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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:00–0:05Welcome to the debate. You know, when you look at a physical photograph of yourself from, say, ten years ago,
0:05–0:10there is this profound, almost unshakable assumption of continuity.
0:10–0:12Oh, absolutely.
0:12–0:17Right? You point your finger at that glossy paper and you say, with total conviction, that is me.
0:17–0:23Yeah, and it feels completely natural. I mean, we just take it for granted that the person staring back from the photograph
0:23–0:27is fundamentally the exact same entity who is holding the photograph today.
0:27–0:27Exactly.
0:27–0:31We just assume that continuity exists, you know, that there is a solid you that traveled
0:31–0:33through that entire decade.
0:33–0:34It feels so obvious.
0:34–0:40But what if that visceral feeling of continuity is, well, the ultimate cognitive illusion?
0:40–0:45What if the universe and absolutely everything in it vanishes and completely recreates itself
0:45–0:47every single millisecond?
0:47–0:49It is a wild thought experiment.
0:49–0:51It is.
0:51–0:58And today we are exploring an 11th century philosophical masterpiece that tackles exactly
0:58–1:01this terrifying and fascinating premise.
1:01–1:07We're examining Udianacharya's Atmatutva Viveka, which is this ancient Sanskrit text
1:07–1:12that has been, frankly, brilliantly revitalized for the modern era through Gajendra Thakur's
1:12–1:15comprehensive Mithili translation.
1:15–1:21It is essentially the ultimate battleground between two massive intellectual traditions
1:21–1:23in classical Indian philosophy.
1:23–1:25You have this really profound clash.
1:25–1:26Right.
1:26–1:30And to establish where we stand today, I will be defending the Nyaya Vaisheyshika school
1:30–1:36which argues for a permanent, stable reality, a universe of enduring substances, and a continuous
1:36–1:38soul.
1:38–1:42And opposing that, I'll be defending the Buddhist philosophical perspective, which
1:42–1:47argues that reality is radically momentary, fluid, and completely lacking any permanent
1:47–1:48essence or soul.
1:48–1:52So the central tension is incredibly stark.
1:52–1:57Is reality fundamentally momentary, constructed by our consciousness, or does it consist of
1:57–2:00permanent, stable entities?
2:00–2:04Let's just jump right into the physical reality of the world around us.
2:04–2:08Because the Buddhist claim here isn't just that things change over time, right, like
2:08–2:12a mountain slowly eroding, it's a radical theory called kshanikavada.
2:12–2:18Yes, kshanikavada, which literally translates to the theory of momentariness.
2:18–2:23The core assertion is quite radical, but when you really break it down, it is logically
2:23–2:24airtight.
2:24–2:28It basically says whatever is real is momentary.
2:28–2:33If something truly exists, it exists only for a single, fleeting instant.
2:33–2:38To understand why, we have to look at the fundamental logic of contradictory qualities.
2:38–2:41Let's take the classic example from the texts, a seed.
2:41–2:45Okay, let's picture a normal wheat seed.
2:45–2:46Right.
2:46–2:48Imagine that wheat seed sitting in a dry granary.
2:48–2:51It's just resting in a burlap sack.
2:51–2:53Now in that state, it doesn't produce a sprout.
2:53–2:55No, it just sits there.
2:55–2:56Exactly.
2:56–3:02But if you take that same seed and bury it in damp soil, it does produce a sprout.
3:02–3:08Now fundamental logic dictates that a single object cannot simultaneously possess contradictory
3:08–3:09qualities.
3:09–3:10Right, of course.
3:10–3:16It cannot be both capable of producing and incapable of producing at the exact same
3:16–3:17time.
3:17–3:22Because it does not produce in the granary, it is inherently incapable there.
3:22–3:23Precisely.
3:23–3:27And because it produces in the dirt, it is capable there, therefore logically the seed
3:27–3:32in the storage bin and the seed in the ground cannot be the exact same permanent entity.
3:32–3:33Wait, really?
3:33–3:34Yeah.
3:34–3:38They possess mutually exclusive traits.
3:38–3:46The only logical conclusion is that the quote-unquote seed is not a permanent object traveling
3:46–3:47through time.
3:47–3:54Instead, it is a series of distinct momentary realities replacing one another so fast that
3:54–3:58it just creates the illusion of a solid permanent object.
3:58–4:01I see why you think that, but let me give you a different perspective, drawn directly
4:01–4:05from Uriana Charya's defense of the Naya Vaisheyshika School.
4:05–4:10The theory of permanence and stable reality doesn't deny that the seed behaves differently
4:10–4:12in the granary than it does in the soil.
4:12–4:13I mean, obviously it does.
4:13–4:14Right.
4:14–4:18But it fundamentally rejects this idea that a change in behavior necessitates the complete
4:18–4:22destruction and recreation of the entity itself.
4:22–4:26The counter to your logic lies in the concept of auxiliary conditions, what we might call
4:26–4:28cooperative causes.
4:28–4:30Meaning the water in the soil.
4:30–4:31Exactly.
4:31–4:36The Naya perspective argues that the seed remains the exact same permanent entity.
4:36–4:38Its intrinsic capability to produce a sprout never changes.
4:38–4:39Okay, but…
4:39–4:40Wait, let me finish.
4:40–4:45What changes is not the seed, but the presence of auxiliary conditions, specifically the
4:45–4:47soil, the water, the temperature.
4:47–4:52A permanent reality interacting with changing external conditions is actually the only
4:52–4:54logical way to explain cause and effect.
4:54–4:59The seed in the grainery has the capability, but it lacks the cooperative causes required
4:59–5:01to trigger that capability.
5:01–5:05doesn't lose its intrinsic nature just because it's, you know, waiting for a rainstorm.
5:05–5:07I come at it from a different way.
5:07–5:11If we are really taking the mechanics of cause and effect seriously here, we have to ask
5:11–5:15how the physical world actually functions on a micro level.
5:15–5:16Sure.
5:16–5:23If a seed fundamentally intrinsically possesses the very nature to produce a sprout.
