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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.992664)
Duration: 20:14
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:09इन्वरिंस अगड, कमप्लित मइथिली च्राविश्वाविमर्शक रेक।
0:09–0:13इन्वरिंस अगड, तब विसिंट मैज्विमर्शक, विस्विमर्शक रेक।
0:13–0:15विस्विमर्शक रेक।
0:15–0:16अछि।
0:16–0:17अछि।
0:17–0:18अछि।
0:18–0:19अछि।
0:19–0:20अछि।
0:20–0:21अछि।
0:21–0:22अछि।
0:22–0:23अछि।
0:36–0:40entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity
0:40–0:45such as Earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, Earth, and so forth.
0:45–0:48Nor can Earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single
0:48–0:53recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter.
0:53–0:56For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or
0:56–1:00lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either.
1:00–1:03Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form,
1:03–1:06their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended.
1:06–1:10Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence,
1:10–1:14hence neither actually doubts God's existence.
1:14–1:16The problem of mutual dependence
1:16–1:213. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are
1:21–1:25equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral
1:25–1:29judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would
1:29–1:33arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those
1:33–1:36inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question.
1:37–1:41Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar.
1:42–1:46Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject,
1:46–1:50the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects.
1:52–1:56Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject.
1:58–2:02For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human
2:02–2:07agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body.
2:07–2:11Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of
2:11–2:16the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like,
2:16–2:21and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject.
2:21–2:25Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings
2:25–2:30to may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities.
2:32–2:35Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort,
2:35–2:39or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and
2:39–2:44opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and
2:44–2:50unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces
2:50–2:55unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort,
2:55–3:00can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit,
3:00–3:05therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in
3:05–3:10earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is
3:10–3:15already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form.
3:16–3:23Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference
3:23–3:28either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce
3:28–3:35the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation
3:35–3:39of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance.
3:40–3:44Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence
3:44–3:49of the probandom is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes
3:49–3:53defective in two ways, through doubt about the reasons presence in a counter instance
3:53–3:58possessing the absence of the probandum, or through doubt about the absence of the probandum
3:58–4:01and a locus possessing the reason.
4:01–4:05Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing
4:05–4:07the probandum.
4:07–4:11This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes
4:11–4:15a defect only in an object distinct from the subject.
4:15–4:19Inference of God, Tat the Sintmai.
4:19–4:21A Sprout cannot be the subject.
4:21–4:276. It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason effect hood is doubtful,
4:27–4:31therefore effect hood becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout.
4:31–4:34But once a current of effect hood in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom
4:34–4:39possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom,
4:39–4:42becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the
4:42–4:44sprout just as in the subject earth.
4:44–4:48It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that
4:48–4:50very sprout.
4:50–4:53This argument, however, is not sound.
4:53–4:58The sprout is not the subject, so effected is not a property of the subject there, consequently
4:58–5:01the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement.
5:01–5:05Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement
5:05–5:07would become a second thesis.
5:07–5:11If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an
5:11–5:14inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference
5:14–5:17would arise because of mutual dependence.
5:17–5:21Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and
5:21–5:23the other things as subjects.
5:23–5:27Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing
5:27–5:30the subject matter arises.
5:30–5:34By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but
5:34–5:37God will not be established.
5:37–5:40Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of
5:40–5:46God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent.
5:46–5:50possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition,
5:50–5:56desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither
5:56–6:00co-presence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because
6:00–6:05if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect
6:05–6:10of establishing what is already established arises.
6:10–6:14Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with
6:14–6:18direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort.
6:18–6:23concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object,
6:23–6:26change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like.
6:27–6:31Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like.
6:32–6:37Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth.
6:39–6:43It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar
6:43–6:48cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status.
6:48–6:53This argument, however, is not sound.
6:53–7:08Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the like and by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already been established.
7:08–7:13Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort.
7:13–7:189. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort.
7:18–7:22It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through
7:22–7:26effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately
7:26–7:31after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent
7:31–7:36from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in
7:36–7:41jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration,
7:41–7:45in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar.
7:45–7:49Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition.
7:50–7:54Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause.
7:56–8:00Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition,
8:00–8:04effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities,
8:04–8:10because such a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material cause
8:10–8:15is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element
8:15–8:20earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in kaitra is devoted
8:20–8:26to his own mother, like mithra. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition.
8:28–8:31Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor
8:31–8:36opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established
8:36–8:40generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandom is apprehended.
