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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
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Detected language: en (0.995513)
Duration: 22:58
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:05No, this नसाखा अजेक्ष्यन is untenable.
0:05–0:12An inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning is stronger.
0:12–0:16Because this inference, produced with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning,
0:16–0:21sublates one of the two means of knowledge producing mutually contradictory cognitions.
0:21–0:28Therefore the means producing cognition of devduttas' necessary presence inside the house can be sublated.
0:28–0:34When, during doubt concerning Devduttas being alive, the evidence for being alive is sublated,
0:34–0:39the means of cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house
0:39–0:42is necessarily sublated as well.
0:42–0:47Thus there is no room for dispute that cognition of Devdutta's external presence arises only
0:47–0:51after decisive hypothetical reasoning.
0:51–0:54An important rule must be understood here.
0:54–0:59If no separate means of knowledge called presumption is accepted, hypothetical reasoning in the
0:59–1:03form of considering economy and complexity does not become a cooperative cause of the
1:03–1:06stated doubt concerning being alive.
1:06–1:11Rather, that reasoning becomes a cooperative cause of an inference from general observation
1:11–1:15that sublates the means of cognizing dev-dut as necessary presence inside the house and
1:15–1:19establishes his presence outside the house.
1:19–1:24An inference from general observation is necessary.
1:24–1:3013, it cannot be said that no inference from general observation need arise here.
1:30–1:34When one among two mutually uncertain means of knowledge is to be sublated, hypothetical
1:34–1:39reasoning determines which means is to be sublated, but actual sublation of one means
1:39–1:44is impossible without an inference from general observation.
1:44–1:48Even after cognition of mutual contradiction, doubt concerning which means is valid and
1:48–1:52which invalid does not cease until it is ascertained that one of the two must be
1:52–1:54invalid.
1:54–1:58And without such ascertainment, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead also will not
1:58–2:05cease, because the two means respectively ascertain devduttas being alive and is death.
2:05–2:08The inference from general observation is causal.
2:08–2:1414. It may again be said that the inference from general observation terminates after
2:14–2:18cognition of the contradiction one of the two means is invalid, thereafter doubt concerning
2:18–2:24being alive arises, and from that doubt cognition of devduttas external presence arises.
2:24–2:29Therefore cognition of external presence proves the causality of the inference from general
2:29–2:32observation.
2:32–2:34But this view is untenable.
2:34–2:38When that same inference from general observation is joined with hypothetical reasoning and
2:38–2:43then remembered again, the inference arises, the means establishing devduttas necessary
2:43–2:48presence in the house is invalid, and this cognition assists ascertainment of Dev Dutta's
2:48–2:54external presence. The same means, unjoined with hypothetical reasoning, yields only the
2:54–2:59inference that one among the two uncertain means is invalid. The same means produces
2:59–3:04different results because of different cooperative causes.
3:04–3:07The objection should not be raised that recollection of that same inference from
3:07–3:11general observation after doubt concerning being alive is unestablished. Once the
3:11–3:16means of cognizing Devadatta's necessary presence in the house no longer remains a means establishing
3:16–3:20a meaning opposed to Devadatta's being alive, supposition of external presence becomes unopposed.
3:21–3:27Therefore no separate presumption is required. The other method cannot be called faultless either.
3:29–3:3415. It may be objected that a definite means known to produce one particular result can,
3:34–3:38when joined with a separate cooperative cause and remembered again, produce another result.
3:38–3:42Thus the inference from general observation, desire resides in the self because it is an
3:42–3:47effect, when joined with the sublation of desires residence in the other eight substances and
3:47–3:51remembered again, can yield cognition of desires residence in the self, in that case purely
3:51–3:54negative inference would be unnecessary.
3:54–3:56But this objection is untenable.
3:56–4:01In inference, the property delimiting being pervaded is apprehended as a qualifier.
4:01–4:05Qualify cognition that the self is a substance distinct from the other eight substances
4:05–4:09is established only through purely negative inference. It is defective to maintain that
4:09–4:14an inference from general observation, even when joined with a separate cooperative cause,
4:14–4:16produces cognition of an entirely different kind.
4:18–4:21Assertainment of external existence is established by inference.
4:23–4:2716. The inference from general observation takes the form,
4:27–4:31Dev Duttet is the counter positive of being alive or death because he is a living person,
4:31–4:38like myself. Here, with the assistance of economical hypothetical reasoning concerning being alive,
4:38–4:44Dev Dutta is determined as the counter positive of being alive. Consequently, ascertainment of
4:44–4:49presence outside the house is established through an inference from general observation in which
4:49–4:53Dev Dutta's being alive has first been ascertained as a qualifier of the reason.
