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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.995994)
Duration: 22:39
Source: Open preserved recording

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0:02–0:09दमसाखव विछ, अपीकोच दन्सिंग आन आम आंटन इस नों फृुप रशुम्षिन।
0:09–0:1431, the msaka says, after the cognition of inexplicability, the peacock does not dance
0:14–0:19anywhere other than the mountain, yet it is dancing, the cognition the peacock is dancing
0:19–0:21on the mountain arises.
0:21–0:25This cognition cannot arise through purely negative inference, because the probandom
0:25–0:30peacock dancing located on the mountain has not previously been established, nor has the
0:30–0:35negative concomitance of its absence been determined.
0:35–0:40is therefore necessary to establish the peacocks dancing on the mountain.
0:40–0:44It should not be said that because the peacocks dancing on the mountain has not previously
0:44–0:48been established, its presumption too is impossible.
0:48–0:53The recollection that dancing is impossible without an established locus, assisted by
0:53–0:58the exclusion of an already established locus, postulates another locus.
0:58–1:04Thus presumption of the peacocks dancing on the mountain is reasonable.
1:04–1:06Refutation of the Forgoing Argument
1:06–1:1232. This argument is not sound.
1:12–1:16The locus of the dancing is established through the inference from general observation, peacock
1:16–1:20dancing has some locus, because it is dancing.
1:20–1:25Assisted by the inexplicability of any already established alternative locus, this inference
1:25–1:29apprehends the mountain as the locus of the dancing.
1:29–1:34Alternatively, the cognition of peacock dancing produced by the sentence the peacock
1:34–1:39is dancing, after the cognition of inexplicability produced by the sentence, the peacock does
1:39–1:43not dance anywhere except on the mountain, apprehends the mountain, distinct from the
1:43–1:48already established locus, as a specific locus and thereby establishes the peacock's dancing
1:48–1:50is situated on the mountain.
1:50–1:56For this very reason the teacher says, through the inexplicability of cognition of impermanence,
1:56–2:00and with established permanence kept in view, the location of an object produced by cognition
2:00–2:03is established in the earth.
2:03–2:10The Neayaka's alternative view, cognition of corpulence from eating at night.
2:10–2:13The peacocks dancing on the mountain can be established through the affirmative negative
2:13–2:14inference.
2:14–2:19The locus of the peacocks dancing is the mountain, because it has a locus and has no locus distinct
2:19–2:22from the mountain.
2:22–2:27Alternatively, the general pervasion may be stated thus, a property that is situated
2:27–2:31in a particular locus and is not situated in any possible locus distinct from that
2:31–2:36locus is situated in that very particular locus.
2:36–2:42Through this provision, the location of peacock dancing on the mountain is established.
2:42–2:46In the same way, in the statement the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition
2:46–2:51of devdutta's corpulence can be explained by establishing previously unknown eating
2:51–2:57at night and taking that eating at night into account, hence presumption is unnecessary.
2:57–3:01The Bha doctrine of presumption from what is heard.
3:01–3:0834, the Bomsaka says, in the sentences Devdutta, who does not eat, is corpulent or the corpulent
3:08–3:13Devdutta does not eat during the day, semantic fitness is unavailable.
3:13–3:17Eating during the day is denied, while eating at night, which is a constituent of semantic
3:17–3:22coherence, is not expressed in the sentence.
3:22–3:26Thus the meaning of the corpulent Devdutta does not eat during the day is not coherent
3:26–3:29without reference to eating at night.
3:29–3:33In the unuttered sentence, the corpulent dev-du-ta eats-id-night is postulated and the reference
3:33–3:38to nocturnal eating is supplied, cognition of the semantic relation among the word meanings
3:38–3:40arises.
3:40–3:45In this way, the postulation of an unexpressed meaning to render the herd sentence meaningful
3:45–3:49is presumption from what is heard.
3:49–3:53Establishment of presumption from what is heard.
3:53–3:5435.
3:54–3:59It should not be said that, for economy, it is sufficient to postulate only eating-id-night
3:59–4:05that there is no need to postulate the words expressing nocturnal eating. According to the rule
4:05–4:10governing verbal cognition, the expectancy of words is fulfilled only by other words, and words
4:10–4:15apprehend meanings indicated by other words and thereby produce cognition of the sentence meaning.
4:16–4:21Therefore, the production from the heard words of cognition of the relation among their meanings
4:21–4:27is inexplicable without postulating semantically coherent words. Where the heard words cannot
4:27–4:31produce cognition of the sentence meaning without the postulation of unuttered word meanings
4:31–4:36semantically related to one another, presumption from what is heard is necessary.