8:41–8:45This general pervasiveness of the probandom is merely being produced by cognition of the material
8:45–8:48cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established.
8:50–8:52Inference of God, Tat Vasant Mai
8:53–8:56Pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended.
8:58–9:0311. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is,
9:03–9:07the status of the probandom as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition
9:07–9:12of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere known in a
9:12–9:17general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible.
9:18–9:22It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material
9:22–9:27cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons
9:27–9:34like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes,
9:34–9:38and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact,
9:38–9:44or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect.
9:44–9:47Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the
9:47–9:52moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition
9:52–9:58and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view
9:58–10:03that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause
10:03–10:06has already been refuted.
10:06–10:10The form of the subject and the probandom.
10:10–10:1512. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced,
10:15–10:20but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an
10:20–10:25An effort concerning a produced material cause is not produced through generic character contact,
10:25–10:29is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated
10:29–10:31by yogic merit.
10:31–10:36Likewise, the pro-bandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed
10:36–10:41with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being
10:41–10:46produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated
10:46–10:49by yogic merit.
10:49–10:53Therefore the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed
10:53–10:57with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced
10:57–11:02through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not
11:02–11:07being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not
11:07–11:12being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future.
11:12–11:16It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition
11:16–11:21and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other
11:21–11:27entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not
11:27–11:34intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment
11:34–11:40of the pro-bandom nor defeat of the pro-bandom arises. Refutation of the proposed forms
11:40–11:44of the subject and pro-bandom.
11:44–11:4913. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic,
11:49–11:53cognition produced by Yodic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing
11:53–11:58such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced
11:58–12:03by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject
12:03–12:07and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent.
12:08–12:12Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent,
12:12–12:15being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference.
12:15–12:21Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce
12:21–12:25unseen merit or demerit, which in turn produces the element earth.
12:25–12:29In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect
12:29–12:33of establishing what is already established arises.
12:33–12:37Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition
12:37–12:41is intended in earth and the other entities.
12:41–12:46This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like.
12:46–12:50Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandum becomes a cause of inference
12:50–12:55only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to
12:55–13:00be held to arise only from determinate cognition of perversion produced in that way.
13:00–13:05The probandum would therefore be unestablished.
13:05–13:11Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise.
13:11–13:1714, it may now be argued that the probandom is established because of the reasons perversion.
13:17–13:22The reasons perversion has the following specific form, wherever there is effecthood, there
13:22–13:26is being produced by a knower of that affects material cause.
13:26–13:31Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material
13:31–13:32causes.
13:32–13:36Therefore, through this specific perversion, the reason effecthood establishes in earth
13:36–13:40than the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material
13:40–13:44cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effecthood occurs.
13:45–13:50Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the
13:50–14:00inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound.
14:01–14:05The question is, in what form does cognition of the provision of the reason
14:05–14:10effect hood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each is being produced by a knower of
14:10–14:15the material cause of that particular jar is being produced by a knower of the material cause of each
14:15–14:21particular effect or is being produced by a knower of effects in general under the first
14:21–14:26alternative the reason effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the
14:26–14:33material cause of a jar under the second alternative how is cognition of the probandoms
14:33–14:39pervasiveness possible. The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent
14:39–14:43common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar.
14:44–14:47The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence.
14:48–14:52Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings
14:52–14:57in general, thereby removing the defect of absence of pervasion by the probandom.
14:58–15:01A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference.
15:01–15:09For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house.
15:09–15:19However, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it.
15:19–15:30In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative-correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative provision.
15:30–15:36Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises.
15:38–15:43Inference of God, TatVasintmai. The form of the inference of God.
15:44–15:5016. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form.
15:50–16:00The conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a diet is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort,
16:00–16:03because it is an effect like a jar.
16:03–16:08Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen,
16:08–16:13the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor.
16:13–16:16This proposal, however, is not sound.
16:16–16:21The production of dyads and the like in creation is not established for the opponent.
16:21–16:24Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent,
16:24–16:28production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established.
16:28–16:34Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing dyads.
16:36–16:39This refutation also rejects the following view.
16:39–16:46A dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect.
16:47–16:54Mirror efforthood in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyads non-inherent cause does not produce the dyad because of the defects of
16:54–16:59of prolixity and lack of instrumentality.
16:59–17:04The nature of the reason cannot be determined.
17:04–17:08Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effecthood is not a property in
17:08–17:13the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property
17:13–17:16cannot be established for the opponent.
