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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:05the established doctrine of deviation
0:05–0:1212. the doctrine of the deviating or inconclusive reason is now stated
0:12–0:22Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum
0:22–0:27Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when
0:27–0:31the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with
0:31–0:34the pro-bandom.
0:34–0:39Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness.
0:39–0:43A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the pro-bandom,
0:43–0:48and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect.
0:48–0:53An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property
0:53–0:59residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar instances,
0:59–1:03and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the
1:03–1:04probandom.
1:04–1:08This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the
1:08–1:13doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason.
1:13–1:17There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons.
1:17–1:2213. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated
1:22–1:27as separate fallacious reasons, Godama's ancient five-fold division of fallacious reasons would
1:27–1:32collapse. Godama includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class
1:32–1:37and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all.
1:37–1:41Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group the defeated reason and the equally
1:41–1:45strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence
1:45–1:49of the probandom while placing the rest in another class.
1:49–1:54The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it is
1:54–1:59not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them.
1:59–2:04With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends.
2:04–2:07Prima-facive view of the common reason.
2:07–2:1214. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom
2:12–2:16is not common reasonhood, because such a definition overextends to the non-exclusive
2:16–2:20reason, as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to
2:20–2:26the uncommon reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also overextends
2:26–2:30to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is
2:30–2:32a substance.
2:32–2:36For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with
2:36–2:39the probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed
2:39–2:43with the probandom or occurring in a similar instance does not yield a proper definition
2:43–2:45of commoness.
2:45–2:49Mere occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice, making
2:49–2:52the remaining qualifiers pointless.
2:52–2:56Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
2:56–3:0215. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also
3:02–3:05occurs in a similar instance.
3:05–3:09The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers.
3:09–3:14saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect
3:14–3:19of the common reason and defeats the proponent.
3:19–3:22It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order
3:22–3:27to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one.
3:27–3:31Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision
3:31–3:37of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless.
3:37–3:42Or is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness, because occurrence
3:42–3:45in a similar instance is unnecessary.
3:45–3:50This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since near occurrence in a counter
3:50–3:56instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason.
3:56–3:59Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not
3:59–4:01commonous.
4:01–4:0216.
4:02–4:06It may be proposed that commonness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance
4:06–4:10distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter instance
4:10–4:14distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude
4:14–4:18the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while
4:18–4:22including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either
4:22–4:25a jar or some other object.
4:25–4:31This proposal, however, is unacceptable. No such conjunctive definition is possible
4:31–4:36without first clearly distinguishing common, non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons.
4:37–4:41The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the
4:41–4:46probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and
4:46–4:50under extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance.
4:51–4:54With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends.
4:54–5:02The established doctrine of the common reason.
5:02–5:08The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood.
5:08–5:12The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandom is ascertained
5:12–5:16constitutes the common defect.
5:16–5:20Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning
5:20–5:25the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter
5:25–5:31instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed
5:31–5:38with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as noability,
5:38–5:42uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally
5:42–5:47taught as distinct defects, because in a state of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate
5:47–5:54commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the
5:54–5:57common reason ends.
5:57–5:59Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason.
5:59–6:0518, excluded from all similar and all counter instances, is called uncommon reasonhood.
6:05–6:09But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with a probandom
6:09–6:13does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded
6:13–6:15as uncommon?
6:15–6:19In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood occurs only in
6:19–6:23the subject, sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon
6:23–6:26fallacious reason because cognition of pervasion and of subject property
6:26–6:28had our causes of inferential cognition.
6:29–6:35Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandum is not uncommonness
6:35–6:39because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even
6:39–6:45without occurring in any similar instance where the probandum is certain. In the example sound
6:45–6:50is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once pervasion
6:50–6:53has been established.
6:53–6:55Recutation by the ancient scholars
6:55–7:0019. The foregoing argument is not sound.
7:00–7:10An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess the probandom and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandom.
7:10–7:24At the time of cognizing perversion, when the probandom and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandom, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless.
7:24–7:30In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless
7:30–7:33reason is a human defect.
7:33–7:36Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of
7:36–7:43doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter-instances.
7:43–7:47Possession of odor may be common in, earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and
7:47–7:51sound is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent
7:51–7:56because of soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion.
7:57–8:02A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance.
8:04–8:07Exclusion from all similar instances is the defect.
8:08–8:1320. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect,
8:13–8:18exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion.
8:18–8:23On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful
8:23–8:26in inference for another.
8:26–8:30Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is established
8:30–8:35only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances.
8:35–8:40Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion, the defect lies only in exclusion
8:40–8:43from similar instances.
8:43–8:47If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, and stops, the
8:47–8:51The opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply
8:51–8:54for incomplete use of the Nyaya statements.
8:54–8:58Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction of perversion must
8:58–9:00be made explicit.
9:00–9:05Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is nearly a deficiency in the use of Nyaya
9:05–9:07statements in inference for another.
9:07–9:12In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs
9:12–9:15cognition of perversion.
9:15–9:22the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances alone.
