MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part8_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.988028)
Duration: 22:35
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:06CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW
0:06–0:12Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition.
0:12–0:18Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object.
0:18–0:24Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion.
0:24–0:29Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion.
0:29–0:35Ordinary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating
0:35–0:39this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction.
0:39–0:43Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from
0:43–0:48illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity.
0:49–0:53It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
0:54–0:58This is not correct. Validity as qualified cognition hood is a cognition that takes
0:58–1:02as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate
1:02–1:07and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent,
1:07–1:12this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-liminosity
1:12–1:17illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible
1:17–1:22even in the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced
1:22–1:26merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have
1:26–1:30have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion.
1:30–1:34The Neo Prabhupra View.
1:34–1:39The Neo Prabhupramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent
1:39–1:41difference.
1:41–1:46Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known.
1:46–1:50Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition
1:50–1:56of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
1:56–1:59Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference.
1:59–2:05Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is
2:05–2:07a prior absence.
2:07–2:14The apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising.
2:14–2:17Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future
2:17–2:23relation, therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect.
2:23–2:28an uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes, non-apprehension of
2:28–2:32a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference. The validity useful
2:32–2:36in activity is merely the validity of the object, it is intrinsically produced from
2:36–2:42the cognitive aggregate. In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect.
2:42–2:46Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two
2:46–2:50alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent
2:50–2:55difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity.
2:55–2:59Gangesa's conclusion.
2:59–3:03Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound.
3:03–3:07Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity,
3:07–3:11it is pointless to call something else validity.
3:11–3:16If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from
3:16–3:19the cognitive aggregate would be impossible.
3:19–3:24For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference
3:24–3:27is absent, nor was it remembered earlier.
3:27–3:31Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state,
3:31–3:36doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference.
3:36–3:40This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation
3:40–3:44and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation.
3:44–3:48If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate,
3:48–3:53about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even
3:53–3:59in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion
3:59–4:03and causing unwavering activity, is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition
4:03–4:07taking as its object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended
4:07–4:12non-existent relation. Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension
4:12–4:16of a non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive
4:16–4:21aggregate. Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by
4:21–4:26perception of a distinguishing feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity
4:26–4:30is firmly established. Here ends the theory of the production of validity.
4:33–4:40The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Prama.
4:42–4:47Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Prama, validity is not a universal.
4:47–4:54What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive
4:54–5:02validity? It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal, as
5:02–5:07soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual
5:07–5:12cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition is this cognition
5:12–5:17valid or not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness
5:17–5:25or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap
5:25–5:31with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are
5:31–5:36the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity.
5:37–5:41If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as
5:41–5:46heinous and loneless differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity
5:46–5:52would disappear and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal.
5:54–5:59The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component.
6:01–6:06If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular
6:06–6:11component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every part of
6:11–6:17its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is
6:17–6:22silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity
6:22–6:27and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive
6:27–6:34universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition is
6:34–6:38not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components.
6:39–6:43Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean,
6:43–6:48veridical experience, but that definition will be refuted below. Therefore even admitting validity
6:48–6:52in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish validity as a universal.
6:54–6:58Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurent.
7:00–7:05It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence of validity
7:05–7:09reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively occurent properties.
7:09–7:13By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively occurent is not pervasively occurent,
7:13–7:17and what is pervasively occurrent is not non-pervasively occurrent, as restricted,
7:17–7:22validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively occurrent.
7:23–7:29This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist in the
7:29–7:34same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a tree. Likewise,
7:34–7:38validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different objects or
7:38–7:41components of cognition clearly delimit them.
7:41–7:46Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem,
7:46–7:50because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also
7:50–7:51present.
7:51–7:55Therefore, treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively occurrent properties
7:55–7:59is incoherent.
7:59–8:05Absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter.
8:05–8:10The Prima-Facey theorist says that not making a property absent from the Qualificand a mode,
8:10–8:14and making a property present in the Qualificand a mode, may respectively delimit the occurrence
8:14–8:16of validity and absence of validity.
