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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.99739)
Duration: 23:42
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0:02–0:12An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances.
0:12–0:24A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandum is possible.
0:24–0:28Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the
0:28–0:32ablative case which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative
0:32–0:36provision, does not state the probandom and produces a verbal cognition
0:36–0:40assisting the substantive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of
0:40–0:46inferential cognition. This definition also applies to the purely negative
0:46–0:49reason if possessing affirmative provision is replaced by devoid of
0:49–0:55affirmative provision. In a Nyaya statement one should say nearly because of smoke, not
0:55–1:02because of possessing smoke. Use of the possessive suffix mat up is pointless.
1:02–1:08The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent.
1:08–1:1316. Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally
1:13–1:18perceptible while devoid of universalhood, but qualifier, possessing universalhood,
1:18–1:22be related to reason status expressed by the ablative case because universal hood is constrained
1:22–1:30by the genitive case. This objection is not sound within the property being externally perceptible,
1:30–1:34but qualifier possessing universal hood can be connected through collocation expressed by the
1:34–1:39locative case. Hence the semantically fit relation is established with reason status expressed by
1:39–1:48the ablative case. Definition of the example. 17 after the reason statement the expectancy
1:48–1:54arises, how is this reason a cause of inference? It is therefore necessary to state first the
1:54–2:00perversion and then subject propertyhood. Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood,
2:00–2:03the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason.
2:05–2:09The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation,
2:09–2:14a specific perversion residing in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes
2:14–2:18a cause of the sentence cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark.
2:20–2:24The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition of the
2:24–2:29perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion relation of the
2:29–2:35absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason. From this, separate definitions of
2:35–2:42affirmative and negative examples are obtained. A sentence nearly expressing an instance does
2:42–2:46not become an example simply because it is a member of Nyaya, since the use of an instance
2:46–2:53is only a customary practice, not a universal rule. The probation statement, whatever possesses
2:53–2:59smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood even though no instance is named.
2:59–3:05An alternative definition of the example. The particular expression denoting the specified
3:05–3:10provision in the cognition of provision produced by a sentence cannot alone be called the
3:10–3:17example, because such a definition would overextend to the application statement as well. Some
3:17–3:23scholars say that the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application.
3:23–3:28This is the general definition of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or
3:28–3:33negative provision is added, the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples are
3:33–3:35obtained.
3:35–3:42Repetition of the relative pronoun. The teachers hold that in the sentence, whatever possesses
3:42–3:47smoke possesses fire, repetition of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent deviation
3:47–3:51of the reason from the probandom.
3:51–3:55But where the provision of reason by probandom is known through co-location, repetition of
3:55–3:59the relative pronoun is unnecessary.
3:59–4:03In purely affirmative inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the
4:03–4:09reason from the probandom does not arise, this is our view.
4:09–4:14occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with the correlative pronoun.
4:14–4:19A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative pronouns bearing different
4:19–4:24case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning retained in the mind without violating
4:24–4:27linguistic rules.
4:27–4:31Defective examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions, devoid of the
4:31–4:35probandom, devoid of the reason.
4:35–4:39of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus, possessing an unstated affirmative
4:39–4:44provision, presenting affirmative provision in reverse, possessing an unstated negative
4:44–4:50provision, and presenting negative provision in reverse.
4:50–4:52Definition of the application.
4:52–4:5320.
4:53–4:58After the example statement has been uttered, the following expectancy arises, the provision
4:58–5:02has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in the subject
5:02–5:04or not?
5:04–5:09The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason pervaded
5:09–5:12by the probandom is displayed.
5:12–5:16In general, the application is that member of Nyaya which produces the cognition that
5:16–5:22generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential
5:22–5:24cognition.
5:24–5:27The application has two special definitions.
5:27–5:32First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a reason
5:32–5:38pervaded by the probandum. Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject
5:38–5:43endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the absence of the
5:43–5:50probandum. For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so too this mountain produces
5:50–5:56the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. In purely
5:56–6:00negative inference, the expression so too this earth produces the cognition, this earth
6:00–6:05possesses odor, which is the counter positive of absence of odor that pervades the absence
6:05–6:09of difference from the other eight substances.
