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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:06रेकॉताषन अद दिव।
0:06–0:1054, this view is unacceptable.
0:10–0:15From collective cognition of the two reasons, while both provisions are recollected, cognitions
0:15–0:20in the form of substantive reflections on both reasons arise simultaneously.
0:20–0:25Because causes producing two opposed results are present at the same time, neither reflection
0:25–0:28produces its result.
0:28–0:33In inference for oneself, such two reflections arise from direct apprehension of the provisions
0:33–0:38of the two reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the
0:38–0:42Nyaya statements employed by the proponent.
0:42–0:44The view of Suwadsa.
0:44–0:4655.
0:46–0:51Suwadsa says that a substantive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely
0:51–0:53affirmative inference.
0:53–0:58For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property
0:58–1:02distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general
1:02–1:07property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the
1:07–1:14mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter
1:14–1:19positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence,
1:19–1:26like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of
1:26–1:32counterbalance. When mere opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional
1:32–1:39qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong
1:39–1:43counter-reason ends. Prima-facie view of non-establishment.
1:45–1:50Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment,
1:50–1:54because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion.
1:56–2:01Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
2:03–2:08The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both,
2:08–2:13occurring successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject.
2:15–2:19If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences,
2:19–2:24the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences
2:24–2:30and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences,
2:30–2:35it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession.
2:36–2:41Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the
2:41–2:48qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal,
2:48–2:54however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke,
2:54–2:59obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition
2:59–3:04or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a
3:04–3:09qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment
3:09–3:14under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood.
3:14–3:22If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons.
3:22–3:31Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence.
3:31–3:39Individual absences such as absence of pervasion can independently constitute the defect of non-establishment.
3:39–3:43Qualified absence is not the defect.
3:43–3:4958. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment.
3:49–3:55Since the individual absences of perversion and subject-propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment,
3:55–4:01positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier.
4:01–4:09Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent.
4:09–4:13The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence.
4:13–4:16There is no need to raise the qualified absence.
4:16–4:21For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected.
4:21–4:32The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to pervasion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences.
4:32–4:37Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary
4:37–4:41in their own forms and defeat the proponent.
4:41–4:45If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish
4:45–4:50pervasion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised
4:50–4:52through deviation itself.
4:52–4:57If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although
4:57–5:01Although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous
5:01–5:04condition arises.
5:04–5:09Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier.
5:09–5:13This refutation also rejects the view that either absence of pervasion or absence of
5:13–5:17subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
5:17–5:23An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown.
5:23–5:29The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless.
5:29–5:34Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
5:34–5:3659.
5:36–5:40Some scholars say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons
5:40–5:44occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment
5:44–5:46of the substratum.
5:46–5:51If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential
5:51–5:54cognition would arise.
5:54–6:01This definition too is unacceptable, because deridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier.
6:01–6:07Even when deridical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish
6:07–6:11the defect of non-establishment.
6:11–6:18Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason.
6:18–6:22The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and
6:22–6:26deridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition
6:26–6:33or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible.
6:33–6:37Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of
6:37–6:43some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless.
6:43–6:48Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified
6:48–6:52by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a
6:52–6:54valid reason.
6:54–6:59It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion
6:59–7:02and subject propertyhood of every reason.
7:02–7:07If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is
7:07–7:11apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the
7:11–7:17absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment.
7:17–7:20If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in
7:20–7:24its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of
7:24–7:29inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic
7:29–7:33of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such
7:33–7:37an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason.
7:38–7:43This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of
7:43–7:48perversion or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is
7:48–7:53non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier,
7:53–7:59even when both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend.
7:59–8:03Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment.
8:03–8:13Let it be granted. Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment,
8:13–8:18and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment.
8:18–8:23For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject,
8:23–8:28inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood.
8:29–8:33Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject,
8:33–8:38inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain.
8:40–8:44It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious
8:44–8:49reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason.
8:50–8:56Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason.
8:57–9:02Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as provision and
9:02–9:08subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by
9:08–9:12provision and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that
9:12–9:18qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result.
9:18–9:26Refutation. 62, no, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and
9:26–9:32the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature
9:32–9:37a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary
9:37–9:43for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of
9:43–9:45non-establishment because certainty of
9:45–9:47perversion is said to be possible even
9:47–9:49in their presence, then non-establishment
9:49–9:51concerning the subject and the like would
9:51–9:53have to be treated as separate fallacious
9:53–9:55reasons, since certainty of perversion is
9:55–9:57possible even when cognition of such
9:57–9:59non-establishment is present.