9:22–9:27With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends.
9:27–9:29The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason
9:29–9:3621. According to the Established Doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes
9:36–9:42negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject.
9:42–9:46When the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both
9:46–9:51similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence
9:51–9:57of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence.
9:57–10:01In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum
10:01–10:06and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty
10:06–10:08on both sides.
10:08–10:13The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct.
10:13–10:18Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic.
10:18–10:22For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all
10:22–10:27similar instances is necessary.
10:27–10:31In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing
10:31–10:36cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances.
10:36–10:41from counter instances is not indispensable because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing
10:41–10:47the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative pervasion.
10:47–10:52Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar
10:52–10:55instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the
10:55–10:59absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed
10:59–11:02by an example or counter example.
11:02–11:09In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar instances.
11:09–11:14Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier
11:14–11:15is pointless.
11:15–11:20A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once
11:20–11:25contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason.
11:25–11:30With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends.
11:30–11:33a facey view of the non-exclusive reason.
11:33–11:3923. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar
11:39–11:46and counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter
11:46–11:51instances are held to be established or unestablished.
11:51–11:54Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and
11:54–11:59delimited by a purely affirmative pro-bandom. A reason such as no ability, pervaded
11:59–12:04by a purely affirmative probandom is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is
12:04–12:09knowable. On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom,
12:09–12:12can take the form of the common defect in, Earth is different from the other substances
12:12–12:15because it possesses odor.
12:15–12:20If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes
12:20–12:24common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence
12:24–12:29in all things are momentary because they exist, would not be non-exclusive but merely common.
12:30–12:35If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless
12:35–12:42because it fails to establish the probandom. Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative
12:42–12:48property is not non-exclusiveness. Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a
12:48–12:53similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition
12:53–12:57of its occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of
12:57–13:04the probandom, is non-exclusiveness. In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the
13:04–13:08subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of
13:08–13:15excluding the contradictory reason. A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely
13:15–13:20affirmative probandom, and making the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence,
13:20–13:25is not a definition of the non-exclusive reason. In the inference, all things are
13:25–13:30nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom is not certain at the time the reason
13:30–13:34is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not established merely from doubt.
13:36–13:40Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order to
13:40–13:45preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers
13:45–13:49make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well.
13:50–13:53This definition is therefore unacceptable.
13:54–13:58Ignorance outside the subject of concomitance useful for apprehending
13:58–14:00perversion is not non-exclusiveness.
14:03–14:07It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known in the subject or in
14:07–14:13objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion.
14:15–14:19But this definition over extends to a faultless reason because even when perversion has been
14:19–14:24ascertained in the subject, concomitance outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown.
14:24–14:29Where all objects constitute the subject, objects outside the subject are impossible, making
14:29–14:31the definition inapplicable.
14:31–14:36The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitance
14:36–14:40useful for apprehending their perversion may remain uncertain both in the subject
14:40–14:42and outside it.
14:42–14:48Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary.
14:48–14:52The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual
14:52–14:57reasons being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness.
14:57–15:02The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers.
15:02–15:08With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends.
15:08–15:10The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason
15:10–15:1426.
15:14–15:18The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary
15:18–15:23properties that produce determinate cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason.
15:24–15:27Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation,
15:27–15:32but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited.
15:33–15:38In an inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and
15:38–15:43ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known,
15:43–15:47becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion.
15:48–15:53Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative
15:53–15:58property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending
15:58–16:03perversion. In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable,
16:03–16:09although no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandum,
16:09–16:12it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply.
16:13–16:22Example of a non-exclusive reason. Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability.
16:22–16:29Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason.
16:29–16:44In the context of a purely negative pro-bandom, when the absence of a property useful for apprehending perversion arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises.
16:44–16:51Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason.
16:51–17:04Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning perversion and its demonstration are in both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises.
17:04–17:09With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends.
17:09–17:1928. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence
17:19–17:24of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in
17:24–17:29this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree.
17:29–17:33Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute
17:33–17:38absence situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference, this
17:38–17:42substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by
17:42–17:45qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition.
17:47–17:52A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandom,
17:52–17:57not co-located with the probandom, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandom.
17:58–18:02The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandom,
18:02–18:06because opposition to the probandom is common to both positive and negative probanda.
18:08–18:17Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing.
18:17–18:24Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established.
18:24–18:28Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view.
18:28–18:3929. An objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory.
18:39–18:43Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason.
18:44–18:56It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction.
18:56–19:033. Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandom
19:03–19:07may be established by another defective reason, but the contradiction defective the reason that
19:07–19:11first appeared as opposed to the probandom itself prevents the production of inferential cognition.
19:12–19:14Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason.
19:14–19:194. Refutation of the traditional view.
19:21–19:2630. The traditionalists may say that colocation of the reason with the absence of the probandom
19:26–19:31is only a defect involving deviation, the defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the
19:31–19:37cumbersome qualifier co-located with the absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished
19:37–19:44probandum too, this qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory
19:44–19:49probandum, that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a
19:49–19:54separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandum.
