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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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  1. 0:04–0:14The Saddhi section of the Tattva Sintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge.
  2. 0:15–0:19It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers.
  3. 0:20–0:31It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention.
  4. 0:31–0:36In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate
  5. 0:36–0:41concerning the personal authorship of the Veda.
  6. 0:41–0:46Verbal testimony and objections, what objections did the Buddhists and Vaikas raise concerning
  7. 0:46–0:51verbal testimony, and how did the Nya-Yakas refute them?
  8. 0:51–0:56The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic
  9. 0:56–1:01fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition
  10. 1:01–1:08impossible without them. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal,
  11. 1:08–1:14and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
  12. 1:15–1:19To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact,
  13. 1:19–1:24to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its
  14. 1:24–1:30refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means
  15. 1:30–1:36of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the
  16. 1:36–1:42relevant effect. They maintain that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce
  17. 1:42–1:46veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge.
  18. 1:47–1:51The Naya Yajas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision.
  19. 1:52–1:56They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory.
  20. 1:56–2:01They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions,
  21. 2:01–2:06aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition.
  22. 2:06–2:10If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge,
  23. 2:10–2:15that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent.
  24. 2:15–2:21The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikha subsumed verbal cognition under inference.
  25. 2:21–2:24Their position is discussed below.
  26. 2:24–2:30The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory.
  27. 2:30–2:35If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established.
  28. 2:35–2:41If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words.
  29. 2:41–2:45When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge,
  30. 2:45–2:49it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence.
  31. 2:49–2:57If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge.
  32. 2:57–3:04Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge.
  33. 3:04–3:07This is the self-contradiction.
  34. 3:07–3:13After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vyaka philosophy.
  35. 3:13–3:22The vayikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge.
  36. 3:22–3:34According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning?
  37. 3:34–3:42According to the Vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference.
  38. 3:42–3:50They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established.
  39. 3:50–3:59Consequently, Vayika philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference.
  40. 3:59–4:04The vayakas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other
  41. 4:04–4:10required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker.
  42. 4:10–4:15The nayayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the vayakas and refute the position
  43. 4:15–4:18of the author of the lillavadi.
  44. 4:18–4:22According to the nayayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected
  45. 4:22–4:27word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical
  46. 4:27–4:31problem arises before that inference can even occur.
  47. 4:31–4:36The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference
  48. 4:36–4:41underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot
  49. 4:41–4:44already be available.
  50. 4:44–4:48An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom
  51. 4:48–4:51are already established.
  52. 4:51–4:55But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it
  53. 4:55–5:00It is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established.
  54. 5:00–5:06Therefore, the reason proposed by the vayakas is invalid for inference.
  55. 5:06–5:11Following this refutation, the vayakas modify their reason and make being intended to produce
  56. 5:11–5:15a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of
  57. 5:15–5:20mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference.
  58. 5:20–5:25Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasa Sankati,
  59. 5:25–5:27he waters with liquid?
  60. 5:27–5:33How does the new Vayika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail?
  61. 5:33–5:36The Nayayaka argument is very precise.
  62. 5:36–5:40In their revised reason, the Vayikas say that words uttered with the intention of
  63. 5:40–5:44producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce
  64. 5:44–5:49a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference.
  65. 5:49–5:55In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason.
  66. 5:55–6:00The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
  67. 6:00–6:06here interpreted as, He waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person.
  68. 6:06–6:12The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows.
  69. 6:12–6:17Suppose an untrustworthy person says Payasasankati, while actually intending to convey He waters
  70. 6:17–6:20with a coconut shell.
  71. 6:20–6:25Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus
  72. 6:25–6:29the proposed reason is present.
  73. 6:29–6:33Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition?
  74. 6:33–6:39No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance
  75. 6:39–6:42comes from an untrustworthy person.
  76. 6:42–6:47The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veridical
  77. 6:47–6:51cognition in this case, must also be present.
  78. 6:51–6:56Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent.
  79. 6:56–7:00The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails.
  80. 7:00–7:06In this section the nayayakas offer another example, karma-tbamanayanam-ti objecthood,
  81. 7:06–7:09bringing, an effort.
  82. 7:09–7:16This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly.
  83. 7:16–7:21Observe that Karmat the Manayana M.T. is not a complete or meaningful sentence.
  84. 7:21–7:26It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic
  85. 7:26–7:30expectancy or grammatical connection.
  86. 7:30–7:35The deviation of the Vaika reason may be understood here as follows.