5:23–5:29If that production is its permanent unchanging essence, then it should produce that sprout
5:29–5:32immediately, continuously, all the time.
5:32–5:34Even without water?
5:34–5:35Yes!
5:35–5:36The Buddhist argument pushes this
5:36–5:39to its absolute logical limit.
5:39–5:43If a thing genuinely has the independent nature to produce,
5:43–5:46then even 100 curses from the gods
5:46–5:49couldn't stop it from producing instantly.
5:49–5:50Oh wow.
5:50–5:53The very fact that there is a delay in production,
5:53–5:54that the seed sits in the granary
5:54–5:57for six months doing absolutely nothing,
5:57–6:01proves that the delayed seed must be fundamentally
6:01–6:03ontologically different from the seed
6:03–6:06that eventually produces the sprout.
6:06–6:07I don't see how that follows.
6:07–6:11Because if its nature was to produce, it would produce.
6:11–6:14Since it doesn't, its nature in that dormant moment
6:14–6:16is non-producing.
6:16–6:18You can't just hand wave this away
6:18–6:21by pointing to water and soil as triggers.
6:21–6:24If the permanent seed relies on water and soil
6:24–6:28to change its state from non-producing to producing,
6:28–6:30then the seed wasn't permanent to begin with.
6:30–6:31It changed.
6:31–6:34I'm not convinced by that line of reasoning
6:34–6:36because you're actually falling into a very specific
6:36–6:38logical trap that Udayana points out
6:38–6:41in the Atma Tatva of Hiveka.
6:41–6:43Let's follow your logic of momentariness
6:43–6:44to its actual conclusion.
6:44–6:45All right, let's do it.
6:45–6:48If a non-producing thing sitting there
6:48–6:51without its auxiliary conditions still fails to produce
6:51–6:55even with them, well then it is forever non-producing.
6:55–6:56That's a dead end.
6:57–6:59On the flip side, if the seed can produce
6:59–7:01without any conditions, then auxiliary causes
7:01–7:04like water and soil are completely useless.
7:04–7:05You're trying to have it both ways.
7:05–7:07I'm not saying the conditions are useless.
7:07–7:10I'm saying they interact with a momentary state
7:10–7:13to create a new momentary state.
7:13–7:15But capacity requires a trigger.
7:15–7:18Think about the implications of your view for a moment.
7:18–7:20How can you account for agricultural science
7:20–7:25really any predictive causality if the underlying entity fundamentally vanishes every millisecond.
7:25–7:29The seed in the ground is a completely entirely different entity from the seed you bought at
7:29–7:35the market. Causality breaks down. If entity A is completely destroyed before entity B comes
7:35–7:40into its distance, A cannot cause B. There is no physical bridge. The universe just becomes
7:40–7:45a series of disconnected, spontaneous events. See, I don't think it breaks down at all.
7:45–7:51It just requires a much more sophisticated understanding of causality as a continuous stream,
7:51–7:55rather than a sequence of solid billiard balls hitting each other.
7:56–8:01Agriculture works not because there is a permanent seed essence holding it all together,
8:01–8:06but because there is a highly constrained, predictable, causal chain of momentary events.
8:06–8:09So the continuity is just an illusion of the chain?
8:09–8:13Exactly. Each momentary seed state generates the next,
8:13–8:16slightly different momentary seed state.
8:16–8:21When the momentary water state interacts with the momentary seed state,
8:21–8:23they jointly cause a momentary sprout state.
8:23–8:24Right.
8:24–8:28The continuity is in the causal stream, not in the substance.
8:28–8:31To demand a permanent substance underneath it all
8:31–8:34is just a human psychological need for stability.
8:34–8:37We want things to hold still so we can slap a label on them,
8:37–8:39but nature doesn't hold still.
8:39–8:42But by reducing everything to a stream of momentary flashes,
8:42–8:45you're stripping the universe of any underlying coherence.
8:45–8:49I mean, why does a wheat seed produce wheat and not a mango?
8:49–8:50Because of the stream.
8:50–8:56But if there's no permanent essence carrying the wheatness through the stream, what stops a mango from popping up?
8:56–9:03The intrinsic, enduring nature of the wheat seed, its permanent reality interacting with conditions is what guarantees the result.
9:03–9:10It produces wheat because the specific momentary configuration of the previous state strictly dictates the parameters of the next date.
9:10–9:14It's not random magic, it's a highly constrained flow.
9:14–9:17But let's actually take a step back here.
9:17–9:22Because this debate about the physical, atomic reality of the seed naturally pulls us toward
9:22–9:25a much deeper question in the text.
9:25–9:29If we are debating the physical reality of the external world, we have to address how
9:29–9:32human beings actually perceive that reality.
9:32–9:38So we are shifting from the physical mechanics of the object to the nature of the observer
9:38–9:40perceiving it.
9:40–9:47Exactly. This brings us to the Buddhist concept of Vijnana Vada or subjective idealism.
9:47–9:51We've been arguing about whether the seed and the dirt is permanent or momentary, but
9:51–9:55does the physical seed even exist outside of our consciousness to begin with?
9:55–9:57That is the big question.
9:57–10:01And the Buddhist position here relies on a principle called the Sahopalamba Niyama,
10:01–10:07which translates to the rule of simultaneous apprehension. It's a very elegant phenomenological
10:07–10:11argument. Think about your everyday experience. Say you're holding a blue coffee mug.
10:11–10:17All right. I've got my blue mug. You have never, ever experienced the physical color blue
10:17–10:22without simultaneously experiencing the internal knowledge of the color blue.
10:22–10:25Well, yeah, because to see it is to know I am seeing it.
10:25–10:32Right. Because blue and the knowledge of blue are always apprehended together. They are
10:32–10:35perfectly simultaneous in your cognitive experience.
10:35–10:39Buddhism argues they're actually identical.
10:39–10:40Wait.
10:40–10:41Identical?
10:41–10:42Yes!
10:42–10:46There is no external blue mug and internal knowledge of a blue mug.
10:46–10:51There is only consciousness temporarily taking the shape of blue.
10:51–10:54The external world is an illusion.
10:54–10:56So the mind is basically projecting the mug?
