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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 21:54
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0:02–0:06A complex absence of non-manifestness is a cause of perception.
0:06–0:14The Siddhantan says, in the manifestation produced by contact with fire of colors delimited by whiteness
0:14–0:20and the like, it is impossible to accept lesser and greater extension of one and the same universal,
0:20–0:24therefore the manifestness residing in colors must be diverse.
0:24–0:29If merely manifest color is called the cause, there will be no recurrent cause.
0:29–0:35Hence the aggregate of absences of all universals of non-manifestness that are pervaded by whiteness
0:35–0:39and the like should be the cause of perception of color and the rest, otherwise recurrent
0:39–0:42perception of color would be impossible.
0:42–0:46In the same way, in perception of touch and the like, the aggregate of absences of the
0:46–0:52relevant universals of non-manifestness should be accepted as the cause.
0:52–0:59The second alternative is not to regard manifestness or non-manifestness as a universal.
0:59–1:05of a universal pervaded by colourhood may be manifestness, and its absence non-manifestness.
1:05–1:10In perceptible white colour there are universals such as greater whiteness and greatest whiteness,
1:10–1:14in the colour of vapour, the eye, and the like there is only general whiteness, because
1:14–1:19there is no proof establishing a special universal pervaded by whiteness there, and
1:19–1:22superior whiteness is absent.
1:22–1:27It cannot be said that colourhood itself establishes a universal pervaded by whiteness
1:27–1:32and therefore that universal should be the cause of perception. Once colorhood is accepted
1:32–1:37through economy as the cause, perception of white color is established, causal status
1:37–1:43of a special universal pervaded by whiteness is then unnecessary. Similarly, general touchhood
1:43–1:49alone suffices in perception of touch. Nor is it established that manifestness together
1:49–1:54with magnitude is a cause of perception of color, because air of extremely great magnitude
1:54–1:58is not perceived.
1:58–1:59INHEBITERS OF PERCEPTION
1:59–2:05Objection, fire present in a roasting potshard and sunlight illuminating a pot situated in
2:05–2:10water ought to be perceived, because the potshard and water are perceptible and therefore possess
2:10–2:11manifest colour.
2:11–2:15Their particular conjunction cannot be called an inhibitor, because water and potshard
2:15–2:19themselves are revealed by light, if that very conjunction were inhibitory, both fire
2:19–2:25can joined with the potshard and sunlight can joined with water would become imperceptible.
2:25–2:30If differences of conjunction are regarded as generated by universals, they would overlap,
2:30–2:35because in both cases conjunction may be produced by motion on either side.
2:35–2:40To accept many conjunctions like high and low tones is cumbersome, to regard each individual
2:40–2:43conjunction as different destroys recurrence.
2:43–2:49Reply, sunlight situated in water is in fact perceived, but because both water and light
2:49–2:54are extremely transparent, they are not distinctly seen as separate.
2:54–2:58From the part of a roasting potchard conjoined with fire there arises a particular fire whose
2:58–3:02color is non-manifest but whose touch is manifest.
3:02–3:07When a part of fire with manifest color enters extremely boiling oil, the fire is sometimes
3:07–3:10perceived.
3:10–3:15It is not accepted that curd is produced from curd atoms conjoined with milk.
3:15–3:20Curd is a substance produced after destruction of milk, as with curdled milk, its material
3:20–3:23causes are the material causes of milk.
3:23–3:30For this example does not defeat the causal status of manifest color.
3:30–3:34Magnitude is also a cause of perception.
3:34–3:38Objection, fire possessing manifest color does not possess manifest touch, cognition of heat
3:38–3:42there arises by a rule concerning another fire conjoined with heat.
3:42–3:46The causal conditions of manifest color and manifest touch in hot fire appear mutually
3:46–3:48incompatible.
3:48–3:53Reply, the undefeated recognition the very fire that I saw is what I am touching,
3:53–3:58both seeing and touching establish both color and touch in fire.
3:58–4:02Firehood is not an inhibitor of production of touch, production and non-production of
4:02–4:06a quality arise from differences in efficient causes.
4:06–4:12Firehood pervaded by substancehood is present in fire possessing manifest color and touch.
4:12–4:16Manifest color and touch coexist in water and earth, the apparent conflict in light
4:16–4:21is merely produced by a difference of efficient causes.