4:38–4:46The view of the bhaas. 36. In the sentence, please close the door, the postulation of the verbal
4:46–4:52expression closes itself presumption from what is heard. If the directly expressed meaning of
4:52–4:56a heard word is contradictory, the intended non-contradictory meaning is postulated.
4:56–5:02According to the Prabhācāra teachers, in the sentence one who desires heaven should
5:02–5:07perform a sacrifice, it is incoherent for the sacrifice directly to possess the capacity
5:07–5:10to produce heaven as its result.
5:10–5:14Since an unseen intermediate instrument in the form of a pārvā is not mentioned, a
5:14–5:18pārvā is postulated through the optative suffix.
5:18–5:22When the sacrifice is understood together with a pārvā, the grammatical relation
5:22–5:27between the injunctive expression and the familiar words becomes semantically coherent,
5:27–5:32and the cognition sacrifice, through a pārvā, is the principal means to heaven arises.
5:33–5:37Otherwise a pārvā could not constitute the expressed meaning of the optative suffix.
5:39–5:43The bas conclude that presumption from what is heard of this kind produces cognition of the
5:43–5:49means to heaven. If cognition of a pārvā did not arise from presumption from what is heard,
5:49–5:55the optative suffix could not express a pārvā. Thus, where cognition of the relation between
5:55–6:00the meaning of one word and that of another is inexplicable without the postulation of a semantically
6:00–6:04coherent meaning, presumption from what is heard is a means of knowledge.
6:06–6:12The Neyayaka conclusion. 37. The Neyayaka says,
6:12–6:17Semantic fitness consists in the absence of a means of knowledge opposed to semantic coherence,
6:17–6:21or in the absence of a contradictory form of the relation among word meanings.
6:21–6:26In the sentence, the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of the sentence
6:26–6:31meaning relating the word meanings arises despite ignorance of his not eating during the day and
6:31–6:35of his eating at night, because devdutta's corpulence must be accounted for by eating.
6:37–6:42In reality, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings is not inexplicable,
6:42–6:48only the already cognized corpulence is inexplicable. To resolve that, eating at night
6:48–6:53is inferred. The unseen aporva likewise is not the directly expressed meaning of the
6:53–6:59optative suffix. Therefore the presumption accepted by the msaka is not distinct from
6:59–7:08previously accepted inference. With this, the discussion of presumption ends. The members
7:08–7:18of a nyaya syllogism. Nyaya and its members. Inference for the sake of another is established
7:18–7:20through the method of Nyaya.
7:20–7:24Accordingly, Nyaya and its members are now explained.
7:24–7:30Nyaya has five members, thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion.
7:30–7:35In inference for the sake of another, a speaker presents his conclusion
7:35–7:41before another person through the ordered use of five statements.
7:41–7:46Thesis, this mountain possesses fire.
7:46–7:51Reason, because it possesses smoke.
7:51–7:57For example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
7:57–8:00Application, this mountain possesses smoke.
8:00–8:07Conclusion, therefore this mountain possesses fire.
8:07–8:15Through the use of these five statements, the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain arises in the listener's mind,
8:15–8:19and thereafter the inferential cognition this mountain possesses fire arises.
8:19–8:23This aggregate of five statements is called Nyaya.
8:23–8:27Each of the five statements of Nyaya is called a member.
8:27–8:36Each member produces its own verbal cognition, and the aggregate of the five verbal cognitions produces the substantive reflection on the inferential mark.
8:36–8:43Hence thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion are the five members of Nyaya.
8:43–8:46Definition of Nyaya
8:46–8:532. Nyaya cannot be defined as a sentence describing a reason endowed with five characteristics,
8:53–8:57because such a definition would overextend to a sentence describing defects such as presence
8:57–9:02in a counter instance, and would also apply to the definition of the reason member.
9:02–9:07Nyaya is therefore the group of statements that produces verbal cognitions which assist
9:07–9:12in producing subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of
9:12–9:15inferential cognition.
9:15–9:20The five member statements, as a single aggregate of sentences, produce a qualitative cognition
9:20–9:22of five meanings.
9:22–9:27From this qualitative cognition arises a distinct comprehensive cognition in which the qualifiers
9:27–9:33are mutually connected, and finally the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark arises.
9:33–9:38Thus, verbal cognition produced by Nyaya is instrumental in producing the subsumptive
9:38–9:41reflection.
9:41–9:45Definition of the members of Nyaya.
9:45–9:50The five statements that produce verbal cognitions, which in turn produce a qualitative cognition
9:50–9:54assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential
9:54–9:59cognition, are called the five members of Nyaya.
