MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode1_Part6_RadioPlay.mp3

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.994183)
Duration: 31:56
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:14The Saddha section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge.
0:15–0:19It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers.
0:20–0:31It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention.
0:31–0:36In addition, it presents the Nya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate
0:36–0:41concerning the personal authorship of the Veda.
0:41–0:42Verbal Testimony and Objections
0:42–0:47What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayakas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how
0:47–0:50did the Nyaayakas refute them?
0:50–0:55The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy,
0:55–1:00semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal
1:00–1:08cognition impossible without them. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal,
1:08–1:13and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
1:15–1:18To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact,
1:18–1:23to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its
1:23–1:29refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a
1:29–1:35means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces
1:35–1:41the relevant effect. They maintain that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce
1:41–1:45veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge.
1:46–1:50The Naya Yaka's, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision.
1:51–1:55They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is
1:55–1:59self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other
1:59–2:04required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce
2:04–2:08veridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to
2:08–2:12produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge
2:12–2:18failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayikha objection differed from this,
2:18–2:22the vayikha's subsumed verbal cognition under inference. Their position is discussed below.
2:22–2:28The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory.
2:28–2:34If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established.
2:34–2:39If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words.
2:39–2:44When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge,
2:44–2:47it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence.
2:47–2:51If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge,
2:51–2:56knowledge, then those very words have become a means of buritical knowledge.
2:56–3:01Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves
3:01–3:03that words are a means of knowledge.
3:03–3:07This is the self-contradiction.
3:07–3:11After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vayaka
3:11–3:12philosophy.
3:12–3:16The Vayakas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions
3:16–3:21can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge.
3:21–3:26According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison
3:26–3:30is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words
3:30–3:34that is, the sentence meaning?
3:34–3:37According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings
3:37–3:42of different words is obtained solely through inference.
3:42–3:46They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject
3:46–3:49whose relevant property is to be established.
3:49–3:54Consequently, Vaika philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge,
3:54–3:58but includes verbal cognition under inference.
3:58–4:03The Vaikas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features,
4:03–4:08from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker.
4:08–4:16The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vaikas and refute the position of the author of the Lila Vati.
4:16–4:20According to the Neiyakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected
4:20–4:25word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical
4:25–4:29problem arises before that inference can even occur.
4:29–4:34The principal difficulty, according to the Neiyakas, is that before the alleged inference
4:34–4:38underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings
4:38–4:42cannot already be available.
4:42–4:46An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom
4:46–4:49are already established.
4:49–4:53But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it is impossible
4:53–4:57to offer an example in which that relation is already established.
4:57–5:04Therefore, the reason proposed by the Viakas is invalid for inference.
5:04–5:08Following this refutation, the Viakas modify their reason and make being intended
5:08–5:13to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition
5:13–5:17of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference.
5:17–5:22Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
5:22–5:25he waters with liquid?
5:25–5:30How does the new Vayika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail?
5:30–5:33The Nayayaka argument is very precise.
5:33–5:37In their revised reason, the Vayikas say that words uttered with the intention
5:37–5:42of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a
5:42–5:46cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference.
5:46–5:52In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason.
5:52–5:57The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
5:57–6:03here interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person.
6:03–6:09The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows.
6:09–6:14Suppose an untrustworthy person says payasasinkadi, while actually intending to convey he waters
6:14–6:17with a coconut shell.
6:17–6:22Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation,
6:22–6:26thus the proposed reason is present.
6:26–6:30Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition?
6:30–6:35No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance
6:35–6:39comes from an untrustworthy person.
6:39–6:44The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veritical
6:44–6:47cognition in this case, must also be present.
6:47–6:52Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent.
6:52–6:57The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails.
6:57–7:03In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbamanayanam t objecthood, bringing,
7:03–7:05an effort.
7:05–7:12This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly.
7:12–7:17Observe that Karmatbamanayanam t is not a complete or meaningful sentence.
7:17–7:22It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic
7:22–7:26expectancy or grammatical connection.
7:26–7:31The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows.
7:31–7:35Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack
7:35–7:39of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring
7:39–7:41some object.
7:41–7:45The vayika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected
7:45–7:48meanings, is fully present.
7:48–7:52Absence of the pro-bandam, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence
7:52–7:55meaning merely from this group of expressions?
7:55–8:01No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among them.
8:01–8:06Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom of deritical verbal cognition
8:06–8:11does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate.
8:11–8:18This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition.
