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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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Detected language: en (0.993478)
Duration: 20:05
Source: Open preserved recording

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0:02–0:13इन्वरिंष अगड, कमप्लिक मइथिली त्रन्स्लेषन, इन्वरिंष अगड, तद्वसिंट मैइ.
0:13–0:21वॉन, दुस, after इन्वरिंष has been explained, डड, the creator of the world and supreme among persons is established through inference.
0:21–0:29डड is established by the inference, एप अध the other things have an agent, because they are effects, like a jar.
0:29–0:32अज्चन, अध अध the other things are not the subject.
0:32–0:372. The following objection may now be raised, Earth and the other entities cannot separately
0:37–0:41be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as Earth cannot be denoted
0:41–0:46merely by the word, Earth, and so forth. Nor can Earth and the others collectively be
0:46–0:50the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary
0:50–0:54delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt
0:54–0:57or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject
0:57–1:02of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent
1:02–1:07common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is
1:07–1:11certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually
1:11–1:13doubts God's existence.
1:13–1:15The problem of mutual dependence
1:15–1:203. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are
1:20–1:25equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge.
1:25–1:29In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from
1:29–1:33mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented
1:33–1:38only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even
1:38–1:44concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such
1:44–1:48as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences
1:48–1:54would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are
1:54–1:56are not the subject.
1:56–2:01For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human
2:01–2:06agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body.
2:06–2:11Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the
2:11–2:15self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like,
2:15–2:20and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject.
2:20–2:25Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too
2:25–2:31may, through unseen merit and demerit, be agents of earth and the other entities.
2:31–2:34Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort,
2:34–2:38or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent
2:38–2:40and opponent.
2:40–2:43Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen
2:43–2:45merit or demerit.
2:45–2:51Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit,
2:51–2:56nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject.
2:56–3:01God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced
3:01–3:06by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities.
3:06–3:10Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established,
3:10–3:15because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form.
3:15–3:19Earth alone is not the subject.
3:19–3:23Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning
3:23–3:30deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness.
3:30–3:34Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt
3:34–3:38about the reason in a certain counter instance.
3:38–3:42Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence
3:42–3:47of the probandum is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reason's occurrence
3:47–3:51becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the reason's presence in a counter-instance
3:51–3:56possessing the absence of the probandum, or through doubt about the absence of the probandum
3:56–3:59and a locus possessing the reason.
3:59–4:03Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject
4:03–4:07possessing the probandum. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason
4:07–4:13invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject.
4:13–4:16Inference of God, Tatva sent Mai.
4:16–4:19A Sprout cannot be the subject.
4:19–4:206.
4:20–4:25It may now be said, in the case of a Sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful,
4:25–4:29therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that Sprout.
4:29–4:32But once a current of effected in the Sprout is certain, inference of the probandom
4:32–4:35possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the
4:35–4:39probandum, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in
4:39–4:44the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally
4:44–4:48strong counter reason arises in that very sprout.
4:48–4:53This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effected is
4:53–4:57not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that
4:57–5:02inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential
5:02–5:05that statement would become a second thesis.
5:05–5:09If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an inference
5:09–5:13of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual
5:13–5:15dependence.
5:15–5:18Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth
5:18–5:20and the other things as subjects.
5:20–5:24Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect
5:24–5:28of changing the subject matter arises.
5:28–5:32By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but
5:32–5:34God will not be established.
5:34–5:38Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God,
5:38–5:43because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent.
5:43–5:47Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition,
5:47–5:50desire to act, and effort.
5:50–5:55Further, possession of an agent is neither co-presence with a person who exerts effort
5:55–5:59nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to
5:59–6:04striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established
6:04–6:07arises.
6:07–6:10Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person in doubt with
6:10–6:15direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort.
6:15–6:19If concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other
6:19–6:23as its object, a change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions
6:23–6:24and the like.
6:24–6:28Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like.
6:29–6:34Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth.
6:35–6:42It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element earth,
6:42–6:45because there is deviation in their causal status.
6:46–6:49This argument, however, is not sound.
6:49–7:03Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth or hell to concern the material cause therefore through that cognition and the like and by means of the unseen there would be the defect of re establishing what has already been established.
7:04–7:08Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort.
7:08–7:159. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither
7:15–7:19being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the
7:19–7:23state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the
7:23–7:28productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration
7:28–7:33of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise.
7:34–7:37Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily
7:37–7:42action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore,
7:42–7:47being made by a person would become an extraneous condition.
7:47–7:52Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause.
