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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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asr-draft

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No

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small

Detected language

en (0.99528)

Duration

21:12

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Timestamped machine output

1. 0:02–0:05दोक्त्रन विलिदिदि is produced by a merit.
2. 0:05–0:10दनेयाका replies that, on the साखगविष्व,
3. 0:10–0:19invalid cognition too would in the same way have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not extrinsically from any additional defect.
4. 0:19–0:26For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or uncommon causes of cognition,
5. 0:26–0:30no separate defect could be a cause of its production.
6. 0:30–0:35It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding
7. 0:35–0:40to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition.
8. 0:40–0:45Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing
9. 0:45–0:49feature and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects.
10. 0:49–0:53An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then
11. 0:53–0:57should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional
12. 0:57–0:58cause?
13. 0:58–1:05Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension,
14. 1:05–1:10and similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals.
15. 1:10–1:15Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive
16. 1:15–1:18to production of the effect and recurrent.
17. 1:18–1:23Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must
18. 1:23–1:27also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
19. 1:27–1:33Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous
20. 1:33–1:36to the clay that causes a pot.
21. 1:36–1:41Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental.
22. 1:41–1:46An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and
23. 1:46–1:50this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to
24. 1:50–1:54pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation.
25. 1:54–1:59Before the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous
26. 1:59–2:05to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition,
27. 2:05–2:07like a pot.
28. 2:07–2:12Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid
29. 2:12–2:17cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because,
30. 2:17–2:21like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition does not suffer from proving
31. 2:21–2:24what is already established.
32. 2:24–2:29This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect.
33. 2:29–2:34The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must
34. 2:34–2:38also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
35. 2:38–2:43The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and
36. 2:43–2:48is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot.
37. 2:48–2:54To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted.
38. 2:54–2:59An effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this
39. 2:59–3:03contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition,
40. 3:03–3:07so there is no deviation in the causal relation.
41. 3:07–3:12Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to
42. 3:12–3:16the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid
43. 3:16–3:21cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition.
44. 3:21–3:25Nor does the following inference prove what is already established, valid cognition is
45. 3:25–3:30produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition,
46. 3:30–3:32it is a produced cognition.
47. 3:32–3:37The reason is that the Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid
48. 3:37–3:41cognition in general.
49. 3:41–3:45Examples and justification of other inferences.
50. 3:45–3:50Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effect hood, because, like invalidity, it
51. 3:50–3:54is a property residing in all effects without obstruction.
52. 3:54–3:59But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood, because it is
53. 3:59–4:05nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood.
54. 4:05–4:09There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties
55. 4:09–4:12as delimiters of effect hood.
56. 4:12–4:17that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is
57. 4:17–4:22also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general.
58. 4:22–4:27Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production
59. 4:27–4:30of non-eternal valid cognition.
60. 4:30–4:34Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that
61. 4:34–4:38determines a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related
62. 4:38–4:44through non-eternal cognitionhood because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognitionhood.
63. 4:45–4:48This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect.
64. 4:50–5:05It is further said that being in non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pothood.
65. 5:05–5:12Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause.
66. 5:12–5:29Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from visual illusion, like pot hood.
67. 5:29–5:35Again, being a non-eternal veritical cognition of silver delimits an effect hood determining
68. 5:35–5:39a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid
69. 5:39–5:44cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent
70. 5:44–5:47from an illusion of silver, like pothood.
71. 5:47–5:51Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of
72. 5:51–5:56silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness
73. 5:56–5:58absent from silver its mode.
74. 5:58–6:03Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced
75. 6:03–6:08extrinsically by a distinct cause.
76. 6:08–6:12Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes
77. 6:12–6:16of validity and invalidity.
78. 6:16–6:20The men-saka objects that in the inference whose pro-bandom is, being produced by a cause
79. 6:20–6:24different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from
80. 6:24–6:27valid cognition is an extraneous condition.
81. 6:27–6:30It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition,
82. 6:30–6:35Nayaikas regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that
83. 6:35–6:39which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative
84. 6:39–6:44instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but because of complexity, a property excluding
85. 6:44–6:49the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous
86. 6:49–6:53condition merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view,
87. 6:53–6:57God's cognition is the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there.
88. 6:57–7:11This objection is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot pervade the probandom or make the reason deviant.
89. 7:11–7:17The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus
90. 7:17–7:23validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone.
91. 7:23–7:27A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely
92. 7:27–7:33distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like stathwood delimiting causality.
93. 7:33–7:35This reasoning is unsound.
94. 7:35–7:39When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does
95. 7:39–7:46not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because absence of the
96. 7:46–7:51defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition.
97. 7:52–7:58Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete sense
98. 7:58–8:02contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, in valid cognition
99. 8:02–8:08arises in their absence. What prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as
100. 8:08–8:13the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition.
101. 8:15–8:22Absence of merit is not a cause. Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is
102. 8:22–8:26an existent thing cannot be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent.
103. 8:27–8:31Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object,
104. 8:31–8:34absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition.
105. 8:36–8:40It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a nonexistent
106. 8:40–8:44object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only
107. 8:44–8:48existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects.
108. 8:49–8:53Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object,
109. 8:53–8:58there is no proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing
110. 8:58–9:03invalid cognition of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object.
111. 9:04–9:08Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid
112. 9:08–9:12cognition of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent
113. 9:12–9:19object. Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and the same
114. 9:19–9:23cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot reside in
115. 9:23–9:28the same substrate. Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes
116. 9:28–9:34absence of defect the cause of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid
117. 9:34–9:38cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions.
118. 9:39–9:44It may further be said that invalid cognition of non-existent objects in general would necessarily
119. 9:44–9:50arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of non-existent
120. 9:50–9:55objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects need not produce invalid
121. 9:55–9:59cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid
122. 9:59–10:06cognition concerning every kind of object either. Recutation of the objection that merit is not a
123. 10:06–10:13cause. A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its
124. 10:13–10:17absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition.
125. 10:18–10:22Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid
126. 10:22–10:27cognition. Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent
127. 10:27–10:31and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition.
128. 10:32–10:36Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect,
129. 10:36–10:39once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises.
130. 10:41–10:44A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property.
131. 10:45–10:49If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in
132. 10:49–10:53general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the