6:09–6:14Certain saccas say that the use of nyaya ends with the three members thesis, reason, and
6:14–6:18example, and that application and conclusion are unnecessary.
6:18–6:21This view is not sound.
6:21–6:25The third subsumptive reflection, combining pervasion and subject propertyhood, is
6:25–6:29produced by no other member, but only by the application.
6:29–6:34Although the Mzaka does not accept the third subsumptive reflection as the cause of inferential
6:34–6:41cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application cannot be omitted.
6:41–6:43The application is necessary.
6:43–6:4521.
6:45–6:49It should not be said that the subject propertyhood of the reason can be understood from the
6:49–6:51reason statement itself.
6:51–6:55The reason statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause
6:55–7:02Because of the probandom, it is not utter to convey the presence of the reason in the subject.
7:02–7:05Nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason
7:05–7:07statement.
7:07–7:12Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject propertyhood.
7:12–7:15Otherwise pervasion, the reason, and subject propertyhood would all be implied by the
7:15–7:20thesis alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless.
7:20–7:24Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood
7:24–7:29on his own. Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible
7:29–7:34to understand everything unaided. The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that
7:34–7:39is, employ the application. Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible.
7:40–7:47The conclusion statement. After the application, the conclusion is stated.
7:48–7:52The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the probandom on the basis of
7:52–7:59the subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood.
7:59–8:04The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound.
8:04–8:08The first four members yield cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood, but unless
8:08–8:12the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason
8:12–8:17are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition.
8:17–8:22The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences.
8:22–8:26Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion.
8:26–8:3223, an objection may be raised, once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the
8:32–8:36reason is complete and no expectancy for another member remains.
8:36–8:40Any doubt concerning the absence of the probandum should be removed by those very members,
8:40–8:44otherwise the conclusion too cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not
8:44–8:47a special sensory perception.
8:47–8:51Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as
8:51–8:57endowed with an established probandom. If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom
8:57–9:02and not its established status, then the ablative meaning because of such a reason cannot be related
9:02–9:08to the probandom. The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known,
9:08–9:13cognition of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason and of
9:13–9:19an equally strong counter reason. Only after the absence of a defeater and of a counter reason
9:19–9:24is known as the intended inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses this result fully.
9:26–9:29Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary.
9:31–9:36An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong
9:36–9:41counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because no
9:41–9:46means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished.
9:46–10:02This objection is not sound. The rule of pavazian is that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something arises from cognition of that thing's absence. Therefore, cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong counter reason is necessary.
10:02–10:08It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the probandom
10:08–10:14as established. Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom
10:14–10:19from further expectancy, that is, its established status, is cognized, this cognition arises
10:19–10:25only after the ablative relation is established. Consequently, the establishment of the
10:25–10:29probandom is known precisely from the conclusion.
10:29–10:32So refers to the reason.
10:32–10:3325.
10:33–10:38Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason-side
10:38–10:41in view, not the pro-bandom side.
10:41–10:46Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reason-pervasion, subject-property-hood,
10:46–10:50absence of a defeater, and so forth.
10:50–10:53This view, however, is not sound.
10:53–10:58It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reason's nature, qualifier,
10:58–11:04similarity. The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with
11:04–11:09therefore, so, if the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning
11:09–11:15would become disconnected. The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject
11:15–11:19in general is also unsound, because relating the subject endowed with the reason merely
11:19–11:26to a general subject would be incoherent. The alternative of similarity is likewise
11:26–11:33In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot
11:33–11:35be apprehended in the conclusion.
11:35–11:41Objection, the relation between, therefore, and so, would be incoherent.
11:41–11:4726, an objection may be raised, when, so, refers to the various intended features of
11:47–11:52the reason, therefore, cannot be related to a general qualifier of the pro-bandom.
11:52–11:56in the opponent's statement, therefore, so, therefore, is also held to connect with the
11:56–12:00contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results.
12:01–12:06The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason.
12:07–12:12Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation
12:12–12:18beyond the knownness of the reason. On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason,
12:18–12:24therefore is connected with the qualified probandom. In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent,
12:24–12:29the established status of the probandom impermanence is specifically cognized in sound.
