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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 21:14
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0:02–0:06व्यु कन्सुर्णिंग देखाँस्छाँस अप्रार अप्संसु।
0:07–0:10विचार-विमर्शक रेक। आप्संस अप्रार अप्संसु।
0:10–0:12विचार-विमर्शक रेक। अप्संसु।
0:12–0:14विचार-विमर्शक रेक। अप्संसु।
0:14–0:16विचार-प्स्सु।
0:16–0:18The msaka rejects this.
0:19–0:22If, when the totality of other causes is present,
0:22–0:26near absence of prior absence does not produce absence of the effect,
0:26–0:28prior absence is not a cause.
0:28–0:31When an all-pervasive mind is accepted as a sense organ,
0:31–0:36adjuncts such as body, bodily part, and locus of operation are unnecessary,
0:36–0:41aficion causes such as sandalwood themselves explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like.
0:43–0:45Conclusion, mind is atomic.
0:46–0:52Now, in a conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet at
0:52–0:56one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises.
0:56–1:00Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is
1:00–1:03the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ.
1:03–1:09Therefore, mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject-establishing proof.
1:09–1:14This is also established by inference, while mitrezi produces cognition, his nose,
1:14–1:18tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction
1:18–1:22with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because
1:22–1:28all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time.
1:28–1:32Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise, when
1:32–1:38the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow.
1:38–1:42Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception.
1:42–1:46It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of
1:46–1:48cognition.
1:48–1:51Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when
1:51–1:54one desires to know a part.
1:54–1:58Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired
1:58–2:04sense organ, without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition.
2:04–2:09Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence.
2:09–2:15Or is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition?
2:15–2:19When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must
2:19–2:23be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost.
2:23–2:27The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit,
2:27–2:33because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively.
2:33–2:38Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects
2:38–2:42At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ.
2:42–2:46This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions
2:46–2:49prevents cognition through the other sense organs.
2:49–2:53Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible.
2:53–2:58Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of cognitions
2:58–3:03arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously.
3:03–3:10in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year, conjunction
3:10–3:14with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound.
3:15–3:20Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound.
3:21–3:27Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly.
3:29–3:31The Objection of 20 Songs
3:31–3:37Memsaka objection, if twenty songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration
3:37–3:41to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all twenty sounds
3:41–3:44and perception of all songs will arise at one time.
3:44–3:48The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot
3:48–3:53escape the fault of simultaneous cognition.
3:53–3:57Proposal of cognition of indifference
3:57–4:02When Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired
4:02–4:06noise is merely a cognition of indifference.
4:06–4:11Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition
4:11–4:13of indifference.
4:13–4:18Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no
4:18–4:20other sound.
4:20–4:24On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise
4:24–4:30of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds.
4:30–4:33Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration.
4:33–4:40Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception
4:40–4:45of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound.
4:45–4:51Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance,
4:51–4:57cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds are known
4:57–5:03generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known. Desire to know a particular
5:03–5:10sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal. The ear is capable of apprehending
5:10–5:17many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds
5:17–5:23at one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise.
5:23–5:28The Neayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual
5:28–5:33sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and
5:33–5:38concentration, clear cognitions arise successively.
5:38–5:44Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind.
5:44–5:48When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited by
5:48–5:49the objects.
5:49–5:53It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, the
5:53–5:58complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct.
5:58–6:04The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously.
6:04–6:08The Objection of Five Cognitions
6:08–6:14The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are simultaneously
6:14–6:19present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural to
6:19–6:21regard them as simultaneous.
6:21–6:25The Nyayaka replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in
6:25–6:31experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous.
6:31–6:35The alternative of five minds is rejected.
6:35–6:41The alternative let mind be fivefold, one for each sense organ is inconsistent.
6:41–6:47If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience
6:47–6:52would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by
6:52–6:55one person as connected.
6:55–7:00Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self.
7:00–7:05from simultaneous actions of bodily parts.
7:05–7:09The men's arc as final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic
7:09–7:13place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body
7:13–7:15and its many parts.
7:15–7:19How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like
7:19–7:24in dance, or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous?
7:24–7:28Twenty efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because
7:28–7:31there is no defeating cognition.
7:31–7:35Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous.
