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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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23:14

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1. 0:02–0:08Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum.
2. 0:08–0:1740. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son.
3. 0:17–0:26If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise.
4. 0:26–0:32The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda.
5. 0:32–0:44In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire.
6. 0:45–0:57But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition.
7. 0:57–1:01Doubtful extraneous condition
8. 1:01–1:0841. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous
9. 1:08–1:12condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an
10. 1:12–1:17undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise.
11. 1:17–1:22But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous
12. 1:22–1:27condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom, a certain extraneous condition
13. 1:27–1:32produces acetaminate of deviation. Prima-facy account of the seed of the
14. 1:32–1:40vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous
15. 1:40–1:46condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the
16. 1:46–1:50reason merely on the ground that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence
17. 1:50–1:55of the probandum, otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason
18. 1:55–2:02attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons.
19. 2:02–2:08Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising
20. 2:08–2:14of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak
21. 2:14–2:18non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandum, whereas a single reason
22. 2:18–2:23Attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free
23. 2:23–2:26from such a condition.
24. 2:26–2:30Provision and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not
25. 2:30–2:37strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood.
26. 2:37–2:42Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
27. 2:42–2:4344.
28. 2:43–2:47If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness
29. 2:47–2:52produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous condition,
30. 2:52–2:57because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons presence in the subject.
31. 2:58–3:03Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition
32. 3:03–3:10occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces
33. 3:10–3:17cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment
34. 3:17–3:19of perversion.
35. 3:19–3:2445. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, it does not
36. 3:24–3:28pervade what pervades the probandom, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without
37. 3:28–3:31cognition of the extraneous condition?
38. 3:31–3:35The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely
39. 3:35–3:37from the absence of what fails to pervade.
40. 3:37–3:41A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous
41. 3:41–3:43condition.
42. 3:43–3:46Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it
43. 3:46–3:52It does not on that ground alone for within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons.
44. 3:52–3:57Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject.
45. 3:57–3:5846.
46. 3:58–4:02It is not the case that cognition of the reasons provision cannot arise while there is cognition
47. 4:02–4:07of the absence of its provision by something that pervades the probandom.
48. 4:07–4:11Cognition of provision itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates
49. 4:11–4:13from the probandom.
50. 4:13–4:18Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition
51. 4:18–4:24of perversion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom.
52. 4:24–4:30Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason.
53. 4:30–4:3747, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation.
54. 4:37–4:41Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous
55. 4:41–4:47condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandum. The causal complexes
56. 4:47–4:53for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous
57. 4:53–4:58condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandum, therefore the defect
58. 4:58–5:05of having a different subject does not arise. An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism
59. 5:05–5:11but a separate pseudo-reason. Established conclusion concerning the seed of the
60. 5:11–5:16the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
61. 5:16–5:21If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished
62. 5:21–5:27reason, or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted.
63. 5:27–5:31Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion
64. 5:31–5:33of the probandom.
65. 5:33–5:37Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it
66. 5:37–5:43It pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason.
67. 5:43–5:45Alternative view.
68. 5:45–5:4649.
69. 5:46–5:51Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandum and a reason
70. 5:51–5:55accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus
71. 5:55–5:59where something that pervades the probandum is absent.
72. 5:59–6:03The objection is untenable but, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is
73. 6:03–6:07regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would
74. 6:07–6:08be eliminated.
75. 6:08–6:12If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as
76. 6:12–6:17an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions
77. 6:17–6:19although they do not pervade the probandom.
78. 6:19–6:23Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding a current in a locus as
79. 6:23–6:27the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the
80. 6:27–6:30like themselves pervade the reason.
81. 6:30–6:34Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted
82. 6:34–6:37by the absence of the reason.
83. 6:37–6:41Thus the established conclusion concerning the seat of the vitiating power of an extraneous
84. 6:41–6:45condition comes to an end.
85. 6:45–6:47Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions
86. 6:47–6:5050.
87. 6:50–6:54Apparent extraneous conditions are now described.
88. 6:54–6:58The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
89. 6:58–7:03In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitants, subject otherness,
90. 7:03–7:06that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the
91. 7:06–7:11probandom is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
92. 7:11–7:15The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished
93. 7:15–7:18absence of the probandom.
94. 7:18–7:23In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous
95. 7:23–7:27conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom.
96. 7:27–7:32The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence
97. 7:32–7:34of the probandom.
98. 7:34–7:40For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is in a parent-extraneous
99. 7:40–7:44condition of a sublated absence of the probandom.
100. 7:44–7:48The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the
101. 7:48–7:52probandom that does not pervade the subject.
102. 7:52–7:56In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated
103. 7:56–8:00in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not
104. 8:00–8:04extend throughout the entire subject.
105. 8:04–8:08The fifth the parent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the
106. 8:08–8:11absence of the prior reason.
107. 8:11–8:15In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard
108. 8:15–8:20the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous
109. 8:20–8:25condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the
110. 8:25–8:30reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent.
111. 8:30–8:35The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior
112. 8:35–8:36reason.
