity. The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with therefore, so, if the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning would become disconnected. The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject in general is also unsound, because relating the subject in doubt with the reason merely to a general subject would be incoherent. The alternative of similarity is likewise incoherent. In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot be apprehended in the conclusion. Objection, the relation between, therefore, and, so, would be incoherent. 26, an objection may be raised, when, so, refers to the various intended features of the reason, therefore, cannot be related to a general qualifier of the probandom. If in the opponent's statement, therefore, so, therefore, is also held to connect with a contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results. The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason. Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation beyond the knownness of the reason. On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason, therefore is connected with the qualified probandum. In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent, the established status of the probandum impermanence is specifically cognized in sound. Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandum impermanence, The matter stated as probandom and the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion by establishing its relation to the reason. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members. 27. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members of nyaya. They possess none of the characteristics of a member of nyaya. Their use in nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement of the number of members. such as does it possess fire or how does smoke indicate fire are not universally necessary, they are useful only in special contexts. With this, the section on the members of Nyaia in the inference division of Tatvassant Mayans. Phalacious reasons. Phalacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory, therefore they are explained here. General definition of a phalacious reason. 2. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of valid cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition, obstructs inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inference is fallacious reasonhood. For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance, substancehood is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the veritical cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood. An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition of the reason becomes an obstruction to inference as fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the cognition concerning the reason, fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire is fallacious. According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inferential cognition is fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain possesses smoke, when the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs inference of fire. These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general. Fallacious reasons as grounds of defeat will be discussed later. The general definitions include the fallacious reasons. In some contexts an uncommon reason and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons, cognition of them obstructs inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason and an equally strong counter reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only perceptual and verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition obstructs cognitions of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious reasons. For, according to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions a defeated reason and an equally strong counter reason do not prevent the production of cognition, but merely render the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however, These two defects of a reason prevent the very production of cognition. Phalacious reasons are of five kinds, one, deviating or inconclusive, two, contradictory, three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, four, unestablished, and, five, defeated. The five corresponding defects are deviation, contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment, and defeat. With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends. The deviating or inconclusive reason 5. A deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive. The definition that which establishes both the probandom and its absence is deviating does not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish both the probandom and its absence, nor can it make both doubtful. Here is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions. A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs in neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandom and its absence and produces doubt. Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the probandom and its absence. One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render both indeterminate. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and invariable connection with both probandom and its absence are found respectively only in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons. The Ancient Scholar's Definition of Deviation The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives that produces doubt concerning the probandom. But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent or not, is itself neither the object of cognition of subject propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting two opposed alternatives. Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced out respectively because of occurrence in both similar and counter instances, absence from both, and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom. The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are knowable because they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar because it is this object, a sometimes faultless. A person's failure to understand such a faultless reason is a defect of that person's ignorance, not of the reason. Otherwise even faultless uses of common reasons and equally strong counter reasons would have to be treated as fallacious owing to ignorance. Refutation of under extension 7. An objection may be raised, the foregoing definition of deviation does not include a common reason. In the inferences, this object is identical with this object because it is knowable, and sound is impermanent because it is either sound or something else, the common reason is not present in the subject as in doubt with the probandom and therefore appears contradictory. This objection is not sound. Even if the common reason is not cognized as a property in the subject, cognition of the universality of the individual reason and the demonstration of that universality can obstruct both inference for oneself and inference for another. To establish the defect of a common reason, both the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood and commoness must be demonstrated, the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect of the reason. The ancient scholars reject this objection of under extension, saying that common reasons such as no ability or being sound or something else are not situated in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appear contradictory, nevertheless, the generality of the individual reason and its demonstration obstruct inference. The commoness of a common reason consists in the occurrence of the reason in both similar and counter instances, this is its defect. of the argument for an alternative definition. 8. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject and undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness are respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes. A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating, but the special conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be separately explained below. Occurrence in both similar and counter-instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness, these three relations of deviation opposed to inference occur separately in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons respectively. A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense, but the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not mutually intermixed. The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained below. Reason for rejecting the alternative definition. 9. Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such as commonness, uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of the foregoing forms of deviation. Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless in the definition of a deviating reason. For the same reason, the following definitions are also rejected, a fallacious reason not pervaded by the probandom, when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom, or a reason occurring only in a subject distinct from similar instances endowed with the probandom. In the first definition, not pervaded by the probandom is an unnecessary qualifier, in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known. These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason, as in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound. Refutation of another definition. 10. Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both similar and counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason. These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason. When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as a similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as, all knowable things are impermanent, because here no separate similar or counter instance is established. And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is improperly included in the definition. Refutation of yet another definition. 11, nor is either of the following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring only in counter instances distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or a reason occurring only in similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter instances. The first formulation does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends to a faultless common reason, the second becomes intermixed with contradictory and uncommon reasons. The definition present in the subject, distinct from a contradictory reason, and devoid of a relation assisting inference likewise contains pointless qualifiers. The successive refutation of these definitions establishes that no single recurrent definition covering all deviating reasons is possible. Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects. This, the prima facie discussion of Deviation Ends.

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