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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
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Detected language: en (0.994864)
Duration: 22:18
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:06Konjunction-Kam-inherence is the cause.
0:06–0:12Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherent in an object conjoined with the sense.
0:12–0:16Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object,
0:16–0:21because inherent in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like.
0:21–0:26It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again.
0:26–0:31Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances
0:31–0:36such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception
0:36–0:39of other substances such as whole objects.
0:39–0:43Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent
0:43–0:46in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone.
0:46–0:51A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor,
0:51–0:54conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception
0:54–0:55of odor.
0:55–1:00Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might
1:00–1:03be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor.
1:03–1:07A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with
1:07–1:09the sense, which is unacceptable.
1:09–1:14Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance
1:14–1:17of the odor is present as a qualifier.
1:17–1:21If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with
1:21–1:26the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would
1:26–1:31produce perception of the odor of cloth.
1:31–1:34Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause.
1:34–1:39Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres the cause
1:39–1:43perception of odor, while inherence merely delimits causality.
1:43–1:46This view is equivalent to the view that inherence in a conjoined object is the cause
1:46–1:51and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth.
1:51–1:55is the argument sound that inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction
1:55–2:00nor inherence nor both. On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a
2:00–2:04combination of conjunction and inherence, inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded
2:04–2:08as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction in calling this
2:08–2:12relation conjunction come inherence, nor does calling it something more conflict with
2:12–2:18Nayaya. The Nayayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inherence
2:18–2:23and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction
2:23–2:28cum inheritance. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal
2:28–2:35blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like.
2:35–2:41Conjunction cum inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal.
2:41–2:44The objection that color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance residing
2:44–2:48in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound. Though
2:48–2:52inheritance in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color,
2:52–2:57taste, and the like is apprehended through inheritance of those qualities in the conjoined object.
2:58–3:03Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances.
3:04–3:08Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is
3:08–3:13unobjectionable, therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through
3:13–3:15an indirect relation.
3:15–3:20Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ.
3:20–3:26Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established
3:26–3:29by recurrent cognition.
3:29–3:33Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the
3:33–3:36universal colorness.
3:36–3:40Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye, because that would
3:40–3:46overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the like is possible only
3:46–3:53through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also
3:53–4:00be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal
4:00–4:06and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed
4:06–4:10of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance, hence the
4:10–4:16The consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible.
4:16–4:21It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance
4:21–4:25but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty.
4:25–4:29If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universals such as
4:29–4:34colorness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities,
4:34–4:37mutual dependence would then follow.
4:37–4:43Or is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument?
4:43–4:48Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste,
4:48–4:52or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous
4:52–4:53sense.
4:53–4:57Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of
4:57–5:01color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness.
5:01–5:07apprehensible by the eye is not blueness because it over extends to yellowness.
5:07–5:11Further objection that individual colors are one.
5:11–5:17Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one because, although difference
5:17–5:23appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color.
5:23–5:27It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals,
5:27–5:30would become a universal.
5:30–5:35A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in
5:35–5:37the whole substance.
5:37–5:41The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal
5:41–5:46is not appropriate to individual blueness.
5:46–5:50Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from
5:50–5:53difference between two colors.
5:53–5:59In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion.
5:59–6:03Though inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their
6:03–6:06production and destruction.
6:06–6:10Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would
6:10–6:17all become one, and comparative cognition such as this is sweeter would be impossible.
6:17–6:22Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the cause.
6:22–6:25Sound inheres an auditory space.
6:25–6:30If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously
6:30–6:32apprehended.
6:32–6:37It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended,
6:37–6:41because there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound
6:41–6:43would not in here there.
6:43–6:47Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit
6:47–6:51sound is never apprehended.
6:51–6:55Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of
6:55–7:01sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not
7:01–7:07relational. Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter
7:07–7:14positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a
7:14–7:19causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a
7:19–7:24common cause of all sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not
7:24–7:30recurrent like fitness of equality. Establishing Inherence as the cause.
7:30–7:37The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its
7:37–7:41perception must arise through contact in the form of inheritance.
7:41–7:44It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive,
7:44–7:49sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended. The contact is the specific
7:49–7:52inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity.
7:53–7:57Conjunction with the ear cavity specifies substrate hood described by inheritance.