9:59–10:04Under this definition, the sentence of subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire as present
10:04–10:08on this mountain is neither Nyaya nor a member of Nyaya, because Nyaya produces
10:08–10:13the subsumptive reflection, while the members of Nyaya produce the qualifying verbal cognitions
10:13–10:17that assist that reflection.
10:17–10:23The application statement alone is not nyaya, refutation of an objection.
10:23–10:28An objection may be raised, the application statement smoke pervaded by fire is present
10:28–10:33on this mountain, also assists the substantive reflection on the inferential mark, hence
10:33–10:37it should be regarded as non-different from the aggregate of five statements and called
10:37–10:40nyaya.
10:40–10:42This objection is not sound.
10:42–10:47In demonstrative nyaya, the five statements are used in the order determined by expectancy.
10:47–10:52The expectancy for the application is fulfilled only after the thesis, reason, and example.
10:52–10:56If the application is used first, the meaning that the reason qualified by pavesion is present
10:56–11:02in the subject will not be clear, and a ground of defeat will arise at the very outset.
11:02–11:07Otherwise, any sentence not traditionally accepted among the five members, or even
11:07–11:11a perceptual organ such as the eye, since it assists the subsumptive reflection, would
11:11–11:14also have to be called Nyaya.
11:14–11:18The absence of sentential expectancy in an organ such as the eye is comparable to the
11:18–11:25absence of the requisite expectancy when the application statement is improperly used first.
11:25–11:27Other Scholars' Definition of Nyaya
11:27–11:295.
11:29–11:34Some scholars say, the five member statements together produce a single qualitative verbal
11:34–11:35cognition.
11:35–11:40The property of jointly producing such a qualitative verbal cognition is Nyayahud.
11:40–11:45Each member statement separately produces an individual qualitative verbal cognition,
11:45–11:52producing such an individual cognition constitutes the nature of the thesis and the other members.
11:52–11:55This view, however, is not reasonable.
11:55–12:00To apply Dinyayat and its members respectively the property of producing a joint qualitative
12:00–12:04verbal cognition through the five statements and the property of producing an individual
12:04–12:09qualitative verbal cognition through each member statement, one would require a common,
12:09–12:15and non- overextensive form. If such a common or overextensive form is accepted, that same
12:15–12:20form would define both Nyaya and its members, otherwise the property of being a thesis would
12:20–12:24become needlessly intermixed with the properties of being a reason and the other members.
12:26–12:31The sentences, this mountain possesses fire, because of smoke, and so forth separately produced
12:31–12:36distinct qualitative verbal cognitions, such as the mountain is the subject of the probandom fire
12:36–12:42and the mountain possesses the reason smoke. Thus each statement, thesis and so forth,
12:42–12:47produces its own distinct verbal cognition and establishes the separate characteristics of the
12:47–12:54distinct members of Nyaya. Gangesa, however, rejects this alternative definition of Nyaya
12:54–13:00and its members. The property of producing one qualitative verbal cognition from the aggregate
13:00–13:05of five statements and the property of producing separate qualitative verbal cognitions from
13:05–13:09each member statement cannot effectively define Nyaya and the thesis and other members unless
13:09–13:15a non- overextensive and ordered common form is accepted for this purpose. If such a non- overextensive
13:15–13:21common form is accepted, that single property would define both Nyaya and the members of Nyaya.
13:22–13:26If distinct non- overextensive properties are accepted, properties such as thesishood would
13:26–13:32become mutually mixed with classes such as reasonhood, producing the defect of class intermixture.
13:32–13:33//
13:33–13:41Definition of the thesis. Among the five members of Nyaya, the thesis is not merely a sentence
13:41–13:46that states the probandom, otherwise even the word probandom, since it states the probandom,
13:46–13:53would become a thesis, and the definition would overextend. The thesis is a sentence that,
13:53–13:57with respect to the intended inference, produces cognition that is neither deficient
13:57–14:01nor excessive, generates cognition of the sentence meaning, and, by assisting the
14:01–14:06cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the reason becomes a cause of the intended
14:06–14:12inferential cognition. An alternative definition of the thesis.
14:12–14:187. Amitting the qualifiers, neither deficient nor excessive, from the foregoing definition,
14:18–14:21it may simply be said that the thesis is a sentence whose verbal cognition does not
14:21–14:27have the reason as its object. By this qualification, the example and the other members are automatically
14:27–14:29excluded.
14:29–14:33The conclusion, that is, the fifth member, is not a cause of subsumptive reflection on
14:33–14:38the reason, because the conclusion produces only cognition of a conclusion that is uncontradicted
14:38–14:42in free from an equally strong counter-reason.
14:42–14:47Alternatively, the thesis may be defined as a sentence that produces a desire for cognition
14:47–14:51concerning the statement of the probandom.
