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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:04–0:14The Saddha section of the Tattva Sintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge.
0:15–0:19It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers.
0:20–0:31It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention.
0:31–0:36In addition, it presents the Nya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate
0:36–0:41concerning the personal authorship of the Veda.
0:41–0:42Verbal Testimony and Objections
0:42–0:47What objections did the Buddhists and Bayekas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how
0:47–0:50did the Nyaikas refute them?
0:50–0:55The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic
0:55–1:01fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veritical verbal cognition impossible
1:01–1:08without them? The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how,
1:08–1:13according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
1:15–1:18To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vayaka philosophy is, in fact,
1:18–1:23to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist
1:23–1:25objection and its refutation.
1:25–1:31The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge.
1:31–1:36An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant
1:36–1:42effect. They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical
1:42–1:47verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge.
1:47–1:52The Naya Yajas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They
1:52–1:57They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory.
1:57–2:01They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions,
2:01–2:06aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce for ridical verbal cognition.
2:06–2:10If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that
2:10–2:13is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their
2:13–2:16appropriate conditions are absent.
2:16–2:19The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikhas subsumed verbal cognition
2:19–2:21under inference.
2:21–2:29The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory.
2:29–2:34If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established.
2:34–2:41If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words.
2:41–2:45When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates
2:45–2:48that claim through words, namely through a sentence.
2:48–2:53If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words
2:53–2:56have become a means of veridical knowledge.
2:56–3:01Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves
3:01–3:03that words are a means of knowledge.
3:03–3:07This is the self-contradiction.
3:07–3:10After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vaika
3:10–3:12philosophy.
3:12–3:16The Vaikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions
3:16–3:21can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge.
3:21–3:26According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison
3:26–3:30is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words,
3:30–3:35that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition
3:35–3:39of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through
3:39–3:44inference. They hold that, in this inference, the
3:44–3:49The words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established.
3:49–3:55Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge,
3:55–3:58but includes verbal cognition under inference.
3:58–4:02The Vayikhas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other
4:02–4:08required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker.
4:08–4:12The Nayayakhas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vayikhas and refute the
4:12–4:18position of the author of the Lila Vadi. According to the Neayakas, if the intention
4:18–4:22to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for
4:22–4:27inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can
4:27–4:33even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged
4:33–4:38inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings
4:38–4:45cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both
4:45–4:51the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not
4:51–4:55understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation
4:55–5:04is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the Viakas is invalid for inference.
5:04–5:08this refutation, the vayakas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a
5:08–5:13cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually
5:13–5:17connected meanings, the basis of inference.
5:17–5:22Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
5:22–5:24he waters with liquid.
5:24–5:30How does the new vayaka reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail?
5:30–5:33The Nayayaka argument is very precise.
5:33–5:38In their revised reason, the vayakas say that words uttered with the intention of producing
5:38–5:42cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose
5:42–5:46mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference.
5:46–5:52In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason.
5:52–5:57The naiyakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, payasasinkati,
5:57–6:03here interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person.
6:03–6:09The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows.
6:09–6:14Suppose an untrustworthy person says payasasinkadi, while actually intending to convey he waters
6:14–6:17with a coconut shell.
6:17–6:22Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation,
6:22–6:26thus the proposed reason is present.
6:26–6:30Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition?
6:30–6:35No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance
6:35–6:39comes from an untrustworthy person.
6:39–6:44The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veridical
6:44–6:47cognition in this case, must also be present.
6:47–6:52Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent.
6:52–6:57The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails.
6:57–7:03In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbamanayanam t objecthood, bringing,
7:03–7:05an effort.
7:05–7:12This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly.
7:12–7:17Observe that Karmatbamanayanam t is not a complete or meaningful sentence.
7:17–7:22It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic
7:22–7:26expectancy or grammatical connection.
7:26–7:31The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows.
7:31–7:35Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack
7:35–7:39of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring
7:39–7:41some object.
7:41–7:45The vayika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected
7:45–7:48meanings, is fully present.
7:48–7:52Absence of the probandum, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence
7:52–7:55meaning merely from this group of expressions?
7:55–8:01No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among them.
8:01–8:06Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom of geritical verbal cognition
8:06–8:11does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate.
8:11–8:18This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition.
8:18–8:21To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the
8:21–8:28The Vayikas' knowledge or intention, the Nayayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument, discussed next.
8:28–8:34The Vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition.
8:34–8:39An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as,
8:39–8:44bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings?
8:44–8:50If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the Vayikha theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence?
8:50–8:54The Vaikas offer an ingenious reply.