  87. 7:35–7:40of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy,
  88. 7:40–7:44intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some
  89. 7:44–7:48object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually
  90. 7:48–7:52connected meanings, is fully present.
  91. 7:52–7:56Absence of the probandom, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence
  92. 7:56–8:03meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection,
  93. 8:03–8:05expectancy among them.
  94. 8:05–8:11Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom, geritical verbal cognition
  95. 8:11–8:16does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate.
  96. 8:16–8:22This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition.
  97. 8:22–8:26To refute the Bayekha theory that meaning is understood through inference from the
  98. 8:26–8:31speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting
  99. 8:31–8:34argument, discussed next.
  100. 8:34–8:38The vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical
  101. 8:38–8:43cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful
  102. 8:43–8:47sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the
  103. 8:47–8:51relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on
  104. 8:51–8:56the vayikha theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence?
  105. 8:56–8:59The vayikas offer an ingenious reply.
  106. 8:59–9:04They concede that in the case of a parrot, or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's
  107. 9:04–9:08veritical cognition or intention, is in fact absent.
  108. 9:08–9:13They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words
  109. 9:13–9:17possess sentential fitness, or the capacity to convey meaning.
  110. 9:17–9:21Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and
  111. 9:21–9:23understands the meaning.
  112. 9:23–9:28Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but
  113. 9:28–9:34from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention.
  114. 9:34–9:38From the nayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring
  115. 9:38–9:43water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate
  116. 9:43–9:47to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion?
  117. 9:47–9:52How does this situation assist the nayakas in establishing words as an independent
  118. 9:52–9:55means of knowledge distinct from inference.
  119. 9:55–10:01The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether.
  120. 10:01–10:05Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original
  121. 10:05–10:11veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition.
  122. 10:11–10:15If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly
  123. 10:15–10:20understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts.
  124. 10:20–10:24This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge
  125. 10:24–10:28in the following manner.
  126. 10:28–10:32According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's
  127. 10:32–10:35veridical cognition.
  128. 10:35–10:39In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the
  129. 10:39–10:44meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is
  130. 10:44–10:46impossible.
  131. 10:46–10:50If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when the
  132. 10:50–10:55alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition, is absent, the knowledge must arise not from
  133. 10:55–11:00the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words.
  134. 11:00–11:04This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony
  135. 11:04–11:09is an independent means of knowledge in its own right.
  136. 11:09–11:13A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys
  137. 11:13–11:18meaning to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words,
  138. 11:18–11:24enabling it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence
  139. 11:24–11:28because certain special properties are inherently present among its words.
  140. 11:29–11:34According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence.
  141. 11:36–11:40A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars.
  142. 11:40–11:46Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order
  143. 11:46–11:52to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent.
  144. 11:52–11:56Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected
  145. 11:56–12:02with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible.
  146. 12:02–12:08Proximity or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without
  147. 12:08–12:10an improper delay.
  148. 12:10–12:16Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful
  149. 12:16–12:20in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present
  150. 12:20–12:22in the words.
  151. 12:22–12:26A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features
  152. 12:26–12:33are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them.
  153. 12:33–12:38An example is now offered to clarify these three features.
  154. 12:38–12:43If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham
  155. 12:43–12:48nyanati, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning?
  156. 12:48–12:51The question deserves careful thought.
  157. 12:51–12:56This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning.
  158. 12:56–12:59It principally lacks syntactic expectancy.
  159. 12:59–13:04Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions.
  160. 13:04–13:08There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its
  161. 13:08–13:11object, by which one word may be joined to another.
  162. 13:11–13:15Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or
  163. 13:15–13:18convey a sentence meaning.
  164. 13:18–13:23The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness.
  165. 13:23–13:27The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible
  166. 13:27–13:33and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire,
  167. 13:33–13:39Vanina Sincati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but
  168. 13:41–13:47which principle feature expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence.
  169. 13:49–13:53Watering is possible with water or another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire
  170. 13:53–14:00is impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness.
  171. 14:02–14:07This raises the question, when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible,
  172. 14:07–14:12which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent.
  173. 14:14–14:16In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness.
  174. 14:18–14:21When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible,
  175. 14:21–14:27As in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another.
  176. 14:28–14:33We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity.
  177. 14:34–14:39Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay.
  178. 14:41–14:44Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring.
  179. 14:45–14:48Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning?
  180. 14:48–14:50meaning?
  181. 14:50–14:56If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood.
