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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.993164)
Duration: 21:08
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:32दाडवात दिवात दिवात रहाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ा�
0:32–0:38Everyone experiences that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous.
0:38–0:43Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object.
0:44–0:49The Mzaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a property as
0:49–0:55qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has already been determined
0:55–1:00by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first cognition's validity cannot
1:00–1:05be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity because doubt about
1:05–1:10validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering human conduct
1:10–1:16arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies,
1:16–1:21granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes
1:21–1:25that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first
1:25–1:29cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition
1:29–1:33consisting in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness,
1:33–1:35otherwise doubt would not arise afterward.
1:37–1:40Udayanakari is a reputation of the Mishram Saka view.
1:42–1:46The Mishram M Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes as
1:46–1:51its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness.
1:52–1:56In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers
1:56–2:01apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to
2:01–2:06the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver.
2:07–2:11Therefore reflexive awareness determines both business and silverness as qualifiers in the
2:11–2:17property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness is,
2:17–2:21I know this object before me as qualified by both business and silverness, not, I know
2:21–2:26both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking
2:26–2:31an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness
2:31–2:36are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing in the
2:36–2:41self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition, which makes
2:41–2:46thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that the self is the substrate
2:46–2:50of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not indeterminate with
2:50–2:53with respect to the object of the first cognition.
2:53–2:57But its object is the first cognition, not the qualification by business and silverness
2:57–3:00in the property bearer, this, itself.
3:00–3:04Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined by the causal
3:04–3:06aggregate of reflexive awareness.
3:06–3:10In a state lacking habituation, because the first cognition's validity becomes an
3:10–3:15object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically through another means.
3:15–3:21of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view.
3:21–3:25The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known
3:25–3:30from its own causal aggregate, it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means.
3:30–3:34The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first
3:34–3:38cognition, while in the Ba'a view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an
3:38–3:43inference. Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically,
3:43–3:49through something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already established.
3:49–3:53It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity
3:53–3:58is other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended.
3:58–4:03The validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended,
4:03–4:07therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that of
4:07–4:10the first cognition.
4:10–4:14And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called other relative
4:14–4:19to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable consequence of invalidity
4:19–4:22in cognition would follow.
4:22–4:26The Naya Yaka replies that in the unhabituated state the validity of the first cognition
4:26–4:31is known neither, as the guru school maintains, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition
4:31–4:34that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the mere aggregate distinct from the
4:34–4:39substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference, in the general senses accepted
4:39–4:44by the Mishra and Bar schools. In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its
4:44–4:49validity becomes an object of doubt. Once the object has been determined, no doubt about
4:49–4:53the object arises in the third moment, and without doubt about validity there is no doubt
4:53–4:57about the object. Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity is
4:57–5:01not deviant. The validity of the disputed first cognition
5:01–5:05is not known from the causal aggregate of the first cognition producing the substrate
5:05–5:09of validity, because even after the first cognition has become determinate, and without
5:09–5:14a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted in the third moment, just like invalidity.
5:14–5:18Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity
5:18–5:22arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such
5:22–5:25a cognition.
5:25–5:29The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies
5:29–5:33validity alone and not its substrate is unsound.
5:33–5:38Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate
5:38–5:42of validity substrate, namely the first cognition.
5:42–5:46Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal
5:46–5:51aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties,
5:51–5:56the doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning.
5:56–6:00Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's
6:00–6:03The zone causal aggregate is contradictory.
6:03–6:09Knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination, knowable in another manner.
6:09–6:15The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference.
6:15–6:22Traditionalist Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely negative inference.
6:22–6:28this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire, because it produces
6:28–6:34activity toward fire capable of burning. Objection, unless validity is already known,
6:34–6:37negative pervasion between the reason and the probandom cannot be determined,
6:37–6:43how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition of validity? Answer, to avoid self-defeat,
6:43–6:48veridical cognition in general and its objects such as fire are initially accepted as established.
6:48–6:53Then, on the basis of that example's being knowable, being an object of prama, is inferred
6:53–6:55in fire.