14:51–14:55Or the thesis is that member statement of Nyaya which produces cognition of the
14:55–15:00the probandom but does not produce cognition of the reason. Under this definition, the
15:00–15:06reason, example, application, and other members are excluded, because they chiefly produce
15:06–15:11cognition of the reason rather than of the probandom.
15:11–15:13Thesishood is not a universal.
15:13–15:198. Some scholars regard thesishood as a universal and support this view by the consistent,
15:19–15:25over extensive technical usage pertaining to theses. This view, however, is not sound.
15:26–15:32If thesishood were a universal, it would intermix with other universals such as being produced by
15:32–15:38devdata. Nor is it sound to define a thesis as a sentence that produces a separate cognition
15:38–15:43of the probandom, because a thesis is held to produce a separate cognition of the probandom
15:43–15:47only on the basis of technical usage.
15:47–15:52Neither producing a separate cognition nor cognition of the cognition produced is possible
15:52–15:55without a recurrent property.
15:55–15:59This refutation also rejects the view that a thesis is a sentence which, by mentioning
15:59–16:04a property of something contained in the cognition it produces, expresses cognition
16:04–16:09of the probandom as in a sound is impermanent whereas that same property is not present
16:09–16:14and the cognition produced by the reason statement because it is produced.
16:14–16:17The thesis is not an instrumental member, objection.
16:17–16:229. An objection may be raised. The thesis is not an instrumental member of inference for
16:22–16:27the sake of another, because acceptance of a thesis creates the possibility of contradiction.
16:27–16:31When the disputant or the neutral judge regards the subject as possessing the probandom and
16:31–16:35seeks a means of knowledge concerning it, only the reason statement should receive
16:35–16:37priority.
16:37–16:39This objection is not sound.
16:39–16:43Once opposition has arisen, the probandom, sound is impermanent, must be established in
16:43–16:48accordance with the expectancy of the disputant or the neutral judge.
16:48–16:52After delimiters such as time have been fixed, the reason statement by itself, without the
16:52–16:56thesis, cannot teach the semantic relation of the reason to the probandom.
16:56–17:01The thesis is therefore necessary as an instrumental member of inference for another.
17:01–17:05The objection that the thesis should be stated first is resolved as follows, after opposition
17:05–17:11has been presented, it is necessary to establish only the probandom, sound is impermanent.
17:11–17:15The reason statement, because it is produced, cannot teach the semantic relation without
17:15–17:18an independent statement of the probandom.
17:18–17:23Objection, the thesis is unnecessary and the probandom may be understood implicitly.
17:23–17:2810, nor should it be said that the impermanence of sound, not explicitly stated in the opponent's
17:28–17:34sentence, can be understood implicitly through semantic fitness, making the thesis unnecessary.
17:34–17:41This were accepted, even what is incapable of being established would be understood implicitly, leading to overextension.
17:41–17:45Nor is it sound to say that the probandom is known from the opponent's statement of opposition,
17:45–17:50because that statement is overridden by the refutation of the opposition and by establishment of the means of knowledge.
17:50–17:56A thesis concerning the probandom is impossible without delimiters such as time and without the opponent's opposition,
17:56–18:00and since the opposing statement terminates after treating the subject as endowed with the probandom,
18:00–18:06itself becomes free from further expectancy. When the word expressing the probandom is repeated,
18:06–18:09that portion of the opponent's statement of opposition becomes the thesis.
18:11–18:16Nor can the probandom be implicitly indicated by the example or another member of Nyaya.
18:17–18:22If this were accepted, mutual dependence would result, because the semantic relation of the
18:22–18:26example, application, and the other members becomes possible only after the probandom
18:26–18:33has been established by the thesis. Thus the thesis is indispensable for apprehending the probandum.
18:35–18:42The thesis is an instrumental member. 11. Other scholars say that the neutral judge may state,
18:42–18:47present a means of knowledge establishing the impermanence of sound. But here the expectancy
18:47–18:52is not for a means of knowledge in general, it is for the specific means constituted by
18:52–18:58producedness qualified by impermanence. A qualified reason cannot be employed without
18:58–19:04stating the probandom. Nor is the neutral judge's statement, present here a means of knowledge
19:04–19:09for the real probandom, suitable in the contexts of both proponent and opponent. Hence sentential
19:09–19:13expectancy concerning the reason does not arise without a thesis expressing the probandom,
19:13–19:17and the semantic relation between reason and probandom is not expressed without the thesis.
19:17–19:21Therefore the thesis is an instrumental member of inference for another.
19:21–19:25A statement of the reason is necessary.