  182. 14:56–15:00Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected
  183. 15:00–15:02in the mind.
  184. 15:02–15:07To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously
  185. 15:07–15:10present without improper delay.
  186. 15:10–15:15Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition
  187. 15:15–15:17of the correct meaning.
  188. 15:17–15:23This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity.
  189. 15:23–15:28Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sainthava, sainhabha manaya.
  190. 15:28–15:32The word sainthava has two meanings, salt and horse.
  191. 15:32–15:36No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's
  192. 15:36–15:39intention, context or purpose.
  193. 15:39–15:44The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt
  194. 15:44–15:46or for a horse.
  195. 15:46–15:51The Neayakas clearly state that in the case of polysemus words and words used in a secondary
  196. 15:51–15:56sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's
  197. 15:56–15:57intention.
  198. 15:57–16:01Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension
  199. 16:01–16:04of one specific meaning.
  200. 16:04–16:09The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended.
  201. 16:09–16:13This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemus words, it
  202. 16:13–16:18It also plays a crucial role in secondary signification.
  203. 16:18–16:23Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti.
  204. 16:23–16:28Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise?
  205. 16:28–16:32inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise.
  206. 16:32–16:37The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms.
  207. 16:37–16:41When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to
  208. 16:41–16:45we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention.
  209. 16:46–16:50This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA.
  210. 16:51–16:57Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity,
  211. 16:57–17:01and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a
  212. 17:01–17:07veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major and
  213. 17:07–17:12celebrated dispute between Nyaia and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy.
  214. 17:13–17:16The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter.
  215. 17:18–17:22MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view,
  216. 17:22–17:27holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as K.A. and
  217. 17:27–17:32K.O.K. are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them,
  218. 17:32–17:36it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that
  219. 17:36–17:38that was already there.
  220. 17:38–17:44Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal.
  221. 17:44–17:53According to the Nayayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks.
  222. 17:53–18:02To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality, the Nayayakas cite examples from direct experience.
  223. 18:02–18:07There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human
  224. 18:07–18:09being.
  225. 18:09–18:13If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when
  226. 18:13–18:15the speaker changed.
  227. 18:15–18:21This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.
  228. 18:21–18:26The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations
  229. 18:26–18:30of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not
  230. 18:30–18:34eternal but are produced and destroyed.
  231. 18:34–18:39If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, their forms would
  232. 18:39–18:42have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere.
  233. 18:42–18:47Yet the real difference is caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory airshow
  234. 18:47–18:51that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical
  235. 18:51–18:52effort.
  236. 18:52–18:58Mnene with Macron essay with Macron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this
  237. 18:58–19:05is that very sound ka as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition
  238. 19:05–19:10of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal ka-lad present in different
  239. 19:10–19:16sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy,
  240. 19:16–19:22semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition
  241. 19:22–19:25impossible without them.
  242. 19:25–19:31According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable
  243. 19:31–19:36for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning, from a sentence.
  244. 19:36–19:42Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in
  245. 19:42–19:44order to complete its meaning.
  246. 19:44–19:52For example, after merely saying gam, a pot, the expression anaya, bring, is expected.
  247. 19:52–19:58fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering
  248. 19:58–20:04with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there.
  249. 20:04–20:09Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance
  250. 20:09–20:15of the expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously.
  251. 20:15–20:19The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines
  252. 20:19–20:27the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively.
  253. 20:27–20:31Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions?
  254. 20:31–20:36If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity,
  255. 20:36–20:41is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in
  256. 20:41–20:47gukkarmatvam nyanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it.
  257. 20:47–20:52At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in Nyaya
  258. 20:52–20:57philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation.
  259. 20:57–21:03The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according
  260. 21:03–21:09to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
  261. 21:09–21:15According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows.
  262. 21:15–21:20The non-eternality of words, the Naayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal
  263. 21:20–21:24because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air
  264. 21:24–21:27and cease after a time, like a pot.
  265. 21:27–21:32Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal.
  266. 21:32–21:37The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakhas
  267. 21:37–21:42hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established.
  268. 21:42–21:47The Nayayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God.
  269. 21:47–21:51At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of
  270. 21:51–21:56a new creation, the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God.
  271. 21:56–22:01The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition.
  272. 22:01–22:06If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has
  273. 22:06–22:10continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered,
  274. 22:10–22:15Why do the Neayakas insist that it was composed by God?
  275. 22:15–22:19The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author
  276. 22:19–22:24is remembered, but the Neayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical
  277. 22:24–22:26standards.