6:55–6:58Since the probandum is generally familiar in the example, the specific validity of the
6:58–7:03cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandum, and because the probandum has not previously
7:03–7:07been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon or purely affirmative
7:07–7:09reason.
7:09–7:13It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property in all cognitions,
7:13–7:16since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs.
7:16–7:21Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be not being delimited
7:21–7:25by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example.
7:25–7:30Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire
7:30–7:34with respect to fire as qualifcant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire, ultimately
7:34–7:39establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire.
7:39–7:43A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his
7:43–7:47own cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying
7:47–7:48validity.
7:48–7:52His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may deny
7:52–7:57validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known
7:57–7:58either.
7:58–8:02Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity toward
8:02–8:05fire and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the
8:05–8:09stated form will remain unknown.
8:09–8:13The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier produces recollection of
8:13–8:18validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present, or absence of cognition
8:18–8:22of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it.
8:22–8:26By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition
8:26–8:31of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent
8:31–8:33from fire its qualifier.
8:33–8:37The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this
8:37–8:43recollection born of a prior impression. Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible.
8:45–8:52The Navya Nayaka view. The Navya Nayaka say that the validity of the first cognition,
8:52–8:58that is, the app. The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire,
8:58–9:02which makes firehood its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where
9:02–9:07firehood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier.
9:07–9:12It does not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making firehood
9:12–9:18its qualifier. It does not fail to take fire as qualifcant. It is not delimited by a qualifier
9:18–9:25not co-located with firehood, or it does not make a qualifier absent from fire its qualifier.
9:25–9:30This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier and producing
9:30–9:35activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking
9:35–9:39fire capable of burning is qualifacand.
9:39–9:45Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire.
9:45–9:49DETERMINATION OF INVALIDITY
9:49–9:53All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion,
9:53–9:57the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in
9:57–10:02In other means, as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where
10:02–10:05firehood was absent.
10:05–10:10In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between
10:10–10:14the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as probandom that produces activity
10:14–10:19toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid
10:19–10:21of firehood.
10:21–10:25Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason consisting
10:25–10:30an absence of the absence of the reason that pervades in validity.
10:30–10:34The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the absence of
10:34–10:39the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the probandum.
10:39–10:44When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the probandum, prior
10:44–10:48familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is required, without familiarity
10:48–10:54with the probandum, absence of the probandum cannot be inferred.
10:54–10:58But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the
10:58–11:03probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference.
11:03–11:07Negative pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar
11:07–11:09in an example.
11:09–11:13For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because
11:13–11:17it possesses spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without
11:17–11:22prior familiarity with space, because absence of space it pervades what is not space.
11:24–11:28It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by validity can be inferred when validity is
11:28–11:34qualifier was not previously known. Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier,
11:34–11:40such a qualified inference is not possible at first. First there is the inference validity
11:40–11:44is present in the first cognition, then from the same reason arises the qualified inference,
11:44–11:50the first cognition is qualified by validity. This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is
11:50–11:56the substrate of the absence of a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition,
11:56–12:01the absence of a pot is on the ground. In this way absence of cognition having
12:01–12:07firehood is mowed in a substrate devoid of firehood is inferred. But a doubt first arises,
12:07–12:12does this cognition having firehood as mowed make firehood a qualifier in fire endowed with
12:12–12:19firehood or in something devoid of firehood? There is no third alternative. Therefore a
12:19–12:24decisive inference of the probandom is impossible without first apprehending, in something possessing
12:24–12:30firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode. The same order applies in
12:30–12:36an inference concerning the eternality of cognition. An alternative form of the purely
12:36–12:42negative inference. Validity may also be determined by another purely negative
12:42–12:46inference. This cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, takes as its object
12:46–12:50something possessing firehood, because it is an objected cognition and does not take
12:50–12:55as its object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid, as in an
12:55–13:00invalid cognition of fire. If objecthood located in the qualific
13:00–13:04and is regarded as a separate entity, the probandom will be, this cognition of fire
13:04–13:10does not make as qualifier firehood located in what is not fire, firehood not co-located with
13:10–13:16firehood, or firehood absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, being cognition
13:16–13:21that makes as qualifier firehood located in fire or in the substrate of objecthood,
13:21–13:27is established through presumption. The positive form of the probandom has not previously been
13:27–13:33independently established, because no familiar example of it exists. In the illusion of fire,
13:33–13:38fire is not the substrate of objecthood, only the qualificand is its substrate.