4:21–4:26related to manifest color and possession of many substances appear equally present through
4:26–4:31positive and negative concomitance in one substance, nevertheless only magnitude regulates
4:31–4:37perception of substance, and economy favors this view. In a heap of cotton, compactness
4:37–4:42increases magnitude without increasing the number of parts, and clarity of perception also
4:42–4:48increases. One should not accept possession of many substances as the cause merely because
4:48–4:51a distant mass of hair is perceived through possession of many substances or conjunction
4:51–4:56of similar hairs without an increase in the number of parts. Possession of many substances
4:56–5:01can be a cause through inherent, not through conjunction. Rather than treating conjunction
5:01–5:05of similar parts in a distant object as its auxiliary, it is simpler to treat that conjunction
5:05–5:10as an auxiliary to magnitude. Nor is it the case that possession of manifest
5:10–5:14colour and magnitude are merely natural eligibility for perception of substance,
5:14–5:19causes, like starford. Excellence of perception depends upon excellence of manifest colour
5:19–5:25and magnitude, therefore both are causes. Absence of excellence in a cause does not invariably
5:25–5:30accompany absence of the effect, so the example of starford does not apply. In visual perception
5:30–5:35of substance, possession of manifest colour and magnitude are both object-located causes,
5:35–5:38as common recurrent properties, they delimit causal status.
5:41–5:43B. The theory of perception of air
5:43–5:52Prima-facy view air is perceptible, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception
5:52–5:55of substance.
5:55–5:59The Prima-facy objector says possession of manifest color does not regulate perception
5:59–6:03of substance because air is perceived even without manifest color.
6:03–6:07Inference, air is perceptible because while possessing magnitude it is the locus of
6:07–6:09manifest touch, like a pot.
6:09–6:13The fact that hot vapor is perceptible does not make the reason deviant.
6:13–6:17of manifest touch together with magnitude establishes tactile perceptibility, possession
6:17–6:21of manifest color does not.
6:21–6:26Nor is possession of manifest color an extraneous condition pervading both the probandum delimited
6:26–6:30by a property of the subject and the probandum delimited by the reason, because it does not
6:30–6:34establish tactile perceptibility.
6:34–6:38After operation of the tactile sense organ there is a direct experience, the air is
6:38–6:40blowing.
6:40–6:44Even if touch is not apprehended as a reason, perceptibility of a pot is not destroyed,
6:44–6:50therefore this experience cannot be explained merely as inference of air from touch.
6:50–6:54If touch were inferred, the cognition would be there is touch in air, not air is hot or
6:54–6:56air is cold.
6:56–7:01Sometimes, even when touch is not distinctly understood, there is the direct experience,
7:01–7:03the air is cold.
7:03–7:07There is no proof that this cognition arises only after air has first been inferred
7:07–7:12is a reason for cognition of a cold substance, nor does perception of a particular quality
7:12–7:16involve superimposition of an opposed quality.
7:16–7:22Nor is visual imperceptibility an inhibitor of tactile perceptibility.
7:22–7:26The eye cognizes substance alone and the skin touch, if the skin cognizes touch together
7:26–7:32with its substrate, it can also cognize touch together with its substrate in air.
7:32–7:36The rule that substance is apprehended only when number, magnitude, and the like
7:36–7:42Like belonging to it or apprehended does not hold in every individual perception of substance.
7:42–7:46Cloth on one's back is known by touch even when its number and magnitude are not understood,
7:46–7:55in blowing air, touch on the body and sometimes number, magnitude, and the like are also experienced.
7:55–7:58Conclusion Air is Imperceptible.
7:58–8:02The Siddhantan says that air is not perceptible.
8:02–8:07In perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest
8:07–8:12color together with magnitude is a cause, it is improper to abandon a possible cause.
8:13–8:18Neither possession of a produced special quality apprehensible by an external sense organ nor
8:18–8:22possession of a special quality co-located with resultant magnitude is the cause,
8:22–8:27otherwise a yellow substance in the tongue, manifest bitter taste, and a fragrance substance
8:27–8:34carried by air would also have to be perceived. Prima-facy rejoinder possession of manifest
8:34–8:41touch is sufficient. The prima facie objecta replies possession of manifest color is not
8:41–8:45a cause of perception of substance, otherwise the yellow substance situated in the eye would be
8:45–8:50perceived. Alternatively, possession of manifest touch may be accepted as the cause in perception
8:50–8:55of air. On this view array will not become imperceptible because array is a fiery substance
8:55–8:59and its perceptibility depends upon manifest color just as perception of hot vapor does.
8:59–9:06How are conjunction, disjunction, and motion in the rays of a blue jewel and the like known?
9:07–9:09They are not perceived in moonbeams and the like.