4:55–4:59An equally strong counter reason against the evidence apprehending being alive.
4:59–5:0617. It may be objected that an inference from general observation, with the assistance of
5:06–5:10economical hypothetical reasoning, apprehends the special property of Devadatta's being alive,
5:10–5:14but opposed to the evidence establishing his being alive is an inference of his death whose
5:14–5:17reason is ascertainment of Devadatta's necessary presence inside the house.
5:18–5:21A single valid reason can sublate many reasons.
5:22–5:26It cannot be said that the inference from general observation is stronger because of
5:26–5:30economical hypothetical reasoning.
5:30–5:33Provision and subject propertyhood are the grounds of the strength of an inferential
5:33–5:39reason, the strength is equal in the general reason and the counter reason.
5:39–5:43Economical hypothetical reasoning leads the general inference to the specific conclusion
5:43–5:48of Dev Dutta's presence in the house, therefore the establishment of perversion in both inferential
5:48–5:51reasons is equally strong.
5:51–5:56The Neyayaka replies that if this were accepted, no inference could establish any specific
5:56–6:01probandum, because whenever an inference empowered by general subject property had produced a
6:01–6:05specific conclusion, a counter reason based on the opposite specific property would always
6:05–6:08become possible.
6:08–6:13And non-establishment of the counter probandum would remain equally doubtful.
6:13–6:17Here cognition of Devdutta's necessary presence in the house is insufficient to establish
6:17–6:21his actual presence there.
6:21–6:25The inference from general observation establishing Devdutta's being alive is veridical because
6:25–6:32it rests upon evidence such as astrology. Through cognition of pervasion it sublates the counter-inference
6:32–6:37concerning dev-dupt as def. Therefore an inference arising from a general property,
6:37–6:43because of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause, establishes a special property,
6:43–6:48evidence apprehending the opposite special property does not become its valid counter-reason.
6:49–6:51Hypothetical reasoning is cooperative.
6:51–6:5818. The objection is untenable that hypothetical reasoning cannot be a special cooperative
6:58–7:02cause of the inference from general observation because it is sublated by some means of knowledge.
7:03–7:07When hypothetical reasoning does not arise, the inference from general observation does not
7:07–7:11operate to establish a special property and therefore does not conflict with its counter
7:11–7:16reason. But when hypothetical reasoning arises, that same inference acquires additional force
7:16–7:19and establishes the special property of devadatta's presence outside the house.
7:19–7:26If hypothetical reasoning were not the cause of this inference's additional force, the possibility
7:26–7:31of an equally strong counter-reason would not cease even after hypothetical reasoning arose.
7:32–7:36Nor can hypothetical reasoning be regarded as a cooperative cause in presumption,
7:36–7:39because there an opposing inference is present as a sublater.
7:41–7:46Supposition of Dev Dutta's death conflicts with the ascertainment Dev Dutta who lives for
7:46–7:52100 years remains only in the house. Nevertheless, sublation of qualified cognition does not arise
7:52–7:59merely from sublation of the qualificand. Even if Devdutta has died, the qualificand Devdutta
7:59–8:04and the sentenced Devdutta who lives for 100 years remains only in the house is not sublated,
8:04–8:10only the qualifier being alive is sublated. Nor should it be held that the absence of
8:10–8:15qualified cognition is automatically established by the absence of the qualifier.
8:16–8:21In the presence of the qualificand, the absence of qualified cognition has only the form of absence
8:21–8:26of the qualifier, it is improper to admit a separate absence of qualified cognition distinct
8:26–8:36from cognition of the qualifier. The view of some Sakhas. 19. Some Sakhas say that among the three
8:36–8:41cognitions, Devdutta lives for a hundred years, Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains
8:41–8:46remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house, the first two are not mutually
8:46–8:52contradictory. The contradiction arises, in light of the third cognition, between Devdutta
8:52–8:57remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house.
8:57–9:01According to this view, Devdutta's presence outside the house is supposed as the opposite
9:01–9:06of the invalid cognition, although Devdutta lives for a hundred years, he does not remain
9:06–9:11only in the house. That external presence is opposed not by cognitions consistent with
9:11–9:17devduttas being alive but by the invalid cognition devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains
9:17–9:22only in the house. The nature of this doubt is held to be such that it apprehends the
9:22–9:26object opposed to the actual invalid cognition, ascertainment of actual invalidity itself
9:26–9:35determines the opposition. Refutation of the view of some sakas. 20, this view
9:35–9:41is trivial. Sometimes invalid cognition may appear valid, therefore, merely after doubt,
9:41–9:46without direct apprehension of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause,
9:46–9:49the cognition devdatta is outside the house is not established.