10:56–10:58Yes.
10:58–11:01Atma Tapva Viveka captures a brilliant Buddhist analogy
11:01–11:05to illustrate this delusion, the elephant at the palace gates.
11:05–11:06Oh, I love this one.
11:06–11:08Imagine a foolish person walking at night
11:08–11:11who looks toward the palace gates in the dark.
11:11–11:14They see a massive elephant standing there,
11:14–11:17but because of their ignorance and the poor lighting,
11:17–11:19they mistake the elephant for a giant shadow
11:19–11:21or a trick of the darkness.
11:21–11:24And eventually they conclude it is nothing,
11:24–11:25it's just a shadow.
11:25–11:25Right.
11:25–11:28The Buddhist argument reverses this.
11:28–11:31People are deluded in the exact same way
11:31–11:38about reality. They see the shapes and colors generated entirely by their own consciousness,
11:38–11:44and they mistakenly believe there is a solid, external, physical reality out there causing it.
11:44–11:49That's an interesting point, though I would frame it very differently. And Oya Dainas'
11:49–11:54counter to this is frankly one of the most brilliant linguistic and epistemological takedowns in
11:54–12:00classical philosophy. The Naya Vesheyshika School argues that you are fundamentally confusing
12:00–12:07the illuminator with the illuminated. Meaning the light versus the object it hits?
12:07–12:14Exactly. Knowledge is simply the light. The external object is the physical thing being
12:14–12:20lit up. They are not the exact same thing just because they appear together in your experience.
12:21–12:27To use the text-specific linguistic counter-analogy, if consciousness and the color blue were truly
12:27–12:34identical. If there was no external mug, only your mind being blue, our internal monologue
12:34–12:35would reflect that.
12:35–12:36How so?
12:36–12:39We would walk around saying, I am blue, but we don't.
12:39–12:41Ha, true.
12:41–12:48The phenomenological experience of every human being across all cultures is, this is blue.
12:48–12:53We draw a boundary. The distinction between the observer and the observed is baked into
12:53–12:58the very structure of our cognition. We do not experience ourselves as becoming the object.
12:58–13:03But language is just a construct. I mean, you can't use the grammar of human language,
13:03–13:09which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism is actually real.
13:09–13:14Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other.
13:14–13:17It doesn't prove the external world exists.
13:17–13:22It's not just grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself.
13:22–13:27Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive
13:27–13:32multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right? You can look at a painting on a wall and
13:32–13:39see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously. Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object
13:39–13:44it perceives as this whole Palumban Niyama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have
13:44–13:49to simultaneously possess the contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely
13:49–15:26yellow and entirely red. But language is just a construct. I mean, you can't use the grammar
15:26–15:31of human language, which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism
15:31–15:37is actually real. Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can
15:37–15:42talk to each other. It doesn't prove the external world exists. It's not just
15:42–15:46grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself. Let me push you
15:46–15:51further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive multiple
15:51–15:56distinct colors at the exact same time, right? You can look at a painting on a wall and see
15:56–15:59blue, yellow, and red simultaneously.
15:59–16:00Sure.
16:00–16:05Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul Palumba Niyama
16:05–16:09claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the
16:09–16:45contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red.
16:45–16:47But language is just a construct.
16:47–16:52I mean you can't use the grammar of human language which was built to navigate a dualistic
16:52–16:56illusion to prove that dualism is actually real.
16:56–17:00Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other.
17:00–17:04It doesn't prove the external world exists.
17:04–17:05It's not just grammar though.
17:05–17:08It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself.
17:08–17:11Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument.
17:11–17:17A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right?
17:17–17:22You can look at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously.
17:22–17:23Sure.
17:23–17:27Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul-Palamba
17:27–17:32Niyama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the
17:32–18:14contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red.
18:14–18:16But language is just a construct.
18:16–18:20I mean, you can't use the grammar of human language, which was built to navigate a dualistic
18:20–18:24illusion to prove that dualism is actually real.
18:24–18:29Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other.
18:29–18:32It doesn't prove the external world exists.
18:32–18:34It's not just grammar though.
18:34–18:37It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself.
18:37–18:40Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument.
18:40–18:45A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time,
18:45–18:46right?
18:46–18:50at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously.
18:50–18:55Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul Palumba
18:55–19:01Neama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the contradictory
19:01–20:50properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red.
20:50–20:55That is logically impossible. A single entity cannot possess mutually exclusive properties
20:55–20:57at the same time.
20:57–21:02Therefore, the consciousness must be a single, distinct entity that acts as a receiver or
21:02–21:05an illuminator for multiple distinct external objects.
21:05–21:09The external painting must exist independently of the mind.
21:09–21:11I'm sorry, but I just don't buy that.
21:11–21:13Let me tell you why.
21:13–21:18You were treating consciousness as if it were a blank movie screen, a permanent canvas
21:18–21:21onto which different colors are projected all at once.
21:21–21:23Right, an enduring observer.
21:23–21:27That assumes consciousness is a singular monolithic thing.
21:27–21:31In the Buddhist framework, consciousness isn't a permanent screen.
21:31–21:35It's a rapidly flickering sequence of distinct cognitive events.
21:35–21:37Like the momentary seed, but in the mind.
21:37–21:44Exactly. What you experience as seeing blue, yellow, and red simultaneously
21:44–21:48is actually your consciousness rapidly flashing between a blue cognitive shape,
21:48–21:52a yellow cognitive shape, and a red cognitive shape.
21:52–21:53Okay.
21:53–21:58It flashes so unimaginably quickly that it creates an illusion of a single unified visual
21:58–21:59field.
21:59–22:03It's like taking a stick with a glowing ember on the end, a firebrand, and spinning it in
22:03–22:04a circle.
22:04–22:06It looks like a solid ring of fire, right?
22:06–22:08Yeah, it does.
22:08–22:09But the solid ring doesn't exist.
22:09–22:13It's just a single point moving very fast.
22:13–22:19Your rapid cognitive moments look like a single, unified experience of a painting.
22:19–22:22The external world isn't needed to explain this.