8:54–8:59They concede that in the case of a parrot or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's
8:59–9:03theoretical cognition or intention, is in fact absent.
9:03–9:08They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words
9:08–9:12possess sentential fitness or the capacity to convey meaning.
9:12–9:16Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and
9:16–9:18understands the meaning.
9:18–9:23Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but
9:23–9:28from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention.
9:28–9:33From the nayayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as
9:33–9:38bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate
9:38–9:42to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion?
9:42–9:46How does this situation assist the nayayakas in establishing words as an independent
9:46–9:53means of knowledge distinct from inference. The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion
9:53–9:59altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to
9:59–10:05an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition.
10:05–10:09If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly
10:09–10:14understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts.
10:14–10:19This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge
10:19–10:22in the following manner.
10:22–10:26According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's
10:26–10:29veridical cognition.
10:29–10:33In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the
10:33–10:38meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is
10:38–10:40impossible.
10:40–10:44If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when
10:44–10:48On the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must arise
10:48–10:54not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words.
10:54–10:58This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is
10:58–11:02an independent means of knowledge in its own right.
11:02–11:07A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning
11:07–11:12to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words,
11:12–11:18it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because
11:18–11:24certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas,
11:24–11:28the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence.
11:29–11:34A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars.
11:35–11:40Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to
11:40–11:44complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent.
11:45–11:50Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one
11:50–11:57another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity, or contiguity,
11:57–12:02the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay.
12:03–12:08Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become
12:08–12:13useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the
12:13–12:19words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features
12:19–12:24are present among those words, the hearer obtains veridical cognition on hearing them.
12:25–12:29An example is now offered to clarify these three features.
12:30–12:35If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham
12:35–12:39Nianity, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning?
12:40–12:46The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or
12:46–12:53sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and
12:53–12:58effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them,
12:58–13:02such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to
13:02–13:08another. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a
13:08–13:14sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness.
13:15–13:20The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a
13:20–13:28defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, venena sinkati. This sentence
13:28–13:34possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature
13:34–13:42expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible
13:42–13:47with water or another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns
13:48–13:55therefore the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question
13:55–14:00when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features,
14:00–14:04expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity is deemed absent.
14:05–14:11In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is
14:11–14:16logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words
14:16–14:22lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important
14:22–14:28pillar of a sentence, proximity, or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words
14:28–14:36continuously, without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring.
14:37–14:40Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning?
14:41–14:46If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood.
14:46–14:52Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in the mind.
14:52–14:59To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay.
14:59–15:07Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning.
15:07–15:12This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity.
15:12–15:19Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya.
15:19–15:23The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse.
15:23–15:28No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention,
15:28–15:30context, or purpose.
15:30–15:35The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt
15:35–15:37or for a horse.
15:37–15:41The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of Pali-Semis words and words used
15:41–15:46in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the
15:46–15:51speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the
15:51–15:58apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is
15:58–16:04intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words,
16:04–16:07it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification.
16:07–16:14Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti.
16:14–16:19Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise?
16:19–16:23inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise.
16:23–16:27The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms.
16:27–16:32When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout,
16:32–16:37we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention.
16:37–16:42This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA.
16:42–16:47Nyaia philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and
16:47–16:52the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical
16:52–16:55and independent means of knowledge.
16:55–16:59This question lies at the root of a major in-celebrated dispute between Nyaia and
16:59–17:03MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy.
17:03–17:08The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter.
17:08–17:13MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds
17:13–17:15are eternal.
17:15–17:20It argues that sounds such as, K.A. and, K.O. are always present in Ether.
17:20–17:23The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as
17:23–17:28switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there.
17:28–17:33Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are
17:33–17:39non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time,
17:39–17:42just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks.
17:43–17:48To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality,
17:48–17:51the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience.
17:52–17:57There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being.
17:58–18:01If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere,
18:01–18:04its character would not vary when the speaker changed.
18:04–18:08This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.
18:10–18:15The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations
18:15–18:20of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not
18:20–18:26eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds cow or ga were single eternal entities
18:26–18:30residing in ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere.
18:31–18:36Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show
18:36–18:41that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical
18:41–18:42effort.
18:42–18:48Mme with makron essay with makron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound
18:48–18:51ka, as evidence of eternality.
18:51–18:55According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an
18:55–18:59individual sound but the shared universal colloid present in different sounds.
19:01–19:05The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy,
19:05–19:09semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention,
19:09–19:12and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them?
19:14–19:18According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars,
19:18–19:23are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning,
19:23–19:24from a sentence.
19:25–19:29Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression
19:29–19:32requires another in order to complete its meaning.