19:25–19:3712. After stating the thesis concerning the probandom, a sentence expressing the reason and containing the ablative case must be used, because only thereby is the expectancy for a reason is cause fulfilled.
19:37–19:43If some other sentence is uttered instead of the expected reason statement, a ground of defeat arises.
19:43–19:49arises. The general linguistic rule is that expectancy terminates only through use of the
19:49–19:55expected sentence. Therefore a reason statement is necessary after the statement of the pro
19:55–19:57bandam.
19:57–20:03Definition of the reason. Reasonhood is the property of an expression containing the
20:03–20:08ablative case which produces verbal cognition without stating the pro bandam and produces
20:08–20:12a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the
20:12–20:19cause of inferential cognition. Alternatively, the reason is that member statement of nyaya
20:19–20:25in which the ablative case expresses the causal status of the reason.
20:25–20:29Or the reason is that member of nyaya which produces a verbal cognition that generates
20:29–20:32expectancy for an example.
20:32–20:37Or the reason is a sentence which, with the intention of producing inferential cognition,
20:37–20:43produces a cognition not mentioning the pro-bandam and ending in the ablative case.
20:43–20:48Or the reason is an ablative containing sentence that removes the expectancy for a cause produced
20:48–20:51by the thesis.
20:51–20:55Or the reason is a sentence ending in the fifth case, used with the intention of producing
20:55–20:58inferential cognition.
20:58–21:03The meaning of the reason expression must indicate cognition of the reason.
21:03–21:07Otherwise a meaning unrelated to the reason would remain, and since the reason would
21:07–21:11not actually be in the ablative relation, it would not become a cause of inference
21:11–21:18of the probandom. Therefore expectancy for a cause is fulfilled only by cognition of a reason connected
21:18–21:25with the ablative meaning. Definitions of affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative reasons.
21:26–21:3214. According to some scholars, reasonhood is the property of a sentence producing cognition
21:32–21:36that contains a universal, as the cognition produced by, because it possesses smoke,
21:36–21:41contains the universal smokehood, while that universal is absent from the cognitions produced
21:41–21:44by the thesis and the other members.
21:44–21:47Other scholars reject this view.
21:47–21:52Without understanding the general nature of a universal, cognition containing that universal
21:52–21:57cannot be apprehended from a particular sentence, hence the definition of reasonhood should
21:57–22:00not depend on a universal.
22:00–22:04An affirmative reason is a member of Nyaya which, containing an ablative case that
22:04–22:09expresses the causal status of the reason, produces expectancy for an example expressing
22:09–22:12affirmative provision.
22:12–22:17In the definition of a negative reason, an expression denoting negative provision is
22:17–22:22substituted for the expression denoting affirmative provision.
22:22–22:27An affirmative negative reason is a member of Nyaya that produces expectancy for examples
22:27–22:31of both kinds, affirmative and negative.
22:31–22:35definitions of the affirmative negative and purely affirmative reasons.

Plain text

दमसाखव विछ, अपीकोच दन्सिंग आन आम आंटन इस नों फृुप रशुम्षिन। 31, the msaka says, after the cognition of inexplicability, the peacock does not dance anywhere other than the mountain, yet it is dancing, the cognition the peacock is dancing on the mountain arises. This cognition cannot arise through purely negative inference, because the probandom peacock dancing located on the mountain has not previously been established, nor has the negative concomitance of its absence been determined. is therefore necessary to establish the peacocks dancing on the mountain. It should not be said that because the peacocks dancing on the mountain has not previously been established, its presumption too is impossible. The recollection that dancing is impossible without an established locus, assisted by the exclusion of an already established locus, postulates another locus. Thus presumption of the peacocks dancing on the mountain is reasonable. Refutation of the Forgoing Argument 32. This argument is not sound. The locus of the dancing is established through the inference from general observation, peacock dancing has some locus, because it is dancing. Assisted by the inexplicability of any already established alternative locus, this inference apprehends the mountain as the locus of the dancing. Alternatively, the cognition of peacock dancing produced by the sentence the peacock is dancing, after the cognition of inexplicability produced by the sentence, the peacock does not dance anywhere except on the mountain, apprehends the mountain, distinct from the already established locus, as a specific locus and thereby establishes the peacock's dancing is situated on the mountain. For this very reason the teacher says, through the inexplicability of cognition of impermanence, and with established permanence kept in view, the location of an object produced by cognition is established in the earth. The Neayaka's alternative view, cognition of corpulence from eating at night. The peacocks dancing on the mountain can be established through the affirmative negative inference. The locus of the peacocks dancing is the mountain, because it has a locus and has no locus distinct from the mountain. Alternatively, the general pervasion may be stated thus, a property that is situated in a particular locus and is not situated in any possible locus distinct from that locus is situated in that very particular locus. Through this provision, the location of peacock dancing on the mountain is established. In the same way, in the statement the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of devdutta's corpulence can be explained by establishing previously unknown eating at night and taking that eating at night into account, hence presumption is unnecessary. The Bha doctrine of presumption from what is heard. 