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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 21:37
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0:02–0:33विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता
0:33–0:37is established on the basis of an obstructive property.
0:38–0:42In other words, only after being the substratum of desire,
0:42–0:45or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance
0:45–0:50that is the self-does-negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom.
0:51–0:54Second objection, the reason would become affirmative.
0:55–0:59Again it may be objected, and desire resides in a substance
0:59–1:02distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance.
1:02–1:06Once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative.
1:08–1:12Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative
1:12–1:15provision, even though negative provision is remembered.
1:16–1:20The reasons on commonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason,
1:20–1:25in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of
1:25–1:31the probandom. For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is
1:31–1:36luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, uncommonness is defective
1:36–1:42in special contexts, not universally. Negative inference is not unnecessary.
1:44–1:48Objection. Once the absence of desire in the eight substances has been established,
1:48–1:53desire's residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of
1:53–2:00being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative
2:00–2:05inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self. The specific probandom,
2:05–2:10the self differs from the other eight substances is not established without negative perversion.
2:11–2:15If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject,
2:15–2:19the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only
2:19–2:23through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a
2:23–2:29pervasive property. Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established
2:29–2:36separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur in the
2:36–2:42self, therefore the self differs from the eight substances. But how is the substratum that is
2:42–2:49the self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the
2:49–2:54substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs
2:54–3:00from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition
3:00–3:05such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of
3:05–3:11knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum
3:11–3:21that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. 50. Some scholars say that
3:21–3:25even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with earth
3:25–3:30and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire cognition of
3:30–3:34difference through the negative inference, the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances.
3:36–3:40Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter-reason.
3:41–3:45Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger.
3:47–3:54Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or
3:54–4:01difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual absence not previously
4:01–4:07known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence
4:07–4:12of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight
4:12–4:18substances is established in earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition
4:18–4:25of the absence of earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living
4:25–4:32body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert
4:32–4:38objects such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum
4:38–4:44of desire. Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of
4:44–4:48desire, the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example.
4:49–4:5452, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example.
4:55–4:59But a living body does not delimit the counterpositiveness determined by that absence,
4:59–5:02because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body
5:02–5:07is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and
5:07–5:12the like is regarded as pervading inirtness, inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum
5:12–5:16of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the
5:16–5:21like, consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness
5:21–5:24is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous
5:24–5:27absence of desire.
5:27–5:36is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53, in this way, validity
5:36–5:40of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition does not produce
5:40–5:46successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the
5:46–5:51state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state
5:51–5:57delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity
5:57–6:02and a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation
6:02–6:05by the opposing property is absent.
6:05–6:10This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity
6:10–6:12of cognition.
6:12–6:16It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established, how can cognition
6:16–6:20qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason?
6:20–6:23This objection is untenable.
6:23–6:26When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject
6:26–6:30is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject
6:30–6:35the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant
6:35–6:37and the ground the qualifier.
6:37–6:42Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of
6:42–6:45the probandom in negative inference.
6:45–6:49This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandom
6:49–6:54is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an
6:54–7:00absence pervading the absence of the probandom. Cognition of possessing the counter positive
7:00–7:04of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is necessary.
7:06–7:1154 may be objected that recollection of the probandom, earth's difference from the other eight
7:11–7:14substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established.
7:15–7:19Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject
7:19–7:22earth possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence
7:22–7:26pervading the absence of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative
7:26–7:33inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In earth, the absence pervading the
7:33–7:37probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of
7:37–7:42earthhood. Here earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the
7:42–7:46probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the probandom and
7:46–7:50does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom.
7:50–7:53method. This method of negative inference applies
7:53–7:59chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference
7:59–8:04from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition
8:04–8:10cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method.
8:10–8:17With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end.
8:17–8:21The theory of presumption.
8:21–8:22Objection.
8:22–8:26Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge.
8:26–8:271.
8:27–8:32Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no
8:32–8:36need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge.
8:36–8:40Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge
8:40–8:45can be achieved through purely negative inference itself.
8:45–8:50The Msoca view of presumption based on doubt.
8:50–8:512.
8:51–8:52This may be admitted.
8:52–8:55Nevertheless, the Mtsaka view is as follows.