12:30–12:34Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandom impermanence,
12:34–12:38the matter stated as probandom in the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion
12:38–12:44by establishing its relation to the reason. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members.
12:44–12:5327. Doubt, Purpose, and the like are not members of Nyaya. They possess none of the characteristics
12:53–12:59of a member of Nyaya. Their use in Nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement
12:59–13:04of the number of members. Questions such as, does it possess fire, or how does smoke indicate
13:04–13:09fire, are not universally necessary, they are useful only in special contexts.
13:09–13:16With this, the section on the members of Nyaya in the inference division of Tatvassant Mayans.
13:18–13:25Fallacious reasons. Fallacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory,
13:25–13:31therefore they are explained here. General definition of a fallacious reason.
13:33–13:372. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of
13:37–13:41valid cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition,
13:41–13:47abstracts inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition abstracts inference is fallacious reasonhood.
13:48–13:52For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance,
13:52–14:00substancehood is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the veridical cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood.
14:01–14:10An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition of the reason becomes an obstruction to inference's fallacious reasonhood.
14:10–14:22In the faulty inference, the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the cognition concerning the reason fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire is fallacious.
14:22–14:30According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inferential cognition is fallacious reasonhood.
14:30–14:40In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain possesses smoke. When the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs inference of fire.
14:40–14:44These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general.
14:44–14:49Fallacious reasons as grounds of defeat will be discussed later.
14:49–14:57The general definitions include the fallacious reasons. In some contexts an uncommon reason
14:57–15:02and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons, cognition of them obstructs
15:02–15:09inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason and an equally
15:09–15:13strong counter reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only perceptual
15:13–15:19and verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition obstructs cognitions
15:19–15:28of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious reasons. For, according
15:28–15:33to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions a defeated reason and an
15:33–15:37equally strong counter reason do not prevent the production of cognition, but merely render
15:37–15:44the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however, these two defects of a reason prevent
15:44–15:50the very production of cognition. Fallacious reasons are of five kinds. One, deviating
15:50–15:56or inconclusive, two, contradictory, three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason,
15:56–16:03four, unestablished, and, five, defeated. The five corresponding defects are deviation,
16:03–16:08contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment, and defeat.
16:08–16:13With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends.
16:13–16:16The deviating or inconclusive reason.
16:16–16:175.
16:17–16:24A deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive.
16:24–16:28The definition that which establishes both the probandom and its absences deviating does
16:28–16:33not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish
16:33–16:38both the probandom and its absences, nor can it make both doubtful.
16:38–16:43Nor is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general
16:43–16:48definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions.
16:49–16:54A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs in
16:54–16:59neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandom and its absence
16:59–17:06and produces doubt. Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the
17:06–17:12probandom and its absence. One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render
17:12–17:18both indeterminate. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both,
17:18–17:23and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and its absence are found respectively only in common,
17:23–17:30uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons. The ancient scholar's definition of deviation.
17:32–17:37The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject
17:37–17:42propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed
17:42–17:47alternatives that produces doubt concerning the pro-bandom.
17:47–17:52But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent or not, is itself neither the object of cognition
17:52–17:56of subject-propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting two opposed alternatives.
17:56–18:00Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced doubt respectively because of occurrence
18:00–18:05in both similar and counter-instances, absence from both, and invariable connection with
18:05–18:08both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom.
18:08–18:11The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are
18:11–18:16knowable because they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar because it is this object,
18:16–18:21are sometimes faultless. A person's failure to understand such a faultless reason is a defect
18:21–18:26of that person's ignorance, not of the reason. Otherwise even faultless uses of common reasons
18:26–18:30and equally strong counter reasons would have to be treated as fallacious owing to ignorance.
18:32–18:34Refutation of under extension
18:36–18:417. An objection may be raised. The foregoing definition of deviation does not include a
18:41–18:46common reason. In the inferences, this object is identical with this object because it is knowable,
18:46–18:50and sound is impermanent because it is either sound or something else, the common reason is
18:50–18:54not present in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appears contradictory.
