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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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  1. 0:02–0:05CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW
  2. 0:06–0:13Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition.
  3. 0:13–0:19Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object.
  4. 0:19–0:24Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion.
  5. 0:24–0:30Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion.
  6. 0:30–0:35Modernary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating
  7. 0:35–0:39this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction.
  8. 0:39–0:43Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from
  9. 0:43–0:49illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity.
  10. 0:49–0:54It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
  11. 0:54–0:56This is not correct.
  12. 0:56–0:59Validity is qualified cognitionhood is a cognition that takes as its object a non-apprehended
  13. 0:59–1:04absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded from illusion.
  14. 1:04–1:09Since the complete causal aggregate for nonrelation is absent, this cannot be intrinsically known
  15. 1:09–1:11from the cognitive aggregate.
  16. 1:11–1:15Cognition's self-luminosity illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt
  17. 1:15–1:19about validity would be impossible even in the unhabituated state.
  18. 1:19–1:23Therefore, cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely from the cognitive aggregate,
  19. 1:23–1:27otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have to be intrinsically produced
  20. 1:27–1:30from the aggregate of illusion.
  21. 1:30–1:33The Neo Prabhakara view
  22. 1:33–1:38The Neo Prabhakaramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent
  23. 1:38–1:40difference.
  24. 1:40–1:45Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known.
  25. 1:45–1:50Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition
  26. 1:50–1:55of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
  27. 1:55–1:58Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference.
  28. 1:58–2:05Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence.
  29. 2:05–2:11Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising.
  30. 2:11–2:17Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation,
  31. 2:17–2:20therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect.
  32. 2:20–2:26Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes,
  33. 2:26–2:30non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference.
  34. 2:30–2:34The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object,
  35. 2:34–2:36it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
  36. 2:37–2:40In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect.
  37. 2:41–2:45Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two
  38. 2:45–2:49alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent
  39. 2:49–2:53difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity.
  40. 2:53–2:57Gangesa's conclusion
  41. 2:57–3:01Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound.
  42. 3:01–3:05Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive
  43. 3:05–3:09validity, it is pointless to call something else validity.
  44. 3:09–3:13If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference,
  45. 3:13–3:17intrinsic cognition of it from the cognitive aggregate would be impossible.
  46. 3:17–3:25For the counter positive of such non-apprehension, apprehension of a non-existent difference is absent, nor was it remembered earlier.
  47. 3:25–3:33Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference.
  48. 3:33–3:42This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation.
  49. 3:42–3:47If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate,
  50. 3:47–3:50doubt about cognitive validity would be impossible,
  51. 3:50–3:54because the relation can be apprehended even in an unhabituated state.
  52. 3:54–3:59Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity,
  53. 3:59–4:04is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property
  54. 4:04–4:07consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation.
  55. 4:07–4:12Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent
  56. 4:12–4:16difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Validity is
  57. 4:16–4:21determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing
  58. 4:21–4:25feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established.
  59. 4:26–4:28Here ends the theory of the production of validity.
  60. 4:32–4:38The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Proma.
  61. 4:40–4:44Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Proma, validity is not a universal.
  62. 4:44–4:52What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive
  63. 4:52–4:54validity?
  64. 4:54–4:57It cannot be a universal or common property.
  65. 4:57–5:02If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were
  66. 5:02–5:07seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible.
  67. 5:07–5:12But in the collective doubtful cognition, is this cognition valid or not, and is this
  68. 5:12–5:16Once a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference, therefore
  69. 5:16–5:19it is not a universal.
  70. 5:19–5:25If validity were a universal, it would overlap with perceptuality.
  71. 5:25–5:29The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the
  72. 5:29–5:35causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity.
  73. 5:35–5:39If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous
  74. 5:39–5:44and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear
  75. 5:44–5:50and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal.
  76. 5:51–5:56The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component.
  77. 5:58–6:03If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another
  78. 6:03–6:08particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every
  79. 6:08–6:13part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver,
  80. 6:13–6:18and this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not,
  81. 6:18–6:22validity and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components.
  82. 6:23–6:27A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference.
  83. 6:29–6:32It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component,
  84. 6:32–6:35like memory, it should have the same status in both components.
  85. 6:35–6:41Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience,
  86. 6:41–6:44but that definition will be refuted below.
  87. 6:44–6:48Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish
  88. 6:48–6:52validity as a universal.
  89. 6:52–6:57Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurrent.
  90. 6:57–7:01It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence
  91. 7:01–7:05validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively-occurrent properties.
  92. 7:06–7:10By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively-occurrent is not pervasively-occurrent,
  93. 7:10–7:14and what is pervasively-occurrent is not non-pervasively-occurrent, as restricted,
  94. 7:14–7:19validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively-occurrent.