13:39–13:42Hence the inference does not prove what is already established.
13:44–13:48Account of validity when objecthood is regarded as a separate entity.
13:50–13:55Other teachers say that, in an illusion of fire, the objecthood residing in the qualifier is not
13:55–14:00distinct from the objecthood residing in the qualificand, therefore that objecthood cannot
14:00–14:04be said to be undelimited by a property not co-located with firehood.
14:04–14:10For this reason the preceding inference does not incur the defect of proving what is already established.
14:11–14:17Objection, a person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel for the jewel and acts toward it may by chance obtain the jewel.
14:17–14:22Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing activity that obtains the jewel
14:22–14:25will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of jewel cognition.
14:26–14:31Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a jewel does not produce activity obtaining the jewel,
14:31–14:34it is cognition of an object different from the jewel cognition.
14:34–14:38The dual is obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible.
14:38–14:42Although dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times,
14:42–14:48the mind can know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition and recollection.
14:48–14:51Therefore the reason is not unestablished.
14:51–14:57Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose probandom is absence of invalidity,
14:57–15:02because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive instance.
15:02–15:06The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form.
15:06–15:11The cognition this is earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent.
15:11–15:15It does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier.
15:15–15:19It does not make a property absent from the qualifical and earthhood its qualifier.
15:19–15:29While making earthhood its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualifical and it is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a property absent from earth its qualifier.
15:29–15:33Property absent from Earth it's qualifier.
15:33–15:39This is because it is a determinate cognition of Earth-hood taking odor-bearing Earth as qualificand.
15:39–15:49An illusion of Earth-hood makes Earth-hood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of Earth-hood, hence the illusion does not make the inference prove what is already established.
15:49–15:56The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificand, whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no deviation.
15:56–16:01The positive probandom, being cognition with Earthhood as mode and something possessing
16:01–16:05Earthhood is established through presumption.
16:05–16:09If only cognition taking a distinct objecthood as object is regarded as determinant, the
16:09–16:13probandom may be expressed not as, this cognition of Earth as Earth does not make Earthhood
16:13–16:17located in Earth its qualifier, but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier and
16:17–16:21Earthhood absent from Earth, not co-located with Earthhood, or absent from the substrate
16:21–16:22of objecthood.
16:22–16:29Its positive meaning, an object hood that makes us qualify Earthhood co-located with Earthhood, is established through presumption.
16:30–16:32The view of still other teachers
16:32–16:41Still other teachers say that the probandom is, absence of cognition that apprehends an object delimited by a qualifier not co-located with Earthhood.
16:41–16:51The reason is, the cognition this is Earth has as counter positive an object hood in which a property not co-located with ODA is not made the mode, while a property co-located with ODA is made the mode.
16:51–16:54In this way doubt is not included in the probandom.
16:54–16:58Alternatively, the probandom may simply be determined at cognition.
16:59–17:05The erroneous cognition, the earth is cold, is nevertheless valid in its component concerning earth.
17:05–17:10In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant,
17:10–17:16because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components.
17:16–17:24Objecthood differs when the quality can differs, but there is no proof that objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs.
17:25–17:29The form of the affirmative inference, the view of other teachers.
17:29–17:36Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an objecthood residing in earth,
17:36–17:40and that objecthood is delimited by a property co-located with earthhood,
17:40–17:47or is undilimited by a property not co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property absent from earth.
17:47–17:54This is because it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood in which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode,
17:54–17:59or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not located in a non-substrative odor,
17:59–18:05or it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood co-located with odor.
18:05–18:07But this view is unsound.
18:07–18:11In such an inference the probandom would be unfamiliar.