9:10–9:15Array of a blue jewel is devoid of color in an earlier place and colored in a later place,
9:15–9:18from this, conjunction and disjunction of its substrate are inferred.
9:19–9:24Such inference as possible just as movement of air is inferred after general touch has
9:24–9:29been perceived in air. Smoke and vapor are not objects of a tactile sense,
9:29–9:33therefore even without manifest color they are objects of visual perception.
9:33–9:38To regard possession of many special qualities apprehensible by external sense organs as the
9:38–9:41cause of perception of substance is a cumbersome postulate that would make moats moving in a
9:41–9:46sunbeam imperceptible. If both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch
9:46–9:51are accepted as causes of perception of substance, separate causalities must be posited for visual
9:51–9:56perception of a pot and tactile perception of air. Through economy, possession of a manifest
9:56–10:00special quality that determines a particular external sense organ should be accepted as
10:00–10:02the common cause.
10:02–10:06The objection that particular perception and general perception arise from different causal
10:06–10:10complexes and therefore one property cannot cause perceptions of substance produced by
10:10–10:13two different sense organs, is unestablished.
10:13–10:17There is no contradiction in accepting possession of manifest colour as the cause of visual
10:17–10:21perception of substance and possession of manifest touch as the cause of tactile perception
10:21–10:23of substance.
10:23–10:26Air is perceptible.
10:26–10:31The experience I touch is valid with respect to air.
10:31–10:35Objection, if air is a substance that is the object of immediate awareness produced by an
10:35–10:39external sense organ, how can colorless air be an object of perception?
10:39–10:44The rule is that a substance that is an object of immediate awareness produces color.
10:44–10:49Reply, a substance produces color only when it in his inner locus of color, merely being
10:49–10:52a substance that is an object of immediate awareness does not make it a producer of
10:52–10:53color.
10:53–10:58Only after color has been produced is it known in that state as a substance that is an object of
10:58–11:03perception. Nor does it follow that if a sense organ other than the eye apprehends substance,
11:03–11:08a pot would become colorless, touchless, and visually imperceptible. Although the tactile
11:08–11:12sense is an external sense organ that apprehends substance, it does not apprehend color,
11:12–11:16just as the eye does not apprehend touch, nevertheless the pot is an object of touch.
11:17–11:21With respect to air, as with a pot, a subsequent cognition, I am touching,
11:21–11:23arises, therefore air is perceptible.
11:25–11:32Manifest touch alone regulates tactile perception. It may again be said that manifest color,
11:32–11:37like manifest touch, is also a cause of tactile perceptibility, because substances possessing
11:37–11:43manifest color are seen to be perceived by touch. Reply, a sunray, though possessing manifest
11:43–11:49color, is imperceptible to touch, therefore manifest touch is necessary in tactile perception,
11:49–11:56while manifest color is purposeless. When manifest touch is present, absence of manifest color does
11:56–12:02not produce absence of tactile perceptibility. If it is said that manifestation located in
12:02–12:07touch is the cause but color is not, the reply is that both touch and its manifestation are causes,
12:07–12:13color is not. The universal's manifestness located in color and touch are only delimiters
12:13–12:24of causal status, not themselves causes. Modern view, air is imperceptible. Modern Neayakas
12:24–12:30say, manifest touch alone does not regulate tactile perception of substance. If it did,
12:30–12:35some are heat vapor, cold and hot substances carried by air, and their numbers, magnitudes,
12:35–12:40conjunctions, disjunctions, and motions would all be perceived. Number and the like residing
12:40–12:45in an eligible individual are apprehended when the appropriate conditions are present,
12:45–12:49yet no one knows the number of hot vapor is one nose apart by touching it with the hand.
12:51–12:56If possession of manifest color alone in general were the cause of perception of substance,
12:56–12:59the number of moonbeams and the yellow substance in the eye would be perceived.
13:00–13:06Even when subtle vapor is seen, its duality, hand-sized magnitude, or motion is not understood.
13:07–13:12Therefore both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are causes and
13:12–13:17perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, because they deviate from one another,
13:17–13:24air is imperceptible. In the cognition, the conch is yellow, only the yellowness of the eye appears,
13:24–13:28not a yellow substance, the parts of the yellow substance are dispersed like rays.
