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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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1. 0:02–0:07EASTERBISHMENT OF THE PRABAKRA PREMA-FACY POSITION
2. 0:07–0:12Alternatively, the Prabhakara establishes his position as follows.
3. 0:12–0:21Even the Naya Yatka who accepts an additional absence admits that a recurrent special cognition of ground is the cause of cognition of absence of a pot.
4. 0:21–0:30Cognition is self-luminous, therefore it is more reasonable to accept that very cognition of ground both as the knowable absence and as the means of cognizing absence.
5. 0:30–0:35Objection, if cognition of empty ground itself is absence of a pot, why is cognition of the
6. 0:35–0:39counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot?
7. 0:39–0:42Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage
8. 0:42–0:45concerning absence of a pot.
9. 0:45–0:48Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required only when there is
10. 0:48–0:52a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an additional cognition
11. 0:52–0:56of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition of a measuring unit
12. 0:56–1:00is required for usage concerning length.
13. 1:00–1:04When the span of a hand is delimited by a larger number, it measures length, the opposite,
14. 1:04–1:07a smaller span, measure shortness.
15. 1:07–1:11Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition
16. 1:11–1:16of the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long.
17. 1:16–1:21Similarly, on the sake of you, although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition
18. 1:21–1:26of a visible pot is needed for usage concerning pot absence.
19. 1:26–1:31Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms is also useful in making
20. 1:31–1:33them perceptible.
21. 1:33–1:38It is not the case that when cognition of ground is destroyed, or when absence of absence of
22. 1:38–1:42a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again.
23. 1:42–1:46Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely
24. 1:46–1:51the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition
25. 1:51–1:53of empty ground.
26. 1:53–1:57or a destroyed pot does not reappear.
27. 1:57–2:02When a dam breaks in an uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even
28. 2:02–2:06if no human being is present, birds and other creatures cognize it.
29. 2:06–2:11Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is, absence of error, no means of knowledge
30. 2:11–2:15is observed within another person, from the effect in the form of usage concerning
31. 2:15–2:19absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of the person who
32. 2:19–2:22was the locus of that absence.
33. 2:22–2:26Even cognition of the locus of absence of error is destroyed, rebirth does not follow, because
34. 2:26–2:31a continuous stream of that cognition of absence of error is available.
35. 2:31–2:34Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established, because there is no
36. 2:34–2:36proof for it.
37. 2:36–2:40Thus absence is the very nature of an empty locus distinct from a locus possessing the
38. 2:40–2:41counter positive.
39. 2:41–2:46In this manner the Prabhikara Prima-Facey position is established.
40. 2:46–2:52Thus ends the Prima-Facey view in the theory of absence.
41. 2:52–2:57The theory of absence, Neyayaka conclusion.
42. 2:57–3:03Neyayaka conclusion, an additional absence determined by a counter positive.
43. 3:03–3:07The Nyayayika doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined
44. 3:07–3:12by some counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth.
45. 3:12–3:17Mea experience of an empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence.
46. 3:17–3:21Thus cognition of absence presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity
47. 3:21–3:26to a cow, cognition of absence depends upon cognition of its counter-positive. Cognition
48. 3:26–3:30merely of ground is possible without cognition of a counter-positive, and the counter-positive
49. 3:30–3:35is not even an object of that cognition, therefore such cognition is not absence.
50. 3:35–3:41If absence is not accepted as determined by a counter-positive, the question arises,
51. 3:41–3:46of which absence is a pot the counter-positive? The Mtsaka may say that the empty locus alone
52. 3:46–3:51is absence, while cognition of the pot is required for usage absence of a pot.
53. 3:51–3:57Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the counter-positive
54. 3:57–4:03of the absence, it is not merely the counter-positive of subsequent verbal usage.
55. 4:03–4:09Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence.