7:52–7:56Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and
7:56–8:00the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such
8:00–8:05a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material
8:05–8:10material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such
8:10–8:15as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as
8:15–8:19in Kiktra is devoted to his own mother, like Maitre.
8:19–8:24Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition.
8:24–8:27Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor
8:27–8:29opponent is trustworthy.
8:29–8:33In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established generally only when the
8:33–8:37general pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the
8:37–8:42probandum is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional
8:42–8:44distinct object be established.
8:44–8:48Inference of God, Tat the Sint Mai
8:48–8:52Pervasion by the probandum cannot be apprehended.
8:52–8:5811, further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that
8:58–9:02is, the status of the probandum as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced
9:02–9:07by cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere
9:07–9:11known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference
9:11–9:16of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the
9:16–9:20like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already
9:20–9:26established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire,
9:26–9:30and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of
9:30–9:35of yogically produced merit, generic character contact, or cognition itself, those cognitions
9:35–9:39and the like may become causes of an effect.
9:39–9:42Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the
9:42–9:47moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition
9:47–9:49and the like is present.
9:49–9:53That person too may be productive through the unseen.
9:53–9:57The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its
9:57–10:01material cause has already been refuted.
10:01–10:04The form of the subject and the probandom.
10:04–10:1012. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced,
10:10–10:15but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort
10:15–10:20concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact,
10:20–10:24is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated
10:24–10:27by yogic merit.
10:27–10:31Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed
10:31–10:36with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being
10:36–10:41produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated
10:41–10:44by yogic merit.
10:44–10:48Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with
10:48–10:52direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced
10:52–10:57through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not
10:57–11:02being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced
11:02–11:07through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future.
11:07–11:11It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and
11:11–11:15effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other
11:15–11:17entities.
11:17–11:23Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended.
11:23–11:28Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment
11:28–11:33of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises.
11:33–11:36Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom
11:36–11:3813.
11:38–11:42No, this proposal is not sound.
11:42–11:46Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness
11:46–11:50of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent.
11:50–11:55Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the
11:55–11:59opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of
11:59–12:04God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness
12:04–12:08were accepted as established for the opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished
12:08–12:13in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced
12:13–12:17by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit which in turn produces
12:17–12:22the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth,
12:22–12:27hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises.
12:27–12:31Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition
12:31–12:37is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations
12:37–12:42of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandom
12:42–12:47becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that
12:47–12:52inference would have to be held to arise only from determinant cognition of perversion produced
12:52–12:58in that way. The probandom would therefore be unestablished.
12:58–13:04Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise.
13:04–13:1014. It may now be argued that the probandom is established because of the reasons perversion.
13:10–13:15The reason's pervasion has the following specific form, wherever there is affected, there is
13:15–13:19being produced by a knower of that affects material cause.
13:19–13:24Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material
13:24–13:25causes.
13:25–13:30Therefore, through this specific pervasion, the reason effect hood establishes in earth
13:30–13:34and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material
13:34–13:39cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effect hood occurs.
13:39–13:44Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the
13:44–13:47inference of God.
13:47–13:50Refutation of the argument.
13:50–13:5115.
13:51–13:54This argument, however, is not sound.
13:54–13:59The question is, in what form does cognition of the pervasion of the reason-effecthood
13:59–14:03arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of
14:03–14:08the material cause of that particular jar, as being produced by a knower of the material
14:08–14:12cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general?
14:13–14:18Under the first alternative, the reason effect hood deviates from the property of being produced
14:18–14:25by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the
14:25–14:31probandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the like have no
14:31–14:36recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar.
14:36–14:40The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence.
14:40–14:45Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in
14:45–14:50general, thereby removing the defective absence of perversion by the probandom.
14:50–14:54A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference.
14:54–14:59For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because,
14:59–15:01while alive, he is not inside the house.
15:01–15:02house.
15:02–15:08Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself,
15:08–15:13while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it.
15:13–15:17In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational
15:17–15:21relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only
15:21–15:24negative provision.
15:24–15:28Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established
15:28–15:31arises.
15:31–15:35of God, Tat Visint Mai.
15:35–15:36The Form of the Inference of God
15:36–15:4316. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form,
15:43–15:48the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be
15:48–15:53produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort,
15:53–15:59because it is an effect, like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the
15:59–16:03complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would
16:03–16:07become an unseen factor.
16:07–16:10This proposal, however, is not sound.
16:10–16:14The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent.
16:14–16:18Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by
16:18–16:21those very cognitions and the like is not established.
16:21–16:25Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do
16:25–16:28not become instrumental in producing dyads.