7:35–7:40Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action.
7:40–7:45The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by
7:45–7:47that desire.
7:47–7:51Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the
7:51–7:53body and its parts.
7:53–7:59If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts
7:59–8:04delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are likewise
8:04–8:08produced by effort delimited by the body.
8:08–8:11Thus the atomic mind is established.
8:11–8:16The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established
8:16–8:21as apprehensible by the atomic mind, the definition of perception is not under extended
8:21–8:26in perceptions of pleasure and the like. Here ends the theory of the Atomicity of Mind
8:26–8:32in the Perception section of the Tathasintmai.
8:32–8:37The Theory of Subsequent Cognition
8:37–8:44Saka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. The msaka says, a present
8:44–8:49first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known, a second mental cognition,
8:49–8:54that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it.
8:54–8:59The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:59–9:04Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition.
9:04–9:08Absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of
9:08–9:10the first cognition.
9:10–9:14Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
9:14–9:18Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such
9:18–9:23as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the
9:23–9:27time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative
9:27–9:31concomitance of subsequent cognition.
9:31–9:34Cognition has itself as its object.
9:34–9:39Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable of
9:39–9:43producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed.
9:43–9:47Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition
9:47–9:51is required for usage concerning desire and the like.
9:51–9:55It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage
9:55–10:00is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second
10:00–10:01cognition.
10:01–10:05The men's arc a replies that the first cognition is itself its own object.
10:05–10:09A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself
10:09–10:11as its object.
10:11–10:15Power of usage, is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is
10:15–10:17no mutual dependence.
10:17–10:21Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the
10:21–10:26power of usage, inherent, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise an
10:26–10:29infinite regress follows.
10:29–10:34Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition.
10:34–10:38The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference.
10:38–10:43How can cognition itself be its own object under identity, is unsound.
10:43–10:47Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective
10:47–10:52cognition. Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition. A special
10:52–10:57nature is possible without dependent on a relation. Just as cognition concerning a pot
10:57–11:04produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition produces usage concerning itself.
11:04–11:09What is the nature of this special nature? Although it is difficult to define in a single
11:09–11:14word, an entity established by experience cannot be rejected, just as a particular
11:14–11:19sweetness of sugar is established by experience. The phrase special nature can
11:19–11:25indicate it, the one word cannot completely describe it. Self objectivity is
11:25–11:31self-luminosity. It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition
11:31–11:35arises from a second mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage
11:35–11:40concerning the first cognition possible without a second? Reply, the simple
11:40–11:43first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental
11:43–11:49cognition. Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness.
11:49–11:53A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning
11:53–11:58the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence,
11:58–12:02so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted. In the illusion, this shell
12:02–12:06is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior toward silver, but behavior
12:06–12:12does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect
12:12–12:15of the shell and non-apprehension of difference from remembered silver cores activity, silver
12:15–12:19cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status.
12:19–12:24Thus cognition self-objectivity means its self-luminosity or capacity to produce usage
12:24–12:26concerning itself.
12:26–12:30This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition,
12:30–12:34otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition
12:34–12:37itself had been its own object.
12:37–12:41The theory of tripartite perception.
12:41–12:45of tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does not require
12:45–12:51a second mental cognition aims to establish self luminosity of the first cognition. Perception
12:51–12:56itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition. Every cognition of the form,
12:56–13:01I know this simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition and known. The self is perceived
13:01–13:05as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action, therefore cognition
13:05–13:09has a tripartite form.
13:09–13:13Inconsistency of being illuminated by another
13:13–13:18The Nyayaka objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent
13:18–13:22cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward.
13:22–13:26The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leuminosity
13:26–13:31of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
13:31–13:36The unheard itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the nature of cognition
13:36–13:40would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition.
13:40–13:44Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition,
13:44–13:48because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions.
13:48–13:52The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another
13:52–13:57cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result.
13:57–14:00Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition,
14:00–14:05infinite regress arises in knowing the property cognition is not mental.
14:05–14:09Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of
14:09–14:15an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable.
14:15–14:20Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality
14:20–14:24The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the self,
14:24–14:29like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted
14:29–14:34as mental and infinite regress follows. Counter inferences are also possible, cognition produced
14:34–14:39by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition
14:39–14:44of a seen perception. If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition,
14:44–14:48the locus is unestablished, because the nature of the first cognition has not previously
14:48–14:52been established. The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of
14:52–14:56the locus, because cognition is self-luminous.
