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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 23:58
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0:02–0:04Alternative Definitions
0:04–0:22Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode of property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence.
0:22–0:35Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid.
0:35–0:47Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid.
0:47–0:53In the illusion, the shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component
0:53–0:58are separate, the first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid
0:58–1:03cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension, objecthood with respect to
1:03–1:07the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct.
1:07–1:11In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with
1:11–1:17respect to pot and cloth differs, both definitions apply properly.
1:17–1:22But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate
1:22–1:24from accepted entities.
1:24–1:29When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood
1:29–1:35may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not.
1:35–1:40Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known,
1:40–1:45the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended.
1:45–1:50Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather,
1:50–1:55it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition.
1:55–2:00Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition,
2:00–2:04a special nature of being related to that cognition.
2:04–2:09This specific objecthood is not self-evident nearly from general cognition of the thing.
2:09–2:14Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to
2:14–2:19the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific
2:19–2:28objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition.
2:28–2:32Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can
2:32–2:37the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition
2:37–2:41is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status or objecthood
2:41–2:46too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition.
2:46–2:49additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows.
2:50–2:55In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is
2:55–2:59inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of
2:59–3:04the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise,
3:04–3:09once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about
3:09–3:15each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the
3:15–3:19substrate and the nature of the absence or inheritance unknown, one may still doubt,
3:19–3:22is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot.
3:23–3:27This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition
3:27–3:32but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation
3:32–3:36is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood.
3:38–3:39Conclusion
3:41–3:45Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition,
3:45–3:49These two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificant cognition,
3:49–3:52there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object
3:52–3:56head of pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificant cognition.
3:58–4:03This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground,
4:03–4:06can also apprehend the object hood of pot-absence.
4:07–4:11If another object hood over and above this object hood is posited in qualifier,
4:11–4:15qualific and cognition, infinite regress follows.
4:16–4:20The difference between qualifier qualific and cognition and collective cognition may arise
4:20–4:23sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects,
4:23–4:28and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity
4:28–4:32according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object,
4:32–4:35because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object.
4:36–4:40Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in
4:40–4:44in the perception section.
4:44–4:50The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion.
4:50–4:54The theory of misapprehension.
4:54–4:59Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible.
4:59–5:02Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical.
5:02–5:05No example exists of the thing to be excluded
5:05–5:07by the definition of invalid cognition.
5:07–5:09Mentioning a qualifier, that is,
5:09–5:11a property residing in the qualifcant
5:11–5:14in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless
5:14–5:16because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition.
5:17–5:29Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the object of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver.
5:29–5:33This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason.
5:33–5:39The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion.
5:39–5:45Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object
5:45–5:49head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver.
5:49–5:54In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in
5:54–5:58cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though
5:58–6:00the object is not silver.
6:00–6:05Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition.
6:05–6:10The defective lacking an example in the inference.
6:10–6:15of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this
6:15–6:19shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity
6:19–6:24toward the shell-like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired
6:24–6:28silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver
6:28–6:33cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the
6:33–6:37inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of
6:37–6:41of the objecthood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking
6:41–6:47silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized
6:47–6:52here, if, one, is removed, even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced
6:52–6:56from cognition having silverness as mode would be established. Therefore inference
6:56–7:05does not establish invalid cognition. The Nyayaka establishment of invalid cognition.
7:05–7:09The Nayaika replies that activity toward the shell produced by desire for silver is generated
7:09–7:14by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant,
7:14–7:19because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell.
7:19–7:22Being activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because
7:22–7:26activityhood itself is a distinct reason here.
7:26–7:31Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualifcant of a cognition
7:31–7:36that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for
7:36–7:41silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell.
7:42–7:47An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of
7:47–7:52silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as veridical cognition of silver does.
7:53–7:58If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create
7:58–8:03contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity
8:03–8:06will alone be the subject.
8:06–8:10Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted
8:10–8:15cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing
8:15–8:20objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained.
8:20–8:24Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as
8:24–8:29qualifier in the shell is qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the
8:29–8:36shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous
8:36–8:42condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from
8:42–8:48a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before
8:48–8:55one its qualificon regularly produces activity. The Prabhācāra view, non-apprehension of
8:55–9:02difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhācāra says that a specifically
9:02–9:06invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary.
9:06–9:10Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference
9:10–9:15between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver.