34, the Bomsaka says, in the sentences Devdutta, who does not eat, is corpulent or the corpulent Devdutta does not eat during the day, semantic fitness is unavailable. Eating during the day is denied, while eating at night, which is a constituent of semantic coherence, is not expressed in the sentence. Thus the meaning of the corpulent Devdutta does not eat during the day is not coherent without reference to eating at night. In the unuttered sentence, the corpulent dev-du-ta eats-id-night is postulated and the reference to nocturnal eating is supplied, cognition of the semantic relation among the word meanings arises. In this way, the postulation of an unexpressed meaning to render the herd sentence meaningful is presumption from what is heard. Establishment of presumption from what is heard. 35. It should not be said that, for economy, it is sufficient to postulate only eating-id-night that there is no need to postulate the words expressing nocturnal eating. According to the rule governing verbal cognition, the expectancy of words is fulfilled only by other words, and words apprehend meanings indicated by other words and thereby produce cognition of the sentence meaning. Therefore, the production from the heard words of cognition of the relation among their meanings is inexplicable without postulating semantically coherent words. Where the heard words cannot produce cognition of the sentence meaning without the postulation of unuttered word meanings semantically related to one another, presumption from what is heard is necessary. The view of the bhaas. 36. In the sentence, please close the door, the postulation of the verbal expression closes itself presumption from what is heard. If the directly expressed meaning of a heard word is contradictory, the intended non-contradictory meaning is postulated. According to the Prabhācāra teachers, in the sentence one who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice, it is incoherent for the sacrifice directly to possess the capacity to produce heaven as its result. Since an unseen intermediate instrument in the form of a pārvā is not mentioned, a pārvā is postulated through the optative suffix. When the sacrifice is understood together with a pārvā, the grammatical relation between the injunctive expression and the familiar words becomes semantically coherent, and the cognition sacrifice, through a pārvā, is the principal means to heaven arises. Otherwise a pārvā could not constitute the expressed meaning of the optative suffix. The bas conclude that presumption from what is heard of this kind produces cognition of the means to heaven. If cognition of a pārvā did not arise from presumption from what is heard, the optative suffix could not express a pārvā. Thus, where cognition of the relation between the meaning of one word and that of another is inexplicable without the postulation of a semantically coherent meaning, presumption from what is heard is a means of knowledge. The Neyayaka conclusion. 37. The Neyayaka says, Semantic fitness consists in the absence of a means of knowledge opposed to semantic coherence, or in the absence of a contradictory form of the relation among word meanings. In the sentence, the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings arises despite ignorance of his not eating during the day and of his eating at night, because devdutta's corpulence must be accounted for by eating. In reality, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings is not inexplicable, only the already cognized corpulence is inexplicable. To resolve that, eating at night is inferred. The unseen aporva likewise is not the directly expressed meaning of the optative suffix. Therefore the presumption accepted by the msaka is not distinct from previously accepted inference. With this, the discussion of presumption ends. The members of a nyaya syllogism. Nyaya and its members. Inference for the sake of another is established through the method of Nyaya. Accordingly, Nyaya and its members are now explained. Nyaya has five members, thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. In inference for the sake of another, a speaker presents his conclusion before another person through the ordered use of five statements. Thesis, this mountain possesses fire. Reason, because it possesses smoke. For example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. Application, this mountain possesses smoke. Conclusion, therefore this mountain possesses fire. Through the use of these five statements, the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain arises in the listener's mind, and thereafter the inferential cognition this mountain possesses fire arises. This aggregate of five statements is called Nyaya. Each of the five statements of Nyaya is called a member. Each member produces its own verbal cognition, and the aggregate of the five verbal cognitions produces the substantive reflection on the inferential mark. Hence thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion are the five members of Nyaya. Definition of Nyaya 2. Nyaya cannot be defined as a sentence describing a reason endowed with five characteristics, because such a definition would overextend to a sentence describing defects such as presence in a counter instance, and would also apply to the definition of the reason member. Nyaya is therefore the group of statements that produces verbal cognitions which assist in producing subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential cognition. The five member statements, as a single aggregate of sentences, produce a qualitative cognition of five meanings. From this qualitative cognition arises a distinct comprehensive cognition in which the qualifiers are mutually connected, and finally the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark arises. Thus, verbal cognition produced by Nyaya is instrumental in producing the subsumptive reflection. Definition of the members of Nyaya. The five statements that produce verbal cognitions, which in turn produce a qualitative cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential cognition, are called the five members of Nyaya. Under this definition, the sentence of subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire as present on this mountain is neither Nyaya nor a member of Nyaya, because Nyaya produces the subsumptive reflection, while the members of Nyaya produce the qualifying verbal cognitions that assist that reflection. The application statement alone is not nyaya, refutation of an objection. An objection may be raised, the application statement smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain, also assists the substantive reflection on the inferential mark, hence it should be regarded as non-different from the aggregate of five statements and called nyaya. This objection is not sound. In demonstrative nyaya, the five statements are used in the order determined by expectancy. The expectancy for the application is fulfilled only after the thesis, reason, and example. If the application is used first, the meaning that the reason qualified by pavesion is present in the subject will not be clear, and a ground of defeat will arise at the very outset. Otherwise, any sentence not traditionally accepted among the five members, or even a perceptual organ such as the eye, since it assists the subsumptive reflection, would also have to be called Nyaya. The absence of sentential expectancy in an organ such as the eye is comparable to the absence of the requisite expectancy when the application statement is improperly used first. Other Scholars' Definition of Nyaya 5. Some scholars say, the five member statements together produce a single qualitative verbal cognition. The property of jointly producing such a qualitative verbal cognition is Nyayahud. Each member statement separately produces an individual qualitative verbal cognition, producing such an individual cognition constitutes the nature of the thesis and the other members. This view, however, is not reasonable. To apply Dinyayat and its members respectively the property of producing a joint qualitative verbal cognition through the five statements and the property of producing an individual qualitative verbal cognition through each member statement, one would require a common, and non- overextensive form. If such a common or overextensive form is accepted, that same form would define both Nyaya and its members, otherwise the property of being a thesis would become needlessly intermixed with the properties of being a reason and the other members. The sentences, this mountain possesses fire, because of smoke, and so forth separately produced distinct qualitative verbal cognitions, such as the mountain is the subject of the probandom fire and the mountain possesses the reason smoke. Thus each statement, thesis and so forth, produces its own distinct verbal cognition and establishes the separate characteristics of the distinct members of Nyaya. Gangesa, however, rejects this alternative definition of Nyaya and its members. The property of producing one qualitative verbal cognition from the aggregate of five statements and the property of producing separate qualitative verbal cognitions from each member statement cannot effectively define Nyaya and the thesis and other members unless a non- overextensive and ordered common form is accepted for this purpose. If such a non- overextensive common form is accepted, that single property would define both Nyaya and the members of Nyaya. If distinct non- overextensive properties are accepted, properties such as thesishood would become mutually mixed with classes such as reasonhood, producing the defect of class intermixture. // Definition of the thesis. Among the five members of Nyaya, the thesis is not merely a sentence that states the probandom, otherwise even the word probandom, since it states the probandom, would become a thesis, and the definition would overextend. The thesis is a sentence that, with respect to the intended inference, produces cognition that is neither deficient nor excessive, generates cognition of the sentence meaning, and, by assisting the cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the reason becomes a cause of the intended inferential cognition. An alternative definition of the thesis. 7. Amitting the qualifiers, neither deficient nor excessive, from the foregoing definition, it may simply be said that the thesis is a sentence whose verbal cognition does not have the reason as its object. By this qualification, the example and the other members are automatically excluded. The conclusion, that is, the fifth member, is not a cause of subsumptive reflection on the reason, because the conclusion produces only cognition of a conclusion that is uncontradicted in free from an equally strong counter-reason. Alternatively, the thesis may be defined as a sentence that produces a desire for cognition concerning the statement of the probandom. Or the thesis is that member statement of Nyaya which produces cognition of the the probandom but does not produce cognition of the reason. Under this definition, the reason, example, application, and other members are excluded, because they chiefly produce cognition of the reason rather than of the probandom. Thesishood is not a universal. 8. Some scholars regard thesishood as a universal and support this view by the consistent, over extensive technical usage pertaining to theses. This view, however, is not sound. If thesishood were a universal, it would intermix with other universals such as being produced by devdata. Nor is it sound to define a thesis as a sentence that produces a separate cognition of the probandom, because a thesis is held to produce a separate cognition of the probandom only on the basis of technical usage. Neither producing a separate cognition nor cognition of the cognition produced is possible without a recurrent property. This refutation also rejects the view that a thesis is a sentence which, by mentioning a property of something contained in the cognition it produces, expresses cognition of the probandom as in a sound is impermanent whereas that same property is not present and the cognition produced by the reason statement because it is produced. The thesis is not an instrumental member, objection. 