9:50–9:55It is improper to accept presumptions solely on the basis of the resulting external presence.
9:57–10:02If this view is accepted, external presence, internal presence, and death would respectively
10:02–10:07have to be supposed from doubts concerning external presence, internal presence, and
10:07–10:13death. For some persons, some of these three cognitions may actually be invalid, nevertheless,
10:13–10:19production of such erroneous cognition through presumption is unacceptable. Consequently,
10:19–10:24the doctrine of presumption caused by doubt comes to an end here.
10:24–10:27Presumption caused by inexplicability.
10:27–10:3321. Suppose doubt concerning devduttas being alive is not the extraordinary or direct cause
10:33–10:39of presumption. Nevertheless, cognition of inexplicability in the form, the absence
10:39–10:44of the living devdutta in the house is impossible without his presence outside it, may be regarded
10:44–10:50as the direct cause of presumption. That is, after the cognition the living devdutta
10:50–10:54is not in the house, the cognition produced by presumption, the living devdutta is
10:54–10:59outside the house arises from the cognition of inexplicability, the absence of the living
10:59–11:05devdatta from the house is impossible unless he is present outside the house. Here cognition
11:05–11:10of inexplicability, grounded in both affirmative and negative provision, becomes the extraordinary
11:10–11:21cause. The objection that presumption is unnecessary, refutation. 22. An objection may be raised,
11:21–11:25the presence of the living devdatta outside the house can be established through inference,
11:25–11:30the living devadatta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house, like a jar,
11:30–11:35or whatever exists but is not in one place is in another place, just as I myself,
11:35–11:40not being in a corner of the house, a minute central part. Why, then, is presumption required?
11:42–11:47This objection, however, is not sound. In the stated inference, no general perversion
11:47–11:52between the reason and the probandom can be ascertained. Since such a general perversion
11:52–11:56is not cognized, cognition of his external presence arises precisely from the cognition
11:56–12:00of inexplicability that the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible
12:00–12:04without his presence outside it. Therefore presumption alone is necessary.
12:05–12:13The incoherence of inexplicability, objection. 23. An objection may be raised. Whether one holds,
12:13–12:17the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his specific presence
12:17–12:21outside the house, or holds in general, it is impossible without some presence outside,
12:21–12:23Both alternatives are defective.
12:24–12:30The first alternative is untenable, because cognition of inexplicability cannot arise unless
12:30–12:34Dev Dutta's specific presence outside the house is already cognized, and if that external
12:34–12:40presence is already known, presumption is futile. If Dev Dutta's absence from the house itself
12:40–12:45is held to be known through presumption, the defect of mutual dependence arises,
12:45–12:49because only after the absence of the counter positive has first been established can there
12:49–12:54be cognition that one thing is impossible without another.
12:54–12:57The second alternative is also untenable.
12:57–13:01The absence of the living devdutta from the house is not impossible without cognition of
13:01–13:05some other person's presence outside a house.
13:05–13:10Even cognition of some person's external presence in general does not establish devdutta's
13:10–13:13particular external presence.
13:13–13:20Thus presumption based on inexplicability itself becomes inexplicable.
13:20–13:23of the objection.
13:23–13:2624. No, this objection is not sound.
13:26–13:30A general cognition of inexplicability, one thing is impossible without the presence of
13:30–13:35another, serves as the cause, while the cognition of a specific thing within what exists generally
13:35–13:37is the result.
13:37–13:40The absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without the living
13:40–13:44devidata's presence outside it, from this cognition, external presence is postulated
13:44–13:47in that case where his absence from the house would actually be inexplicable, and
13:47–13:50not elsewhere.
13:50–13:54When it is ascertained that the living Devdutta is not in the house, presence outside the
13:54–13:57house is postulated of Devdutta.
13:57–14:02Here external presence is not treated as the immediate result in a merely general form,
14:02–14:05but as the result indirectly.
14:05–14:10Cognition of inexplicability does not generate a general cognition of some other person's
14:10–14:13external presence.
14:13–14:17This may be understood through the example of smoke and fire.
14:17–14:22On the basis of smoke pervaded by fire in general, fire is established on the mountain,
14:22–14:26although fire was not previously known specifically as mountain fire.
14:26–14:31Likewise, Devduttas presence outside the house is established specifically through cognition
14:31–14:35of external presence in general.
14:35–14:38The argument that presumption is unnecessary.
14:38–14:4425. It may again be said, inexplicability is simply the invariable absence of the
14:44–14:49reason and the locus where the absence of what is to be established occurs.