22:22–22:26Only the complex, rapid mechanics of consciousness itself.
22:26–22:32But if consciousness is just a series of rapid, disconnected flashes, a flickering sequence
22:32–22:40of momentary, cognitive events spinning in the dark, who or what is observing the spinning
22:40–22:41firebrand?
22:41–22:47Well, if we separate the observer from the observed reality, the ultimate question
22:47–22:52remains. Who is experiencing the burn when you touch the fire? You can't have a delusion
22:52–22:58without a deluded observer, which forces us to ask, what actually IS the self in this momentary
22:58–22:59universe?
22:59–23:04That's a compelling argument, but have you considered that the very search for a permanent
23:04–23:09observer is exactly the trap? You're looking for a ghost in the machine. This brings
23:09–23:14us to a concept called niratmiyavata, which is the no-soul theory.
23:14–23:17A universe with absolutely no enduring self?
23:17–23:18Right.
23:18–23:20The Buddhist perspective proposes that the self
23:20–23:23is simply this momentary flow of consciousness.
23:23–23:27There is no permanent unchanging doer or experiencer
23:27–23:30sitting behind the eyes watching the show.
23:30–23:31You don't need a permanent soul
23:31–23:34to explain human experience.
23:34–23:36Instead, Buddhism relies on the mechanics
23:36–23:40of the alea vishinana, the storehouse consciousness.
23:40–23:42Wait, let's break that down for the listener.
23:42–23:43How does a storehouse work
23:43–23:46if everything vanishes every millisecond.
23:46–23:48It's essentially a repository,
23:48–23:51a flowing stream that carries cognitive impressions,
23:51–23:54memories and karmic seeds forward
23:54–23:57from one momentary state to the next.
23:57–23:59It provides the mechanism of continuity
23:59–24:03without ever requiring an underlying permanence.
24:03–24:04Like a river.
24:04–24:06Think of it exactly like a river.
24:06–24:08You point at the water and call it the Ganges.
24:08–24:10The river looks like a permanent entity.
24:10–24:13It has a name, it has a continuous force,
24:13–24:16but the actual water molecules are never the same
24:16–24:17from one second to the next.
24:17–24:19The self is the river.
24:19–24:22It's a dynamic process, not a static substance.
24:22–24:24I hear the river metaphor a lot
24:24–24:27and you know, it sounds beautiful in poetry,
24:27–24:30but it collapses under rigorous scrutiny,
24:30–24:32especially when we look at the mechanics
24:32–24:33of human cognition.
24:33–24:34How so?
24:34–24:36Udayana challenges this deeply
24:36–24:39using the concepts of memory and recognition,
24:39–24:42what the text calls Pratyabhijana.
24:42–24:43Let me ask you this directly.
24:43–24:46If the consciousness that experienced an event yesterday
24:46–24:49is entirely 100% destroyed and gone,
24:49–24:52how can a completely new momentary consciousness
24:52–24:53remember it today?
24:53–24:54Through the stream.
24:54–24:56If I loan you $100 yesterday
24:56–24:59and the you of yesterday is completely annihilated,
24:59–25:01why should the you of today
25:01–25:03feel any obligation to pay me back?
25:03–25:06Because the me of today is causally downstream
25:06–25:08from the me of yesterday.
25:08–25:10The impression of the debt
25:10–25:12was passed through the Al Javijana,
25:12–25:14the storehouse consciousness.
25:14–25:17The new momentary consciousness inherits the karmic
25:17–25:19and cognitive baggage of the previous one.
25:19–25:22It's like passing a flame from one candle to another.
25:22–25:23Okay, but-
25:23–25:25The second flame isn't the first flame,
25:25–25:27but it is causally connected to it.
25:27–25:28The flame carried the dead.
25:28–25:32But a causal connection isn't enough for recognition.
25:32–25:35Recognition requires an identity of the experiencer.
25:35–25:36When you remember something,
25:36–25:38you don't just access a data point
25:38–25:40like a computer reading a hard drive.
25:40–25:43Your internal visceral experience is,
25:43–25:47I, the very same person who saw this yesterday
25:47–25:49and remembering it today.
25:49–25:50The experiencer and the rememberer
25:50–25:53must be the exact same entity.
25:53–25:56I disagree, it just feels that way.
25:56–25:59And Udayana uses a very poignant piece of evidence
25:59–26:00from the text to prove this continuity
26:00–26:03goes even deeper than our current lives.
26:03–26:06Ah, you're referring to the instinct argument.
26:06–26:07Yes.
26:07–26:09Think about a newborn child.
26:09–26:13A newborn child instinctively makes the physical effort to drink milk.
26:13–26:16They haven't learned this behavior in their current life.
26:16–26:19They haven't had time to form a new causal chain of habits.
26:19–26:23This instinctual drive proves the existence of impressions from a past life.
26:23–26:24Okay, but-
26:24–26:30And for a cognitive impression to survive the profound physical trauma of death and
26:30–26:37rebirth, there must be a continuous, permanent soul to carry it. A momentary, flickering
26:37–26:40stream would break down during that transition.
26:40–26:44Well, obviously, today we explain instinct through biology and genetics. But even within
26:44–26:49the strict context of classical philosophy, the storehouse consciousness completely accounts
26:49–26:54for the trans lifetime caring of instincts. The stream doesn't stop at death, it just
26:54–26:59flows into a new physical vessel. You don't need an unchanging iron rod of a soul to
26:59–27:03carry a habit. A fluid stream carries sediment downstream just fine.
27:03–27:07But it's not just about carrying cognitive sediment. It's about the very foundation of
27:07–27:14moral responsibility. If we accept the no soul theory, the entire law of karma collapses
27:14–27:20into profound cosmic injustice. Urayana points out a massive flaw here, what he calls the
27:20–27:24twin fallacies of Krita Pranashya and A. Krita Bhagama.
27:24–27:29loss of earned merit and the receiving of unearned results.
27:29–27:31Exactly!
27:31–27:36If there is no permanent soul, a momentary being would suffer the consequences for actions
27:36–27:41they did not commit because the person who committed the sin is dead and gone, vanished
27:41–27:42in a millisecond.