133. 10:53–10:58counter-positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence,
134. 10:58–11:01and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself.
135. 11:02–11:05If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself,
136. 11:05–11:08even considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect,
137. 11:08–11:11an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid.
138. 11:12–11:15If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts,
139. 11:15–11:17the same point applies equally to merits.
140. 11:17–11:25Nsaka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition.
141. 11:25–11:30The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither
142. 11:30–11:32valid nor invalid cognition.
143. 11:32–11:38Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo
144. 11:38–11:44is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises.
145. 11:44–11:49Their absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should
146. 11:49–11:53be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well.
147. 11:53–11:58Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because the
148. 11:58–12:04tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch.
149. 12:04–12:08It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error,
150. 12:08–12:13I am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises
151. 12:13–12:14from a merit.
152. 12:14–12:18answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception
153. 12:18–12:22of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity
154. 12:22–12:25error does not arise.
155. 12:25–12:29It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition
156. 12:29–12:33of that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same
157. 12:33–12:36class, and not in its absence.
158. 12:36–12:41Thus ocular contact is merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should
159. 12:41–12:45likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere.
160. 12:45–12:50Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair
161. 12:50–12:55located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with
162. 12:55–12:57other hair of the same class.
163. 12:57–13:02Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because
164. 13:02–13:08if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid.
165. 13:08–13:12It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature
166. 13:12–13:18causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence,
167. 13:18–13:21perception of the distinction, will cause valid cognition.
168. 13:21–13:26Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity
169. 13:26–13:33of absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation.
170. 13:33–13:40The M'saqa view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality.
171. 13:40–13:44Many jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily
172. 13:44–13:49defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect.
173. 13:49–13:53It should not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must
174. 13:53–13:58be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony,
175. 13:58–14:03mere non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition.
176. 14:03–14:07It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes
177. 14:07–14:12this invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible
178. 14:12–14:15for them to produce invalid cognition.
179. 14:15–14:20Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect
180. 14:20–14:24relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total
181. 14:24–14:28absence of all defects.
182. 14:28–14:31It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing
183. 14:31–14:36feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent, lose
184. 14:36–14:42causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity of defects such
185. 14:42–14:47as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition of the distinction not occur
186. 14:47–14:52everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one distinction has no further distinction,
187. 14:52–14:57there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction is neither the cause of all
188. 14:57–15:02valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition, it deviates in both. And if
189. 15:02–15:06And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition of itself, infinite
190. 15:06–15:07regress follows.
191. 15:07–15:13A further objection, in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object
192. 15:13–15:18contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent,
193. 15:18–15:21therefore a defect cause is invalid cognition.
194. 15:21–15:24If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences
195. 15:24–15:29follow that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid.
196. 15:29–15:36cognition being produced by contact would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition,
197. 15:36–15:40the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor
198. 15:40–15:46by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is
199. 15:46–15:51unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be
200. 15:51–15:56both overextension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence. Nor should it be said that
201. 15:56–16:02a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and in cognition of valid cognition,
202. 16:02–16:06just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid cognition.
203. 16:07–16:12Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional
204. 16:12–16:20recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Naya Yaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent.
205. 16:22–16:26The Naya Yaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid
206. 16:26–16:31cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of pervasion belonging
207. 16:31–16:36to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception,
208. 16:36–16:41inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is established by positive
209. 16:41–16:46and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects
210. 16:46–16:50of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is
211. 16:50–16:55a specific merit of perception. The mensaka proposes that only the cause of perception
212. 16:55–16:59of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, because absence of
213. 16:59–17:04valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception of
214. 17:04–17:09the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception
215. 17:09–17:13of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then,
216. 17:13–17:17if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity
217. 17:17–17:22in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing
218. 17:22–17:27hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Naya Yaka will ask how perception
219. 17:27–17:32of the pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception
220. 17:32–17:36of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error.
221. 17:37–17:41On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition
222. 17:41–17:46of an individual arising after doubt or error. But this proposal too is unsound.
223. 17:46–17:52hand, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the
224. 17:52–17:57causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions
225. 17:57–18:01of individuals arising after doubt or error.
226. 18:01–18:05Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition
227. 18:05–18:11arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction.
228. 18:11–18:15Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other
229. 18:15–18:17means of knowledge.
230. 18:17–18:22Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and
231. 18:22–18:27not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception.
232. 18:27–18:31Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate
233. 18:31–18:36is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here.
234. 18:36–18:40Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while
235. 18:40–18:44contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity
236. 18:44–18:48of sublator and sublated would be impossible.
237. 18:48–18:52It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates.
238. 18:52–18:57Even invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition
239. 18:57–18:59of a post.
240. 18:59–19:04Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because
241. 19:04–19:10a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated.
242. 19:10–19:15Is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the sublator?
243. 19:15–19:19Here only cognition produced by veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has
244. 19:19–19:25been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical
245. 19:25–19:29cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived,
246. 19:29–19:33and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness,
247. 19:33–19:37is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes
248. 19:37–19:42valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes
249. 19:42–19:46the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion
250. 19:46–19:51and in the identity error, I am fair. But in valid cognition of a post arising after
251. 19:51–19:55doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs.
252. 19:55–20:00Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence
253. 20:00–20:05respectively of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning,
254. 20:05–20:11consisting in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition
255. 20:11–20:16of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit.
256. 20:17–20:22Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition
257. 20:22–20:28of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established.
258. 20:29–20:32That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition.
259. 20:32–20:38Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid
260. 20:38–20:41perceptual cognition.
261. 20:41–20:45But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction,
262. 20:45–20:48so this is not its cause.
263. 20:48–20:52Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects
264. 20:52–20:56such as an illusory mark, true subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be
265. 20:56–20:58accepted as causes.
266. 20:58–21:04Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition
267. 21:04–21:09of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