19:33–19:37For example, after merely saying gum, a pot, the expression
19:37–19:39anaya, bring, is expected.
19:40–19:43Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the
19:43–19:45expressions to fit together logically.
19:46–19:48Watering with fire is impossible.
19:48–19:51Therefore, semantic fitness is absent there.
19:51–20:02Proximity or Contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions, so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously.
20:02–20:13The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with St. Hava, or is used figuratively.
20:13–20:18Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions?
20:18–20:25If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent,
20:25–20:31the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvamnayanati,
20:31–20:33and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it.
20:35–20:39At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in
20:39–20:44nyaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation.
20:44–20:50The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according
20:50–20:55to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
20:57–21:01According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows.
21:02–21:07The non-eternality of words, the Nyayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are
21:07–21:10non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palette,
21:10–21:14and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot.
21:15–21:18Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal.
21:19–21:23The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God,
21:23–21:28themsakhas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established.
21:29–21:33The Neayakhas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God.
21:34–21:39At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation,
21:39–21:42the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God.
21:43–21:48The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition.
21:49–21:54If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from
21:54–21:59beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do the Neayakas
21:59–22:04insist that it was composed by God? The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is
22:04–22:09is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Neyayakas test this
22:09–22:13claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards.
22:13–22:19The Neyayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons.
22:19–22:24The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Nyaya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes
22:24–22:28a great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions
22:28–22:30are destroyed.
22:30–22:34If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot
22:34–22:36be preserved.
22:36–22:41Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself
22:41–22:45without a conscious and omniscient author.
22:45–22:49Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge
22:49–22:51of the cosmos.
22:51–22:55Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning
22:55–23:00of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered
23:00–23:05logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God.
23:05–23:10The masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution.
23:10–23:14Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless
23:14–23:20and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction.
23:20–23:24According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings
23:24–23:25is eternal.
23:25–23:29Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words
23:29–23:35and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation.
23:35–23:38Hence no divine composition is required.
23:38–23:50The msakhas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds.
23:50–23:58In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence.
23:58–24:01The main Neayaka arguments are as follows.
24:02–24:09Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air.
24:10–24:13Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot.
24:15–24:20Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end.
24:21–24:26Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time,
24:26–24:29which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent.
24:31–24:36Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal
24:36–24:42quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the
24:42–24:47refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I
24:47–24:53heard before. According to Nyaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality
24:53–24:59of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such
24:59–25:01as GA hood.
25:01–25:06Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow wood,
25:06–25:11so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form
25:11–25:16this is that very GA arises from apprehending the common universal GA hood.
25:16–25:21An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal
25:21–25:27remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual
25:27–25:32sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality
25:32–25:39of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made
25:39–25:45first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole
25:45–25:49house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal.
25:49–25:54Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words.
25:54–25:59Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort
25:59–26:00in parish.
26:00–26:06Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes
26:06–26:09is likewise non-eternal.
26:09–26:13Sentences and the Veda, sentence is formed by combining many words, and the Veda
26:13–26:19formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal.
26:19–26:25On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established
26:25–26:31entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author.
26:31–26:35At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal
26:35–26:40phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Makran essay with Makran claim,
26:40–26:44neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically
26:44–26:49authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine.
26:49–26:53The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and
26:53–26:59beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons.
26:59–27:03The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by
27:03–27:07effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes
27:07–27:10cannot be eternal.
27:10–27:15The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence
27:15–27:18by itself without a conscious author.
27:18–27:23Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind the
27:23–27:27composition of the Vedic is logically necessary.
27:27–27:31The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during
27:31–27:36the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible
27:36–27:39without an omniscient author.
27:39–27:43These Nyea arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Makran-S.A.
27:43–27:48with Makran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless.
27:48–27:54A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the Great Cosmic Dissolution,
27:54–27:58how does the M.M.A. with Makran-S.A. with Makran assertion that the relation between
27:58–28:02the word and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine
28:02–28:06of dissolution? According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic
28:06–28:11dissolution at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly
28:11–28:15traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed.
28:15–28:20In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between
28:20–28:25word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction.
28:25–28:29The principal points of contradiction are these.
28:29–28:33utterance and manifestation the practical operation of a relation between word and
28:33–28:39meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
28:39–28:44The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
28:44–28:50the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
28:50–28:54According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great
28:54–28:58Dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
28:58–29:07Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
29:08–29:17According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely...
29:17–29:20The principal points of contradiction are these.
29:20–29:26Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning
29:26–29:32is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
29:32–29:36The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
29:36–29:43the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
29:43–29:46According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great
29:46–29:50dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
29:50–29:55Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation
29:55–30:01is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
30:01–30:05According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches
30:05–30:11humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows.