9:15–9:20To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension
9:20–9:25of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from
9:25–9:32a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition
9:32–9:37accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be
9:37–9:41stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of
9:41–9:45silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood
9:45–9:50of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode.
9:50–9:54Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition
9:54–9:59such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference
9:59–10:02too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference.
10:02–10:07Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell
10:07–10:10before one as mutually unrelated objects.
10:10–10:14Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition
10:14–10:18of identity with unknown silver is impossible.
10:18–10:23Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause
10:23–10:28Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow,
10:28–10:32not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object,
10:32–10:35he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white
10:35–10:40conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white,
10:40–10:45should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow
10:45–10:49object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference.
10:50–10:54Therefore the Nyayaka too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of
10:54–10:58activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not
10:58–11:02prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not
11:02–11:07prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views.
11:09–11:14Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object
11:14–11:20as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not
11:20–11:25take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired
11:25–11:30silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an
11:30–11:34earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent
11:34–11:38defect produced cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that
11:38–11:43difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity.
11:43–11:53Objection on this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell.
11:53–12:04Reflexive awareness such as I know this shell as silver or this is known as silver also takes the shell as its object. It cannot be described merely as non apprehension of silver's non relation.
12:04–12:10Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises
12:10–12:14because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as
12:14–12:19object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only
12:19–12:24as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualify cognition taking
12:24–12:29both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a
12:29–12:33shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and
12:33–12:39latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness.
12:39–12:44Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition.
12:44–12:48Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately
12:48–12:54remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together.
12:54–12:58Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different
12:58–13:02times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed
13:02–13:06alternatives remembered at two different times.
13:06–13:11It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt is this a post or a
13:11–13:13person.
13:13–13:17Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at
13:17–13:20the time of cognition of both alternatives.
13:20–13:25Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because
13:25–13:30through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence.
13:30–13:35the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not
13:35–13:41arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however,
13:41–13:44activity also does not arise.
13:44–13:47Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke
13:47–13:51may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the
13:51–13:53lake.
13:53–13:56The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is
13:56–14:01no fire, fire independently remembered through perversion becomes the inference that prompts
14:01–14:09activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required.
14:09–14:14If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark,
14:14–14:20the perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ.
14:20–14:24In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means,
14:24–14:28In the latter there is such recollection.
14:28–14:35The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object.
14:35–14:40Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired
14:40–14:44shell causes withdrawal from silver.
14:44–14:47Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual
14:47–14:52absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise
14:52–14:56the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation,
14:56–15:02invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired
15:02–15:06object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver,
15:06–15:11this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have
15:11–15:16to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension of different causes withdraw, in the case,
15:16–15:20this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required.
15:20–15:24In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver.
15:24–15:29Activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together.
15:29–15:34There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion.
15:34–15:38The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension
15:38–15:43and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended.
15:43–15:48Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell, would have to be admitted.
15:48–15:55See in withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects.
15:55–16:02The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand.
16:02–16:06Some partial MSAKs say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which
16:06–16:12negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension.
16:12–16:17Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established,
16:17–16:20being sublated is not established.
16:20–16:25A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension
16:25–16:29of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference.
16:29–16:34In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted.
16:34–16:38The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver
16:38–16:42as its mode, then invalid cognition of, silver alone, cannot be cognition of the
16:42–16:44non-silver shell.
16:44–16:48If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes
16:48–16:53collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition,
16:53–16:56when the shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant.
16:57–17:01Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of
17:01–17:06cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid,
17:06–17:10unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain
17:10–17:16liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that confidence in veridical cognition
17:16–17:21is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective
17:21–17:26cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise
17:26–17:31because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Naya Yuka commits a great error
17:31–17:36in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object,
17:36–17:38how can confidence in it be possible through any means?
17:40–17:43Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension
17:43–17:49If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established?
17:50–17:54If it takes a non-existent thing as object, the mad hyamica theory of apprehension of the
17:54–17:59unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available.
18:01–18:05The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause
18:05–18:10invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference
18:10–18:16respectively. Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition,
18:16–18:21because the required fitness or markhood is absent, only veridical cognition together with
18:21–18:27ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition-like view that the
18:27–18:31Iapprehend's remembered silverness in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and
18:31–18:37Iapprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite
18:37–18:41lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect.
18:42–18:46A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect,
18:46–18:51nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested,
18:51–18:56it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed.
18:57–19:03Ash may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition
19:03–19:08with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by
19:08–19:14veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of
19:14–19:19misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone.