  95. 7:20–7:24This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed,
  96. 7:24–7:29they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top
  97. 7:29–7:34and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if
  98. 7:34–7:37different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them.
  99. 7:38–7:43Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem,
  100. 7:43–7:47because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present.
  101. 7:48–7:51Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively
  102. 7:51–7:53occurrent properties is incoherent.
  103. 7:53–8:00The absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter.
  104. 8:00–8:06The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a mode
  105. 8:06–8:12and making a property present in the qualificand a mode may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity.
  106. 8:12–8:19Answer, these conditions may explain the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity.
  107. 8:19–8:23validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate
  108. 8:23–8:27of validity or its absence.
  109. 8:27–8:31Recutation of the Prabhācāra view
  110. 8:31–8:35The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended,
  111. 8:35–8:41or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity. This view is
  112. 8:41–8:45unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an
  113. 8:45–8:50earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended,
  114. 8:50–8:53yet the later cognition can be veridical.
  115. 8:53–8:57The Prabhikara may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the post qualified
  116. 8:57–9:02by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new.
  117. 9:02–9:06But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness, is apprehended on the basis
  118. 9:06–9:09of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour.
  119. 9:09–9:13Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions
  120. 9:13–9:18of Vedic meaning to a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what
  121. 9:18–9:23was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity.
  122. 9:23–9:29Veridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud.
  123. 9:29–9:34Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed
  124. 9:34–9:38by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such
  125. 9:38–9:42as pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too.
  126. 9:42–9:46Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity, because
  127. 9:46–9:50these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because they
  128. 9:50–9:56depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence.
  129. 9:56–10:01Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition
  130. 10:01–10:06opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive.
  131. 10:06–10:11experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing
  132. 10:11–10:17successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and success must again be defined
  133. 10:17–10:22through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an
  134. 10:22–10:27unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest
  135. 10:27–10:33its experience would equally occur in illusion. Experience of a property that is not the
  136. 10:33–10:37counter-positive of an absolute absence and the qualificand is not pramahud.
  137. 10:39–10:43It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as moda property that is not the
  138. 10:43–10:49counter-positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand. But this definition does not
  139. 10:49–10:55apply to the ridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction is non-pervasively a current.
  140. 10:55–11:00If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current,
  141. 11:00–11:05it overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an
  142. 11:05–11:08illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current.
  143. 11:10–11:16A definition based on mutual absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction are
  144. 11:16–11:21non-pervasively a current because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root
  145. 11:21–11:27and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose
  146. 11:27–11:33its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based
  147. 11:33–11:38on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal
  148. 11:38–11:41delimiters.
  149. 11:41–11:46Objecthood is a special mode of qualification.
  150. 11:46–11:51Experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not Pramahood.
  151. 11:51–11:58In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualificon may occur as modes.
  152. 11:58–12:03Nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualifcans,
  153. 12:03–12:07then the condition that the property be absent from the qualificon becomes pointless, and
  154. 12:07–12:11because all modes do not reside in a single qualificon the definition will not apply
  155. 12:11–12:14to collective cognition.
  156. 12:14–12:18The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition
  157. 12:18–12:20is the delimiter of objecthood.
  158. 12:20–12:24In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited
  159. 12:24–12:29by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable
  160. 12:29–12:31silverness.
  161. 12:31–12:34Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and
  162. 12:34–12:36future objects.
  163. 12:36–12:40Objecthood is a special qualificative relation between cognition and object, a special relational
  164. 12:40–12:42property of its own.
  165. 12:42–12:46A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that,
  166. 12:46–12:52knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that
  167. 12:52–12:56a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate
  168. 12:56–13:01must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot, involving
  169. 13:01–13:05an instrumental relation through pothood, would be impossible.
  170. 13:05–13:11Mothood too is one kind of this special relation, not mere objecthood.
  171. 13:11–13:16Experience whose mode is co-located with objecthood is not valid cognition.
  172. 13:16–13:21It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is collocated with object hood,
  173. 13:21–13:24or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode.
  174. 13:24–13:28This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies
  175. 13:28–13:32to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this, and the
  176. 13:32–13:36mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate.
  177. 13:36–13:41If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality
  178. 13:41–13:45must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless.
  179. 13:46–13:50A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another,
  180. 13:50–13:53but this definition does not exclude the illusory component.
  181. 13:54–13:58The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either.
  182. 14:00–14:05Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere
  183. 14:05–14:06is not valid cognition.
  184. 14:06–14:13Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited
  185. 14:13–14:20by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition, objecthood differs
  186. 14:20–14:25in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property
  187. 14:25–14:31residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory
  188. 14:31–14:36component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell.