8:55–9:00That Devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another
9:00–9:02scientifically accepted cause.
9:02–9:07Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdatta, who lives for a hundred
9:07–9:10years, stays only inside the house.
9:10–9:15When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdatta, is not found in the
9:15–9:19house, his absence within the house is ascertained.
9:19–9:24This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdatta's presence outside the house.
9:24–9:29His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta
9:29–9:31alive or not?
9:31–9:36According to the Memsaka, Devdatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning
9:36–9:37his being alive.
9:37–9:42From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdatta's being alive and his necessary
9:42–9:43presence.
9:43–9:47Without supposing Devdatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength
9:47–9:51of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta is outside the
9:51–9:56house, rises only after the entire specified causal complex.
9:56–9:59Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through
9:59–10:03affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being
10:03–10:07alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary
10:07–10:10cause of the presumption of external presence.
10:10–10:14Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the
10:14–10:18cause of presumption because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental
10:18–10:21operation.
10:21–10:25Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being
10:25–10:30alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause
10:30–10:32of presumption.
10:32–10:37On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta
10:37–10:41is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house.
10:41–10:45But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason
10:45–10:50is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted
10:50–10:54as a separate means of knowledge.
10:54–10:58Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection.
10:58–11:003.
11:00–11:05It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument,
11:05–11:08then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative
11:08–11:11would also become inevitable.
11:11–11:15Or is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition?
11:15–11:19If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and
11:19–11:24if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference.
11:24–11:28If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive
11:28–11:32arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be
11:32–11:34accepted as necessary.
11:34–11:38Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because
11:38–11:43of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence.
11:43–11:46But this argument is untenable.
11:46–11:51Doubt about dev-dut does being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause
11:51–11:53of presumption.
11:53–11:57For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce
11:57–12:01that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition
12:01–12:03of the person's presence outside.
12:03–12:08The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive,
12:08–12:13the living devdutta, is not itself doubt about devduttas being alive.
12:13–12:17Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent.
12:17–12:22For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devdatta's
12:22–12:26being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then
12:26–12:29is supposition of external presence possible?
12:29–12:33No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed.
12:33–12:37If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and
12:37–12:41preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external
12:41–12:44presence preserves his known being alive.
12:44–12:49As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal.
12:49–12:55Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view.
12:55–12:565.
12:56–13:00When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger
13:00–13:04negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning Devadatta's being alive or dead does
13:04–13:11not arise. Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when is being alive and his absence
13:11–13:15inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being
13:15–13:21alive. For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence outside the house should be regarded
13:21–13:25as arising through purely negative inference, living Devdatta is outside the house because
13:25–13:29he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house.
13:30–13:34Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through
13:34–13:38presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive.
13:38–13:42Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both
13:42–13:46cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external
13:46–13:50presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause
13:50–13:54ascertainment of that same object.
13:54–13:56Mutual Confrediction of the Two Acertainments
13:56–13:596.
13:59–14:01This position is unacceptable.
14:01–14:06A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal-complex
14:06–14:08reasons as follows.
14:08–14:12The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension
14:12–14:17of an eligible counter-positive, namely the living devdutta in the house.
14:17–14:22Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments
14:22–14:26– devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must
14:26–14:33be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid.
14:33–14:37Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death,
14:37–14:43or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence.
14:43–14:47In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside
14:47–14:52the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta
14:52–14:57lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the
14:57–15:03house are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment
15:03–15:09Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated.
15:09–15:13Doubt produces the supposition of external presence.
15:13–15:197. Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period,
15:19–15:26long period as in Devdatta is alive today and Devdatta will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal
15:26–15:31divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated.
15:32–15:37Compared with these numerous provisions, the provision of Devdatta's presence inside the house,
15:37–15:41which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive.
15:42–15:46Devdatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more
15:46–15:52economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being
15:52–15:56merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction
15:56–16:02with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive
16:02–16:06in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves
16:06–16:11being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's
16:11–16:16external presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as
16:16–16:18supposed by presumption.
16:18–16:23Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical
16:23–16:31reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Dev Dutta's external presence.
16:31–16:35Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
16:35–16:368.
