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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 20:48
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0:02–0:06नच्रिन्चिक अछि।
0:33–0:38by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended
0:38–0:42by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its
0:42–0:46object. After a purely negative inference, validity
0:46–0:50may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this
0:50–0:54cognition of a body is valid, because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate
0:54–0:59possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not
0:59–1:03deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because
1:03–1:07that too is valid cognition with respect to a body.
1:07–1:14Refutation of Objections to the Reason in the Inference Concerning Cognition of a Body
1:14–1:18This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference that this body cognition
1:18–1:22is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet,
1:22–1:25being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because
1:25–1:29there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion.
1:29–1:33Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body
1:33–1:38cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such
1:38–1:44a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body.
1:44–1:47If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that
1:47–1:52is the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate
1:52–1:55of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes
1:55–2:00a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct
2:00–2:05from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason.
2:05–2:10If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified
2:10–2:14reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid
2:14–2:18of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object
2:18–2:22bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar.
2:22–2:26Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object
2:26–2:31avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood,
2:31–2:36and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available.
2:36–2:41Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes bodyhood its mode and a substrate
2:41–2:46of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with
2:46–2:51hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood
2:51–2:55delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being
2:55–2:59body cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an object
2:59–3:04devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood.
3:04–3:09This reason establishes the validity of cognition.
3:09–3:14Refutation of the Prabhakara Objection of Infinite Regress
3:14–3:18The Prabhakara or Guru Party may say, a cognition whose validity has already been
3:18–3:21determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity
3:21–3:25of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress.
3:25–3:30can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity,
3:30–3:34for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore
3:34–3:38let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of
3:38–3:42another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine
3:42–3:46its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through
3:46–3:50another cognition in order to determine its object.
3:50–3:54The naiyayika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore
3:54–3:59its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected
3:59–4:03that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine
4:03–4:08the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object
4:08–4:13arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an
4:13–4:17object clear as an amelaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity
4:17–4:21arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object
4:21–4:25produces unwavering activity.
4:25–4:29But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt
4:29–4:33about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does
4:33–4:37not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon
4:37–4:39a determination of validity.
4:39–4:43Therefore, inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been
4:43–4:47apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting
4:47–4:50in doubt about invalidity is absent.
4:50–4:54If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its
4:54–4:57validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity.
4:57–5:02Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the
5:02–5:04validity of the object cognition.
5:04–5:09Avoidance of infinite regress
5:09–5:12There is no infinite regress in this way.
5:12–5:15Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of
5:15–5:20the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered,
5:20–5:23or because some distinct object has already been obtained.
5:23–5:27On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the bar view, because cognition's validity
5:27–5:31is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition.
5:31–5:35In the Guru MMA with Macron SA with Macron view too, validity is included neither in
5:35–5:39the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot
5:39–5:42be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate.
5:42–5:46It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means,
5:46–5:50And the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing
5:50–5:52regress.
5:52–5:56Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the
5:56–6:00first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so
6:00–6:02there is no infinite regress.
6:02–6:06They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity
6:06–6:11of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, no doubt about
6:11–6:13the validity of the first cognition remains.
6:13–6:18Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition,
6:18–6:22the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress.
6:23–6:25But this view is not correct.
6:25–6:30If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain,
6:30–6:34determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object,
6:34–6:38unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone.
6:38–6:43It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object
6:43–6:46of cognition, causes activity.
6:46–6:50If it is asked how doubt about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object
6:50–6:54already determined, one should consult experience.
6:54–6:58Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions validity or invalidity causes
6:58–7:00doubt about the object.
7:00–7:03The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity
7:03–7:07and produces doubt concerning the object.
7:07–7:14Misaka objection and Neyayaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference.
7:14–7:18Some Misaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and
7:18–7:22pervasion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is
7:22–7:27an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished.
7:27–7:31The Neyayaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition
7:31–7:34of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would
7:34–7:39disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically
7:39–7:44dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity
7:44–7:47of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the
7:47–7:52reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the
7:52–7:54opposing alternative.