19:22–19:28Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed
19:28–19:33cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier,
19:33–19:37because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition.
19:38–19:41In reality this is merely non-apprehension, ignorance of difference.
19:42–19:47The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and,
19:47–19:51because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended,
19:51–19:52produces activity toward the shell.
19:54–19:58Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing
19:58–20:01objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness.
20:01–20:05Cognition hood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognition hood.
20:06–20:11The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition
20:11–20:16different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition
20:16–20:21different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition
20:21–20:25called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell.
20:26–20:30On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the
20:30–20:34the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect
20:34–20:40to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension
20:40–20:44expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through
20:44–20:48non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver,
20:48–20:54concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical,
20:54–20:58on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on
20:58–21:03the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical,
21:03–21:07but cognition met within difference produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called
21:07–21:11non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the
21:11–21:21perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive
21:21–21:26doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object
21:26–21:30object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated
21:30–21:35activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes
21:35–21:39the objecthood of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality
21:39–21:43of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality
21:43–21:48of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable
21:48–21:52through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting
21:52–21:57qualification in invalid cognition too.
21:57–22:01Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the
22:01–22:03cause.
22:03–22:07It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver
22:07–22:12causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended,
22:12–22:13delimits causality.
22:13–22:17But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension
22:17–22:18of difference.
22:18–22:23Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated
22:23–22:29an uncoroperated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both.
22:29–22:31But this is unsound.
22:31–22:35Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be
22:35–22:40admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted.
22:40–22:45Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of
22:45–22:52activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection.
22:52–22:57activity arises from qualified cognition.
22:57–23:02It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces
23:02–23:04needless complexity.
23:04–23:09Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that complexity
23:09–23:13disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a
23:13–23:16defect when admitting a means.
23:16–23:22That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof.
23:22–23:28uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity,
23:28–23:30like corroborated activity.
23:30–23:35An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is
23:35–23:40established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable.
23:40–23:45Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty
23:45–23:49too becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition.
23:49–23:54To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof
23:54–23:54of the doctrine.

Plain text

Alternative Definitions Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode of property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence. Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid. Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid. In the illusion, the shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate, the first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension, objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct. In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs, both definitions apply properly. But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities. When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not. Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended. Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition. Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not self-evident nearly from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition. Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status or objecthood too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition. additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows. In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inheritance unknown, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot. This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood. Conclusion Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, These two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificant cognition, there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object head of pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificant cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the object hood of pot-absence. If another object hood over and above this object hood is posited in qualifier, qualific and cognition, infinite regress follows. The difference between qualifier qualific and cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in in the perception section. The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualifcant in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the object of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition. The defective lacking an example in the inference. of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell-like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of of the objecthood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized here, if, one, is removed, even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition. The Nyayaka establishment of invalid cognition. The Nayaika replies that activity toward the shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because activityhood itself is a distinct reason here. Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualifcant of a cognition that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as veridical cognition of silver does. If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained. Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier in the shell is qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualificon regularly produces activity. The Prabhācāra view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhācāra says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition of identity with unknown silver is impossible. Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore the Nyayaka too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views. Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity. Objection on this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell. Reflexive awareness such as I know this shell as silver or this is known as silver also takes the shell as its object. It cannot be described merely as non apprehension of silver's non relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualify cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness. Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition. Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together. Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed alternatives remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt is this a post or a person. Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives. Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence. the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however, activity also does not arise. Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently remembered through perversion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ. In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, In the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver. Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension of different causes withdraw, in the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver. Activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell, would have to be admitted. See in withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects. The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand. Some partial MSAKs say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension. Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference. In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted. The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver as its mode, then invalid cognition of, silver alone, cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell. If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition, when the shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant. Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Naya Yuka commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means? Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established? If it takes a non-existent thing as object, the mad hyamica theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available. The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively. Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or markhood is absent, only veridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition-like view that the Iapprehend's remembered silverness in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and Iapprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect. A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed. Ash may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition. In reality this is merely non-apprehension, ignorance of difference. The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and, because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness. Cognition hood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognition hood. The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell. On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver, concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within difference produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the objecthood of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too. Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause. It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, delimits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated an uncoroperated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both. But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection. activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting a means. That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof. uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity, like corroborated activity. An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable. Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition. To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof of the doctrine.

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