27:42–27:47That's Akrita Pagama, and the person who did the good deed fails to receive the
27:47–27:49fruits of their actions before they vanish.
27:49–27:50That's Krita Pranasha.
27:50–27:52Right, the mismatch.
27:52–27:57violates the basic cosmic justice that both of these philosophical traditions actually
27:57–27:58believe in.
27:58–28:03You cannot have moral responsibility if the agent of action and the experiencer of the
28:03–28:06result are two completely different entities.
28:06–28:10That assumes justice requires a permanent courtroom and a permanent defendant.
28:10–28:15The Buddhist view is that the flow of karma is a natural law of physics, not a judicial
28:15–28:17decree from a judge.
28:17–28:22The suffering occurs in the exact same continuum where the action occurred.
28:22–28:24Let's ground this.
28:24–28:27If you accidentally hit your thumb with a hammer, the thumb hurts.
28:27–28:28Okay.
28:28–28:33It doesn't matter if the physical cells in the thumb are constantly dying and replacing
28:33–28:34themselves.
28:34–28:38The localized continuum of the thumb experiences the physical result of the hammer.
28:38–28:44So the localized stream suffers, not a permanent you.
28:44–28:50Yes, the localized continuum of consciousness experiences the result of the karma.
28:50–28:56The relentless demand for a permanent soul is, at its core, an emotional attachment to the ego.
28:56–29:02We are terrified of our own transience, so we invent a permanent, immortal soul to comfort
29:02–29:04ourselves against the abyss.
29:04–29:11Atma-tet-viveka is brilliant precisely because it forces us to look this terror in the face.
29:11–29:15even as Udayana tries to build a logical fortress against it.
29:15–29:19Or Udayana is building a fortress because the fortress is actually there,
29:19–29:23and reality isn't just a terrifying, formless void of momentary flashes.
29:23–29:26The stability we experience is real.
29:26–29:28As we wrap up this intense exchange,
29:28–29:33I think it's crucial to summarize where we stand on this monumental philosophical divide.
29:33–29:34Absolutely.
29:34–29:37From the Buddhist perspective, when reality is placed under the rigorous,
29:37–29:40logical scrutiny we've discussed today,
29:40–29:43It reveals itself as a fluid, momentary stream.
29:43–29:46The fixed identities we cling to so desperately,
29:46–29:48whether it's the permanence of a seed waiting
29:48–29:50in a granary to sprout,
29:50–29:52the objective reality of a blue coffee mug,
29:52–29:55or the comforting idea of an eternal and changing self,
29:55–29:57are ultimately illusions.
29:57–30:01They are simply human linguistic and cognitive constructs
30:01–30:04mapped onto a dynamic, ever-flowing reality.
30:04–30:06To cling to permanence is to misunderstand
30:06–30:08the very nature of existence.
30:08–30:13And from the Ayaya Vaiseshika perspective, which I've defended, the universe simply
30:13–30:16cannot function on that kind of ontological chaos.
30:16–30:23It relies on stable, continuous entities interacting with the world through cooperative conditions,
30:23–30:28our capacity for memory, our deep sense of moral responsibility, and our variability to
30:28–30:35take purposeful action all prove the existence of a permanent reality and an enduring self.
30:35–30:40the observer to perceive the light and the enduring soul to carry the weight of its actions,
30:40–30:43the universe loses its coherence.
30:43–30:50What is truly remarkable as how Atma Tathva Viveka acts as this brilliant logical crucible
30:50–30:52for human cognition?
30:52–30:56Reading Gajendra Thakur's translation, you realize that these aren't just dusty,
30:56–30:59abstract arguments from a forgotten era.
30:59–31:00Not at all.
31:00–31:03This is an 11th century intellectual.
31:03–31:09grappling with the exact same questions of cognitive science, phenomenology, and realism
31:09–31:14that modern philosophers and neuroscientists are arguing about right now.
31:14–31:19The translation really manages to bring this incredibly dense sans-script debate into
31:19–31:24the modern intellectual sphere, making it accessible for mythyly readers and, by extension,
31:24–31:27providing the foundation for our discussion right now.
31:27–31:32It's a monumental achievement in translation, bridging a millennium of thought.
31:32–31:33It really is.
31:33–31:37These ancient epistemological debates hold up a mirror to our modern inquiries.
31:37–31:41It leaves all of us with the profound task of forming our own conclusions on the true
31:41–31:43nature of reality.
31:43–31:48So the next time you look at that photograph of yourself from 10 years ago, ask yourself,
31:48–31:52are you looking at a permanent soul that has weathered the passage of time?
31:52–31:55Or are you just looking at a momentary flicker in an endless flowing stream?
31:55–32:00A question that might just take another thousand years to finally answer.
32:00–32:02Thank you for joining us on the debate.
32:02–32:03We will catch you next time.