18:55–19:01This objection is not sound. Even if the common reason is not cognized as a property in the
19:01–19:05subject, cognition of the universality of the individual reason and the demonstration of
19:05–19:10that universality can obstruct both inference for oneself and inference for another. To establish
19:10–19:14the defect of a common reason, both the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood
19:14–19:19and commoness must be demonstrated, the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect of the
19:19–19:24reason. The ancient scholars reject this objection of under extension, saying that common reasons
19:24–19:29such as no ability or being sound or something else are not situated in the subject as endowed
19:29–19:33with the probandom and therefore appear contradictory, nevertheless, the generality of
19:33–19:38the individual reason and its demonstration obstruct inference. The commoness of a common
19:38–19:43reason consists in the occurrence of the reason in both similar and counter instances, this is its defect.
19:45–19:48Refutation of the argument for an alternative definition.
19:50–19:558. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject and
19:55–19:59undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating.
20:00–20:05Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness
20:05–20:11are respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive
20:11–20:15reasons, these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes.
20:17–20:21A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating,
20:21–20:25but the special conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be
20:25–20:31separately explained below. A occurrence in both similar and counter instances,
20:31–20:36exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness, these three relations of deviation opposed to
20:36–20:41inference occur separately in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons respectively.
20:42–20:46A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense,
20:46–20:51but the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not
20:51–20:57mutually intermixed. The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained
20:57–21:04below. Reason for rejecting the alternative definition.
21:04–21:099. Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such
21:09–21:14as commonness, uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of
21:14–21:20the foregoing forms of deviation. Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless
21:20–21:24in the definition of a deviating reason.
21:24–21:29For the same reason, the following definitions are also rejected, a fallacious reason not
21:29–21:34pervaded by the probandom, when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom, or a reason
21:34–21:40occurring only in a subject distinct from similar instances endowed with the probandom.
21:40–21:45In the first definition, not pervaded by the probandom is an unnecessary qualifier,
21:45–21:49in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known.
21:49–21:53These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason, as
21:53–22:00in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound.
22:00–22:03Refutation of another definition.
22:03–22:0410.
22:04–22:09Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both similar and
22:09–22:14counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason.
22:14–22:21These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason.
22:21–22:24When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as
22:24–22:28a similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as, all knowable
22:28–22:34things are impermanent, because here no separate similar or counter instance is established.
22:34–22:38And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is improperly
22:38–22:41included in the definition.
22:41–22:46Refutation of yet another definition.
22:46–22:5111, nor is either of the following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring
22:51–22:55only in counter instances distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or
22:55–23:00a reason occurring only in similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter
23:00–23:06instances. The first formulation does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends
23:06–23:10to a faultless common reason, the second becomes intermixed with contradictory and
23:10–23:15uncommon reasons. The definition present in the subject, distinct
23:15–23:19from a contradictory reason, and devoid of a relation assisting inference likewise
23:19–23:25contains pointless qualifiers. The successive refutation of these definitions establishes
23:25–23:30that no single recurrent definition covering all deviating reasons is possible.
23:31–23:34Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects.
23:36–23:49With this, the prima facie discussion of deviation ends.