9:59–10:01To demonstrate non-establishment
10:01–10:03in inference for another,
10:03–10:05cognition of it must first be present.
10:05–10:07Hence cognition
10:07–10:09of non-establishment concerning the
10:09–10:11subject and the like is necessary both
10:11–10:15cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration in inference for
10:15–10:21another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved.
10:22–10:28If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent,
10:28–10:33both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not
10:33–10:38destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious.
10:38–10:43Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious.
10:43–10:50A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when pervasion and
10:50–10:54subject property had actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain.
10:54–10:59This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference
10:59–11:04is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown.
11:05–11:09It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of pervasion and the like
11:09–11:13an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such
11:13–11:18as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of
11:18–11:24perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general.
11:24–11:26This view is not sound.
11:26–11:31If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become
11:31–11:33nothing but non-establishment.
11:33–11:38Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences
11:38–11:42in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated
11:42–11:45as separate fallacious reasons.
11:45–11:50In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because
11:50–11:53of absence of a cause.
11:53–11:56Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence
11:56–12:01of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise
12:01–12:05if fire itself is absent.
12:05–12:10Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons.
12:10–12:15It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious
12:15–12:17reason.
12:17–12:21But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes
12:21–12:23of inference.
12:23–12:27If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject propertyhood occurred
12:27–12:33only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious
12:33–12:34reason.
12:34–12:38And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause
12:38–12:44of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal
12:44–12:49status of the remaining factors would become pointless.
12:49–12:53Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
12:53–12:57Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to
12:57–13:02inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence,
13:02–13:05is fallacious reasonhood.
13:05–13:09Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength
13:09–13:11is counterbalance.
13:11–13:15of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, and a reason
13:15–13:20in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory.
13:20–13:24It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into
13:24–13:27non-establishment.
13:27–13:31When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason
13:31–13:35is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition
13:35–13:40of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition.
13:40–13:42This view too is not sound.
13:42–13:46Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject
13:46–13:51propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier.
13:51–13:55Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion and
13:55–13:59subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object
13:59–14:03of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like.
14:03–14:07Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends.
14:07–14:12The three divisions of non-establishment.
14:12–14:16The established doctrine is now stated.
14:16–14:20Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment
14:20–14:25of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration
14:25–14:30of each separately obstructs inference in its own form.
14:30–14:34Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of
14:34–14:40The perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood is not a separate non-establishment,
14:40–14:43the qualification is unnecessary.
14:43–14:49Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form.
14:49–14:53Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not bent to fit definitions.
14:53–14:57The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object
14:57–14:59of substantive reflection.
14:59–15:03Therefore neither the three-fold division of non-establishment nor the established
15:03–15:07five-fold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted.
15:07–15:12Restatement of the established doctrine
15:12–15:16For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms
15:16–15:21of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment,
15:21–15:26while defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context,
15:26–15:28confirms our own position.
15:28–15:32The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and
15:32–15:36counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction
15:36–15:41are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain
15:41–15:47scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear.
15:47–15:51Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like,
15:51–15:57its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends.
15:57–16:03defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract.
16:03–16:08Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment.
16:08–16:16Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised?
16:16–16:22It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow,
16:22–16:26so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake,
16:26–16:30for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible.
16:32–16:35Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower,
16:35–16:40the skyflower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference.
16:42–16:46Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the
16:46–16:50qualificand in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons,
16:50–16:55it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier,
16:55–16:59Non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect.
17:00–17:03Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed,
17:03–17:06occasion for the second non-establishment arises.
17:08–17:11An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion.
17:13–17:18It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous
17:18–17:24condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandom
17:24–17:29fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot
17:29–17:36be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandom
17:36–17:41that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an
17:41–17:47extraneous condition, is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive
17:47–17:53in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not
17:53–17:58an extraneous condition, what is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition.
17:59–18:04An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently,
18:04–18:10it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a
18:10–18:16separate sixth fallacious reason. In smoke is not fire because it is a substance,
18:16–18:21substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition.
18:21–18:26In Earth is different from water because it possesses odor,
18:26–18:31Earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of
18:31–18:37Earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of
18:37–18:42pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of pervasion and in the
18:42–18:48defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from
18:48–18:51non-establishment of pervasion and is not an independent fallacious reason.