7:54–7:59The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity,
7:59–8:03cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that
8:03–8:08blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object.
8:08–8:12Some Naya Yikas say that even the Memsarco admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes
8:12–8:16arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not.
8:16–8:20The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri...
8:20–8:24It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth
8:24–8:28and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless,
8:28–8:31why then pursue an inference determining its validity?
8:31–8:36Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been
8:36–8:40established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the
8:40–8:42same sacrifice as its object.
8:42–8:46Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second
8:46–8:51cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity.
8:51–8:55Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing
8:55–9:00doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity.
9:00–9:05In Ayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness
9:05–9:08is not.
9:08–9:12Some Nayayikas, including the Kasperti, say that the validity of an inference free from
9:12–9:16any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal
9:16–9:18aggregate.
9:18–9:22This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object
9:22–9:27possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity.
9:27–9:31Because of perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in
9:31–9:36Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity
9:36–9:42is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity.
9:42–9:47In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself
9:47–9:53is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no
9:53–9:59doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I
9:59–10:04I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in
10:04–10:07the form, I know it as cloth.
10:07–10:11Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first
10:11–10:17cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition.
10:17–10:22Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body,
10:22–10:27extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated
10:27–10:32reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity
10:32–10:35is determined extrinsically.
10:35–10:37This view is unsound.
10:37–10:42Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of
10:42–10:47an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its
10:47–10:51determination must occur extrinsically through another means.
10:51–10:56Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition
10:56–11:00and the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from
11:00–11:05doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity.
11:05–11:09Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause
11:09–11:11of activity.
11:11–11:15The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence
11:15–11:19of the first cognition's own causal aggregate.
11:19–11:23A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy,
11:23–11:28The water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known.
11:28–11:32Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section
11:32–11:38of the Tat the Sintmai composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya.
11:38–11:43The theory of the production of validity.
11:43–11:48The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically.
11:48–11:53The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not
11:53–11:58produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone.
11:58–12:03Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become
12:03–12:05valid.
12:05–12:10And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid.
12:10–12:14If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the
12:14–12:19cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition,
12:19–12:23would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive
12:23–12:25aggregate.
12:25–12:30For the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit
12:30–12:34and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate.
12:34–12:38A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and
12:38–12:43defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the
12:43–12:47same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity
12:47–12:48should arise.
12:48–12:53Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity
12:53–12:58and invalidity is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself
12:58–13:04the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate
13:04–13:09exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific
13:09–13:15cause in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Mnsaka objection to the
13:15–13:22inference of the author of the Kusumunjeli. The Mnsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions,
13:22–13:26though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary
13:26–13:31properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ
13:31–13:35from each other. It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be
13:35–13:40recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent
13:40–13:45effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot
13:45–13:50be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects,
13:50–13:54is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue-pot hood and pot-cognition hood.
13:56–13:58The author of the Kusumunjali may say,
13:58–14:02valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of
14:02–14:07cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition.
14:08–14:10But this inference is unsound.
14:11–14:16Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the
14:16–14:21cause of cognition in general, thus the probandum is absent from the subject and contradiction results.
14:22–14:27If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general,
14:27–14:32the probandum is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example
14:32–14:39in valid cognition. Since the probandum contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established
14:39–14:44either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced
14:44–14:49by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions,
14:49–14:55the defect is proving what is already established. Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate
14:55–15:00distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general, be the probandom, as before, both
15:00–15:05proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general
15:05–15:10general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise
15:10–15:15general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition.
15:15–15:19Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between
15:19–15:21their effects.
15:21–15:26This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause
15:26–15:29distinct from the cause of cognition in general.
15:29–15:34If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make
15:34–15:38If the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property
15:38–15:44bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished.
15:44–15:48Refutation of other inferences.
15:48–15:52Nor is the following probandom admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose
15:52–15:57causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited
15:57–16:01by effect hood delimited by cognition hood.
16:01–16:05Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced
16:05–16:06Effecthood.
16:06–16:08Objection.
16:08–16:12The rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause
16:12–16:15delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property.