Plain text

Welcome to the debate. You know, when you look at a physical photograph of yourself from, say, ten years ago, there is this profound, almost unshakable assumption of continuity. Oh, absolutely. Right? You point your finger at that glossy paper and you say, with total conviction, that is me. Yeah, and it feels completely natural. I mean, we just take it for granted that the person staring back from the photograph is fundamentally the exact same entity who is holding the photograph today. Exactly. We just assume that continuity exists, you know, that there is a solid you that traveled through that entire decade. It feels so obvious. But what if that visceral feeling of continuity is, well, the ultimate cognitive illusion? What if the universe and absolutely everything in it vanishes and completely recreates itself every single millisecond? It is a wild thought experiment. It is. And today we are exploring an 11th century philosophical masterpiece that tackles exactly this terrifying and fascinating premise. We're examining Udianacharya's Atmatutva Viveka, which is this ancient Sanskrit text that has been, frankly, brilliantly revitalized for the modern era through Gajendra Thakur's comprehensive Mithili translation. It is essentially the ultimate battleground between two massive intellectual traditions in classical Indian philosophy. You have this really profound clash. Right. And to establish where we stand today, I will be defending the Nyaya Vaisheyshika school which argues for a permanent, stable reality, a universe of enduring substances, and a continuous soul. And opposing that, I'll be defending the Buddhist philosophical perspective, which argues that reality is radically momentary, fluid, and completely lacking any permanent essence or soul. So the central tension is incredibly stark. Is reality fundamentally momentary, constructed by our consciousness, or does it consist of permanent, stable entities? Let's just jump right into the physical reality of the world around us. Because the Buddhist claim here isn't just that things change over time, right, like a mountain slowly eroding, it's a radical theory called kshanikavada. Yes, kshanikavada, which literally translates to the theory of momentariness. The core assertion is quite radical, but when you really break it down, it is logically airtight. It basically says whatever is real is momentary. If something truly exists, it exists only for a single, fleeting instant. To understand why, we have to look at the fundamental logic of contradictory qualities. Let's take the classic example from the texts, a seed. Okay, let's picture a normal wheat seed. Right. Imagine that wheat seed sitting in a dry granary. It's just resting in a burlap sack. Now in that state, it doesn't produce a sprout. No, it just sits there. Exactly. But if you take that same seed and bury it in damp soil, it does produce a sprout. Now fundamental logic dictates that a single object cannot simultaneously possess contradictory qualities. Right, of course. It cannot be both capable of producing and incapable of producing at the exact same time. Because it does not produce in the granary, it is inherently incapable there. Precisely. And because it produces in the dirt, it is capable there, therefore logically the seed in the storage bin and the seed in the ground cannot be the exact same permanent entity. Wait, really? Yeah. They possess mutually exclusive traits. The only logical conclusion is that the quote-unquote seed is not a permanent object traveling through time. Instead, it is a series of distinct momentary realities replacing one another so fast that it just creates the illusion of a solid permanent object. I see why you think that, but let me give you a different perspective, drawn directly from Uriana Charya's defense of the Naya Vaisheyshika School. The theory of permanence and stable reality doesn't deny that the seed behaves differently in the granary than it does in the soil. I mean, obviously it does. Right. But it fundamentally rejects this idea that a change in behavior necessitates the complete destruction and recreation of the entity itself. The counter to your logic lies in the concept of auxiliary conditions, what we might call cooperative causes. Meaning the water in the soil. Exactly. The Naya perspective argues that the seed remains the exact same permanent entity. Its intrinsic capability to produce a sprout never changes. Okay, but… Wait, let me finish. What changes is not the seed, but the presence of auxiliary conditions, specifically the soil, the water, the temperature. A permanent reality interacting with changing external conditions is actually the only logical way to explain cause and effect. The seed in the grainery has the capability, but it lacks the cooperative causes required to trigger that capability. doesn't lose its intrinsic nature just because it's, you know, waiting for a rainstorm. I come at it from a different way. If we are really taking the mechanics of cause and effect seriously here, we have to ask how the physical world actually functions on a micro level. Sure. If a seed fundamentally intrinsically possesses the very nature to produce a sprout. If that production is its permanent unchanging essence, then it should produce that sprout immediately, continuously, all the time. Even without water? Yes! The Buddhist argument pushes this to its absolute logical limit. If a thing genuinely has the independent nature to produce, then even 100 curses from the gods couldn't stop it from producing instantly. Oh wow. The very fact that there is a delay in production, that the seed sits in the granary for six months doing absolutely nothing, proves that the delayed seed must be fundamentally ontologically different from the seed that eventually produces the sprout. I don't see how that follows. Because if its nature was to produce, it would produce. Since it doesn't, its nature in that dormant moment is non-producing. You can't just hand wave this away by pointing to water and soil as triggers. If the permanent seed relies on water and soil to change its state from non-producing to producing, then the seed wasn't permanent to begin with. It changed. I'm not convinced by that line of reasoning because you're actually falling into a very specific logical trap that Udayana points out in the Atma Tatva of Hiveka. Let's follow your logic of momentariness to its actual conclusion. All right, let's do it. If a non-producing thing sitting there without its auxiliary conditions still fails to produce even with them, well then it is forever non-producing. That's a dead end. On the flip side, if the seed can produce without any conditions, then auxiliary causes like water and soil are completely useless. You're trying to have it both ways. I'm not saying the conditions are useless. I'm saying they interact with a momentary state to create a new momentary state. But capacity requires a trigger. Think about the implications of your view for a moment. How can you account for agricultural science really any predictive causality if the underlying entity fundamentally vanishes every millisecond. The seed in the ground is a completely entirely different entity from the seed you bought at the market. Causality breaks down. If entity A is completely destroyed before entity B comes into its distance, A cannot cause B. There is no physical bridge. The universe just becomes a series of disconnected, spontaneous events. See, I don't think it breaks down at all. It just requires a much more sophisticated understanding of causality as a continuous stream, rather than a sequence of solid billiard balls hitting each other. Agriculture works not because there is a permanent seed essence holding it all together, but because there is a highly constrained, predictable, causal chain of momentary events. So the continuity is just an illusion of the chain? Exactly. Each momentary seed state generates the next, slightly different momentary seed state. When the momentary water state interacts with the momentary seed state, they jointly cause a momentary sprout state. Right. The continuity is in the causal stream, not in the substance. To demand a permanent substance underneath it all is just a human psychological need for stability. We want things to hold still so we can slap a label on them, but nature doesn't hold still. But by reducing everything to a stream of momentary flashes, you're stripping the universe of any underlying coherence. I mean, why does a wheat seed produce wheat and not a mango? Because of the stream. But if there's no permanent essence carrying the wheatness