Plain text

An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances. A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandum is possible. Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the ablative case which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative provision, does not state the probandom and produces a verbal cognition assisting the substantive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. This definition also applies to the purely negative reason if possessing affirmative provision is replaced by devoid of affirmative provision. In a Nyaya statement one should say nearly because of smoke, not because of possessing smoke. Use of the possessive suffix mat up is pointless. The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent. 16. Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally perceptible while devoid of universalhood, but qualifier, possessing universalhood, be related to reason status expressed by the ablative case because universal hood is constrained by the genitive case. This objection is not sound within the property being externally perceptible, but qualifier possessing universal hood can be connected through collocation expressed by the locative case. Hence the semantically fit relation is established with reason status expressed by the ablative case. Definition of the example. 17 after the reason statement the expectancy arises, how is this reason a cause of inference? It is therefore necessary to state first the perversion and then subject propertyhood. Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood, the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason. The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion residing in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes a cause of the sentence cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark. The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition of the perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion relation of the absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason. From this, separate definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. A sentence nearly expressing an instance does not become an example simply because it is a member of Nyaya, since the use of an instance is only a customary practice, not a universal rule. The probation statement, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood even though no instance is named. An alternative definition of the example. The particular expression denoting the specified provision in the cognition of provision produced by a sentence cannot alone be called the example, because such a definition would overextend to the application statement as well. Some scholars say that the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application. This is the general definition of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or negative provision is added, the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. Repetition of the relative pronoun. The teachers hold that in the sentence, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, repetition of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent deviation of the reason from the probandom. But where the provision of reason by probandom is known through co-location, repetition of the relative pronoun is unnecessary. In purely affirmative inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the reason from the probandom does not arise, this is our view. occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with the correlative pronoun. A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative pronouns bearing different case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning retained in the mind without violating linguistic rules. Defective examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions, devoid of the probandom, devoid of the reason. of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus, possessing an unstated affirmative provision, presenting affirmative provision in reverse, possessing an unstated negative provision, and presenting negative provision in reverse. Definition of the application. 20. After the example statement has been uttered, the following expectancy arises, the provision has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in the subject or not? The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason pervaded by the probandom is displayed. In general, the application is that member of Nyaya which produces the cognition that generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. The application has two special definitions. First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a reason pervaded by the probandum. Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the absence of the probandum. For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so too this mountain produces the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. In purely negative inference, the expression so too this earth produces the cognition, this earth possesses odor, which is the counter positive of absence of odor that pervades the absence of difference from the other eight substances. Certain saccas say that the use of nyaya ends with the three members thesis, reason, and example, and that application and conclusion are unnecessary. This view is not sound. The third subsumptive reflection, combining pervasion and subject propertyhood, is produced by no other member, but only by the application. Although the Mzaka does not accept the third subsumptive reflection as the cause of inferential cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application cannot be omitted. The application is necessary. 21. It should not be said that the subject propertyhood of the reason can be understood from the reason statement itself. The reason statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause Because of the probandom, it is not utter to convey the presence of the reason in the subject. Nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason statement. Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject propertyhood. Otherwise pervasion, the reason, and subject propertyhood would all be implied by the thesis alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless. Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood on his own. Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible to understand everything unaided. The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that is, employ the application. Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible. The conclusion statement. After the application, the conclusion is stated. The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the probandom on the basis of the subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood. The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound. The first four members yield cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood, but unless the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition. The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences. Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion. 23, an objection may be raised, once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the reason is complete and no expectancy for another member remains. Any doubt concerning the absence of the probandum should be removed by those very members, otherwise the conclusion too cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not a special sensory perception. Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as endowed with an established probandom. If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom and not its established status, then the ablative meaning because of such a reason cannot be related to the probandom. The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known, cognition of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason and of an equally strong counter reason. Only after the absence of a defeater and of a counter reason is known as the intended inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses this result fully. Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary. An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because no means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished. This objection is not sound. The rule of pavazian is that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something arises from cognition of that thing's absence. Therefore, cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong counter reason is necessary. It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the probandom as established. Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom from further expectancy, that is, its established status, is cognized, this cognition arises only after the ablative relation is established. Consequently, the establishment of the probandom is known precisely from the conclusion. So refers to the reason. 25. Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason-side in view, not the pro-bandom side. Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reason-pervasion, subject-property-hood, absence of a defeater, and so forth. This view, however, is not sound. It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reason's nature, qualifier, similarity. The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with therefore, so, if the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning would become disconnected. The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject in general is also unsound, because relating the subject endowed with the reason merely to a general subject would be incoherent. The alternative of similarity is likewise In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot be apprehended in the conclusion. Objection, the relation between, therefore, and so, would be incoherent. 26, an objection may be raised, when, so, refers to the various intended features of the reason, therefore, cannot be related to a general qualifier of the pro-bandom. in the opponent's statement, therefore, so, therefore, is also held to connect with the contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results. The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason. Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation beyond the knownness of the reason. On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason, therefore is connected with the qualified probandom. In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent, the established status of the probandom impermanence is specifically cognized in sound. Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandom impermanence, the matter stated as probandom in the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion by establishing its relation to the reason. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members. 27. Doubt, Purpose, and the like are not members of Nyaya. They possess none of the characteristics of a member of Nyaya. Their use in Nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement of the number of members. Questions such as, does it possess fire, or how does smoke indicate fire, are not universally necessary, they are useful only in special contexts. With this, the section on the members of Nyaya in the inference division of Tatvassant Mayans. Fallacious reasons. Fallacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory, therefore they are explained here. General definition of a fallacious reason. 2. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of valid cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition, abstracts inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition abstracts inference is fallacious reasonhood. For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance, substancehood is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the veridical cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood. An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition of the reason becomes an obstruction to inference's fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the cognition concerning the reason fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire is fallacious. According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inferential cognition is fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain possesses smoke. When the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs inference of fire. These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general. Fallacious reasons as grounds of defeat will be discussed later. The general definitions include the fallacious reasons. In some contexts an uncommon reason and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons, cognition of them obstructs inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason and an equally strong counter reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only perceptual and verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition obstructs cognitions of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious reasons. For, according to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions a defeated reason and an equally strong counter reason do not prevent the production of cognition, but merely render the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however, these two defects of a reason prevent the very production of cognition. Fallacious reasons are of five kinds. One, deviating or inconclusive, two, contradictory, three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, four, unestablished, and, five, defeated. The five corresponding defects are deviation, contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment, and defeat. With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends. The deviating or inconclusive reason. 5. A deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive. The definition that which establishes both the probandom and its absences deviating does not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish both the probandom and its absences, nor can it make both doubtful. Nor is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions. A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs in neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandom and its absence and produces doubt. Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the probandom and its absence. One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render both indeterminate. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and its absence are found respectively only in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons. The ancient scholar's definition of deviation. The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives that produces doubt concerning the pro-bandom. But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent or not, is itself neither the object of cognition of subject-propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting two opposed alternatives. Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced doubt respectively because of occurrence in both similar and counter-instances, absence from both, and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom. The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are knowable because they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar because it is this object, are sometimes faultless. A person's failure to understand such a faultless reason is a defect of that person's ignorance, not of the reason. Otherwise even faultless uses of common reasons and equally strong counter reasons would have to be treated as fallacious owing to ignorance. Refutation of under extension 7. An objection may be raised. The foregoing definition of deviation does not include a common reason. In the inferences, this object is identical with this object because it is knowable, and sound is impermanent because it is either sound or something else, the common reason is not present in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appears contradictory. This objection is not sound. Even if the common reason is not cognized as a property in the subject, cognition of the universality of the individual reason and the demonstration of that universality can obstruct both inference for oneself and inference for another. To establish the defect of a common reason, both the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood and commoness must be demonstrated, the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect of the reason. The ancient scholars reject this objection of under extension, saying that common reasons such as no ability or being sound or something else are not situated in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appear contradictory, nevertheless, the generality of the individual reason and its demonstration obstruct inference. The commoness of a common reason consists in the occurrence of the reason in both similar and counter instances, this is its defect. Refutation of the argument for an alternative definition. 8. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject and undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness are respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons, these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes. A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating, but the special conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be separately explained below. A occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness, these three relations of deviation opposed to inference occur separately in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons respectively. A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense, but the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not mutually intermixed. The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained below. Reason for rejecting the alternative definition. 9. Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such as commonness, uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of the foregoing forms of deviation. Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless in the definition of a deviating reason. For the same reason, the following definitions are also rejected, a fallacious reason not pervaded by the probandom, when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom, or a reason occurring only in a subject distinct from similar instances endowed with the probandom. In the first definition, not pervaded by the probandom is an unnecessary qualifier, in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known. These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason, as in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound. Refutation of another definition. 10. Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both similar and counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason. These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason. When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as a similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as, all knowable things are impermanent, because here no separate similar or counter instance is established. And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is improperly included in the definition. Refutation of yet another definition. 11, nor is either of the following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring only in counter instances distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or a reason occurring only in similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter instances. The first formulation does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends to a faultless common reason, the second becomes intermixed with contradictory and uncommon reasons. The definition present in the subject, distinct from a contradictory reason, and devoid of a relation assisting inference likewise contains pointless qualifiers. The successive refutation of these definitions establishes that no single recurrent definition covering all deviating reasons is possible. Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects. With this, the prima facie discussion of deviation ends.

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