7:58–8:03The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere.
8:04–8:09Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear is apprehended,
8:09–8:12sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not.
8:12–8:18Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not
8:18–8:23by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited
8:23–8:25by hand conjunction.
8:25–8:32Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere.
8:32–8:35The objection that inheritance would thereby become non-pervasively occurrence does not
8:35–8:37arise.
8:37–8:41Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inheritance, but it occurs pervasively
8:41–8:44through intrinsic relation as qualitative status.
8:44–8:48Even if the inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended
8:48–8:51in many places.
8:51–8:56Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense.
8:56–9:02Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited
9:02–9:07by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the
9:07–9:08ear cavity.
9:08–9:13Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one
9:13–9:18would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear.
9:18–9:21Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters
9:21–9:27produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of sound locations,
9:27–9:31the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments
9:31–9:35such as the VA with Macron S substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity
9:35–9:40to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely
9:40–9:42many directions.
9:42–9:47The reply that nearby and distant persons experience differences of loud and soft sound,
9:47–9:53thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound.
9:53–9:59One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed.
9:59–10:03When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear
10:03–10:09opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the year opening is covered.
10:11–10:15The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the year is the auditory sense.
10:17–10:23The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the year opening,
10:23–10:28because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense.
10:28–10:36Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception.
10:36–10:40Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body is a sense faculty, the experience
10:40–10:44I hear the sound of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space
10:44–10:47to be the auditory sense.
10:47–10:52V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception.
10:52–10:57V.A. with Macron S are infinitely many, not all-pervasive, and are not common causes
10:57–10:59of sound perception.
10:59–11:03V-A with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense
11:03–11:09faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V-A with Macron.
11:09–11:13How then arises the cognition sound is in the V-A with Macron.
11:13–11:19It is unnecessary to apprehend the V-A with Macron as the substrate of every sound.
11:19–11:24The V-A with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists
11:24–11:28the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the
11:28–11:33in hearing cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate.
11:33–11:37Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds.
11:37–11:42Objection, if it is a limited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced
11:42–11:47in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously.
11:47–11:50The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of
11:50–11:55one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory.
11:56–12:02Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or
12:02–12:09softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference
12:09–12:15is due to extreme similarity. If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of
12:15–12:19a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition
12:19–12:24such as, I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before.
12:24–12:29A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general
12:29–12:34cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a
12:34–12:38VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series
12:38–12:43must be accepted. The manner of sound production
12:43–12:50One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, otherwise sounds of
12:50–12:55clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person. The initial sound, conjoined
12:55–13:00with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction.
13:01–13:05An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction,
13:05–13:10thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider
13:10–13:17region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place.
13:17–13:23Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first,
13:23–13:28apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of
13:28–13:34air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds
13:34–13:40in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds.
13:40–13:44for the cadambasphere model.
13:44–13:49Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions?
13:49–13:54Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences,
13:54–13:57many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere.
13:57–14:02It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike, near difference
14:02–14:06of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects.
14:06–14:10difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates, and difference of prior
14:10–14:14absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate.
14:14–14:18Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the
14:18–14:20same.
14:20–14:23Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences
14:23–14:28of prior absence and destruction of previous color.
14:28–14:32There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color
14:32–14:35to be the same cause everywhere.
14:35–14:40prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences
14:40–14:45of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior
14:45–14:48absence of odor in the taste of water.
14:48–14:54Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant.
14:54–15:00Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes.
15:00–15:05Alternatively, though prior absence is alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors
15:05–15:11such as fragrance and stanchorize at different times from special conjunctions with fire.
15:11–15:15Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be
15:15–15:21deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest.
15:21–15:26Therefore prior absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general.
15:26–15:30The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because
15:30–15:33cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound.
15:33–15:37Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators
15:37–15:41are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a
15:41–15:43general cause.
15:43–15:48It is not true that one cause will aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production
15:48–15:51of an effect results from absence of its aggregate.
15:51–15:56The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly
15:56–15:58complex.
15:58–16:02of non-production of the effect with an inhering cause qualified by destruction establishes
16:02–16:10only the existent inhering cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality.
16:10–16:14Even without accepting inherance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness, the universal
16:14–16:20soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as color-ness.