16:36–16:39It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more
16:39–16:44economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical
16:44–16:49meaning and inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devduttas external
16:49–16:56presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does
16:56–17:01not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative
17:01–17:06cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with
17:06–17:12perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in
17:12–17:17the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish Devdatta's
17:17–17:23external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
17:25–17:28Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt.
17:30–17:359. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning,
17:35–17:39produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific
17:39–17:43nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced
17:43–17:47from a doubt in which devidata is either in the house or dead should also be veridical.
17:48–17:53But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception
17:53–17:59and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning
17:59–18:02being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the
18:02–18:07non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling
18:07–18:12supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition.
18:13–18:18This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the
18:18–18:22necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality
18:22–18:28of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive
18:28–18:32joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce veridical cognition of
18:32–18:37devadatta's presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption
18:37–18:41based on doubt comes to an end.
18:41–18:44Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt
18:44–18:5210. The Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption based on doubt is now stated.
18:52–18:56The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory
18:56–19:01meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning,
19:01–19:05sublates devduttas necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas being
19:05–19:11alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes
19:11–19:19Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence
19:19–19:23for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from
19:23–19:30a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently,
19:30–19:34both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and
19:34–19:38Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated.
19:40–19:45When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's
19:45–19:50being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation
19:50–19:54joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the
19:54–19:58inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house.
19:59–20:04The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death,
20:04–20:10it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence.
20:11–20:16Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference
20:16–20:20from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason
20:20–20:26is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of devduttas external
20:26–20:31presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is
20:31–20:32required.
20:32–20:36Objection, presumption is necessary.
20:36–20:4111. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house,
20:41–20:45even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains
20:45–20:51only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once
20:51–20:55the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of
20:55–20:59external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference
20:59–21:04of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive.
21:04–21:10Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise.
21:10–21:14Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside
21:14–21:19the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence?
21:19–21:24Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces
21:24–21:29cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside
21:29–21:31the house.
21:31–21:33Refutation of the objection.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता is established on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum of desire, or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance that is the self-does-negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected, and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance. Once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason, in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally. Negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection. Once the absence of desire in the eight substances has been established, desire's residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self. The specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances is not established without negative perversion. If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property. Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur in the self, therefore the self differs from the eight substances. But how is the substratum that is the self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. 50. Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference, the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter-reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire. Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire, the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example. 52, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example. But a living body does not delimit the counterpositiveness determined by that absence, because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inirtness, inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53, in this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity and a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition. It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason? This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier. Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the probandom in negative inference. This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandom is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom. Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is necessary. 54 may be objected that recollection of the probandom, earth's difference from the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject earth possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of earthhood. Here earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom. method. This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method. With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end. The theory of presumption. Objection. Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. 1. Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through purely negative inference itself. The Msoca view of presumption based on doubt. 2. This may be admitted. Nevertheless, the Mtsaka view is as follows. That Devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another scientifically accepted cause. Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdatta, who lives for a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdatta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdatta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta alive or not? According to the Memsaka, Devdatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdatta's being alive and his necessary presence. Without supposing Devdatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta is outside the house, rises only after the entire specified causal complex. Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption. On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection. 3. It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative would also become inevitable. Or is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition? If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence. But this argument is untenable. Doubt about dev-dut does being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive, the living devdutta, is not itself doubt about devduttas being alive. Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent. For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devdatta's being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then is supposition of external presence possible? No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal. Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view. 5. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning Devadatta's being alive or dead does not arise. Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when is being alive and his absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference, living Devdatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive. Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause ascertainment of that same object. Mutual Confrediction of the Two Acertainments 6. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal-complex reasons as follows. The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive, namely the living devdutta in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments – devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid. Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death, or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated. Doubt produces the supposition of external presence. 7. Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period, long period as in Devdatta is alive today and Devdatta will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the provision of Devdatta's presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive. Devdatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's external presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption. Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Dev Dutta's external presence. Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. 8. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning and inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devduttas external presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish Devdatta's external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt. 9. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning, produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which devidata is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce veridical cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end. Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt 10. The Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption based on doubt is now stated. The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning, sublates devduttas necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of devduttas external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required. Objection, presumption is necessary. 11. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise. Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house. Refutation of the objection.

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