56. 4:09–4:12There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter-positive
57. 4:12–4:17is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence. Once the object
58. 4:17–4:21whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition of the counter positive
59. 4:21–4:26is seen to be required. Such additional cognition is not established as a cause in general usage
60. 4:26–4:31concerning absence, if its separate causal status were accepted in each particular usage,
61. 4:31–4:35there would be non-recurrence. Therefore both cognition of absence and usage concerning
62. 4:35–4:41absence are grounded in an additional absence determined by the counter positive.
63. 4:41–4:47of shortness, length and similarity. Shortness and length are special dimensions
64. 4:47–4:52distinct from dimension in general. Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as
65. 4:52–4:57something is measured by a hand or other measured delimited by a smaller or larger number.
66. 4:57–5:01Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object, particular usage as short
67. 5:01–5:05or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure.
68. 5:05–5:10Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a
69. 5:10–5:16gavaia, but the particular cognition the gavaia is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow.
70. 5:16–5:21At the time of cognition merely of a gavaia, determinant usage concerning similarity to
71. 5:21–5:27a cow does not arise. Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its
72. 5:27–5:32counter positive is not extraordinary.
73. 5:32–5:37Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot.
74. 5:37–5:41The M Saka objection, use of the expression, absence of a pot, is a cause of some cognition,
75. 5:41–5:46in cognition of absence the counter positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground.
76. 5:46–5:50Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used
77. 5:50–5:55should itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression,
78. 5:55–5:59absence of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter positive
79. 5:59–6:03relation and relation between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing
80. 6:03–6:05a counter positive.
81. 6:05–6:11Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence of a pot.
82. 6:11–6:15Experience takes the form, there is absence of a pot on the ground, or, there is no pot
83. 6:15–6:17on the ground.
84. 6:17–6:21This usage shows absence of the pot to be distinct from the ground, just as in there
85. 6:21–6:26is a pot on the ground, the pot is not the ground.
86. 6:26–6:29If the grounds being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application
87. 6:29–6:33of the expression absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an
88. 6:33–6:37object of that expression only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence
89. 6:37–6:41of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression.
90. 6:41–6:45Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application, and here absence
91. 6:45–6:48of pothood itself is the ground of application.
92. 6:48–6:53Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage.
93. 6:53–6:57This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of
94. 6:57–7:00a counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an object
95. 7:00–7:02of that usage.
96. 7:02–7:06The ground alone is not absence of a pot because a container contains relation between absence
97. 7:06–7:11of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible in an identical
98. 7:11–7:12thing.
99. 7:12–7:16Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded
100. 7:16–7:20as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would
101. 7:20–7:23be obstructed.
102. 7:23–7:29Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence.
103. 7:29–7:34Masaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground
104. 7:34–7:38is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground is understood
105. 7:38–7:40as its locus.
106. 7:40–7:46Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive
107. 7:46–7:50pot, this has already been established.
108. 7:50–7:52There are two alternatives.
109. 7:52–7:56First, cognition of the nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence
110. 7:56–7:58of a pot.
111. 7:58–8:03Then no pot absence as something contained in the ground would be presented.
112. 8:03–8:08Second, cognition in the form of negation together with the ground's character as locus may be
113. 8:08–8:09the cause.
114. 8:09–8:14But at that time cognition of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition
115. 8:14–8:18of difference from it is also unavailable.
116. 8:18–8:22If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of pot possessing
117. 8:22–8:26ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an ocular defect, cognition of pot possession
118. 8:26–8:30fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence of the pot would
119. 8:30–8:32have to be accepted there.
120. 8:32–8:35Usage concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then
121. 8:35–8:41no longer be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object.
122. 8:41–8:45Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual cognition
123. 8:45–8:50of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground possessing
124. 8:50–8:52a pot.
125. 8:52–8:56Cognition of ground is distinct from cognition of pot-possessing ground as possible only
126. 8:56–9:01after absence of a pot on the ground has already been ascertained through non-apprehension
127. 9:01–9:03of an eligible counter-positive pot.