8:18–8:21To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the
8:21–8:26speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting
8:26–8:32argument discussed next. The Vaikas hold that a hero understands meaning by inferring the speaker's
8:32–8:38veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful
8:38–8:42sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation
8:42–8:48among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the Vaika theory,
8:48–8:49Do we nevertheless understand the sentence?
8:51–8:53The Viikas offer an ingenious reply.
8:54–8:57They concede that in the case of a parrot or of a deceiver,
8:57–9:02the reason, the speaker's deritical cognition or intention is in fact absent.
9:03–9:08They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess
9:08–9:11sentential fitness or the capacity to convey meaning.
9:12–9:16Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and
9:16–9:22understands the meaning. Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not
9:22–9:27from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention.
9:28–9:33From the nayayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring
9:33–9:38water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard
9:38–9:44that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the nayayakas
9:44–9:48in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference.
9:50–9:54The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether.
9:55–10:00Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original
10:00–10:04veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition.
10:05–10:09If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly
10:09–10:13understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts.
10:13–10:21This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner.
10:21–10:28According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veridical cognition.
10:28–10:39In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible.
10:39–10:44If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when the
10:44–10:48alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition, is absent, the knowledge must arise
10:48–10:54not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words.
10:54–10:58This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony
10:58–11:02is an independent means of knowledge in its own right.
11:02–11:07A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning
11:07–11:12According to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words,
11:12–11:16enabling it to produce veridical cognition.
11:16–11:20Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently
11:20–11:23present among its words.
11:23–11:27According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical
11:27–11:30sentence.
11:30–11:35A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features, or pillars.
11:35–11:40Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order
11:40–11:46to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent.
11:46–11:50Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected
11:50–11:55with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible.
11:55–12:01Proximity, or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without
12:01–12:03an improper delay.
12:03–12:09Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful
12:09–12:13in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present
12:13–12:15in the words.
12:15–12:19A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features
12:19–12:26are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them.
12:26–12:30An example is now offered to clarify these three features.
12:30–12:35If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham
12:35–12:41nyanati, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning?
12:41–12:44The question deserves careful thought.
12:44–12:49This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning.
12:49–12:51It principally lacks syntactic expectancy.
12:51–12:56Pot, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions.
12:56–13:00There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb
13:00–13:05and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual
13:05–13:10expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning.
13:10–13:16The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the
13:16–13:23meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition.
13:23–13:28Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, Vanina Sinkati. This sentence possesses
13:28–13:35grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy,
13:35–13:43semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or
13:43–13:49another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore,
13:49–13:56the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question when a sentence
13:56–14:01a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy,
14:01–14:06semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent.
14:06–14:09In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness.
14:09–14:14When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering
14:14–14:20with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another.
14:20–14:27We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity.
14:27–14:32Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay.
14:32–14:37Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring.
14:37–14:41Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning?
14:41–14:47If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood.
14:47–14:52Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected
14:52–14:53in the mind.
14:53–14:59To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present
14:59–15:01without improper delay.
15:01–15:05Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces
15:05–15:08cognition of the correct meaning.
15:08–15:14This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity, or contiguity.
15:14–15:19Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya.
15:19–15:23The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse.
15:23–15:28No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention,
15:28–15:30context, or purpose.
15:30–15:35The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt
15:35–15:37or for a horse.
15:37–15:41The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of polysemus words and words used
15:41–15:46in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the
15:46–15:48speaker's intention.
15:48–15:52Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of
15:52–15:54one specific meaning.
15:54–16:00The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended.
16:00–16:05This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words, it also
16:05–16:09plays a crucial role in secondary signification.
16:09–16:14Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti.
16:14–16:19Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise?
16:19–16:23inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise.
16:23–16:27The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms.
16:27–16:32When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to
16:32–16:37shout, we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention.
16:37–16:42This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA.
16:42–16:47Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and
16:47–16:52the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical
16:52–16:55and independent means of knowledge.
16:55–16:59This question lies at the root of a major and celebrated dispute between Nyaya and
16:59–17:03MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy.
17:03–17:08The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter.
17:08–17:13Mme with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or
17:13–17:15sounds are eternal.
17:15–17:20It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether.
17:20–17:23The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as
17:23–17:28switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there.
17:28–17:33Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are
17:33–17:39non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time,
17:39–17:42just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks.
17:43–17:48To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality,
17:48–17:51the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience.
17:52–17:57There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being.
17:58–18:01If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere,
18:01–18:04its character would not vary when the speaker changed.
18:04–18:10This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.