16:20–16:24Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and
16:24–16:32the perception section of the Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
16:32–16:33The theory of Inherence
16:33–16:38Inherence is an apprehensive relation.
16:38–16:44Prima-Facey view, Inherence is not an apprehensive relation.
16:44–16:47Prima-Facey view, Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot
16:47–16:52be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and
16:52–16:53the like.
16:53–16:57Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between
16:57–17:01qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of Inherence as an apprehensive
17:01–17:06relation. The respondent may say, universals, qualities,
17:06–17:11actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually related by Inherence, such qualifier
17:11–17:15cognition and corresponding usage are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and
17:15–17:20therefore the relation of Inherence must be accepted. The prima facie objector, however,
17:20–17:25says that from the experience of related things Inherence itself does not appear as a qualifier,
17:25–17:30Inherence has not previously been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent,
17:30–17:35is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is.
17:35–17:40Nor does Inherence appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form,
17:40–17:46I know Inherence. The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as
17:46–17:51its object the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of Inherence is unsound. In an
17:51–17:55In inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises, as
17:55–17:59in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible.
17:59–18:04If merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject
18:04–18:06becomes pointless.
18:06–18:10Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite,
18:10–18:14when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results.
18:14–18:18A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance, because
18:18–18:22it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object, otherwise the
18:22–18:25cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent.
18:25–18:31Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as,
18:31–18:36the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented.
18:36–18:39Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates the
18:39–18:42objective reality of that relation.
18:42–18:46Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as
18:46–18:50devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no
18:50–18:56absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized.
18:56–19:00Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid
19:00–19:02of a pot.
19:02–19:06The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in
19:06–19:10some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance.
19:10–19:14A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not
19:14–19:20been established here as a possible relation. Nor can it be said that what is present here
19:20–19:26is merely relation in general. If this means the capacity to make known and the like, you
19:26–19:31incur the fault of proving what is already established. Both you and we accept that a
19:31–19:36qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier
19:36–19:40can. Nor can inheritance be accepted as the
19:40–19:44relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified
19:44–19:49cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely
19:49–19:54what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view,
19:54–20:00is a self-linking relation, not inheritance. Nor can the qualification, conforming to the
20:00–20:04pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it.
20:05–20:09Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example.
20:09–20:15The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating
20:15–20:18proof, has already been rejected.
20:18–20:22In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving
20:22–20:25reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without
20:25–20:29a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence.
20:29–20:34Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through
20:34–20:37a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists
20:37–20:41either in a distinct qualifierhood or is fixed by modehood and the like.
20:41–20:45But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation
20:45–20:48as a part of the objecthood of cognition.
20:48–20:52Objection, some of what you say may be true.
20:52–20:56Nevertheless the following argument proves the existence of inheritance.
20:56–21:00Cognitions of the form, is in this, concerning a hole in its parts, a quality in the qualified
21:00–21:05thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in,
21:05–21:09The cloth is in the threads, the white colour is in the cloth, motion is in this object,
21:09–21:13and cloth hood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between
21:13–21:15container and contained.
21:15–21:21Reason, these are both truth conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this.
21:21–21:24Corroborative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves
21:24–21:28the existence of the relation of conjunction.
21:28–21:30Prima-facy objecta, no.
21:30–21:34Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there
21:34–21:39is absent of a pot. Do not again add the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof,
21:39–21:44for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because
21:44–21:48the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct
21:48–21:53container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production,
21:53–21:57as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the
21:57–22:01cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition,
22:01–22:05in a pot's assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that the
22:05–22:08contained entity has an indispensable dependence.
22:08–22:11This dependence is a self-linking relation.