128. 9:03–9:09Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment of absence is again required, a circle or
129. 9:09–9:13mutual dependence.
130. 9:13–9:15Impossibility of Recurrent Usage Concerning Absence
131. 9:15–9:21On the M'saka view, different empty loci in their cognitions are non-recurrent,
132. 9:21–9:25Well then is recurrent usage of absence possible.
133. 9:25–9:29On the Neyayakavu, on the strength of one mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent
134. 9:29–9:35usage a pot and the like are not cloth, on the strength of one absolute absence of conus,
135. 9:35–9:39conus is not in a pot and the like, on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the
136. 9:39–9:43pot has been destroyed in different potchards, and on the strength of one prior absence
137. 9:43–9:49of the pot, the pot does not exist in the potchards before its production.
138. 9:49–9:54Each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction, and prior
139. 9:54–9:58absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci.
140. 9:58–10:02The Mtsaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms
141. 10:02–10:05of recurrent negative usage.
142. 10:05–10:10Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a
143. 10:10–10:17single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence.
144. 10:17–10:21with a particular time is not absence.
145. 10:21–10:26The msaka says, let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence expressed
146. 10:26–10:32by there is no pot on the ground now, this also establishes a container-contained relation.
147. 10:32–10:36If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional
148. 10:36–10:42absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted.
149. 10:42–10:46Whatever recurrent property the nayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in conjunction
150. 10:46–10:48with a particular time.
151. 10:48–10:54Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter positive pot
152. 10:54–10:58and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence.
153. 10:58–11:03In, there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a locus of
154. 11:03–11:06absence, not as absence itself.
155. 11:06–11:11If the particular time is said to reside in conjunction with that particular time,
156. 11:11–11:14relation is impossible because of identity.
157. 11:14–11:17What is the particular time?
158. 11:17–11:21If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time, an additional absence has
159. 11:21–11:24been accepted effortlessly.
160. 11:24–11:28If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence.
161. 11:28–11:33On the Neyayaka view one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time
162. 11:33–11:36is only one delimiter of it.
163. 11:36–11:40On Lumsaka view, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground exists
164. 11:40–11:44but not there is absence of a pot on the ground because the particular time
165. 11:44–11:49becoming its own qualifier produces a cognition of itself not an absence
166. 11:49–11:55determined by a counter positive. Pot shards and the like would become causes
167. 11:55–12:01of usage concerning a pot. If different loci can join with different times
168. 12:01–12:05produce usage concerning absence of a pot on the ground then various parts and
169. 12:05–12:09pot shards of a pot as delimited by a particular aggregate of parts should
170. 12:09–12:15likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's existence. What need would there
171. 12:15–12:20then be to accept a separate pot or counter positive? Cognition of the counter positive
172. 12:20–12:25would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence.
173. 12:25–12:29Nor is the following objection established, first the pot is seen, then the hammer falls,
174. 12:29–12:33and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive
175. 12:33–12:38is seen, and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless. The cognition
176. 12:38–12:42of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents an additional
177. 12:42–12:47destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced by the hammer, both
178. 12:47–12:50existed before the blow.
179. 12:50–12:54If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence, how could destructionhood
180. 12:54–13:01belong to absence? And if it could, every absence would become destruction. Nor can
181. 13:01–13:06it be said that what destroys on the Neyayakavu, the hammer blow or the ground slash cognition
182. 13:06–13:11of ground can join with it is itself destruction on the sake of you. Destruction is produced
183. 13:11–13:18by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself. Destruction of the pot is experienced as determined
184. 13:18–13:22by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer blow is not determined by the pot as
185. 13:22–13:28counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct from its destroyer, and absence
186. 13:28–13:31distinct from the empty locus.
187. 13:31–13:39Qualifier hood, that is, a self linking relation, is the apprehensive relation of absence.
188. 13:39–13:43The men's RKS final objection, if the ground has no relation with absence, how can there
189. 13:43–13:46be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground.