  189. 14:36–14:41It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undilimited
  190. 14:41–14:44by that same property.
  191. 14:44–14:48Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes
  192. 14:48–14:53as mode of property not residing where objecthood resides likewise over extends to an illusion
  193. 14:53–14:56containing a shellless component.
  194. 14:56–15:01Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current, formulations based on it also fail
  195. 15:01–15:06to apply to all examples of veridical cognition.
  196. 15:06–15:11Avoidance of under extension or failure of application.
  197. 15:11–15:16Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion
  198. 15:16–15:18cannot be valid.
  199. 15:18–15:23But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity
  200. 15:23–15:29are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone
  201. 15:29–15:36cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes as motor property
  202. 15:36–15:41not co-located with objecthood is illusion, and experience distinct from it is valid also fails.
  203. 15:42–15:48If in the valid cognition this is knowable no ability is imagined not to reside in objecthood,
  204. 15:48–15:50The definition will not apply.
  205. 15:50–15:54In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver,
  206. 15:54–15:59therefore, merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would
  207. 15:59–16:05have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these
  208. 16:05–16:08attempts to avoid under extension or non-application.
  209. 16:10–16:17A single objecthood is not admissible. If in illusion only one objecthood is admitted
  210. 16:17–16:21If it is regarded for both shell and silver, with silverness absent from the shell as its
  211. 16:21–16:27delimiter, the cognition this shell is silver will not be valid even in the shell component.
  212. 16:27–16:31If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded
  213. 16:31–16:35as valid in the silver component.
  214. 16:35–16:38If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but
  215. 16:38–16:42invalid in the qualitative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too
  216. 16:42–16:44is unsound.
  217. 16:44–16:50The superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition.
  218. 16:51–17:01Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifies in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component.
  219. 17:03–17:05Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view
  220. 17:05–17:12The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a
  221. 17:12–17:18qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood also fails.
  222. 17:18–17:23In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode,
  223. 17:23–17:27imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal,
  224. 17:27–17:30so the definition will not apply to that valid cognition.
  225. 17:30–17:36The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the
  226. 17:36–17:41like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter-positive of an absence
  227. 17:41–17:44is delimited by the property delimiting counter-positiveness, the condition,
  228. 17:44–17:49undelimited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from
  229. 17:49–17:54indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends to illusion and under extends
  230. 17:54–17:59to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of
  231. 17:59–18:04of prama in the perception section.
  232. 18:04–18:08The established definition of prama.
  233. 18:08–18:14An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid.
  234. 18:14–18:19The proponent of the doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate
  235. 18:19–18:22where that entity actually exists is valid.
  236. 18:22–18:27Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate
  237. 18:27–18:29of that property.
  238. 18:29–18:34Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid, or cognition
  239. 18:34–18:40that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that property is invalid.
  240. 18:40–18:45Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity.
  241. 18:45–18:50Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate,
  242. 18:50–18:55cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition
  243. 18:55–18:58of the mode.
  244. 18:58–19:04Incognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition.
  245. 19:04–19:09God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualifican form, he knows the qualifican
  246. 19:09–19:15of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property separately as a mode.
  247. 19:15–19:19An indeterminate cognition such as this is something, is excluded from both valid and
  248. 19:19–19:24invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct.
  249. 19:24–19:29Using it inexpressible in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without
  250. 19:29–19:32association with name and universal.
  251. 19:32–19:37The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness resides
  252. 19:37–19:41in the shell, and invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made a mode
  253. 19:41–19:44in the shell where silverness is absent.
  254. 19:44–19:48But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its
  255. 19:48–19:53qualifical components, pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate
  256. 19:53–20:00of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate
  257. 20:00–20:06cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition of non-pervasively
  258. 20:06–20:12a current presence and absence. Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively
  259. 20:12–20:16a current positive entity such as conjunction and of its absence would both be respectively
  260. 20:16–20:20valid and invalid with regard to the same qualificant, a single tree, because conjunction
  261. 20:20–20:24and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top.
  262. 20:24–20:28Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts,
  263. 20:28–20:30the root and top.
  264. 20:30–20:34Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part in
  265. 20:34–20:41which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction.
  266. 20:41–20:46Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump.
  267. 20:46–20:51Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has
  268. 20:51–20:56been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid.
  269. 20:56–21:00Use in this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in
  270. 21:00–21:04which is not a defect of failed generalization.
  271. 21:04–21:08Validity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the
  272. 21:08–21:14specific substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition.
  273. 21:14–21:18view of others.
  274. 21:18–21:23Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity.
  275. 21:23–21:28Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component, nevertheless
  276. 21:28–21:34valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined.