8:16–8:21Answer, these conditions may explain the use of, valid, and, invalid, but they provide
8:21–8:24no need to posit a universal called validity.
8:24–8:27It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate
8:27–8:31of validity or its absence.
8:31–8:35Recutation of the Prabhakara view
8:35–8:39The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended,
8:39–8:44or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity.
8:44–8:46This view is unacceptable.
8:46–8:50In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition,
8:50–8:54this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet
8:54–8:57the later cognition can be veridical.
8:57–9:01The Prabhākāra may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the
9:01–9:05post-qualified by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new.
9:06–9:11But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness, is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal
9:11–9:16adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant,
9:16–9:20and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning too a new object is not apprehended at every
9:20–9:25moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity.
9:25–9:31Viridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud.
9:31–9:36Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity.
9:36–9:45Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too.
9:45–9:51nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity because
9:51–9:55these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition and because they
9:55–9:59depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence.
9:59–10:05Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation is itself valid cognition
10:05–10:11opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive.
10:11–10:16experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing
10:16–10:21successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and success must again
10:21–10:26be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition,
10:26–10:30because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise,
10:30–10:33while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion.
10:35–10:40Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence in the
10:40–10:47qualificand is not Pramahud. It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes
10:47–10:52us mode a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand.
10:53–10:57But this definition does not apply to veritical cognition of conjunction,
10:57–11:03since conjunction is non-pervasively a current. If the definition is saved by qualifying
11:03–11:08absolute absence as pervasively a current, it overextends to an illusion of conjunction,
11:08–11:13because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively
11:13–11:21occurrent. A definition based on neutral absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction
11:21–11:26are non-pervasively occurrent because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root
11:26–11:32and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose
11:32–11:38its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based
11:38–11:43on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal
11:43–11:52delimiters. Objecthood is a special mode of qualification. Experience that does not make
11:52–11:58his mode a property absent from the qualificalnd is not Pramahood. In a collective cognition,
11:58–12:02many properties absent from one qualificalnd may occur as modes.
12:02–12:07or is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several
12:07–12:12qualificans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualifican becomes pointless,
12:12–12:17and because all modes do not reside in a single qualifican the definition will not apply to
12:17–12:23collective cognition. The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood,
12:23–12:27and cognition is the delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver,
12:27–12:31the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited by the sublated silverness,
12:31–12:35while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable silverness.
12:36–12:40Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future objects.
12:41–12:45Objecthood is a special qualitative relation between cognition and object,
12:45–12:50a special relational property of its own. A person who understands generally that,
12:50–12:54he has cognition, and specifically that, he knows a pot, may still doubt,
12:54–12:59does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that a special object relation
12:59–13:02distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted.
13:03–13:07Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot, involving an instrumental
13:07–13:13relation through pothood, would be impossible. Modehood 2 is one kind of this special relation,
13:13–13:18not mere objecthood. Experience whose mode is co-located with
13:18–13:24objecthood is not valid cognition. It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its
13:24–13:29mode is co-located with objecthood, or when it delimits objecthood together with such a
13:29–13:33mode. This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something,
13:33–13:38and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because objecthood with respect to,
13:38–13:41this, and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate.
13:42–13:47If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality must be
13:47–13:53made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless. A cognition
13:53–13:58can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude
13:58–14:04the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either.
14:06–14:12Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is
14:12–14:19not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood
14:19–14:25as undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition,
14:25–14:30objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is
14:30–14:36not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies
14:36–14:41to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell.
14:42–14:47It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also
14:47–14:53undilimited by that same property. Defining validity is experience that does not delimit
14:53–14:58objecthood or experience that makes as motor property not residing where objecthood resides
14:58–15:02likewise overextends to an illusion containing a shellless component.
15:03–15:06Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current,
15:06–15:11formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition.