22:11–22:14That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

Plain text

Konjunction-Kam-inherence is the cause. Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherent in an object conjoined with the sense. Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object, because inherent in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like. It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again. Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception of other substances such as whole objects. Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone. A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor, conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception of odor. Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor. A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with the sense, which is unacceptable. Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance of the odor is present as a qualifier. If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would produce perception of the odor of cloth. Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause. Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres the cause perception of odor, while inherence merely delimits causality. This view is equivalent to the view that inherence in a conjoined object is the cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth. is the argument sound that inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction nor inherence nor both. On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a combination of conjunction and inherence, inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction in calling this relation conjunction come inherence, nor does calling it something more conflict with Nayaya. The Nayayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inherence and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction cum inheritance. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like. Conjunction cum inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal. The objection that color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance residing in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound. Though inheritance in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color, taste, and the like is apprehended through inheritance of those qualities in the conjoined object. Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances. Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable, therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect relation. Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ. Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by recurrent cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye, because that would overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the like is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance, hence the The consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible. It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty. If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universals such as colorness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities, mutual dependence would then follow. Or is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument? Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste, or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense. Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness. apprehensible by the eye is not blueness because it over extends to yellowness. Further objection that individual colors are one. Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color. It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would become a universal. A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance. The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to individual blueness. Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from difference between two colors. In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion. Though inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their production and destruction. Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one, and comparative cognition such as this is sweeter would be impossible. Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the cause. Sound inheres an auditory space. If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously apprehended. It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended, because there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there. Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended. Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational. Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality. Establishing Inherence as the cause. The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form of inheritance. It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended. The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity. Conjunction with the ear cavity specifies substrate hood described by inheritance. The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere. Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear is apprehended, sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not. Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited by hand conjunction. Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere. The objection that inheritance would thereby become non-pervasively occurrence does not arise. Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inheritance, but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualitative status. Even if the inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places. Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear. Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of sound locations, the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments such as the VA with Macron S substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely many directions. The reply that nearby and distant persons experience differences of loud and soft sound, thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound. One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed. When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the year opening is covered. The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the year is the auditory sense. The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the year opening, because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense. Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception. Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body is a sense faculty, the experience I hear the sound of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space to be the auditory sense. V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception. V.A. with Macron S are infinitely many, not all-pervasive, and are not common causes of sound perception. V-A with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V-A with Macron. How then arises the cognition sound is in the V-A with Macron. It is unnecessary to apprehend the V-A with Macron as the substrate of every sound. The V-A with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the in hearing cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate. Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds. Objection, if it is a limited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously. The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory. Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity. If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition such as, I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before. A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted. The manner of sound production One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, otherwise sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person. The initial sound, conjoined with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction. An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction, thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place. Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first, apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds. for the cadambasphere model. Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions? Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences, many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere. It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike, near difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects. difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates, and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate. Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same. Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of prior absence and destruction of previous color. There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere. prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the taste of water. Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant. Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes. Alternatively, though prior absence is alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors such as fragrance and stanchorize at different times from special conjunctions with fire. Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound. Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general cause. It is not true that one cause will aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production of an effect results from absence of its aggregate. The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly complex. of non-production of the effect with an inhering cause qualified by destruction establishes only the existent inhering cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality. Even without accepting inherance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness, the universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as color-ness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and the perception section of the Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of Inherence Inherence is an apprehensive relation. Prima-Facey view, Inherence is not an apprehensive relation. Prima-Facey view, Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like. Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of Inherence as an apprehensive relation. The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually related by Inherence, such qualifier cognition and corresponding usage are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of Inherence must be accepted. The prima facie objector, however, says that from the experience of related things Inherence itself does not appear as a qualifier, Inherence has not previously been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does Inherence appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form, I know Inherence. The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as its object the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of Inherence is unsound. In an In inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises, as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible. If merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject becomes pointless. Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results. A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance, because it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object, otherwise the cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent. Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented. Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective reality of that relation. Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized. Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot. The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance. A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not been established here as a possible relation. Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general. If this means the capacity to make known and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established. Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can. Nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inheritance. Nor can the qualification, conforming to the pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it. Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example. The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected. In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence. Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists either in a distinct qualifierhood or is fixed by modehood and the like. But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation as a part of the objecthood of cognition. Objection, some of what you say may be true. Nevertheless the following argument proves the existence of inheritance. Cognitions of the form, is in this, concerning a hole in its parts, a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in, The cloth is in the threads, the white colour is in the cloth, motion is in this object, and cloth hood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between container and contained. Reason, these are both truth conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this. Corroborative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction. Prima-facy objecta, no. Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there is absent of a pot. Do not again add the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof, for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production, as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition, in a pot's assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence. This dependence is a self-linking relation. That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

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