190. 13:46–13:50If a self linking relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self
191. 13:50–13:55related to absence of a pot at a crossroads, because a self linking relation is nothing
192. 13:55–13:58over and above the ground and the absence.
193. 13:58–14:02If it is said that superimposing the counter positive pot on the locus and then negating
194. 14:02–14:07it is itself the self-linking relation, mutual dependence results, superimposition depends
195. 14:07–14:12upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon superimposition.
196. 14:12–14:18Reply, the very fitness of absence and its locus to produce a qualified cognition without
197. 14:18–14:21any other relation is the self-linking relation.
198. 14:21–14:25Ground possessing a pot and absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly
199. 14:25–14:29produce the cognition, there is absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension.
200. 14:30–14:34If a separate relation were again accepted between cognition and its object,
201. 14:34–14:37and then another relation for that relation, an infinite regress would follow.
202. 14:38–14:41Hence Qualifiedhood in the form of a self-linking relation alone should be
203. 14:41–14:46accepted as the apprehensive relation between absence and its locus. Thus an additional entity,
204. 14:46–14:50absence, and its apprehensive relation, Qualifiedhood, established.
205. 14:50–14:52The theory of absence ends here.
206. 14:52–14:57The theory of the causes of perception.
207. 14:57–15:04The theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tat the sent may.
208. 15:04–15:09Ah the theory of sense, object, contact.
209. 15:09–15:15Conjunction of object and light is a cause of visual perception.
210. 15:15–15:20Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions.
211. 15:20–15:25In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular object is a cause,
212. 15:25–15:30cause, conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. An eye situated in light does not see an
213. 15:30–15:35object situated in darkness, whereas an eye situated in darkness can see an illuminated object.
214. 15:36–15:40Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite the eye is
215. 15:40–15:45illuminated. The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for
216. 15:45–15:49apprehension of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no
217. 15:49–15:54proof for postulating separate conditions for apprehension of the parts. If conjunction
218. 15:54–15:58of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is accepted as the cause,
219. 15:58–16:02why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part facing the eye as
220. 16:02–16:07the cause? If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause,
221. 16:07–16:11limiting the incompatibility of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension
222. 16:11–16:15of cloth and gold or cloth and water. One would then have to accept conjunction of
223. 16:15–16:19light and eye delimited by conjunction with the pot as the cause.
224. 16:19–16:25If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of eye and pot is accepted as the cause,
225. 16:25–16:29the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and eye in the same way arises.
226. 16:29–16:34Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light
227. 16:34–16:38as the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of the pot.
228. 16:38–16:43Therefore conjunction of light and eye is not a separate cause.
229. 16:43–16:48Manifest color is a cause of illumination.
230. 16:48–16:53Other Niyayikas say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception, conjunction
231. 16:53–16:56of light and object is itself established as the cause.
232. 16:56–16:59Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and
233. 16:59–17:03conjunction with light are accepted, conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately
234. 17:03–17:06remains the cause.
235. 17:06–17:10The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended,
236. 17:10–17:14because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts.
237. 17:14–17:17If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with
238. 17:17–17:21Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative
239. 17:21–17:25concomitance, revealing cause of perception.
240. 17:25–17:29Prima-facie view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by
241. 17:29–17:33firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible.
242. 17:33–17:37If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality
243. 17:37–17:41like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest color are
244. 17:41–17:45perceptual effect does not invariably occur.
245. 17:45–17:49Reply, both light and manifest color are causes.
246. 17:49–17:53There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colorhood or
247. 17:53–17:56manifest colorhood delimits firehood.
248. 17:56–17:59Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel,
249. 17:59–18:03here positive and negative concomitance cannot be established for one while
250. 18:03–18:09excluding the other, therefore causal status must be accepted in both.
251. 18:09–18:12View of the tradition nor the color of the eye is also a revealer.