  278. 22:26–22:32The Neayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons.
  279. 22:32–22:37The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes
  280. 22:37–22:42great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed.
  281. 22:43–22:47If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved.
  282. 22:49–22:54Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself
  283. 22:54–23:00without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author,
  284. 23:00–23:03God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos.
  285. 23:03–23:17Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God.
  286. 23:17–23:23The Msaakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution.
  287. 23:23–23:32Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction.
  288. 23:33–23:38According to the masakas, the relation between words or phonemes and their meanings is eternal.
  289. 23:39–23:48Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation.
  290. 23:49–23:51Hence no divine composition is required.
  291. 23:51–24:03The msakhas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds.
  292. 24:03–24:11In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence.
  293. 24:11–24:15The main Neayaka arguments are as follows.
  294. 24:15–24:21Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the
  295. 24:21–24:27throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot.
  296. 24:27–24:34Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end.
  297. 24:34–24:40Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place and time,
  298. 24:40–24:44which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent.
  299. 24:44–24:52Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort.
  300. 24:52–25:02At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before.
  301. 25:02–25:04heard before.
  302. 25:04–25:10According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual
  303. 25:10–25:16sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as G.A. Hood.
  304. 25:16–25:21Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow-wood,
  305. 25:21–25:25so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition
  306. 25:25–25:30in the form, this is that very G.A. arises from apprehending the common universal G.A.
  307. 25:30–25:31Hood.
  308. 25:31–25:36An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains
  309. 25:36–25:40common to every member of that class.
  310. 25:40–25:45Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist
  311. 25:45–25:52Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda?
  312. 25:52–25:56When a house is constructed, bricks are made first.
  313. 25:56–26:00If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole
  314. 26:00–26:04house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal.
  315. 26:04–26:09Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words.
  316. 26:09–26:15Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort and
  317. 26:15–26:17perish.
  318. 26:17–26:21Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes
  319. 26:21–26:24is likewise non-eternal.
  320. 26:24–26:29Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed
  321. 26:29–26:35as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal.
  322. 26:35–26:40On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established
  323. 26:40–26:47entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author.
  324. 26:47–26:51At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal
  325. 26:51–26:56phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Makron essay with Makron claim,
  326. 26:56–27:00neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically
  327. 27:00–27:05authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine.
  328. 27:05–27:10The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and
  329. 27:10–27:15beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons.
  330. 27:15–27:19The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by
  331. 27:19–27:23effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes
  332. 27:23–27:26cannot be eternal.
  333. 27:26–27:31The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence
  334. 27:31–27:35by itself without a conscious author.
  335. 27:35–27:39Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient god behind
  336. 27:39–27:44the composition of the Vedic is logically necessary.
  337. 27:44–27:48The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during
  338. 27:48–27:52the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible
  339. 27:52–27:59without an omniscient author. These Nyaya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the MMA with
  340. 27:59–28:03Makran essay with Makran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless.
  341. 28:05–28:10A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution,
  342. 28:10–28:15how does the MMA with Makran essay with Makran assertion that the relation between the word
  343. 28:15–28:19and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution?
  344. 28:19–28:26According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire
  345. 28:26–28:31physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed.
  346. 28:32–28:37In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between
  347. 28:37–28:40word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction.
  348. 28:42–28:44The principal points of contradiction are these.
  349. 28:44–28:51utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning
  350. 28:51–28:57is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
  351. 28:57–29:01The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
  352. 29:01–29:08the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
  353. 29:08–29:12According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the great
  354. 29:12–29:15dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
  355. 29:15–29:21Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation
  356. 29:21–29:26is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
  357. 29:26–29:30According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire
  358. 29:30–29:35physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely...
  359. 29:35–29:39The principal points of contradiction are these.
  360. 29:39–29:44in manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is
  361. 29:44–29:50possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
  362. 29:50–29:54The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
  363. 29:54–30:01the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
  364. 30:01–30:05According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the great
  365. 30:05–30:08dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
  366. 30:08–30:17Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
  367. 30:18–30:27According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the Great Dissolution is as follows.
  368. 30:28–30:36The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda anew.
  369. 30:36–30:43The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintas, together with the sages,
  370. 30:43–30:47receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the
  371. 30:47–30:54practices of cultivated persons. Nyaia philosophy thus regards God, who was considered entirely
  372. 30:54–31:01free of human error or defect, as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaia philosophy regards
  373. 31:01–31:06the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an
  374. 31:06–31:11ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless
  375. 31:11–31:13and authoritative.