through the stream, what stops a mango from popping up? The intrinsic, enduring nature of the wheat seed, its permanent reality interacting with conditions is what guarantees the result. It produces wheat because the specific momentary configuration of the previous state strictly dictates the parameters of the next date. It's not random magic, it's a highly constrained flow. But let's actually take a step back here. Because this debate about the physical, atomic reality of the seed naturally pulls us toward a much deeper question in the text. If we are debating the physical reality of the external world, we have to address how human beings actually perceive that reality. So we are shifting from the physical mechanics of the object to the nature of the observer perceiving it. Exactly. This brings us to the Buddhist concept of Vijnana Vada or subjective idealism. We've been arguing about whether the seed and the dirt is permanent or momentary, but does the physical seed even exist outside of our consciousness to begin with? That is the big question. And the Buddhist position here relies on a principle called the Sahopalamba Niyama, which translates to the rule of simultaneous apprehension. It's a very elegant phenomenological argument. Think about your everyday experience. Say you're holding a blue coffee mug. All right. I've got my blue mug. You have never, ever experienced the physical color blue without simultaneously experiencing the internal knowledge of the color blue. Well, yeah, because to see it is to know I am seeing it. Right. Because blue and the knowledge of blue are always apprehended together. They are perfectly simultaneous in your cognitive experience. Buddhism argues they're actually identical. Wait. Identical? Yes! There is no external blue mug and internal knowledge of a blue mug. There is only consciousness temporarily taking the shape of blue. The external world is an illusion. So the mind is basically projecting the mug? Yes. Atma Tapva Viveka captures a brilliant Buddhist analogy to illustrate this delusion, the elephant at the palace gates. Oh, I love this one. Imagine a foolish person walking at night who looks toward the palace gates in the dark. They see a massive elephant standing there, but because of their ignorance and the poor lighting, they mistake the elephant for a giant shadow or a trick of the darkness. And eventually they conclude it is nothing, it's just a shadow. Right. The Buddhist argument reverses this. People are deluded in the exact same way about reality. They see the shapes and colors generated entirely by their own consciousness, and they mistakenly believe there is a solid, external, physical reality out there causing it. That's an interesting point, though I would frame it very differently. And Oya Dainas' counter to this is frankly one of the most brilliant linguistic and epistemological takedowns in classical philosophy. The Naya Vesheyshika School argues that you are fundamentally confusing the illuminator with the illuminated. Meaning the light versus the object it hits? Exactly. Knowledge is simply the light. The external object is the physical thing being lit up. They are not the exact same thing just because they appear together in your experience. To use the text-specific linguistic counter-analogy, if consciousness and the color blue were truly identical. If there was no external mug, only your mind being blue, our internal monologue would reflect that. How so? We would walk around saying, I am blue, but we don't. Ha, true. The phenomenological experience of every human being across all cultures is, this is blue. We draw a boundary. The distinction between the observer and the observed is baked into the very structure of our cognition. We do not experience ourselves as becoming the object. But language is just a construct. I mean, you can't use the grammar of human language, which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism is actually real. Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other. It doesn't prove the external world exists. It's not just grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself. Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right? You can look at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously. Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives as this whole Palumban Niyama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow and entirely red. But language is just a construct. I mean, you can't use the grammar of human language, which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism is actually real. Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other. It doesn't prove the external world exists. It's not just grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself. Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right? You can look at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously. Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul Palumba Niyama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red. But language is just a construct. I mean you can't use the grammar of human language which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism is actually real. Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other. It doesn't prove the external world exists. It's not just grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself. Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right? You can look at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously. Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul-Palamba Niyama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red. But language is just a construct. I mean, you can't use the grammar of human language, which was built to navigate a dualistic illusion to prove that dualism is actually real. Saying this is blue is just a useful social convention so we can talk to each other. It doesn't prove the external world exists. It's not just grammar though. It's the mechanical structure of apprehension itself. Let me push you further on the mechanics of your argument. A single consciousness can perceive multiple distinct colors at the exact same time, right? at a painting on a wall and see blue, yellow, and red simultaneously. Sure. Now, if consciousness is identical to the object it perceives, as the Sahul Palumba Neama claims, then that single unified consciousness would have to simultaneously possess the contradictory properties of being entirely blue, entirely yellow, and entirely red. That is logically impossible. A single entity cannot possess mutually exclusive properties at the same time. Therefore, the consciousness must be a single, distinct entity that acts as a receiver or an illuminator for multiple distinct external objects. The external painting must exist independently of the mind. I'm sorry, but I just don't buy that. Let me tell you why. You were treating consciousness as if it were a blank movie screen, a permanent canvas onto which different colors are projected all at once. Right, an enduring observer. That assumes consciousness is a singular monolithic thing. In the Buddhist framework, consciousness isn't a permanent screen. It's a rapidly flickering sequence of distinct cognitive events. Like the momentary seed, but in the mind. Exactly. What you experience as seeing blue, yellow, and red simultaneously is actually your consciousness rapidly flashing between a blue cognitive shape, a yellow cognitive shape, and a red cognitive shape. Okay. It flashes so unimaginably quickly that it creates an illusion of a single unified visual field. It's like taking a stick with a glowing ember on the end, a firebrand, and spinning it in a circle. It looks like a solid ring of fire, right? Yeah, it does. But the solid ring doesn't exist. It's just a single point moving very fast. Your rapid cognitive moments look like a single, unified experience of a painting. The external world isn't needed to explain this. Only the complex, rapid mechanics of consciousness itself. But if consciousness is just a series of rapid, disconnected flashes, a flickering sequence of momentary, cognitive events spinning in the dark, who or what is observing the spinning firebrand? Well, if we separate the observer from the observed reality, the ultimate question remains. Who is experiencing the burn when you touch the fire? You can't have a delusion without a deluded observer, which forces us to ask, what actually IS the self in this momentary universe? That's a compelling argument, but have you considered that the very search for a permanent observer is exactly the trap? You're looking for a ghost in the machine. This