113. 8:36–8:41In an inference of being without an agent, eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous
114. 8:41–8:44conditions of this kind.
115. 8:44–8:49The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference
116. 8:49–8:53from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance.
117. 8:53–8:56In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from
118. 8:56–9:01the mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition.
119. 9:01–9:06The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandum
120. 9:06–9:09and what is other than the subject.
121. 9:09–9:13In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct
122. 9:13–9:17from the mountain is a defect of this kind.
123. 9:17–9:22The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing
124. 9:22–9:26the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject.
125. 9:26–9:31In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct
126. 9:31–9:35from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition.
127. 9:35–9:40The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the
128. 9:40–9:41like.
129. 9:41–9:46In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition
130. 9:46–9:49obstruct inference.
131. 9:49–9:54With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions
132. 9:54–9:57comes to an end.
133. 9:57–10:04Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject. Having expounded
134. 10:04–10:09pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood,
135. 10:09–10:11is now described.
136. 10:11–10:18Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandom. Possession of
137. 10:18–10:24a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood.
138. 10:24–10:302. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood.
139. 10:30–10:35Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after
140. 10:35–10:40perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before substantive reflection
141. 10:40–10:45arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased.
142. 10:45–10:49If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal
143. 10:49–10:54existence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible
144. 10:54–10:59even when the probandom has already been ascertained.
145. 10:59–11:06The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood.
146. 11:06–11:11The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood.
147. 11:11–11:15The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined
148. 11:15–11:19absence is unnecessary.
149. 11:19–11:24the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there
150. 11:24–11:29is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of
151. 11:29–11:32the reason themselves prevent inference.
152. 11:32–11:35Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood.
153. 11:35–11:40The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object
154. 11:40–11:44known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred.
155. 11:44–11:49The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another.
156. 11:49–11:54The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish
157. 11:54–11:59it is subjecthood, the earlier view.
158. 11:59–12:03The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to
159. 12:03–12:10establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood.
160. 12:10–12:14A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the
161. 12:14–12:19self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible.
162. 12:19–12:23But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an
163. 12:23–12:28object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet,
164. 12:28–12:31a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire.
165. 12:32–12:37Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view.
166. 12:39–12:45This proposal is unacceptable. Like doubt about the probandom, the desire to establish
167. 12:45–12:50should need not remain present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential
168. 12:50–12:52mark.
169. 12:52–12:57The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred
170. 12:57–13:02from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object
171. 13:02–13:07too is inferred through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the
172. 13:07–13:10desire to establish is not a cause of inference.
173. 13:10–13:16With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end.
174. 13:16–13:17Establish Conclusion
175. 13:17–13:21The entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence
176. 13:21–13:26of the desire to establish is the subject.
177. 13:26–13:31The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent
178. 13:31–13:35together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is
179. 13:35–13:37the subject.
180. 13:37–13:41But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is
181. 13:41–13:44not the subject.
182. 13:44–13:48In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state
183. 13:48–13:53consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire
184. 13:53–13:55to establish it.
185. 13:55–14:01The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject.
186. 14:01–14:06Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing
187. 14:06–14:11evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through
188. 14:11–14:15a qualified absence.
189. 14:15–14:19Subjecthood through a qualified absence.
190. 14:19–14:23When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence
191. 14:23–14:28of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted
192. 14:28–14:32on the basis of a qualified absence.
193. 14:32–14:37In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is
194. 14:37–14:41absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of
195. 14:41–14:46ascertainment of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not
196. 14:46–14:48under extended.
197. 14:48–14:56Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot
198. 14:56–15:01be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as
199. 15:01–15:07the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of
200. 15:07–15:11subjecthood comes to an end.
201. 15:11–15:16Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection
202. 15:16–15:21Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason,
203. 15:21–15:25pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of
204. 15:25–15:28inference.
205. 15:28–15:33Mtsaka-prima-facie view, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood
206. 15:33–15:38are causes, not subsumptive reflection.
207. 15:38–15:42Samsakas say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present
208. 15:42–15:47in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference.
209. 15:47–15:52There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection.
210. 15:52–15:56The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the
211. 15:56–16:00combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire perversion and cognizing smoke on
212. 16:00–16:02the mountain.
213. 16:02–16:06These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of
214. 16:06–16:10economy, substantive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause.
215. 16:12–16:17It is not invariably established that substantive reflection actually precedes inference,
216. 16:17–16:20if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise.
217. 16:22–16:29Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect
218. 16:29–16:34to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke
219. 16:34–16:38which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference.
220. 16:40–16:46But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of
221. 16:46–16:52perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition
222. 16:52–16:57is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it,
223. 16:57–17:03leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property
224. 17:03–17:10is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property
225. 17:10–17:15of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such
226. 17:15–17:22cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible.
227. 17:22–17:26Even when pervasion and subject propertyhood are remembered, mere cognition that the subject
228. 17:26–17:32property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition
229. 17:32–17:35an infinite regress would follow.
230. 17:35–17:39The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects.
231. 17:39–17:405.