252. 18:14–18:18The nor of the tradition says in that case the color of the eye too would be a revealer
253. 18:18–18:23because it is the color of revealing fire. If color is a revealer to regard manifest
254. 18:23–18:27colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood residing in fire as an extraneous condition
255. 18:27–18:32is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness through economy revealing color alone is the
256. 18:32–18:37extraneous condition. Manifest color present in an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual
257. 18:37–18:38illumination.
258. 18:38–18:44A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs,
259. 18:44–18:49and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness, because the
260. 18:49–18:52required causes of perception are absent.
261. 18:52–18:57Therefore recurrent properties such as colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their
262. 18:57–19:01perception, not substancehood, and the like in substances.
263. 19:01–19:05Otherwise apprehension of color would necessarily accompany apprehension of touch and hot
264. 19:05–19:11vapor, and apprehension of touch a company apprehension of color in array.
265. 19:11–19:16There is no need to accept one recurrent property common to both color and touch, causal status
266. 19:16–19:20can be established by distinct properties residing respectively in each color and the
267. 19:20–19:22like.
268. 19:22–19:27When one is apprehended, the other is not, so their recurrent properties differ.
269. 19:27–19:31There is no contradiction of higher and lower universals, the distinction of colorhood
270. 19:31–19:37in touchhood is possible like the distinction between higher and lower tones. Thus each
271. 19:37–19:41manifestation assists perception of its own color and the like.
272. 19:41–19:46Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard
273. 19:46–19:51magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately in color
274. 19:51–19:55and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the magnitude
275. 19:55–20:00of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically in visually
276. 20:00–20:05apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present in the
277. 20:05–20:08general quality magnitude.
278. 20:08–20:13Nor is it the case that non-manifestness alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility,
279. 20:13–20:17while perception arises through its absence.
280. 20:17–20:21Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper
281. 20:21–20:26to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception.
282. 20:26–20:31To regard non-manifestness as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly
283. 20:31–20:33cumbersome.
284. 20:33–20:37This is the view of the tradition nor.
285. 20:37–20:40the theory of sense, object, contact, remaining portion.

Plain text

EASTERBISHMENT OF THE PRABAKRA PREMA-FACY POSITION Alternatively, the Prabhakara establishes his position as follows. Even the Naya Yatka who accepts an additional absence admits that a recurrent special cognition of ground is the cause of cognition of absence of a pot. Cognition is self-luminous, therefore it is more reasonable to accept that very cognition of ground both as the knowable absence and as the means of cognizing absence. Objection, if cognition of empty ground itself is absence of a pot, why is cognition of the counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot? Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage concerning absence of a pot. Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required only when there is a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an additional cognition of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition of a measuring unit is required for usage concerning length. When the span of a hand is delimited by a larger number, it measures length, the opposite, a smaller span, measure shortness. Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition of the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long. Similarly, on the sake of you, although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition of a visible pot is needed for usage concerning pot absence. Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms is also useful in making them perceptible. It is not the case that when cognition of ground is destroyed, or when absence of absence of a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again. Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition of empty ground. or a destroyed pot does not reappear. When a dam breaks in an uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even if no human being is present, birds and other creatures cognize it. Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is, absence of error, no means of knowledge is observed within another person, from the effect in the form of usage concerning absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of the person who was the locus of that absence. Even cognition of the locus of absence of error is destroyed, rebirth does not follow, because a continuous stream of that cognition of absence of error is available. Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established, because there is no proof for it. Thus absence is the very nature of an empty locus distinct from a locus possessing the counter positive. In this manner the Prabhikara Prima-Facey position is established. Thus ends the Prima-Facey view in the theory of absence. The theory of absence, Neyayaka conclusion. Neyayaka conclusion, an additional absence determined by a counter positive. The Nyayayika doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined by some counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth. Mea experience of an empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence. Thus cognition of absence presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity to a cow, cognition of absence depends upon cognition of its counter-positive. Cognition merely of ground is possible without cognition of a counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not even an object of that cognition, therefore such cognition is not absence. If absence is not accepted as determined by a counter-positive, the question arises, of which absence is a pot the counter-positive? The Mtsaka may say that the empty locus alone is absence, while cognition of the pot is required for usage absence of a pot. Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the counter-positive of the absence, it is not merely the counter-positive of subsequent verbal usage. Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence. There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter-positive is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence. Once the object whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition of the counter positive is seen to be required. Such additional cognition is not established as a cause in general usage concerning absence, if its separate causal status were accepted in each particular usage, there would be non-recurrence. Therefore both cognition of absence and usage concerning absence are grounded in an additional absence determined by the counter positive. of shortness, length and similarity. Shortness and length are special dimensions distinct from dimension in general. Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as something is measured by a hand or other measured delimited by a smaller or larger number. Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object, particular usage as short or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure. Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a gavaia, but the particular cognition the gavaia is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow. At the time of cognition merely of a gavaia, determinant usage concerning similarity to a cow does not arise. Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its counter positive is not extraordinary. Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot. The M Saka objection, use of the expression, absence of a pot, is a cause of some cognition, in cognition of absence the counter positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground. Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used should itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression, absence of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter positive relation and relation between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing a counter positive. Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence of a pot. Experience takes the form, there is absence of a pot on the ground, or, there is no pot on the ground. This usage shows absence of the pot to be distinct from the ground, just as in there is a pot on the ground, the pot is not the ground. If the grounds being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application of the expression absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an object of that expression only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression. Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application, and here absence of pothood itself is the ground of application. Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage. This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of a counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an object of that usage. The ground alone is not absence of a pot because a container contains relation between absence of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible in an identical thing. Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would be obstructed. Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence. Masaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground is understood as its locus. Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive pot, this has already been established. There are two alternatives. First, cognition of the nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence of a pot. Then no pot absence as something contained in the ground would be presented. Second, cognition in the form of negation together with the ground's character as locus may be the cause. But at that time cognition of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition of difference from it is also unavailable. If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of pot possessing ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an ocular defect, cognition of pot possession fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence of the pot would have to be accepted there. Usage concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then no longer be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object. Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual cognition of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground possessing a pot. Cognition of ground is distinct from cognition of pot-possessing ground as possible only after absence of a pot on the ground has already been ascertained through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive pot. Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment of absence is again required, a circle or mutual dependence. Impossibility of Recurrent Usage Concerning Absence On the M'saka view, different empty loci in their cognitions are non-recurrent, Well then is recurrent usage of absence possible. On the Neyayakavu, on the strength of one mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent usage a pot and the like are not cloth, on the strength of one absolute absence of conus, conus is not in a pot and the like, on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the pot has been destroyed in different potchards, and on the strength of one prior absence of the pot, the pot does not exist in the potchards before its production. Each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction, and prior absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci. The Mtsaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms of recurrent negative usage. Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence. with a particular time is not absence. The msaka says, let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence expressed by there is no pot on the ground now, this also establishes a container-contained relation. If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted. Whatever recurrent property the nayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in conjunction with a particular time. Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter positive pot and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence. In, there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a locus of absence, not as absence itself. If the particular time is said to reside in conjunction with that particular time, relation is impossible because of identity. What is the particular time? If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time, an additional absence has been accepted effortlessly. If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence. On the Neyayaka view one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time is only one delimiter of it. On Lumsaka view, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground exists but not there is absence of a pot on the ground because the particular time becoming its own qualifier produces a cognition of itself not an absence determined by a counter positive. Pot shards and the like would become causes of usage concerning a pot. If different loci can join with different times produce usage concerning absence of a pot on the ground then various parts and pot shards of a pot as delimited by a particular aggregate of parts should likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's existence. What need would there then be to accept a separate pot or counter positive? Cognition of the counter positive would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence. Nor is the following objection established, first the pot is seen, then the hammer falls, and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive is seen, and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless. The cognition of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents an additional destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced by the hammer, both existed before the blow. If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence, how