14:49–14:55Near absence of the probandom is not sufficient, because overextension would result.
14:55–14:59The probandom can therefore be established solely through a purely negative inference,
14:59–15:03presumption is consequently unnecessary.
15:03–15:08For example, the living devdatta is outside the house, because, although alive, he is
15:08–15:12not in the house, whatever is not such as not of this kind, like a dead person or
15:12–15:18a person who is in the house. By this purely negative inference, Dev Dutta's presence outside
15:18–15:24the house is established. It should not be said that this would lead to overextension,
15:24–15:28because one thing would become inferentially indicative of another through the perversion
15:28–15:33belonging to some different thing. What regulates negative inference is precisely being the
15:33–15:39counter positive of an absence that pervades the absence of the probandom. Some scholars
15:39–15:44say that this regulator applies only to presumption and not to inference, but there is no basis
15:44–15:47for such a distinction.
15:47–15:51Cognition through presumption does not arise without cognition of inexplicability, and
15:51–15:56an apparent presumption likewise does not arise without deviation.
15:56–15:59Presumption is necessary.
15:59–16:0426. No, the foregoing argument is not sound.
16:04–16:08In the inference of Deb Dutton's presence outside the house, the negative concomitance
16:08–16:13of the absence of the probandum is determined by the absence of the reason, but an affirmative
16:13–16:16reason is a property present in the subject.
16:16–16:21Hence, although cognition of external presence arises from knowledge of negative pervasion,
16:21–16:26it is not a purely negative inferential cognition, because inferential cognition arises from
16:26–16:31cognition of the subject propertyhood of the pervaded reason.
16:31–16:35It should not be objected that cognition of a reason which is the counter positive
16:35–16:39of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is present here, and that the same
16:39–16:45cognition is used in presumption. Such a cognition is impossible in purely affirmative
16:45–16:50inference, compared with it, it is more economical to hold that inference arises on the basis
16:50–16:55of the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom. For this reason a distinct
16:55–17:00role for cognition of inexplicability must be accepted.
17:00–17:04Thus, although the cognition of presence outside the house arises from cognition
17:04–17:09of negative pervasion, it cannot be called inferential cognition, therefore presumption
17:09–17:15must be admitted to produce such cognition of devduttas presence outside the house.
17:15–17:19The msaka supports his position on the ground that inference arises from cognition of a
17:19–17:24reason property present in the subject, but the stated cognition of devduttas presence
17:24–17:31outside the house does not arise from cognition of a reason property situated in the subject.
17:31–17:34The naiyayika objects, cognition of a subject property that is the counter positive
17:34–17:39of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom assists inferential cognition.
17:39–17:43Such cognition of a reason property is present in the current example of presumption as well,
17:43–17:47hence the cognition of devodata's presence outside the house should be held to arise solely
17:47–17:49from inference.
17:49–17:52The memsaka rejects this objection as well.
17:52–17:56According to him, such cognition of a reason property situated in the subject, one that
17:56–18:00is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, cannot be
18:00–18:03admitted in purely affirmative inference.
18:03–18:07with this cognition, the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, is more economical
18:07–18:12and is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition. In the present context, however,
18:12–18:16no such cognition of pervasion is available, inference is therefore impossible and presumption
18:16–18:19necessary.
18:19–18:21The three types of inference.
18:21–18:2627, an objection may be raised, in negative inference, because of the negative concomitance
18:26–18:30between the absence of the probandom and the absence of the reason, only negative
18:30–18:36perversion is apprehended. Thus, since cognition of perversion is based on three kinds of concomitants,
18:36–18:42affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative, inference 2 is of three types. Accordingly,
18:42–18:46a reason such as smoke is affirmative, negative, or affirmative negative in three different
18:46–18:49circumstances.
18:49–18:54Let this be granted. Even so, the absence of the living devduttas inside the house
18:54–18:58cannot serve as a reason for establishing devduttas' presence outside the house, because
18:58–19:04that absence does not reside in Devdutta. Nor do absence inside the house and presence
19:04–19:08outside the house possess a pervasion in the form of regular colocation, because their
19:08–19:14loci are not the same. In the inference, the illuminating cause, the sun, has risen
19:14–19:19above the earth, the sun's rising is inferred in the upper region near the illuminated
19:19–19:24ground, but the present case is not established by this illustration.
19:24–19:30Even the counter-positive of an absence located in the house is not an inferential mark.
19:30–19:3128.
19:31–19:36Nor can being the counter-positive of an absence located in Devdutta's house serve as the
19:36–19:38reason in an inference.
19:38–19:42Such counter-positiveness is certainly a property of Devdutta, but because there
19:42–19:47is no sensory contact with Devdutta, its perceptual cognition is impossible.