30:11–30:15The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient
30:15–30:19and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu.
30:19–30:25The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with the sages,
30:25–30:28receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition
30:28–30:32and the practices of cultivated persons.
30:32–30:37Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error
30:37–30:41or defect, as the original source of the Veda.
30:41–30:46As Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in
30:46–30:51authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda
30:51–30:54always to remain faultless and authoritative?
30:54–30:59The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine
30:59–31:03composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from
31:03–31:05defects.
31:05–31:10Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable
31:10–31:16to error and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written
31:16–31:22by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity.
31:22–31:26Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda
31:26–31:32is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed
31:32–31:37by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless,
31:37–31:40refutable, and authoritative.
31:40–31:45At this point, since Nyaia philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof
31:45–31:51or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient?
31:51–31:52Chapter 2

Plain text

The Saddha section of the Tattva Sintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge. It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers. It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention. In addition, it presents the Nya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda. Verbal Testimony and Objections What objections did the Buddhists and Bayekas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nyaikas refute them? The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veritical verbal cognition impossible without them? The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect. They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge. The Naya Yajas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce for ridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikhas subsumed verbal cognition under inference. The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established. If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words. When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge. Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction. After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vaika philosophy. The Vaikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge. According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference. They hold that, in this inference, the The words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The Vayikhas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker. The Nayayakhas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vayikhas and refute the position of the author of the Lila Vadi. According to the Neayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the Viakas is invalid for inference. this refutation, the vayakas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, he waters with liquid. How does the new vayaka reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail? The Nayayaka argument is very precise. In their revised reason, the vayakas say that words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference. In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason. The naiyakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, payasasinkati, here interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person. The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows. Suppose an untrustworthy person says payasasinkadi, while actually intending to convey he waters with a coconut shell. Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition? No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person. The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veridical cognition in this case, must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails. In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbamanayanam t objecthood, bringing, an effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that Karmatbamanayanam t is not a complete or meaningful sentence. It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows. Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object. The vayika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings, is fully present. Absence of the probandum, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom of geritical verbal cognition does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition. To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the The Vayikas' knowledge or intention, the Nayayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument, discussed next. The Vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the Vayikha theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence? The Vaikas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's theoretical cognition or intention, is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness or the capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention. From the nayayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the nayayakas in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference. The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition. If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts. This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner. According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veridical cognition. In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible. If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when On the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words. This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right. A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence. A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars. Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent. Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity, or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay. Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features are present among those words, the hearer obtains veridical cognition on hearing them. An example is now offered to clarify these three features. If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham Nianity, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning? The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, venena sinkati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns therefore the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity is deemed absent. In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity, or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring. Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning? If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood. Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya. The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse. No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention, context, or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt or for a horse. The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of Pali-Semis words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words, it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification. Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti. Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise? inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise. The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms. When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout, we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention. This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA. Nyaia philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major in-celebrated dispute between Nyaia and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy. The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter. MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as, K.A. and, K.O. are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there. Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks. To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality, the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience. There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being. If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed. This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds. The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds cow or ga were single eternal entities residing in ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere. Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort. Mme with makron essay with makron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound ka, as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal colloid present in different sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning, from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gum, a pot, the expression anaya, bring, is expected. Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible. Therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or Contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions, so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously. The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with St. Hava, or is used figuratively. Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvamnayanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in nyaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows. The non-eternality of words, the Nyayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palette, and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakhas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established. The Neayakhas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God. At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation, the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do the Neayakas insist that it was composed by God? The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Neyayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards. The Neyayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons. The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Nyaya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes a great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved. Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God. The masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution. Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction. According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings is eternal. Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The msakhas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence. The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before. According to Nyaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as GA hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow wood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form this is that very GA arises from apprehending the common universal GA hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal. Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words. Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort in parish. Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal. Sentences and the Veda, sentence is formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal. On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author. At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Makran essay with Makran claim, neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine. The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons. The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal. The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind the composition of the Vedic is logically necessary. The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author. These Nyea arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Makran-S.A. with Makran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless. A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the Great Cosmic Dissolution, how does the M.M.A. with Makran-S.A. with Makran assertion that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution? According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic dissolution at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed. In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction. The principal points of contradiction are these. utterance and manifestation the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely... The principal points of contradiction are these. Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows. The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons. Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error or defect, as the original source of the Veda. As Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative? The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, refutable, and authoritative. At this point, since Nyaia philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient? Chapter 2

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