18:11–18:16It must therefore be accepted that in such a purely negative inference the positive probandom
18:16–18:20is established only through presumption.
18:20–18:24Thus a special pervasion is known in being cognition that produces activity toward the
18:24–18:29odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively in hands, feet, and the
18:29–18:31like.
18:31–18:34Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that property
18:34–18:39is the reason establishing cognitive validity.
18:39–18:46and reply concerning apprehension of the objecthood of fire capable of burning.
18:46–18:50It may be objected that the objecthood of fire capable of burning, delimited by cognition
18:50–18:54of fire, cannot be determined by the first cognition, this fire is capable of burning,
18:54–18:58because that cognition does not take itself and its objecthood as objects.
18:58–19:02Nor can that object have be determined by a later reflexive awareness of fire capable
19:02–19:06of burning, because the burning capacity of the fire before one is not an object of
19:06–19:08reflexive awareness.
19:08–19:12Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend the burning capacity apprehended
19:12–19:14by the first cognition.
19:14–19:18If the firehood located in the fire before one and apprehended by the first cognition
19:18–19:22is made an object of reflexive awareness, validity would be known intrinsically.
19:22–19:26For the same reason it would become impossible to determine that cognition of earth and
19:26–19:30water takes as its object the substrate of odor and viscosity respectively.
19:30–19:34Answer, when reflexive awareness arises of fire making firehood its mode, burning
19:34–19:38capacity is apprehended in the fire that is its object.
19:38–19:42Consequently, objecthood with respect to burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended
19:42–19:46in the first cognition of fire also presented by recollection.
19:46–19:50Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented by recollection, the
19:50–19:54property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively is mentally
19:54–19:57determined with clarity.
19:57–20:00For after a qualified determination that something is the substrate of odor and the
20:00–20:04like, a person experiences, i apprehended earthhood and so forth in the substrate of
20:04–20:06odor and the like.
20:06–20:10This is like the qualified determination of pervasion in smoke presented by recollection,
20:10–20:15or the qualified cognition of fragrance in sandalwood through a visual cognition.
20:15–20:19It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of earthhood as
20:19–20:24mode in the substrate of odor, just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status
20:24–20:27of the substrate of odor as qualificand.
20:27–20:31Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood as mode arises, cognition
20:31–20:35occurs of being cognition with Earthhood as mode in the substrate of Earthhood.
20:35–20:40Likewise, absence of a mode absent from Earth, or absence of a mode absent from the
20:40–20:44Qualificant, for example, absence in Earth cognition of cognition making
20:44–20:49Pothood its mode, is mentally determined with clarity. Thus validity might be
20:49–20:54intrinsically determined by cognition's own causal aggregate. But this
20:54–20:59argument is unsound. The validity present in a first cognition made
20:59–21:04available for recollection by another first cognition cannot avoid being apprehended extrinsically.

Plain text

दाडवात दिवात दिवात रहाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ाज़ा� Everyone experiences that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous. Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object. The Mzaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a property as qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has already been determined by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first cognition's validity cannot be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity because doubt about validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering human conduct arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies, granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition consisting in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness, otherwise doubt would not arise afterward. Udayanakari is a reputation of the Mishram Saka view. The Mishram M Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes as its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness. In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver. Therefore reflexive awareness determines both business and silverness as qualifiers in the property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness is, I know this object before me as qualified by both business and silverness, not, I know both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing in the self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition, which makes thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that the self is the substrate of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not indeterminate with with respect to the object of the first cognition. But its object is the first cognition, not the qualification by business and silverness in the property bearer, this, itself. Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined by the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness. In a state lacking habituation, because the first cognition's validity becomes an object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically through another means. of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view. The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known from its own causal aggregate, it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means. The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first cognition, while in the Ba'a view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an inference. Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically, through something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already established. It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity is other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended. The validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended, therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that of the first cognition. And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called other relative to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable consequence of invalidity in cognition would follow. The Naya Yaka replies that in the unhabituated state the validity of the first cognition is known neither, as the guru school maintains, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the mere aggregate distinct from the substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference, in the general senses accepted by the Mishra and Bar schools. In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its validity becomes an object of doubt. Once the object has been determined, no doubt about the object arises in the third moment, and without doubt about validity there is no doubt about the object. Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity is not deviant. The validity of the disputed first cognition is not known from the causal aggregate of the first cognition producing the substrate of validity, because even after the first cognition has become determinate, and without a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted in the third moment, just like invalidity. Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such a cognition. The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies validity alone and not its substrate is unsound. Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate of validity substrate, namely the first cognition. Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties, the doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning. Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's The zone causal aggregate is contradictory. Knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination, knowable in another manner. The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference. Traditionalist Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely negative inference. this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire, because it produces activity toward fire capable of burning. Objection, unless validity is already known, negative pervasion between the reason and the probandom cannot be determined, how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition of validity? Answer, to avoid self-defeat, veridical cognition in general and its objects such as fire are initially accepted as established. Then, on the basis of that example's being knowable, being an object of prama, is inferred in fire. Since the probandum is generally familiar in the example, the specific validity of the cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandum, and because the probandum has not previously been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon or purely affirmative reason. It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property in all cognitions, since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs. Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be not being delimited by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example. Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire with respect to fire as qualifcant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire, ultimately establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire. A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his own cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying validity. His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may deny validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known either. Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity toward fire and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the stated form will remain unknown. The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier produces recollection of validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present, or absence of cognition of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it. By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent from fire its qualifier. The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this recollection born of a prior impression. Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible. The Navya Nayaka view. The Navya Nayaka say that the validity of the first cognition, that is, the app. The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where firehood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier. It does not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making firehood its qualifier. It does not fail to take fire as qualifcant. It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with firehood, or it does not make a qualifier absent from fire its qualifier. This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier and producing activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking fire capable of burning is qualifacand. Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire. DETERMINATION OF INVALIDITY All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion, the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in In other means, as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where firehood was absent. In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as probandom that produces activity toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of firehood. Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason consisting an absence of the absence of the reason that pervades in validity. The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the absence of the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the probandum. When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is required, without familiarity with the probandum, absence of the probandum cannot be inferred. But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference. Negative pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar in an example. For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because it possesses spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without prior familiarity with space, because absence of space it pervades what is not space. It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by validity can be inferred when validity is qualifier was not previously known. Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier, such a qualified inference is not possible at first. First there is the inference validity is present in the first cognition, then from the same reason arises the qualified inference, the first cognition is qualified by validity. This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is the substrate of the absence of a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition, the absence of a pot is on the ground. In this way absence of cognition having firehood is mowed in a substrate devoid of firehood is inferred. But a doubt first arises, does this cognition having firehood as mowed make firehood a qualifier in fire endowed with firehood or in something devoid of firehood? There is no third alternative. Therefore a decisive inference of the probandom is impossible without first apprehending, in something possessing firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode. The same order applies in an inference concerning the eternality of cognition. An alternative form of the purely negative inference. Validity may also be determined by another purely negative inference. This cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, takes as its object something possessing firehood, because it is an objected cognition and does not take as its object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid, as in an invalid cognition of fire. If objecthood located in the qualific and is regarded as a separate entity, the probandom will be, this cognition of fire does not make as qualifier firehood located in what is not fire, firehood not co-located with firehood, or firehood absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, being cognition that makes as qualifier firehood located in fire or in the substrate of objecthood, is established through presumption. The positive form of the probandom has not previously been independently established, because no familiar example of it exists. In the illusion of fire, fire is not the substrate of objecthood, only the qualificand is its substrate. Hence the inference does not prove what is already established. Account of validity when objecthood is regarded as a separate entity. Other teachers say that, in an illusion of fire, the objecthood residing in the qualifier is not distinct from the objecthood residing in the qualificand, therefore that objecthood cannot be said to be undelimited by a property not co-located with firehood. For this reason the preceding inference does not incur the defect of proving what is already established. Objection, a person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel for the jewel and acts toward it may by chance obtain the jewel. Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing activity that obtains the jewel will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of jewel cognition. Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a jewel does not produce activity obtaining the jewel, it is cognition of an object different from the jewel cognition. The dual is obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible. Although dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times, the mind can know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition and recollection. Therefore the reason is not unestablished. Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose probandom is absence of invalidity, because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive instance. The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form. The cognition this is earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier. It does not make a property absent from the qualifical and earthhood its qualifier. While making earthhood its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualifical and it is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a property absent from earth its qualifier. Property absent from Earth it's qualifier. This is because it is a determinate cognition of Earth-hood taking odor-bearing Earth as qualificand. An illusion of Earth-hood makes Earth-hood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of Earth-hood, hence the illusion does not make the inference prove what is already established. The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificand, whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no deviation. The positive probandom, being cognition with Earthhood as mode and something possessing Earthhood is established through presumption. If only cognition taking a distinct objecthood as object is regarded as determinant, the probandom may be expressed not as, this cognition of Earth as Earth does not make Earthhood located in Earth its qualifier, but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier and Earthhood absent from Earth, not co-located with Earthhood, or absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, an object hood that makes us qualify Earthhood co-located with Earthhood, is established through presumption. The view of still other teachers Still other teachers say that the probandom is, absence of cognition that apprehends an object delimited by a qualifier not co-located with Earthhood. The reason is, the cognition this is Earth has as counter positive an object hood in which a property not co-located with ODA is not made the mode, while a property co-located with ODA is made the mode. In this way doubt is not included in the probandom. Alternatively, the probandom may simply be determined at cognition. The erroneous cognition, the earth is cold, is nevertheless valid in its component concerning earth. In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant, because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components. Objecthood differs when the quality can differs, but there is no proof that objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs. The form of the affirmative inference, the view of other teachers. Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an objecthood residing in earth, and that objecthood is delimited by a property co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property not co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property absent from earth. This is because it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood in which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode, or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not located in a non-substrative odor, or it is cognition of the counter positive of an objecthood co-located with odor. But this view is unsound. In such an inference the probandom would be unfamiliar. It must therefore be accepted that in such a purely negative inference the positive probandom is established only through presumption. Thus a special pervasion is known in being cognition that produces activity toward the odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively in hands, feet, and the like. Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that property is the reason establishing cognitive validity. and reply concerning apprehension of the objecthood of fire capable of burning. It may be objected that the objecthood of fire capable of burning, delimited by cognition of fire, cannot be determined by the first cognition, this fire is capable of burning, because that cognition does not take itself and its objecthood as objects. Nor can that object have be determined by a later reflexive awareness of fire capable of burning, because the burning capacity of the fire before one is not an object of reflexive awareness. Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend the burning capacity apprehended by the first cognition. If the firehood located in the fire before one and apprehended by the first cognition is made an object of reflexive awareness, validity would be known intrinsically. For the same reason it would become impossible to determine that cognition of earth and water takes as its object the substrate of odor and viscosity respectively. Answer, when reflexive awareness arises of fire making firehood its mode, burning capacity is apprehended in the fire that is its object. Consequently, objecthood with respect to burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended in the first cognition of fire also presented by recollection. Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented by recollection, the property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively is mentally determined with clarity. For after a qualified determination that something is the substrate of odor and the like, a person experiences, i apprehended earthhood and so forth in the substrate of odor and the like. This is like the qualified determination of pervasion in smoke presented by recollection, or the qualified cognition of fragrance in sandalwood through a visual cognition. It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of earthhood as mode in the substrate of odor, just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status of the substrate of odor as qualificand. Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood as mode arises, cognition occurs of being cognition with Earthhood as mode in the substrate of Earthhood. Likewise, absence of a mode absent from Earth, or absence of a mode absent from the Qualificant, for example, absence in Earth cognition of cognition making Pothood its mode, is mentally determined with clarity. Thus validity might be intrinsically determined by cognition's own causal aggregate. But this argument is unsound. The validity present in a first cognition made available for recollection by another first cognition cannot avoid being apprehended extrinsically.

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