19:47–19:53Consequently, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with Devdutta
19:53–19:57as the qualificand, cannot arise from perception.
19:57–20:01It should not be said that cognition of the absence of the living dev-duttat and the house
20:01–20:06in cognition of negative pervasion may both arise through the mind together with auxiliary
20:06–20:08causes.
20:08–20:12If that is accepted, those auxiliary causes themselves would have to be admitted as a
20:12–20:16separate means of knowledge.
20:16–20:21The Msaka conclusion, presumption is necessary.
20:21–20:25An objection may be raised, after cognition of the pervasion of smoke, how does inference
20:25–20:30of fire on the mountain arise merely from recollection of smoke.
20:30–20:36Here too the third substantive reflection on smoke does not arise from perception.
20:36–20:43The Msaka replies, in such a condition, inferential cognition of fire on the mountain never arises.
20:43–20:47If the Neyayaka asks how cognition of fire arises from cognition of perversion and
20:47–20:51recollection of smoke as a property of the mountain, the answer is that cognition of
20:51–20:57fire on the mountain arises from the cognition of inexplicability, smoke is impossible without
20:57–21:04fire. Thus, after cognition that perceived smoke is impossible without fire, only a presumption
21:04–21:10of fire arises. Where smoke is recollected as a reason pervaded by fire, only there does
21:10–21:16inference of fire arise. It is for this reason that the Neayaka himself accepts three divisions
21:16–21:21of inference. Therefore, on the basis of negative pervasion, the absence of the living
21:21–21:26Devdutta and the house produces a presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house.
21:28–21:36The Neayakas reply. 30. The Neayakas says, even without sensory contact with Devdutta,
21:36–21:41cognition of the counter-positiveness of Devdutta's absence located in the house is perceptual.
21:42–21:47In the perception Devdutta is absent from the house, all three Devdutta, the absence,
21:47–21:51and the relation in the form of the absence's counter-positiveness, are cognized.
21:51–21:57In cognition of an absence, the meaning of its relation to the counter-positive consists
21:57–22:02merely in the delimitation of counter-positiveness, no other relation is required.
22:03–22:08A remembered qualifier of perversion 2 can readily be apprehended in perception,
22:08–22:13because being the counter-positive of Devdutta's absence located in the house is itself perceptible.
22:15–22:19It should not be objected that being the counter-positive of an absence located in the
22:19–22:24house, with Devdatta as its qualificand, is not known as pervaded by presence outside the house.
22:26–22:30Nearly the third subsumptive reflection on the reason present in the subject is the cause of
22:30–22:35inferential cognition, adding a further qualifier is fruitless because it incurs the defect of
22:35–22:42prolixity. Alternatively, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with the
22:42–22:46remembered Devdatta as its qualificand, may be held to arise through the mind.
22:46–22:52It arises through the ordinary auxiliary causes of mental cognition, hence no separate means
22:52–22:54of knowledge need be admitted here.

Plain text

No, this नसाखा अजेक्ष्यन is untenable. An inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning is stronger. Because this inference, produced with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, sublates one of the two means of knowledge producing mutually contradictory cognitions. Therefore the means producing cognition of devduttas' necessary presence inside the house can be sublated. When, during doubt concerning Devduttas being alive, the evidence for being alive is sublated, the means of cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house is necessarily sublated as well. Thus there is no room for dispute that cognition of Devdutta's external presence arises only after decisive hypothetical reasoning. An important rule must be understood here. If no separate means of knowledge called presumption is accepted, hypothetical reasoning in the form of considering economy and complexity does not become a cooperative cause of the stated doubt concerning being alive. Rather, that reasoning becomes a cooperative cause of an inference from general observation that sublates the means of cognizing dev-dut as necessary presence inside the house and establishes his presence outside the house. An inference from general observation is necessary. 13, it cannot be said that no inference from general observation need arise here. When one among two mutually uncertain means of knowledge is to be sublated, hypothetical reasoning determines which means is to be sublated, but actual sublation of one means is impossible without an inference from general observation. Even after cognition of mutual contradiction, doubt concerning which means is valid and which invalid does not cease until it is ascertained that one of the two must be invalid. And without such ascertainment, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead also will not cease, because the two means respectively ascertain devduttas being alive and is death. The inference from general observation is causal. 14. It may again be said that the inference from general observation terminates after cognition of the contradiction one of the two means is invalid, thereafter doubt concerning being alive arises, and from that doubt cognition of devduttas external presence arises. Therefore cognition of external presence proves the causality of the inference from general observation. But this view is untenable. When that same inference from general observation is joined with hypothetical reasoning and then remembered again, the inference arises, the means establishing devduttas necessary presence in the house is invalid, and this cognition assists ascertainment of Dev Dutta's external presence. The same means, unjoined with hypothetical reasoning, yields only the inference that one among the two uncertain means is invalid. The same means produces different results because of different cooperative causes. The objection should not be raised that recollection of that same inference from general observation after doubt concerning being alive is unestablished. Once the means of cognizing Devadatta's necessary presence in the house no longer remains a means establishing a meaning opposed to Devadatta's being alive, supposition of external presence becomes unopposed. Therefore no separate presumption is required. The other method cannot be called faultless either. 