15:13–15:16Avoidance of under extension or failure of application.
15:18–15:22Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed,
15:22–15:24and therefore an illusion cannot be valid.
15:25–15:29But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished,
15:29–15:34validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components.
15:35–15:39Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid.
15:40–15:45The definition cognition that makes his motor property not co-located with objecthood is
15:45–15:51illusion, and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this
15:51–15:56is knowable knowability is imagined not to reside in objecthood, the definition will not apply.
15:56–16:03In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver, therefore, merely
16:03–16:07on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would have
16:07–16:10to be called valid in the silver component.
16:10–16:17Thus no stable definition results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application.
16:17–16:22A single objecthood is not admissible.
16:22–16:26If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver, with
16:26–16:31When silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition the shell as silver
16:31–16:34will not be valid even in the shell component.
16:34–16:39If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded
16:39–16:43as valid in the silver component.
16:43–16:46If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but
16:46–16:50invalid in the qualificative component, the shell is identical with silver, that
16:50–16:52too is unsound.
16:52–16:56Superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore
16:56–17:01cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present
17:01–17:05as qualifiers in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have
17:05–17:09to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component.
17:11–17:13Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:15–17:20The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a
17:20–17:25qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood
17:25–17:31also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode,
17:31–17:36imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition will
17:36–17:42not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no
17:42–17:46ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is unacceptable.
17:47–17:51Cognition of the counter positive of an absence is delimited by the property delimiting
17:51–17:56counter-positiveness, the condition, under-limited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion
17:56–18:01too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends
18:01–18:05to illusion and under-extends to indeterminate cognition.
18:05–18:08Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of prama in the perception
18:08–18:12section.
18:12–18:17The Established Definition of Prama
18:17–18:24An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of
18:24–18:29doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually
18:29–18:35exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the
18:35–18:42substrate of that property. Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent
18:42–18:46is invalid, or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence
18:46–18:53of that property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity.
18:54–18:58Volidity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate,
18:58–19:04cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode.
19:06–19:11Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition.
19:13–19:17God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualificon form,
19:17–19:22He knows the qualificon of a qualifier, though He does not apprehend every property separately
19:22–19:28as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from both valid
19:28–19:34and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling it inexpressible
19:34–19:39and anayasutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and
19:39–19:45universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness
19:45–19:50resides in the shell, an invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made
19:50–19:53made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent.
19:53–19:59But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its qualifican
19:59–20:00components.
20:00–20:05Pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate of its own absence.
20:05–20:10God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate cognition
20:10–20:13is excluded from both.
20:13–20:19Validity of cognition of non-pervasively occurent presence and absence.
20:19–20:24Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively a current positive entity such as conjunction
20:24–20:27and of its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same
20:27–20:32qualificant, a single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made
20:32–20:34modes in the tree's top.
20:34–20:38Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different
20:38–20:40parts, the root and top.
20:40–20:44Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the
20:44–20:48part in which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified
20:48–20:51by absence of conjunction.
20:51–20:56Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump.
20:56–21:01Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has
21:01–21:06been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid.
21:06–21:10Use in this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time
21:10–21:14in which is not a defect of failed generalization.
21:14–21:19Validity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific
21:19–21:24substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition.
21:24–21:28The view of others.
21:28–21:33Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity.
21:33–21:38Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component, nevertheless
21:38–21:44valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined.
21:44–21:49of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness is valid cognition concerning
21:49–21:54silver, while experience of silverness and a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness,
21:54–21:58is invalid cognition concerning silver.
21:58–22:02On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid
22:02–22:07cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific object
22:07–22:11had belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may
22:11–22:15be defined as experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate
22:15–22:20of object hood. Alternatively, cognition delimiting object hood together with a mode collocated
22:20–22:25with object hood may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid.