14:56–15:02Self objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself.
15:02–15:07This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by contact
15:07–15:11with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself.
15:11–15:15Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and the like
15:15–15:19and is fruitless.
15:19–15:24Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual.
15:24–15:27The simple first cognition is self-luminous.
15:27–15:30Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an
15:30–15:36object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition.
15:36–15:41Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self-objectivity
15:41–15:45or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature.
15:45–15:50Cognition produced by sense-object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual.
15:50–15:54Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in
15:54–15:56the self.
15:56–16:00The perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different
16:00–16:04sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive object is fixed
16:04–16:09merely by the relevant sensory cause.
16:09–16:13Naoyaka refutation of self-luminosity
16:13–16:17The Naoyaka replies, perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple
16:17–16:22first cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I
16:22–16:24know this silver.
16:24–16:29arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by
16:29–16:34experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, rises after the first cognition,
16:34–16:39this experience cannot be discarded. Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct
16:39–16:43from the first does not create an infinite regress, because not every cognition must
16:43–16:48be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended
16:48–16:53by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous,
16:53–16:58It cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition.
16:58–17:02Cognition is not its own object.
17:02–17:05Agency is being the in hearing locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of
17:05–17:09the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being
17:09–17:12the meaning of a verbal root.
17:12–17:15In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its
17:15–17:20own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object.
17:20–17:25Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears.
17:25–17:29Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore
17:29–17:32cannot qualify the first cognition.
17:32–17:36It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the
17:36–17:40word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self.
17:40–17:44Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition
17:44–17:46thereby becomes cognition of the self.
17:46–17:50The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself
17:50–17:54and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to itself.
17:54–17:57The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense contact, because it
17:57–18:02is produced by contact with mind, it is mental.
18:02–18:06Influence establishing subsequent cognition
18:06–18:11The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition
18:11–18:15produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not
18:15–18:20the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because
18:20–18:23Because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property
18:23–18:26of the self, and is not produced by itself.
18:26–18:30Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus of
18:30–18:35contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition.
18:35–18:40Known this or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition.
18:40–18:43When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory
18:43–18:47is present, subsequent cognition arises.
18:47–18:51When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present,
18:51–18:56the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent
18:56–18:59cognitions simultaneously.
18:59–19:06Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition
19:06–19:09Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition
19:09–19:13produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye.
19:13–19:17The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the
19:17–19:21object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent
19:21–19:24cognition through contact in the form of knownness.
19:24–19:29God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects.
19:29–19:33The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition
19:33–19:36creates an infinite regress is unsound.
19:36–19:40Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes
19:40–19:44an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ.
19:44–19:49It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known.
19:49–19:53When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual cause
19:53–19:57for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent cognition can
19:57–20:00be inhibited.
20:00–20:05Necessary knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity.
20:05–20:09The mensaka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion,
20:09–20:14is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self,
20:14–20:17every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-liminous.
20:17–20:20Reply, no such pervasion is established.
20:20–20:25If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite
20:25–20:27chain arises.
20:27–20:31Nor can self-liminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense
20:31–20:32organ is perceived.
20:32–20:37If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal
20:37–20:41order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated
20:41–20:47cause, the rule of causality is destroyed. Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition
20:47–20:51were established through exclusion, another inference would be required to illuminate subsequent
20:51–20:56cognition, and the regress would not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-luminosity,
20:56–21:00or inhibition by perception of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply
21:00–21:05equally to subsequent cognition. Therefore illumination of the first cognition is possible
21:05–21:09through the general contact of cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity
21:09–21:10is needed.