16:15–16:20The qualifier, unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides
16:20–16:24in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause.
16:24–16:25Answer.
16:25–16:28For the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood
16:28–16:33whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognition
16:33–16:35hood is not such a property.
16:35–16:39If the probandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities,
16:39–16:43the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established,
16:43–16:47since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces
16:47–16:52cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference,
16:52–16:56validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another
16:56–17:02causality, because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood.
17:02–17:08Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood.
17:08–17:19The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of non-eternal entities delimits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties.
17:19–17:29It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect arising from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition.
17:29–17:35cognition. This is unsound. Jaundice and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning
17:35–17:40their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition.
17:40–17:44If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition.
17:45–17:49The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning
17:49–17:53a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes.
17:55–17:57Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:57–18:03It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is
18:03–18:07delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot,
18:07–18:12it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause
18:12–18:16whose counter positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would
18:16–18:21become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established.
18:22–18:26Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upset from invalid
18:26–18:30cognition and the sense faculties and the like our causes having that contact as their
18:30–18:35counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that
18:35–18:39being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity with
18:39–18:45invalid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition
18:45–18:50is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because,
18:50–18:55like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced
18:55–18:59by a cause that does not produce a leucary perception, because, like valid gustatory cognition
18:59–19:04produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove
19:04–19:09what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing
19:09–19:14valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce
19:14–19:19a leucary perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition
19:19–19:24is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid
19:24–19:30cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post,
19:30–19:35repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit
19:35–19:41the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition,
19:41–19:45bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce
19:45–19:51invalid cognition. But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the
19:51–19:57producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving
19:57–20:03what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect
20:03–20:07to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition.
20:09–20:13Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as
20:13–20:18valid perceptions. Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class.
20:18–20:23us. Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal
20:23–20:29of cause-ness. Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood,
20:29–20:33as the property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing
20:33–20:39only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory
20:39–20:42of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the Tatvasant
20:42–20:44composed by Sri Gangesopadhyaya.

Plain text

नच्रिन्चिक अछि। by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid, because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body. Refutation of Objections to the Reason in the Inference Concerning Cognition of a Body This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference that this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion. Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body. If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason. If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar. Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available. Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes bodyhood its mode and a substrate of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being body cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition. Refutation of the Prabhakara Objection of Infinite Regress The Prabhakara or Guru Party may say, a cognition whose validity has already been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object. The naiyayika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an object clear as an amelaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore, inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition. Avoidance of infinite regress There is no infinite regress in this way. Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some distinct object has already been obtained. On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the bar view, because cognition's validity is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition. In the Guru MMA with Macron SA with Macron view too, validity is included neither in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means, And the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress. Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object already determined, one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object. Misaka objection and Neyayaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference. Some Misaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and pervasion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished. The Neyayaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative. The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object. Some Naya Yikas say that even the Memsarco admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri... It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference determining its validity? Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity. In Ayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not. Some Nayayikas, including the Kasperti, say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate. This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity. Because of perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth. Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body, extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically through another means. Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition and the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity. The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy, The water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section of the Tat the Sintmai composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya. The theory of the production of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. For the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate. A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise. Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Mnsaka objection to the inference of the author of the Kusumunjeli. The Mnsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other. It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects, is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue-pot hood and pot-cognition hood. The author of the Kusumunjali may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandum is absent from the subject and contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general, the probandum is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition. Since the probandum contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established. Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general, be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make If the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished. Refutation of other inferences. Nor is the following probandom admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced Effecthood. Objection. The rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier, unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause. Answer. For the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognition hood is not such a property. If the probandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established, since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood. Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood. The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of non-eternal entities delimits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties. It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect arising from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition. cognition. This is unsound. Jaundice and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established. Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition and the sense faculties and the like our causes having that contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a leucary perception, because, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce a leucary perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition. Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid perceptions. Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class. us. Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal of cause-ness. Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the Tatvasant composed by Sri Gangesopadhyaya.

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