could destructionhood belong to absence? And if it could, every absence would become destruction. Nor can it be said that what destroys on the Neyayakavu, the hammer blow or the ground slash cognition of ground can join with it is itself destruction on the sake of you. Destruction is produced by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself. Destruction of the pot is experienced as determined by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer blow is not determined by the pot as counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct from its destroyer, and absence distinct from the empty locus. Qualifier hood, that is, a self linking relation, is the apprehensive relation of absence. The men's RKS final objection, if the ground has no relation with absence, how can there be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground. If a self linking relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self related to absence of a pot at a crossroads, because a self linking relation is nothing over and above the ground and the absence. If it is said that superimposing the counter positive pot on the locus and then negating it is itself the self-linking relation, mutual dependence results, superimposition depends upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon superimposition. Reply, the very fitness of absence and its locus to produce a qualified cognition without any other relation is the self-linking relation. Ground possessing a pot and absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly produce the cognition, there is absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension. If a separate relation were again accepted between cognition and its object, and then another relation for that relation, an infinite regress would follow. Hence Qualifiedhood in the form of a self-linking relation alone should be accepted as the apprehensive relation between absence and its locus. Thus an additional entity, absence, and its apprehensive relation, Qualifiedhood, established. The theory of absence ends here. The theory of the causes of perception. The theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tat the sent may. Ah the theory of sense, object, contact. Conjunction of object and light is a cause of visual perception. Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions. In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular object is a cause, cause, conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. An eye situated in light does not see an object situated in darkness, whereas an eye situated in darkness can see an illuminated object. Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite the eye is illuminated. The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for apprehension of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no proof for postulating separate conditions for apprehension of the parts. If conjunction of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is accepted as the cause, why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part facing the eye as the cause? If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause, limiting the incompatibility of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension of cloth and gold or cloth and water. One would then have to accept conjunction of light and eye delimited by conjunction with the pot as the cause. If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of eye and pot is accepted as the cause, the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and eye in the same way arises. Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light as the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of the pot. Therefore conjunction of light and eye is not a separate cause. Manifest color is a cause of illumination. Other Niyayikas say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception, conjunction of light and object is itself established as the cause. Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and conjunction with light are accepted, conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately remains the cause. The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended, because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts. If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative concomitance, revealing cause of perception. Prima-facie view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible. If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest color are perceptual effect does not invariably occur. Reply, both light and manifest color are causes. There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colorhood or manifest colorhood delimits firehood. Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel, here positive and negative concomitance cannot be established for one while excluding the other, therefore causal status must be accepted in both. View of the tradition nor the color of the eye is also a revealer. The nor of the tradition says in that case the color of the eye too would be a revealer because it is the color of revealing fire. If color is a revealer to regard manifest colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood residing in fire as an extraneous condition is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness through economy revealing color alone is the extraneous condition. Manifest color present in an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual illumination. A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs, and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness, because the required causes of perception are absent. Therefore recurrent properties such as colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their perception, not substancehood, and the like in substances. Otherwise apprehension of color would necessarily accompany apprehension of touch and hot vapor, and apprehension of touch a company apprehension of color in array. There is no need to accept one recurrent property common to both color and touch, causal status can be established by distinct properties residing respectively in each color and the like. When one is apprehended, the other is not, so their recurrent properties differ. There is no contradiction of higher and lower universals, the distinction of colorhood in touchhood is possible like the distinction between higher and lower tones. Thus each manifestation assists perception of its own color and the like. Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately in color and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the magnitude of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically in visually apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present in the general quality magnitude. Nor is it the case that non-manifestness alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility, while perception arises through its absence. Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception. To regard non-manifestness as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly cumbersome. This is the view of the tradition nor. the theory of sense, object, contact, remaining portion.

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