15. It may be objected that a definite means known to produce one particular result can, when joined with a separate cooperative cause and remembered again, produce another result. Thus the inference from general observation, desire resides in the self because it is an effect, when joined with the sublation of desires residence in the other eight substances and remembered again, can yield cognition of desires residence in the self, in that case purely negative inference would be unnecessary. But this objection is untenable. In inference, the property delimiting being pervaded is apprehended as a qualifier. Qualify cognition that the self is a substance distinct from the other eight substances is established only through purely negative inference. It is defective to maintain that an inference from general observation, even when joined with a separate cooperative cause, produces cognition of an entirely different kind. Assertainment of external existence is established by inference. 16. The inference from general observation takes the form, Dev Duttet is the counter positive of being alive or death because he is a living person, like myself. Here, with the assistance of economical hypothetical reasoning concerning being alive, Dev Dutta is determined as the counter positive of being alive. Consequently, ascertainment of presence outside the house is established through an inference from general observation in which Dev Dutta's being alive has first been ascertained as a qualifier of the reason. An equally strong counter reason against the evidence apprehending being alive. 17. It may be objected that an inference from general observation, with the assistance of economical hypothetical reasoning, apprehends the special property of Devadatta's being alive, but opposed to the evidence establishing his being alive is an inference of his death whose reason is ascertainment of Devadatta's necessary presence inside the house. A single valid reason can sublate many reasons. It cannot be said that the inference from general observation is stronger because of economical hypothetical reasoning. Provision and subject propertyhood are the grounds of the strength of an inferential reason, the strength is equal in the general reason and the counter reason. Economical hypothetical reasoning leads the general inference to the specific conclusion of Dev Dutta's presence in the house, therefore the establishment of perversion in both inferential reasons is equally strong. The Neyayaka replies that if this were accepted, no inference could establish any specific probandum, because whenever an inference empowered by general subject property had produced a specific conclusion, a counter reason based on the opposite specific property would always become possible. And non-establishment of the counter probandum would remain equally doubtful. Here cognition of Devdutta's necessary presence in the house is insufficient to establish his actual presence there. The inference from general observation establishing Devdutta's being alive is veridical because it rests upon evidence such as astrology. Through cognition of pervasion it sublates the counter-inference concerning dev-dupt as def. Therefore an inference arising from a general property, because of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause, establishes a special property, evidence apprehending the opposite special property does not become its valid counter-reason. Hypothetical reasoning is cooperative. 18. The objection is untenable that hypothetical reasoning cannot be a special cooperative cause of the inference from general observation because it is sublated by some means of knowledge. When hypothetical reasoning does not arise, the inference from general observation does not operate to establish a special property and therefore does not conflict with its counter reason. But when hypothetical reasoning arises, that same inference acquires additional force and establishes the special property of devadatta's presence outside the house. If hypothetical reasoning were not the cause of this inference's additional force, the possibility of an equally strong counter-reason would not cease even after hypothetical reasoning arose. Nor can hypothetical reasoning be regarded as a cooperative cause in presumption, because there an opposing inference is present as a sublater. Supposition of Dev Dutta's death conflicts with the ascertainment Dev Dutta who lives for 100 years remains only in the house. Nevertheless, sublation of qualified cognition does not arise merely from sublation of the qualificand. Even if Devdutta has died, the qualificand Devdutta and the sentenced Devdutta who lives for 100 years remains only in the house is not sublated, only the qualifier being alive is sublated. Nor should it be held that the absence of qualified cognition is automatically established by the absence of the qualifier. In the presence of the qualificand, the absence of qualified cognition has only the form of absence of the qualifier, it is improper to admit a separate absence of qualified cognition distinct from cognition of the qualifier. The view of some Sakhas. 19. Some Sakhas say that among the three cognitions, Devdutta lives for a hundred years, Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house, the first two are not mutually contradictory. The contradiction arises, in light of the third cognition, between Devdutta remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house. According to this view, Devdutta's presence outside the house is supposed as the opposite of the invalid cognition, although Devdutta lives for a hundred years, he does not remain only in the house. That external presence is opposed not by cognitions consistent with devduttas being alive but by the invalid cognition devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. The nature of this doubt is held to be such that it apprehends the object opposed to the actual invalid cognition, ascertainment of actual invalidity itself determines the opposition. Refutation of the view of some sakas. 