Plain text

व्यु कन्सुर्णिंग देखाँस्छाँस अप्रार अप्संसु। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। आप्संस अप्रार अप्संसु। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। अप्संसु। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। अप्संसु। विचार-प्स्सु। The msaka rejects this. If, when the totality of other causes is present, near absence of prior absence does not produce absence of the effect, prior absence is not a cause. When an all-pervasive mind is accepted as a sense organ, adjuncts such as body, bodily part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, aficion causes such as sandalwood themselves explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like. Conclusion, mind is atomic. Now, in a conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises. Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ. Therefore, mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject-establishing proof. This is also established by inference, while mitrezi produces cognition, his nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time. Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow. Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception. It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition. Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when one desires to know a part. Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired sense organ, without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition. Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence. Or is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition? When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost. The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit, because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively. Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ. This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions prevents cognition through the other sense organs. Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible. Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously. in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year, conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound. Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound. Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly. The Objection of 20 Songs Memsaka objection, if twenty songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all twenty sounds and perception of all songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition. Proposal of cognition of indifference When Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired noise is merely a cognition of indifference. Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition of indifference. Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no other sound. On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds. Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration. Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound. Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance, cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known. Desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal. The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise. The Neayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively. Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind. When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited by the objects. It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, the complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct. The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously. The Objection of Five Cognitions The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural to regard them as simultaneous. The Nyayaka replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous. The alternative of five minds is rejected. The alternative let mind be fivefold, one for each sense organ is inconsistent. If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by one person as connected. Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self. from simultaneous actions of bodily parts. The men's arc as final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts. How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in dance, or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous? Twenty efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because there is no defeating cognition. Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous. Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action. The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by that desire. Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body and its parts. If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body. Thus the atomic mind is established. The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established as apprehensible by the atomic mind, the definition of perception is not under extended in perceptions of pleasure and the like. Here ends the theory of the Atomicity of Mind in the Perception section of the Tathasintmai. The Theory of Subsequent Cognition Saka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. The msaka says, a present first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known, a second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it. The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of the first cognition. Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Cognition has itself as its object. Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed. Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition is required for usage concerning desire and the like. It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second cognition. The men's arc a replies that the first cognition is itself its own object. A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself as its object. Power of usage, is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no mutual dependence. Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the power of usage, inherent, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise an infinite regress follows. Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition. The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference. How can cognition itself be its own object under identity, is unsound. Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective cognition. Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition. A special nature is possible without dependent on a relation. Just as cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition produces usage concerning itself. What is the nature of this special nature? Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience. The phrase special nature can indicate it, the one word cannot completely describe it. Self objectivity is self-luminosity. It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first cognition possible without a second? Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental cognition. Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness. A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence, so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior toward silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non-apprehension of difference from remembered silver cores activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status. Thus cognition self-objectivity means its self-luminosity or capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition itself had been its own object. The theory of tripartite perception. of tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does not require a second mental cognition aims to establish self luminosity of the first cognition. Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition. Every cognition of the form, I know this simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition and known. The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action, therefore cognition has a tripartite form. Inconsistency of being illuminated by another The Nyayaka objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward. The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leuminosity of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome. The unheard itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition. Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition, because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions. The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result. Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition, infinite regress arises in knowing the property cognition is not mental. Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable. Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the self, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted as mental and infinite regress follows. Counter inferences are also possible, cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception. If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished, because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established. The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus, because cognition is self-luminous. Self objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself. Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and the like and is fruitless. Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual. The simple first cognition is self-luminous. Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition. Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self-objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature. Cognition produced by sense-object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual. Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the self. The perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause. Naoyaka refutation of self-luminosity The Naoyaka replies, perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver. arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, rises after the first cognition, this experience cannot be discarded. Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress, because not every cognition must be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, It cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition. Cognition is not its own object. Agency is being the in hearing locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being the meaning of a verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object. Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears. Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore cannot qualify the first cognition. It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self. Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to itself. The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense contact, because it is produced by contact with mind, it is mental. Influence establishing subsequent cognition The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because Because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of the self, and is not produced by itself. Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition. Known this or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition. When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory is present, subsequent cognition arises. When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present, the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously. Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye. The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent cognition through contact in the form of knownness. God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects. The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition creates an infinite regress is unsound. Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ. It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known. When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual cause for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent cognition can be inhibited. Necessary knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity. The mensaka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self, every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-liminous. Reply, no such pervasion is established. If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite chain arises. Nor can self-liminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense organ is perceived. If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated cause, the rule of causality is destroyed. Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-luminosity, or inhibition by perception of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition. Therefore illumination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

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