18:10–18:14The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the
18:14–18:19pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual
18:19–18:23sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed.
18:23–18:27If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether,
18:27–18:30their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere.
18:31–18:37Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show that
18:37–18:41sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort.
18:42–18:47M. M. Withmakran S. A. Withmakran takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that
18:47–18:53very sound ka, as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this
18:53–18:58This cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal
18:58–19:01colloid present in different sounds.
19:01–19:06The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic
19:06–19:12fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible
19:12–19:14without them?
19:14–19:19According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable
19:19–19:24for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning from a sentence.
19:25–19:31Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order
19:31–19:37to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gham, a pot, the expression anaya,
19:37–19:44brain, is expected. Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions
19:44–19:51to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent
19:51–19:57there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the
19:57–20:02expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously.
20:03–20:08The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct
20:08–20:13meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively.
20:15–20:18Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions?
20:19–20:24If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity,
20:24–20:28is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words,
20:28–20:33as in gukkarmatvam nyanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it.
20:33–20:43At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in Nyaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation.
20:44–20:55The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
20:56–21:00According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows.
21:00–21:07follows. The non-eternality of words, the Naayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds
21:07–21:11are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and
21:11–21:17articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakas, by contrast, regard them
21:17–21:22as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that
21:22–21:27is, its composition by God, themsakas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless,
21:27–21:33intrinsically established. The Nayayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God.
21:34–21:39At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation,
21:39–21:45the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon
21:45–21:52God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the
21:52–21:56teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author
21:56–22:08of the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the
22:08–22:13Nayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards.
22:13–22:19The Nayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons.
22:19–22:24The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes
22:24–22:29great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed.
22:30–22:34If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved.
22:36–22:42Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without
22:42–22:47a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source
22:47–22:51of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos.
22:51–22:56Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation
22:56–23:01after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept
23:01–23:05an omniscient author, namely God.
23:05–23:10The Msaakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution.
23:10–23:14Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are
23:14–23:18beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction.
23:19–23:24According to the masakas, the relation between words or phonemes and their meanings is eternal.
23:25–23:29Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the
23:29–23:33current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new
23:33–23:40creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The masakas regard the Veda and words as
23:40–23:46eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production,
23:46–23:53destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound,
23:53–23:57Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence.
23:58–24:05The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks,
24:05–24:11sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by
24:11–24:18effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases
24:18–24:25and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place
24:25–24:29in time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent.
24:29–24:36Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal
24:36–24:42quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the
24:42–24:47refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I
24:47–24:53heard before. According to Nyaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality
24:53–24:58of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property,
24:58–25:05such as GA hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal
25:05–25:11cow wood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the
25:11–25:17form, this is that very GA arises from apprehending the common universal GA hood. An individual sound
25:17–25:22perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of
25:22–25:29that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does
25:29–25:35this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and
25:35–25:42the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are
25:42–25:46non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks
25:46–25:49must also be non-eternal.
25:49–25:54Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words.
25:54–25:59Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort and
25:59–26:01perish.
26:01–26:06Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes
26:06–26:09is likewise non-eternal.
26:09–26:14Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed
26:14–26:19as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal.
26:19–26:25On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established
26:25–26:31entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author.
26:31–26:35At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal
26:35–26:40phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim,
26:40–26:44either a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically
26:44–26:49authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine.
26:49–26:53The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and
26:53–26:59beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons.
26:59–27:03The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced
27:03–27:07by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes
27:07–27:10cannot be eternal.
27:10–27:15The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence
27:15–27:18by itself without a conscious author.
27:18–27:23Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind
27:23–27:27the composition of the Vedic is logically necessary.
27:27–27:31The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during
27:31–27:36the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible
27:36–27:39without an omniscient author.
27:39–27:43These Nyea arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Macron essay
27:43–27:48with Macron claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless.
27:48–27:54A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the Great Cosmic Dissolution,
27:54–27:58how does the M.M.A. with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between
27:58–28:02the word and its meaning is eternal, become contradictory in relation to the doctrine
28:02–28:05of dissolution?
28:05–28:09According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical
28:09–28:15world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed.
28:15–28:20In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between
28:20–28:25word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction.
28:25–28:29The principal points of contradiction are these.
28:29–28:33utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and
28:33–28:39meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
28:39–28:44The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
28:44–28:50the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
28:50–28:54According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great
28:54–28:58Dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
28:58–29:03Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation
29:03–29:08is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
29:08–29:12According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire
29:12–29:17physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely d-
29:17–29:22The principal points of contradiction are these.