Plain text

दोक्त्रन विलिदिदि is produced by a merit. दनेयाका replies that, on the साखगविष्व, invalid cognition too would in the same way have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not extrinsically from any additional defect. For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or uncommon causes of cognition, no separate defect could be a cause of its production. It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition. Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects. An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause? Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension, and similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals. Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive to production of the effect and recurrent. Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to the clay that causes a pot. Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental. An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation. Before the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition does not suffer from proving what is already established. This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect. The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot. To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted. An effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so there is no deviation in the causal relation. Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition. Nor does the following inference prove what is already established, valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. The reason is that the Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid cognition in general. Examples and justification of other inferences. Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effect hood, because, like invalidity, it is a property residing in all effects without obstruction. But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood, because it is nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood. There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties as delimiters of effect hood. that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognitionhood because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognitionhood. This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect. It is further said that being in non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pothood. Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from visual illusion, like pot hood. Again, being a non-eternal veritical cognition of silver delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from an illusion of silver, like pothood. Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent from silver its mode. Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes of validity and invalidity. The men-saka objects that in the inference whose pro-bandom is, being produced by a cause different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid cognition is an extraneous condition. It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition, Nayaikas regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there. This objection is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot pervade the probandom or make the reason deviant. The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone. A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like stathwood delimiting causality. This reasoning is unsound. When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition. Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, in valid cognition arises in their absence. What prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition. Absence of merit is not a cause. Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent. Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object, absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition. It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a nonexistent object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects. Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object. Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent object. Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and the same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot reside in the same substrate. Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes absence of defect the cause of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions. It may further be said that invalid cognition of non-existent objects in general would necessarily arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of non-existent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either. Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause. A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition. Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises. A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property. If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the counter-positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself. If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid. If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies equally to merits. Nsaka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition. The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither valid nor invalid cognition. Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises. Their absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well. Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch. It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a merit. answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity error does not arise. It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition of that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same class, and not in its absence. Thus ocular contact is merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere. Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other hair of the same class. Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid. It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence, perception of the distinction, will cause valid cognition. Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation. The M'saqa view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality. Many jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect. It should not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony, mere non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition. It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition, it deviates in both. And if And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection, in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect cause is invalid cognition. If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. cognition being produced by contact would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both overextension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence. Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and in cognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Naya Yaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent. The Naya Yaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of pervasion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is a specific merit of perception. The mensaka proposes that only the cause of perception of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, because absence of valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception of the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then, if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Naya Yaka will ask how perception of the pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. But this proposal too is unsound. hand, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions of individuals arising after doubt or error. Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction. Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other means of knowledge. Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception. Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here. Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator and sublated would be impossible. It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of a post. Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated. Is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the sublator? Here only cognition produced by veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived, and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion and in the identity error, I am fair. But in valid cognition of a post arising after doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs. Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, consisting in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit. Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established. That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition. Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid perceptual cognition. But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction, so this is not its cause. Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects such as an illusory mark, true subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes. Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

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