17:16–17:21Nor can the reason-effecthood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing
17:21–17:26in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and
17:26–17:30totality of past time cannot be established.
17:30–17:34Nor can the reason-effecthood be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present
17:34–17:40from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property.
17:40–17:45Nor is the reason-effecthood the state of being the counter-positive of prior absence,
17:45–17:50because this property deviates in the condition of destruction.
17:50–17:53Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing
17:53–17:57existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent,
17:57–18:02while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction.
18:02–18:07An Alternative Form of the Influence of God.
18:07–18:0818.
18:08–18:12Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows, this
18:12–18:16jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition,
18:16–18:23desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth.
18:23–18:26This proposal, however, is not sound.
18:26–18:32In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental.
18:32–18:37Otherwise, the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal
18:37–18:41substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences.
18:41–18:45This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the
18:45–18:50impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth.
18:50–18:54And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and
18:54–18:59pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this.
18:59–19:04Direct Cognition, because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain.
19:04–19:09The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter-inference,
19:09–19:13this jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the
19:13–19:17impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood,
19:17–19:20like another jar.
19:20–19:23A Second Alternative Form of the Inference
19:23–19:2619.
19:26–19:30Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable
19:30–19:35to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object.
19:35–19:39It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, but
19:39–19:43conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not
19:43–19:47the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation.
19:47–19:51On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not
19:51–19:55occur in that preceding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and
19:55–20:00of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort,
20:00–20:04because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action.
20:04–20:09Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent,
20:09–20:11time that is the substratum of mental effort.

Plain text

इन्वरिंस अगड, कमप्लित मइथिली च्राविश्वाविमर्शक रेक। इन्वरिंस अगड, तब विसिंट मैज्विमर्शक, विस्विमर्शक रेक। विस्विमर्शक रेक। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as Earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, Earth, and so forth. Nor can Earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence. The problem of mutual dependence 3. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings to may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort, or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form. Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the reasons presence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandum, or through doubt about the absence of the probandum and a locus possessing the reason. Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing the probandum. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject. Inference of God, Tat the Sintmai. A Sprout cannot be the subject. 6. It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason effect hood is doubtful, therefore effect hood becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effect hood in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that very sprout. This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effected is not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises. By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established. Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent. possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither co-presence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth. It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status. This argument, however, is not sound. Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the like and by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already been established. Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort. 9. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition. Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause. Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in kaitra is devoted to his own mother, like mithra. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition. Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandom is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandom is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established. Inference of God, Tat Vasant Mai Pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended. 11. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the probandom as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact, or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect. Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an An effort concerning a produced material cause is not produced through generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated by yogic merit. Likewise, the pro-bandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated by yogic merit. Therefore the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future. It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the pro-bandom nor defeat of the pro-bandom arises. Refutation of the proposed forms of the subject and pro-bandom. 13. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic, cognition produced by Yodic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit, which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandum becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinate cognition of perversion produced in that way. The probandum would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14, it may now be argued that the probandom is established because of the reasons perversion. The reasons perversion has the following specific form, wherever there is effecthood, there is being produced by a knower of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific perversion, the reason effecthood establishes in earth than the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effecthood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound. The question is, in what form does cognition of the provision of the reason effect hood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each is being produced by a knower of the material cause of that particular jar is being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect or is being produced by a knower of effects in general under the first alternative the reason effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar under the second alternative how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible. The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defect of absence of pervasion by the probandom. A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house. However, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it. In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative-correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative provision. Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Inference of God, TatVasintmai. The form of the inference of God. 16. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form. The conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a diet is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor. This proposal, however, is not sound. The production of dyads and the like in creation is not established for the opponent. Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established. Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing dyads. This refutation also rejects the following view. A dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect. Mirror efforthood in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyads non-inherent cause does not produce the dyad because of the defects of of prolixity and lack of instrumentality. The nature of the reason cannot be determined. Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effecthood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason-effecthood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and totality of past time cannot be established. Nor can the reason-effecthood be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property. Nor is the reason-effecthood the state of being the counter-positive of prior absence, because this property deviates in the condition of destruction. Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent, while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction. An Alternative Form of the Influence of God. 18. Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows, this jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise, the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences. This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth. And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this. Direct Cognition, because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain. The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter-inference, this jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another jar. A Second Alternative Form of the Inference 19. Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, but conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that preceding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action. Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

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