9. An objection may be raised. The thesis is not an instrumental member of inference for the sake of another, because acceptance of a thesis creates the possibility of contradiction. When the disputant or the neutral judge regards the subject as possessing the probandom and seeks a means of knowledge concerning it, only the reason statement should receive priority. This objection is not sound. Once opposition has arisen, the probandom, sound is impermanent, must be established in accordance with the expectancy of the disputant or the neutral judge. After delimiters such as time have been fixed, the reason statement by itself, without the thesis, cannot teach the semantic relation of the reason to the probandom. The thesis is therefore necessary as an instrumental member of inference for another. The objection that the thesis should be stated first is resolved as follows, after opposition has been presented, it is necessary to establish only the probandom, sound is impermanent. The reason statement, because it is produced, cannot teach the semantic relation without an independent statement of the probandom. Objection, the thesis is unnecessary and the probandom may be understood implicitly. 10, nor should it be said that the impermanence of sound, not explicitly stated in the opponent's sentence, can be understood implicitly through semantic fitness, making the thesis unnecessary. This were accepted, even what is incapable of being established would be understood implicitly, leading to overextension. Nor is it sound to say that the probandom is known from the opponent's statement of opposition, because that statement is overridden by the refutation of the opposition and by establishment of the means of knowledge. A thesis concerning the probandom is impossible without delimiters such as time and without the opponent's opposition, and since the opposing statement terminates after treating the subject as endowed with the probandom, itself becomes free from further expectancy. When the word expressing the probandom is repeated, that portion of the opponent's statement of opposition becomes the thesis. Nor can the probandom be implicitly indicated by the example or another member of Nyaya. If this were accepted, mutual dependence would result, because the semantic relation of the example, application, and the other members becomes possible only after the probandom has been established by the thesis. Thus the thesis is indispensable for apprehending the probandum. The thesis is an instrumental member. 11. Other scholars say that the neutral judge may state, present a means of knowledge establishing the impermanence of sound. But here the expectancy is not for a means of knowledge in general, it is for the specific means constituted by producedness qualified by impermanence. A qualified reason cannot be employed without stating the probandom. Nor is the neutral judge's statement, present here a means of knowledge for the real probandom, suitable in the contexts of both proponent and opponent. Hence sentential expectancy concerning the reason does not arise without a thesis expressing the probandom, and the semantic relation between reason and probandom is not expressed without the thesis. Therefore the thesis is an instrumental member of inference for another. A statement of the reason is necessary. 12. After stating the thesis concerning the probandom, a sentence expressing the reason and containing the ablative case must be used, because only thereby is the expectancy for a reason is cause fulfilled. If some other sentence is uttered instead of the expected reason statement, a ground of defeat arises. arises. The general linguistic rule is that expectancy terminates only through use of the expected sentence. Therefore a reason statement is necessary after the statement of the pro bandam. Definition of the reason. Reasonhood is the property of an expression containing the ablative case which produces verbal cognition without stating the pro bandam and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. Alternatively, the reason is that member statement of nyaya in which the ablative case expresses the causal status of the reason. Or the reason is that member of nyaya which produces a verbal cognition that generates expectancy for an example. Or the reason is a sentence which, with the intention of producing inferential cognition, produces a cognition not mentioning the pro-bandam and ending in the ablative case. Or the reason is an ablative containing sentence that removes the expectancy for a cause produced by the thesis. Or the reason is a sentence ending in the fifth case, used with the intention of producing inferential cognition. The meaning of the reason expression must indicate cognition of the reason. Otherwise a meaning unrelated to the reason would remain, and since the reason would not actually be in the ablative relation, it would not become a cause of inference of the probandom. Therefore expectancy for a cause is fulfilled only by cognition of a reason connected with the ablative meaning. Definitions of affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative reasons. 14. According to some scholars, reasonhood is the property of a sentence producing cognition that contains a universal, as the cognition produced by, because it possesses smoke, contains the universal smokehood, while that universal is absent from the cognitions produced by the thesis and the other members. Other scholars reject this view. Without understanding the general nature of a universal, cognition containing that universal cannot be apprehended from a particular sentence, hence the definition of reasonhood should not depend on a universal. An affirmative reason is a member of Nyaya which, containing an ablative case that expresses the causal status of the reason, produces expectancy for an example expressing affirmative provision. In the definition of a negative reason, an expression denoting negative provision is substituted for the expression denoting affirmative provision. An affirmative negative reason is a member of Nyaya that produces expectancy for examples of both kinds, affirmative and negative. definitions of the affirmative negative and purely affirmative reasons.

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