29:22–29:26utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning
29:26–29:32is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
29:32–29:36The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
29:36–29:43the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
29:43–29:47According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great
29:47–29:50Dissolution, it must have some creator or author.
29:50–29:55Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically
29:55–30:01eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
30:01–30:05According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches
30:05–30:11humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows.
30:11–30:15The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient
30:15–30:19and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu.
30:19–30:24The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with
30:24–30:28the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered
30:28–30:32tradition and the practices of cultivated persons.
30:32–30:37Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error or
30:37–30:41defect as the original source of the Veda.
30:41–30:46If Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference
30:46–30:50in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the
30:50–30:54the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative.
30:54–30:59The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine
30:59–31:05composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects.
31:05–31:10Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable
31:10–31:14to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion.
31:14–31:20Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity.
31:21–31:27Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient
31:27–31:33and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and
31:33–31:39faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative.
31:39–31:45At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof
31:45–31:51or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient?
31:51–31:52Chapter 2

Plain text

The Saddha section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge. It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers. It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention. In addition, it presents the Nya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda. Verbal Testimony and Objections What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayakas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nyaayakas refute them? The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect. They maintain that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge. The Naya Yaka's, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikha's subsumed verbal cognition under inference. Their position is discussed below. The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established. If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words. When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, knowledge, then those very words have become a means of buritical knowledge. Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction. After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vayaka philosophy. The Vayakas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge. According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference. They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vaika philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The Vaikas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker. The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vaikas and refute the position of the author of the Lila Vati. According to the Neiyakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neiyakas, is that before the alleged inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the Viakas is invalid for inference. Following this refutation, the Viakas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, he waters with liquid? How does the new Vayika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail? The Nayayaka argument is very precise. In their revised reason, the Vayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference. In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason. The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, here interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person. The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows. Suppose an untrustworthy person says payasasinkadi, while actually intending to convey he waters with a coconut shell. Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition? No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person. The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandum, veritical cognition in this case, must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while the probandum is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails. In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbamanayanam t objecthood, bringing, an effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that Karmatbamanayanam t is not a complete or meaningful sentence. It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows. Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object. The vayika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings, is fully present. Absence of the pro-bandam, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom of deritical verbal cognition does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition. To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument discussed next. The Vaikas hold that a hero understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the Vaika theory, Do we nevertheless understand the sentence? The Viikas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's deritical cognition or intention is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness or the capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the vayakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention. From the nayayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the nayayakas in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference. The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition. If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts. This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner. According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veridical cognition. In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible. If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition, is absent, the knowledge must arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words. This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right. A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning According to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, enabling it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence. A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features, or pillars. Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent. Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity, or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay. Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them. An example is now offered to clarify these three features. If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karmatbham nyanati, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning? The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Pot, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, Vanina Sinkati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or another liquid watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question when a sentence a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent. In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring. Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning? If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood. Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity, or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya. The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse. No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention, context, or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt or for a horse. The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of polysemus words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words, it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification. Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti. Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise? inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise. The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms. When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout, we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention. This process is called secondary signification, or LAKA. Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major and celebrated dispute between Nyaya and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy. The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter. Mme with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there. Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks. To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternality, the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience. There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being. If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed. This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds. The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere. Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort. M. M. Withmakran S. A. Withmakran takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound ka, as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this This cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal colloid present in different sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gham, a pot, the expression anaya, brain, is expected. Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously. The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively. Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvam nyanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in Nyaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows. follows. The non-eternality of words, the Naayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakas, by contrast, regard them as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, intrinsically established. The Nayayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God. At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation, the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Nayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards. The Nayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons. The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved. Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God. The Msaakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution. Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction. According to the masakas, the relation between words or phonemes and their meanings is eternal. Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The masakas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence. The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before. According to Nyaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as GA hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow wood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form, this is that very GA arises from apprehending the common universal GA hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal. Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words. Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort and perish. Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal. Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal. On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author. At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim, either a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine. The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons. The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal. The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind the composition of the Vedic is logically necessary. The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author. These Nyea arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Macron essay with Macron claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless. A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the Great Cosmic Dissolution, how does the M.M.A. with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal, become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution? According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed. In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between word and meaning is eternal generates a logical contradiction. The principal points of contradiction are these. utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely d- The principal points of contradiction are these. utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows. The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons. Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error or defect as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative. The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative. At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient? Chapter 2

← Transcript index