16:28–16:33This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation
16:33–16:38is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is
16:38–16:39an effect.
16:39–16:44Mirror efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does
16:44–16:51not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality.
16:51–16:56The nature of the reason cannot be determined.
16:56–17:00Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effecthood is not a property
17:00–17:05in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property
17:05–17:11cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason effect be regarded as relation
17:11–17:16to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects
17:16–17:22have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established. Nor can
17:22–17:26the reason effect would be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from
17:26–17:32time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property.
17:32–17:36Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because
17:36–17:41this property deviates in the condition of destruction.
17:41–17:45Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing
17:45–17:49existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent,
17:49–17:53while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction.
17:53–17:58alternative form of the inference of God.
17:58–18:0318. Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows. This jar
18:03–18:07is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition,
18:07–18:14desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a cloth.
18:14–18:19This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter
18:19–18:23instance, such an inference is not instrumental.
18:23–18:27Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal
18:27–18:32substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences.
18:32–18:36This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the
18:36–18:41impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth.
18:41–18:45And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and
18:45–18:51pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure in pain producing this. Direct cognition, because
18:51–18:57it is a direct cognition of pleasure in pain. The proposed alternative inference is also
18:57–19:01defective because of a counter-inference. This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal
19:01–19:05cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing
19:05–19:11this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another jar.
19:11–19:13A Second Alternative Form of the Inference
19:13–19:1619.
19:16–19:20Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favourable
19:20–19:25to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object.
19:25–19:29It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, but
19:29–19:33conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not
19:33–19:38the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation.
19:38–19:41On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur
19:41–19:46in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of
19:46–19:50all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental
19:50–19:53effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental
19:53–19:54action.
19:54–19:58Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the proceeding, or
19:58–20:01subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

Plain text

इन्वरिंष अगड, कमप्लिक मइथिली त्रन्स्लेषन, इन्वरिंष अगड, तद्वसिंट मैइ. वॉन, दुस, after इन्वरिंष has been explained, डड, the creator of the world and supreme among persons is established through inference. डड is established by the inference, एप अध the other things have an agent, because they are effects, like a jar. अज्चन, अध अध the other things are not the subject. 2. The following objection may now be raised, Earth and the other entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as Earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, Earth, and so forth. Nor can Earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence. The problem of mutual dependence 3. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are are not the subject. For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, be agents of earth and the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort, or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form. Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandum is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reason's occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the reason's presence in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandum, or through doubt about the absence of the probandum and a locus possessing the reason. Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing the probandum. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject. Inference of God, Tatva sent Mai. A Sprout cannot be the subject. 6. It may now be said, in the case of a Sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful, therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that Sprout. But once a current of effected in the Sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandum, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that very sprout. This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effected is not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises. By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established. Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent. Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither co-presence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person in doubt with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. If concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object, a change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth. It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status. This argument, however, is not sound. Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth or hell to concern the material cause therefore through that cognition and the like and by means of the unseen there would be the defect of re establishing what has already been established. Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort. 9. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition. Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause. Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in Kiktra is devoted to his own mother, like Maitre. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition. Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandum is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established. Inference of God, Tat the Sint Mai Pervasion by the probandum cannot be apprehended. 11, further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the probandum as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of of yogically produced merit, generic character contact, or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect. Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future. It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises. Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom 13. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandom becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinant cognition of perversion produced in that way. The probandom would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14. It may now be argued that the probandom is established because of the reasons perversion. The reason's pervasion has the following specific form, wherever there is affected, there is being produced by a knower of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific pervasion, the reason effect hood establishes in earth and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effect hood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound. The question is, in what form does cognition of the pervasion of the reason-effecthood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of the material cause of that particular jar, as being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general? Under the first alternative, the reason effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defective absence of perversion by the probandom. A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house. house. Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it. In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative provision. Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises. of God, Tat Visint Mai. The Form of the Inference of God 16. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form, the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect, like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor. This proposal, however, is not sound. The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent. Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established. Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing dyads. This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect. Mirror efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality. The nature of the reason cannot be determined. Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effecthood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason effect be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established. Nor can the reason effect would be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property. Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because this property deviates in the condition of destruction. Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent, while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction. alternative form of the inference of God. 18. Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows. This jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences. This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth. And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure in pain producing this. Direct cognition, because it is a direct cognition of pleasure in pain. The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter-inference. This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another jar. A Second Alternative Form of the Inference 19. Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favourable to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, but conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action. Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the proceeding, or subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

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