19:54–20:00If a occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition
20:00–20:03of deviation, the uncommon reason is excluded.
20:03–20:07For this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect
20:07–20:09of a reason.
20:09–20:14But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional
20:14–20:17qualifier is pointless.
20:17–20:21The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common
20:21–20:28reason ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable.
20:30–20:37The view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the
20:37–20:42probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the
20:42–20:48common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose probandom is unestablished.
20:48–20:55For example, in there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded
20:55–21:00by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself.
21:00–21:04In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason
21:04–21:08creates the defect of superfluity.
21:08–21:12This view, however, is not sound.
21:12–21:16Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located
21:16–21:22with the probandom burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory
21:22–21:27reason, analysis would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect
21:27–21:32of superfluity in the reason is not automatically established.
21:32–21:36In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes
21:36–21:41the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses
21:41–21:48smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent. View that contradiction
21:48–21:50is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

Plain text

the established doctrine of deviation 12. the doctrine of the deviating or inconclusive reason is now stated Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the pro-bandom. Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness. A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the pro-bandom, and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect. An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar instances, and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandom. This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons. 13. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated as separate fallacious reasons, Godama's ancient five-fold division of fallacious reasons would collapse. Godama includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all. Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the probandom while placing the rest in another class. The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them. With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends. Prima-facive view of the common reason. 14. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom is not common reasonhood, because such a definition overextends to the non-exclusive reason, as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the uncommon reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also overextends to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance. For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom or occurring in a similar instance does not yield a proper definition of commoness. Mere occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice, making the remaining qualifiers pointless. Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. 15. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance. The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers. saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent. It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one. Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless. Or is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since near occurrence in a counter instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason. Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonous. 16. It may be proposed that commonness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either a jar or some other object. This proposal, however, is unacceptable. No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common, non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons. The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance. With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends. The established doctrine of the common reason. The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood. The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandom is ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as noability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects, because in a state of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends. Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason. 18, excluded from all similar and all counter instances, is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with a probandom does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood occurs only in the subject, sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason because cognition of pervasion and of subject property had our causes of inferential cognition. Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandum is not uncommonness because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandum is certain. In the example sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once pervasion has been established. Recutation by the ancient scholars 19. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess the probandom and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandom. At the time of cognizing perversion, when the probandom and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandom, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless. In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter-instances. Possession of odor may be common in, earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion. A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance. Exclusion from all similar instances is the defect. 20. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful in inference for another. Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is established only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances. Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion, the defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances. If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, and stops, the The opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for incomplete use of the Nyaya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction of perversion must be made explicit. Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is nearly a deficiency in the use of Nyaya statements in inference for another. In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs cognition of perversion. the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances alone. With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason 21. According to the Established Doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject. When the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence. In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both sides. The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct. Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic. For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all similar instances is necessary. In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances. from counter instances is not indispensable because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative pervasion. Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example or counter example. In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar instances. Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier is pointless. A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason. With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends. a facey view of the non-exclusive reason. 23. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar and counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are held to be established or unestablished. Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and delimited by a purely affirmative pro-bandom. A reason such as no ability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is knowable. On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take the form of the common defect in, Earth is different from the other substances because it possesses odor. If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence in all things are momentary because they exist, would not be non-exclusive but merely common. If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom. Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness. Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness. In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory reason. A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative probandom, and making the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence, is not a definition of the non-exclusive reason. In the inference, all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable. Ignorance outside the subject of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known in the subject or in objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion. But this definition over extends to a faultless reason because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitance outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the subject, objects outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable. The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitance useful for apprehending their perversion may remain uncertain both in the subject and outside it. Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary. The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual reasons being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness. The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers. With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason 26. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce determinate cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason. Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited. In an inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known, becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion. Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending perversion. In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandum, it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply. Example of a non-exclusive reason. Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability. Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason. In the context of a purely negative pro-bandom, when the absence of a property useful for apprehending perversion arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises. Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason. Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning perversion and its demonstration are in both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises. With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends. 28. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree. Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute absence situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference, this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition. A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandom, not co-located with the probandom, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandom. The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandom, because opposition to the probandom is common to both positive and negative probanda. Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing. Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established. Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view. 29. An objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory. Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason. It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction. 3. Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandom may be established by another defective reason, but the contradiction defective the reason that first appeared as opposed to the probandom itself prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason. 4. Refutation of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that colocation of the reason with the absence of the probandom is only a defect involving deviation, the defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier co-located with the absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished probandum too, this qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandum, that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandum. If a occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition of deviation, the uncommon reason is excluded. For this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect of a reason. But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional qualifier is pointless. The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable. The view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose probandom is unestablished. For example, in there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defect of superfluity. This view, however, is not sound. Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with the probandom burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect of superfluity in the reason is not automatically established. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent. View that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

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