brings us to a concept called niratmiyavata, which is the no-soul theory. A universe with absolutely no enduring self? Right. The Buddhist perspective proposes that the self is simply this momentary flow of consciousness. There is no permanent unchanging doer or experiencer sitting behind the eyes watching the show. You don't need a permanent soul to explain human experience. Instead, Buddhism relies on the mechanics of the alea vishinana, the storehouse consciousness. Wait, let's break that down for the listener. How does a storehouse work if everything vanishes every millisecond. It's essentially a repository, a flowing stream that carries cognitive impressions, memories and karmic seeds forward from one momentary state to the next. It provides the mechanism of continuity without ever requiring an underlying permanence. Like a river. Think of it exactly like a river. You point at the water and call it the Ganges. The river looks like a permanent entity. It has a name, it has a continuous force, but the actual water molecules are never the same from one second to the next. The self is the river. It's a dynamic process, not a static substance. I hear the river metaphor a lot and you know, it sounds beautiful in poetry, but it collapses under rigorous scrutiny, especially when we look at the mechanics of human cognition. How so? Udayana challenges this deeply using the concepts of memory and recognition, what the text calls Pratyabhijana. Let me ask you this directly. If the consciousness that experienced an event yesterday is entirely 100% destroyed and gone, how can a completely new momentary consciousness remember it today? Through the stream. If I loan you $100 yesterday and the you of yesterday is completely annihilated, why should the you of today feel any obligation to pay me back? Because the me of today is causally downstream from the me of yesterday. The impression of the debt was passed through the Al Javijana, the storehouse consciousness. The new momentary consciousness inherits the karmic and cognitive baggage of the previous one. It's like passing a flame from one candle to another. Okay, but- The second flame isn't the first flame, but it is causally connected to it. The flame carried the dead. But a causal connection isn't enough for recognition. Recognition requires an identity of the experiencer. When you remember something, you don't just access a data point like a computer reading a hard drive. Your internal visceral experience is, I, the very same person who saw this yesterday and remembering it today. The experiencer and the rememberer must be the exact same entity. I disagree, it just feels that way. And Udayana uses a very poignant piece of evidence from the text to prove this continuity goes even deeper than our current lives. Ah, you're referring to the instinct argument. Yes. Think about a newborn child. A newborn child instinctively makes the physical effort to drink milk. They haven't learned this behavior in their current life. They haven't had time to form a new causal chain of habits. This instinctual drive proves the existence of impressions from a past life. Okay, but- And for a cognitive impression to survive the profound physical trauma of death and rebirth, there must be a continuous, permanent soul to carry it. A momentary, flickering stream would break down during that transition. Well, obviously, today we explain instinct through biology and genetics. But even within the strict context of classical philosophy, the storehouse consciousness completely accounts for the trans lifetime caring of instincts. The stream doesn't stop at death, it just flows into a new physical vessel. You don't need an unchanging iron rod of a soul to carry a habit. A fluid stream carries sediment downstream just fine. But it's not just about carrying cognitive sediment. It's about the very foundation of moral responsibility. If we accept the no soul theory, the entire law of karma collapses into profound cosmic injustice. Urayana points out a massive flaw here, what he calls the twin fallacies of Krita Pranashya and A. Krita Bhagama. loss of earned merit and the receiving of unearned results. Exactly! If there is no permanent soul, a momentary being would suffer the consequences for actions they did not commit because the person who committed the sin is dead and gone, vanished in a millisecond. That's Akrita Pagama, and the person who did the good deed fails to receive the fruits of their actions before they vanish. That's Krita Pranasha. Right, the mismatch. violates the basic cosmic justice that both of these philosophical traditions actually believe in. You cannot have moral responsibility if the agent of action and the experiencer of the result are two completely different entities. That assumes justice requires a permanent courtroom and a permanent defendant. The Buddhist view is that the flow of karma is a natural law of physics, not a judicial decree from a judge. The suffering occurs in the exact same continuum where the action occurred. Let's ground this. If you accidentally hit your thumb with a hammer, the thumb hurts. Okay. It doesn't matter if the physical cells in the thumb are constantly dying and replacing themselves. The localized continuum of the thumb experiences the physical result of the hammer. So the localized stream suffers, not a permanent you. Yes, the localized continuum of consciousness experiences the result of the karma. The relentless demand for a permanent soul is, at its core, an emotional attachment to the ego. We are terrified of our own transience, so we invent a permanent, immortal soul to comfort ourselves against the abyss. Atma-tet-viveka is brilliant precisely because it forces us to look this terror in the face. even as Udayana tries to build a logical fortress against it. Or Udayana is building a fortress because the fortress is actually there, and reality isn't just a terrifying, formless void of momentary flashes. The stability we experience is real. As we wrap up this intense exchange, I think it's crucial to summarize where we stand on this monumental philosophical divide. Absolutely. From the Buddhist perspective, when reality is placed under the rigorous, logical scrutiny we've discussed today, It reveals itself as a fluid, momentary stream. The fixed identities we cling to so desperately, whether it's the permanence of a seed waiting in a granary to sprout, the objective reality of a blue coffee mug, or the comforting idea of an eternal and changing self, are ultimately illusions. They are simply human linguistic and cognitive constructs mapped onto a dynamic, ever-flowing reality. To cling to permanence is to misunderstand the very nature of existence. And from the Ayaya Vaiseshika perspective, which I've defended, the universe simply cannot function on that kind of ontological chaos. It relies on stable, continuous entities interacting with the world through cooperative conditions, our capacity for memory, our deep sense of moral responsibility, and our variability to take purposeful action all prove the existence of a permanent reality and an enduring self. the observer to perceive the light and the enduring soul to carry the weight of its actions, the universe loses its coherence. What is truly remarkable as how Atma Tathva Viveka acts as this brilliant logical crucible for human cognition? Reading Gajendra Thakur's translation, you realize that these aren't just dusty, abstract arguments from a forgotten era. Not at all. This is an 11th century intellectual. grappling with the exact same questions of cognitive science, phenomenology, and realism that modern philosophers and neuroscientists are arguing about right now. The translation really manages to bring this incredibly dense sans-script debate into the modern intellectual sphere, making it accessible for mythyly readers and, by extension, providing the foundation for our discussion right now. It's a monumental achievement in translation, bridging a millennium of thought. It really is. These ancient epistemological debates hold up a mirror to our modern inquiries. It leaves all of us with the profound task of forming our own conclusions on the true nature of reality. So the next time you look at that photograph of yourself from 10 years ago, ask yourself, are you looking at a permanent soul that has weathered the passage of time? Or are you just looking at a momentary flicker in an endless flowing stream? A question that might just take another thousand years to finally answer. Thank you for joining us on the debate. We will catch you next time.

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