20, this view is trivial. Sometimes invalid cognition may appear valid, therefore, merely after doubt, without direct apprehension of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause, the cognition devdatta is outside the house is not established. It is improper to accept presumptions solely on the basis of the resulting external presence. If this view is accepted, external presence, internal presence, and death would respectively have to be supposed from doubts concerning external presence, internal presence, and death. For some persons, some of these three cognitions may actually be invalid, nevertheless, production of such erroneous cognition through presumption is unacceptable. Consequently, the doctrine of presumption caused by doubt comes to an end here. Presumption caused by inexplicability. 21. Suppose doubt concerning devduttas being alive is not the extraordinary or direct cause of presumption. Nevertheless, cognition of inexplicability in the form, the absence of the living devdutta in the house is impossible without his presence outside it, may be regarded as the direct cause of presumption. That is, after the cognition the living devdutta is not in the house, the cognition produced by presumption, the living devdutta is outside the house arises from the cognition of inexplicability, the absence of the living devdatta from the house is impossible unless he is present outside the house. Here cognition of inexplicability, grounded in both affirmative and negative provision, becomes the extraordinary cause. The objection that presumption is unnecessary, refutation. 22. An objection may be raised, the presence of the living devdatta outside the house can be established through inference, the living devadatta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house, like a jar, or whatever exists but is not in one place is in another place, just as I myself, not being in a corner of the house, a minute central part. Why, then, is presumption required? This objection, however, is not sound. In the stated inference, no general perversion between the reason and the probandom can be ascertained. Since such a general perversion is not cognized, cognition of his external presence arises precisely from the cognition of inexplicability that the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his presence outside it. Therefore presumption alone is necessary. The incoherence of inexplicability, objection. 23. An objection may be raised. Whether one holds, the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his specific presence outside the house, or holds in general, it is impossible without some presence outside, Both alternatives are defective. The first alternative is untenable, because cognition of inexplicability cannot arise unless Dev Dutta's specific presence outside the house is already cognized, and if that external presence is already known, presumption is futile. If Dev Dutta's absence from the house itself is held to be known through presumption, the defect of mutual dependence arises, because only after the absence of the counter positive has first been established can there be cognition that one thing is impossible without another. The second alternative is also untenable. The absence of the living devdutta from the house is not impossible without cognition of some other person's presence outside a house. Even cognition of some person's external presence in general does not establish devdutta's particular external presence. Thus presumption based on inexplicability itself becomes inexplicable. of the objection. 24. No, this objection is not sound. A general cognition of inexplicability, one thing is impossible without the presence of another, serves as the cause, while the cognition of a specific thing within what exists generally is the result. The absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without the living devidata's presence outside it, from this cognition, external presence is postulated in that case where his absence from the house would actually be inexplicable, and not elsewhere. When it is ascertained that the living Devdutta is not in the house, presence outside the house is postulated of Devdutta. Here external presence is not treated as the immediate result in a merely general form, but as the result indirectly. Cognition of inexplicability does not generate a general cognition of some other person's external presence. This may be understood through the example of smoke and fire. On the basis of smoke pervaded by fire in general, fire is established on the mountain, although fire was not previously known specifically as mountain fire. Likewise, Devduttas presence outside the house is established specifically through cognition of external presence in general. The argument that presumption is unnecessary. 25. It may again be said, inexplicability is simply the invariable absence of the reason and the locus where the absence of what is to be established occurs. Near absence of the probandom is not sufficient, because overextension would result. The probandom can therefore be established solely through a purely negative inference, presumption is consequently unnecessary. For example, the living devdatta is outside the house, because, although alive, he is not in the house, whatever is not such as not of this kind, like a dead person or a person who is in the house. By this purely negative inference, Dev Dutta's presence outside the house is established. It should not be said that this would lead to overextension, because one thing would become inferentially indicative of another through the perversion belonging to some different thing. What regulates negative inference is precisely being the counter positive of an absence that pervades the absence of the probandom. Some scholars say that this regulator applies only to presumption and not to inference, but there is no basis for such a distinction. Cognition through presumption does not arise without cognition of inexplicability, and an apparent presumption likewise does not arise without deviation. Presumption is necessary. 