22:25–22:29In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of
22:29–22:32valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

Plain text

CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition. Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object. Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion. Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion. Ordinary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction. Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity. It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. This is not correct. Validity as qualified cognition hood is a cognition that takes as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent, this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-liminosity illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible even in the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion. The Neo Prabhupra View. The Neo Prabhupramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known. Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence. The apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising. Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation, therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect. an uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference. The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object, it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect. Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity. Gangesa's conclusion. Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound. Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity, it is pointless to call something else validity. If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from the cognitive aggregate would be impossible. For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference is absent, nor was it remembered earlier. Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation. If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity, is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation. Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established. Here ends the theory of the production of validity. The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Prama. Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Prama, validity is not a universal. What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive validity? It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition is this cognition valid or not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity. If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous and loneless differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal. The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component. If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components. Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience, but that definition will be refuted below. Therefore even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish validity as a universal. Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurent. It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence of validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively occurent properties. By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively occurent is not pervasively occurent, and what is pervasively occurrent is not non-pervasively occurrent, as restricted, validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively occurrent. This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them. Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem, because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present. Therefore, treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively occurrent properties is incoherent. Absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter. The Prima-Facey theorist says that not making a property absent from the Qualificand a mode, and making a property present in the Qualificand a mode, may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity. Answer, these conditions may explain the use of, valid, and, invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate of validity or its absence. Recutation of the Prabhakara view The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended, or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity. This view is unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet the later cognition can be veridical. The Prabhākāra may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the post-qualified by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness, is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning too a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity. Viridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud. Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too. nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity because these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition and because they depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence. Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation is itself valid cognition opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive. experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and success must again be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion. Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence in the qualificand is not Pramahud. It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes us mode a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand. But this definition does not apply to veritical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction is non-pervasively a current. If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current, it overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively occurrent. A definition based on neutral absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively occurrent because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters. Objecthood is a special mode of qualification. Experience that does not make his mode a property absent from the qualificalnd is not Pramahood. In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualificalnd may occur as modes. or is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualificans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualifican becomes pointless, and because all modes do not reside in a single qualifican the definition will not apply to collective cognition. The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition is the delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable silverness. Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future objects. Objecthood is a special qualitative relation between cognition and object, a special relational property of its own. A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that, he knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot, involving an instrumental relation through pothood, would be impossible. Modehood 2 is one kind of this special relation, not mere objecthood. Experience whose mode is co-located with objecthood is not valid cognition. It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is co-located with objecthood, or when it delimits objecthood together with such a mode. This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because objecthood with respect to, this, and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate. If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless. A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either. Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell. It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undilimited by that same property. Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes as motor property not residing where objecthood resides likewise overextends to an illusion containing a shellless component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition. Avoidance of under extension or failure of application. Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes his motor property not co-located with objecthood is illusion, and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable knowability is imagined not to reside in objecthood, the definition will not apply. In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver, therefore, merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not admissible. If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver, with When silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition the shell as silver will not be valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component. If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in the qualificative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. Superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifiers in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode, imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition will not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter positive of an absence is delimited by the property delimiting counter-positiveness, the condition, under-limited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends to illusion and under-extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of prama in the perception section. The Established Definition of Prama An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property. Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid, or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity. Volidity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate, cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode. Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition. God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualificon form, He knows the qualificon of a qualifier, though He does not apprehend every property separately as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling it inexpressible and anayasutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness resides in the shell, an invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent. But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its qualifican components. Pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition of non-pervasively occurent presence and absence. Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively a current positive entity such as conjunction and of its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualificant, a single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top. Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts, the root and top. Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part in which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction. Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump. Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid. Use in this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in which is not a defect of failed generalization. Validity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition. The view of others. Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity. Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component, nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined. of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness is valid cognition concerning silver, while experience of silverness and a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness, is invalid cognition concerning silver. On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific object had belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may be defined as experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate of object hood. Alternatively, cognition delimiting object hood together with a mode collocated with object hood may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid. In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

← Transcript index