  376. 31:13–31:18The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine
  377. 31:18–31:22composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from
  378. 31:22–31:25defects.
  379. 31:25–31:29Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable
  380. 31:29–31:34to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion.
  381. 31:34–31:41Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity.
  382. 31:41–31:45Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is
  383. 31:45–31:50omniscient and entirely free of every human defect.
  384. 31:50–31:55Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded
  385. 31:55–32:00as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative.
  386. 32:00–32:05At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof
  387. 32:05–32:11or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient?
  388. 32:11–32:12Chapter 2

Plain text

The Saddhi section of the Tattva Sintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge. It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers. It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention. In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda. Verbal testimony and objections, what objections did the Buddhists and Vaikas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nya-Yakas refute them? The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect. They maintain that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge. The Naya Yajas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikha subsumed verbal cognition under inference. Their position is discussed below. The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established. If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words. When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge. Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction. After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vyaka philosophy. The vayikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge. According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning? According to the Vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference. They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vayika philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The vayakas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker. The nayayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the vayakas and refute the position of the author of the lillavadi. According to the nayayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it It is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the vayakas is invalid for inference. Following this refutation, the vayakas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasa Sankati, he waters with liquid? How does the new Vayika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail? The Nayayaka argument is very precise. In their revised reason, the Vayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference. In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason. The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, here interpreted as, He waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person. The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows. Suppose an untrustworthy person says Payasasankati, while actually intending to convey He waters with a coconut shell. Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition? No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person. The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veridical cognition in this case, must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails. In this section the nayayakas offer another example, karma-tbamanayanam-ti objecthood, bringing, an effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that Karmat the Manayana M.T. is not a complete or meaningful sentence. It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the Vaika reason may be understood here as follows. of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings, is fully present. Absence of the probandom, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection, expectancy among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom, geritical verbal cognition does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition. To refute the Bayekha theory that meaning is understood through inference from the speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument, discussed next. The vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the vayikha theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence? The vayikas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot, or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's veritical cognition or intention, is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness, or the capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention. From the nayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the nayakas in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference. The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition. If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts. This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner. According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veridical cognition. In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible. If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition, is absent, the knowledge must arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words. This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right. A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, enabling it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence. A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars. Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent. Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay. Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them. An example is now offered to clarify these three features. If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham nyanati, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning? The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, Vanina Sincati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question, when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent. In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, As in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring. Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning? meaning? If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood. Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sainthava, sainhabha manaya. The word sainthava has two meanings, salt and horse. No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention, context or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt or for a horse. The Neayakas clearly state that in the case of polysemus words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemus words, it It also plays a crucial role in secondary signification. Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti. Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise? inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise. The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms. When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention. This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA. Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major and celebrated dispute between Nyaia and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy. The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter. MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as K.A. and K.O.K. are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that that was already there. Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal. According to the Nayayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks. To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality, the Nayayakas cite examples from direct experience. There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being. If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed. This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds. The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere. Yet the real difference is caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory airshow that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort. Mnene with Macron essay with Macron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound ka as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal ka-lad present in different sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them. According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning, from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gam, a pot, the expression anaya, bring, is expected. fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously. The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively. Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvam nyanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in Nyaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows. The non-eternality of words, the Naayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakhas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established. The Nayayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God. At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation, the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, Why do the Neayakas insist that it was composed by God? The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Neayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards. The Neayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons. The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved. Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God. The Msaakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution. Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction. According to the masakas, the relation between words or phonemes and their meanings is eternal. Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The msakhas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence. The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place and time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before. heard before. According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as G.A. Hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow-wood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form, this is that very G.A. arises from apprehending the common universal G.A. Hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal. Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words. Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort and perish. Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal. Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal. On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author. At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Makron essay with Makron claim, neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine. The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons. The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal. The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient god behind the composition of the Vedic is logically necessary. The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author. These Nyaya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the MMA with Makran essay with Makran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless. A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution, how does the MMA with Makran essay with Makran assertion that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution? According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed. In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction. The principal points of contradiction are these. utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the great dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely... The principal points of contradiction are these. in manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the great dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the Great Dissolution is as follows. The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda anew. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintas, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons. Nyaia philosophy thus regards God, who was considered entirely free of human error or defect, as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaia philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative. The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative. At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient? Chapter 2

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