26. No, the foregoing argument is not sound. In the inference of Deb Dutton's presence outside the house, the negative concomitance of the absence of the probandum is determined by the absence of the reason, but an affirmative reason is a property present in the subject. Hence, although cognition of external presence arises from knowledge of negative pervasion, it is not a purely negative inferential cognition, because inferential cognition arises from cognition of the subject propertyhood of the pervaded reason. It should not be objected that cognition of a reason which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is present here, and that the same cognition is used in presumption. Such a cognition is impossible in purely affirmative inference, compared with it, it is more economical to hold that inference arises on the basis of the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom. For this reason a distinct role for cognition of inexplicability must be accepted. Thus, although the cognition of presence outside the house arises from cognition of negative pervasion, it cannot be called inferential cognition, therefore presumption must be admitted to produce such cognition of devduttas presence outside the house. The msaka supports his position on the ground that inference arises from cognition of a reason property present in the subject, but the stated cognition of devduttas presence outside the house does not arise from cognition of a reason property situated in the subject. The naiyayika objects, cognition of a subject property that is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom assists inferential cognition. Such cognition of a reason property is present in the current example of presumption as well, hence the cognition of devodata's presence outside the house should be held to arise solely from inference. The memsaka rejects this objection as well. According to him, such cognition of a reason property situated in the subject, one that is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, cannot be admitted in purely affirmative inference. with this cognition, the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, is more economical and is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition. In the present context, however, no such cognition of pervasion is available, inference is therefore impossible and presumption necessary. The three types of inference. 27, an objection may be raised, in negative inference, because of the negative concomitance between the absence of the probandom and the absence of the reason, only negative perversion is apprehended. Thus, since cognition of perversion is based on three kinds of concomitants, affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative, inference 2 is of three types. Accordingly, a reason such as smoke is affirmative, negative, or affirmative negative in three different circumstances. Let this be granted. Even so, the absence of the living devduttas inside the house cannot serve as a reason for establishing devduttas' presence outside the house, because that absence does not reside in Devdutta. Nor do absence inside the house and presence outside the house possess a pervasion in the form of regular colocation, because their loci are not the same. In the inference, the illuminating cause, the sun, has risen above the earth, the sun's rising is inferred in the upper region near the illuminated ground, but the present case is not established by this illustration. Even the counter-positive of an absence located in the house is not an inferential mark. 28. Nor can being the counter-positive of an absence located in Devdutta's house serve as the reason in an inference. Such counter-positiveness is certainly a property of Devdutta, but because there is no sensory contact with Devdutta, its perceptual cognition is impossible. Consequently, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with Devdutta as the qualificand, cannot arise from perception. It should not be said that cognition of the absence of the living dev-duttat and the house in cognition of negative pervasion may both arise through the mind together with auxiliary causes. If that is accepted, those auxiliary causes themselves would have to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge. The Msaka conclusion, presumption is necessary. An objection may be raised, after cognition of the pervasion of smoke, how does inference of fire on the mountain arise merely from recollection of smoke. Here too the third substantive reflection on smoke does not arise from perception. The Msaka replies, in such a condition, inferential cognition of fire on the mountain never arises. If the Neyayaka asks how cognition of fire arises from cognition of perversion and recollection of smoke as a property of the mountain, the answer is that cognition of fire on the mountain arises from the cognition of inexplicability, smoke is impossible without fire. Thus, after cognition that perceived smoke is impossible without fire, only a presumption of fire arises. Where smoke is recollected as a reason pervaded by fire, only there does inference of fire arise. It is for this reason that the Neayaka himself accepts three divisions of inference. Therefore, on the basis of negative pervasion, the absence of the living Devdutta and the house produces a presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house. The Neayakas reply. 30. The Neayakas says, even without sensory contact with Devdutta, cognition of the counter-positiveness of Devdutta's absence located in the house is perceptual. In the perception Devdutta is absent from the house, all three Devdutta, the absence, and the relation in the form of the absence's counter-positiveness, are cognized. In cognition of an absence, the meaning of its relation to the counter-positive consists merely in the delimitation of counter-positiveness, no other relation is required. A remembered qualifier of perversion 2 can readily be apprehended in perception, because being the counter-positive of Devdutta's absence located in the house is itself perceptible. It should not be objected that being the counter-positive of an absence located in the house, with Devdatta as its qualificand, is not known as pervaded by presence outside the house. Nearly the third subsumptive reflection on the reason present in the subject is the cause of inferential cognition, adding a further qualifier is fruitless because it incurs the defect of prolixity. Alternatively, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with the remembered Devdatta as its qualificand, may be held to arise through the mind. It arises through the ordinary auxiliary causes of mental cognition, hence no separate means of knowledge need be admitted here.

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