  277. 21:34–21:38Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness, is valid cognition
  278. 21:38–21:43concerning silver, while experience of silverness in a shell, the substrate of absence of
  279. 21:43–21:48silverness is invalid cognition concerning silver.
  280. 21:48–21:52On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition
  281. 21:52–21:56with its specific object causes unwavering activity.
  282. 21:56–22:00If specific objecthood belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid
  283. 22:00–22:04cognition may be defined as experience that does not make as mode a property absent from
  284. 22:04–22:06the substrate of objecthood.
  285. 22:06–22:11Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode co-located with objecthood
  286. 22:11–22:15may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid.
  287. 22:15–22:19In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid
  288. 22:19–22:22and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

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CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition. Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object. Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion. Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion. Modernary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction. Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity. It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. This is not correct. Validity is qualified cognitionhood is a cognition that takes as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for nonrelation is absent, this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-luminosity illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible even in the unhabituated state. Therefore, cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion. The Neo Prabhakara view The Neo Prabhakaramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known. Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence. Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising. Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation, therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect. Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference. The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object, it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect. Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity. Gangesa's conclusion Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound. Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity, it is pointless to call something else validity. If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from the cognitive aggregate would be impossible. For the counter positive of such non-apprehension, apprehension of a non-existent difference is absent, nor was it remembered earlier. Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation. If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, doubt about cognitive validity would be impossible, because the relation can be apprehended even in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity, is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation. Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established. Here ends the theory of the production of validity. The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Proma. Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Proma, validity is not a universal. What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive validity? It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition, is this cognition valid or not, and is this Once a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity. If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal. The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component. If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components. Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience, but that definition will be refuted below. Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish validity as a universal. Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurrent. It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively-occurrent properties. By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively-occurrent is not pervasively-occurrent, and what is pervasively-occurrent is not non-pervasively-occurrent, as restricted, validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively-occurrent. This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them. Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem, because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present. Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively occurrent properties is incoherent. The absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter. The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a mode and making a property present in the qualificand a mode may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity. Answer, these conditions may explain the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity. validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate of validity or its absence. Recutation of the Prabhācāra view The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended, or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity. This view is unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet the later cognition can be veridical. The Prabhikara may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the post qualified by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness, is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning to a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity. Veridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud. Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such as pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too. Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity, because these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because they depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence. Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive. experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and success must again be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion. Experience of a property that is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence and the qualificand is not pramahud. It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as moda property that is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand. But this definition does not apply to the ridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction is non-pervasively a current. If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current, it overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current. A definition based on mutual absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively a current because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters. Objecthood is a special mode of qualification. Experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not Pramahood. In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualificon may occur as modes. Nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualifcans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualificon becomes pointless, and because all modes do not reside in a single qualificon the definition will not apply to collective cognition. The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition is the delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable silverness. Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future objects. Objecthood is a special qualificative relation between cognition and object, a special relational property of its own. A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that, knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot, involving an instrumental relation through pothood, would be impossible. Mothood too is one kind of this special relation, not mere objecthood. Experience whose mode is co-located with objecthood is not valid cognition. It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is collocated with object hood, or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode. This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this, and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate. If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless. A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either. Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell. It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undilimited by that same property. Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes as mode of property not residing where objecthood resides likewise over extends to an illusion containing a shellless component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition. Avoidance of under extension or failure of application. Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes as motor property not co-located with objecthood is illusion, and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable no ability is imagined not to reside in objecthood, The definition will not apply. In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver, therefore, merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not admissible. If in illusion only one objecthood is admitted If it is regarded for both shell and silver, with silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition this shell is silver will not be valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component. If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in the qualitative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. The superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifies in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode, imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition will not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter-positive of an absence is delimited by the property delimiting counter-positiveness, the condition, undelimited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends to illusion and under extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of of prama in the perception section. The established definition of prama. An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of the doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property. Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid, or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity. Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate, cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode. Incognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition. God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualifican form, he knows the qualifican of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property separately as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something, is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Using it inexpressible in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness resides in the shell, and invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent. But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its qualifical components, pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition of non-pervasively a current presence and absence. Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively a current positive entity such as conjunction and of its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualificant, a single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top. Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts, the root and top. Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part in which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction. Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump. Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid. Use in this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in which is not a defect of failed generalization. Validity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition. view of others. Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity. Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component, nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined. Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness, is valid cognition concerning silver, while experience of silverness in a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness is invalid cognition concerning silver. On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific objecthood belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may be defined as experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate of objecthood. Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode co-located with objecthood may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid. In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

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