232. 17:40–17:45It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external
233. 17:45–17:49objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or
234. 17:49–17:51not.
235. 17:51–17:54Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating
236. 17:54–17:57property are its cooperative causes.
237. 17:57–18:00Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect
238. 18:00–18:06mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject
239. 18:06–18:10remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pervasion and cognition of
240. 18:10–18:15the reasons present in the subject, produces the substantive reflection, smoke pervaded
241. 18:15–18:21by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition
242. 18:21–18:25concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot
243. 18:25–18:32take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection
244. 18:32–18:36of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense
245. 18:36–18:41contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception.
246. 18:43–18:46Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view.
247. 18:48–18:536. The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application
248. 18:53–18:58of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible. The answer given is that
249. 18:58–19:03remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire.
250. 19:04–19:09According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire,
251. 19:09–19:13and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only
252. 19:13–19:17for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is
253. 19:17–19:22pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible.
254. 19:23–19:27Inference is possible despite doubt.
255. 19:27–19:31It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through
256. 19:31–19:35smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not.
257. 19:35–19:39How, then, does inference arise?
258. 19:39–19:43The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present,
259. 19:43–19:47the determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt.
260. 19:47–19:51Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of
261. 19:51–19:55operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible.
262. 19:55–20:00Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary.
263. 20:00–20:118. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire.
264. 20:11–20:19Cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire jointly cause inference.
265. 20:19–20:25Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized.
266. 20:26–20:31Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required.
267. 20:33–20:37No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives.
268. 20:39–20:44Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or
269. 20:44–20:48does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together?
270. 20:51–20:57Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason.
271. 20:57–21:01For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of
272. 21:01–21:04smoke or light is the reason.
273. 21:04–21:08Therefore too alternative no-ability is not incoherent.
274. 21:08–21:13Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity
275. 21:13–21:15a cause.
276. 21:15–21:19It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of
277. 21:19–21:24mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition
278. 21:24–21:29of difference or cognition of identity causes inference.
279. 21:29–21:32But this view is untenable.
280. 21:32–21:36Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference
281. 21:36–21:41produces the inference there is fire on the mountain.
282. 21:41–21:45Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition
283. 21:45–21:49of identity is not an independent cause.
284. 21:49–21:54It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood,
285. 21:54–21:59a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire,
286. 21:59–22:02qualified by smokehood, is necessary.
287. 22:02–22:08But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's perversion by fire,
288. 22:08–22:12such qualified cognition is unnecessary.
289. 22:12–22:18And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present.
290. 22:18–22:21the materials of inference are present.
291. 22:21–22:26Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden.
292. 22:26–22:30Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor.
293. 22:30–22:3612. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct inference,
294. 22:36–22:41and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an obstructor.
295. 22:41–22:47The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference.
296. 22:47–23:05Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required.
297. 23:06–23:10Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason.

Plain text

Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum. 40. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son. If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise. The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire. But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition. Doubtful extraneous condition 41. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom, a certain extraneous condition produces acetaminate of deviation. Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandum, otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons. Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandum, whereas a single reason Attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free from such a condition. Provision and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood. Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 44. If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion. 45. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, it does not pervade what pervades the probandom, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it It does not on that ground alone for within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons. Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the reasons provision cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its provision by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of provision itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of perversion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation. Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandum. The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandum, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not arise. An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason. Established conclusion concerning the seed of the the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason, or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted. Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion of the probandom. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it It pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason. Alternative view. 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandum and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandum is absent. The objection is untenable but, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding a current in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seat of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end. Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions 50. Apparent extraneous conditions are now described. The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitants, subject otherness, that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is in a parent-extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not pervade the subject. In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth the parent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent. The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent, eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind. The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject. Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood, is now described. Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandom. Possession of a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood. 2. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood. Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before substantive reflection arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased. If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal existence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood. The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary. the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference. Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another. The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish it is subjecthood, the earlier view. The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood. A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible. But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire. Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is unacceptable. Like doubt about the probandom, the desire to establish should need not remain present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark. The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object too is inferred through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end. Establish Conclusion The entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject. In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject. Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through a qualified absence. Subjecthood through a qualified absence. When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of ascertainment of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end. Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of inference. Mtsaka-prima-facie view, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection. Samsakas say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference. There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire perversion and cognizing smoke on the mountain. These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of economy, substantive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause. It is not invariably established that substantive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise. Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference. But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when pervasion and subject propertyhood are remembered, mere cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition an infinite regress would follow. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects. 5. It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not. Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the substantive reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception. Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view. 6. The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible. The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire. According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible. Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not. How, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt. Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible. Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary. 8. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. Cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire jointly cause inference. Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required. No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives. Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together? Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason. For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke or light is the reason. Therefore too alternative no-ability is not incoherent. Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition of difference or cognition of identity causes inference. But this view is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces the inference there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent cause. It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified by smokehood, is necessary. But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's perversion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary. And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present. the materials of inference are present. Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden. Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor. 12. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an obstructor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required. Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason.

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