18:53–18:58Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose
18:58–19:04cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom
19:04–19:09and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition
19:09–19:15the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that
19:15–19:19that the gold hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference.
19:19–19:23It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like.
19:23–19:27Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference,
19:27–19:31destroying the nature of veridical inference.
19:31–19:34Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions.
19:34–19:4075, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for
19:40–19:44another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because
19:44–19:50that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning,
19:50–19:54neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of
19:54–19:58fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no
19:58–20:03necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not
20:03–20:08render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not
20:08–20:11stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason.
20:11–20:17Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat.
20:17–20:2376. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons
20:23–20:27collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious,
20:27–20:30because the obstruction to inference is the same in both.
20:30–20:34The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation,
20:34–20:38and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example,
20:38–20:42For example, firehood and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
20:43–20:45Answer, this is not sound.
20:46–20:56When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary.
20:58–21:07If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat.
21:08–21:1377. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded
21:13–21:18by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the
21:18–21:23probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by
21:23–21:29the absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain.
21:29–21:32If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an
21:32–21:36opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all
21:36–21:41characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious.
21:42–21:45A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength.
21:46–21:51Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without
21:51–21:57excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation
21:57–22:02arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made
22:02–22:09an independent defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason.
22:10–22:1578. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat,
22:15–22:19but establishment of deviation would depend on the reason's establishment of the probandom.
22:20–22:24Otherwise mutual dependence would result cognition of uselessness from deviation
22:24–22:30and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer. Absence of cognition that the reason
22:30–22:36is favorable to establishment of the probandum is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation
22:36–22:42of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandum.
22:42–22:46Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum in the subject causes
22:46–22:50deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason.
22:50–22:55Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation,
22:55–23:01independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop
23:01–23:06inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known
23:06–23:12deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate
23:12–23:19fallacious reason. Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not
23:19–23:26an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the
23:26–23:31The absence of the probandum and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandum,
23:31–23:36therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference.
23:36–23:42Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason.
23:42–23:46Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandum and the
23:46–23:50subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference.
23:50–23:55Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other
23:55–24:00means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference.
24:00–24:02Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

Plain text

रेकॉताषन अद दिव। 54, this view is unacceptable. From collective cognition of the two reasons, while both provisions are recollected, cognitions in the form of substantive reflections on both reasons arise simultaneously. Because causes producing two opposed results are present at the same time, neither reflection produces its result. In inference for oneself, such two reflections arise from direct apprehension of the provisions of the two reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a substantive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of counterbalance. When mere opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends. Prima-facie view of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood. If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence. Individual absences such as absence of pervasion can independently constitute the defect of non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect. 58. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual absences of perversion and subject-propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence. For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to pervasion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences. Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent. If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish pervasion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although Although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier. This refutation also rejects the view that either absence of pervasion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because deridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when deridical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and deridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible. Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless. Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason. It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment. If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason. This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of perversion or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend. Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted. Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain. It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason. Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason. Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as provision and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by provision and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result. Refutation. 62, no, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment because certainty of perversion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons, since certainty of perversion is possible even when cognition of such non-establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration in inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious. Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when pervasion and subject property had actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of pervasion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general. This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise if fire itself is absent. Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons. It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious reason. But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes of inference. If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject propertyhood occurred only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence, is fallacious reasonhood. Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength is counterbalance. of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory. It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment. When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition. This view too is not sound. Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier. Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment. The established doctrine is now stated. Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form. Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of The perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood is not a separate non-establishment, the qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form. Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not bent to fit definitions. The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object of substantive reflection. Therefore neither the three-fold division of non-establishment nor the established five-fold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted. Restatement of the established doctrine For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, while defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms our own position. The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear. Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends. defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract. Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment. Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised? It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible. Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower, the skyflower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference. Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualificand in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, Non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion. It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandom fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandom that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an extraneous condition, is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition, what is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently, it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason. In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition. In Earth is different from water because it possesses odor, Earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of Earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of pervasion and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of pervasion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that that the gold hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference. Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions. 75, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason. Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat. 76. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, For example, firehood and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary. If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious. A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength. Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason. 78. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment of deviation would depend on the reason's establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence would result cognition of uselessness from deviation and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer. Absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandum is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandum. Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the The absence of the probandum and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandum, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference. Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason. Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandum and the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference. Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference. Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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