13:29–13:37Accepting this does not violate the Neayaka doctrine. This is the modern view. View of
13:37–13:44of the tradition nor air is imperceptible. The tradition nor says, if only possession
13:44–13:50of manifest touch, and not possession of manifest color, caused perception of substance, disjunction
13:50–13:54from an eastern place in conjunction with a northern place and a row of flying birds
13:54–13:58would not be perceived, because the mass of rays in the eastern and northern places
13:58–14:03lacks manifest touch. Then the inference, the row of birds is moving on the basis of
14:03–14:07the mass of rays would be impossible, and inference, the moon and stars are moving
14:07–14:12from conjunction and disjunction would also be obstructed.
14:12–14:16Nor may one first infer the birds in the northeast region and then infer their conjunction and
14:16–14:20disjunction, because those regions are not perceived.
14:20–14:25Thus possession of manifest color alone is an indispensable cause of perception of air,
14:25–14:29and air is imperceptible.
14:29–14:33Explanation of the cognition, the air is cold.
14:33–14:38Objection, if air is knowable only by inference, how can cold touch qualify air
14:38–14:39in the illusion, the air is cold?
14:39–14:45Air is not an eligible substrate of cold touch. It is not enough to say that there is no obstruction
14:45–14:49to mentioning cold touch in cognition of air in general, because attribution of the quality
14:49–14:55to a particular air is impossible. It is also difficult to regard cold touch known
14:55–14:59by the tactile sense as superimposed upon air supplied by inference, because the
14:59–15:04mind does not directly perceive the four qualities such as touch inferred through air. Nor
15:04–15:09can cold touch be mentally superimposed upon air inferred as the cause of cognition
15:09–15:15of a cold substance because air is inferred as not being a locus of cold touch.
15:15–15:20If air is cold as an illusion produced by an external sense organ, such an illusion would
15:20–15:25likewise arise through defect and inferential apprehension of a particular.
15:25–15:29It is not an erroneous inference produced by a fallacious reason because cold touch
15:29–15:33is not erroneously taken as the mark of air.
15:33–15:37Nor is identity with remembered air superimposed upon the cold substance inferred from cold
15:37–15:41touch, the cognition is an awareness of cold touch with air as its qualificand.
15:42–15:47Even the attenuated illusion this cold touch belongs to air is unestablished.
15:48–15:52It is not merely a mental cognition of cold touch like a dream illusion,
15:52–15:55because it follows the operation of the tactile sense organ.
15:56–16:00The tradition or replies, cold touch known in water in the like may,
16:00–16:05through a sensory defect, be superimposed upon inferred air as a property contrary to it,
16:05–16:11like an illusion of direction in space. By superimposing the character of being an
16:11–16:16inferential mark of air upon cold touch, the inference this cold touch belongs to air becomes
16:16–16:23possible. Then through mental superimposition the cognition this air is cold arises, like air is not
16:23–16:31hot. Therefore air is knowable only through inference. Establishment of the air is blowing
16:31–16:37and cold air is blowing. Objection, after operation of the tactile sense, how can one
16:37–16:42When inferred, the air is blowing, when conjunction and disjunction, which are reasons for movement,
16:42–16:44are imperceptible.
16:44–16:48If impact of air upon the body is called the reason, impact itself is a conjunction and
16:48–16:50therefore imperceptible.
16:50–16:55Reply, from a particular pleasure or pain produced by impact, impact upon the body
16:55–17:00is inferred, in that impact, production by a swift stream possessing touch is inferred,
17:00–17:04and from the stream the blowing motion of air is inferred.
17:04–17:09A person who does not know this mediating process does not infer blowing.
17:09–17:16A further question, how is there one qualified inferential cognition cold air is blowing?
17:16–17:19Cognition of air qualified by cold touch is mental, while cognition of the blowing
17:19–17:23motion is inferential, there would be an overlap of kinds.
17:23–17:28Reply, the blowing motion is inferred and air remembered is qualified by cold touch,
17:28–17:33therefore one inferential qualified cognition of air is qualified by blowing motion is
17:33–17:39possible. Cold touch and blowing motion are not jointly apprehended in air at one and the same moment.
17:40–17:45This is not faulted by cumbersomeness of postulation, because perception of both
17:45–17:51qualifiers in air is prevented by a stronger defeater. Once possession of manifest color is
17:51–17:56established as a cause and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession
17:56–18:01of manifest color, pervading the probandum delimited by a property of the subject or the
18:01–18:06the probandum delimited by the reason, becomes an extraneous condition of the inference proving
18:06–18:08perception of air.
18:08–18:13There is no fault of proving something else or of deviation in the qualificand, ultimately
18:13–18:19deviation of the probandum perceptibility in air and absence of the qualificand are established.
18:19–18:24Therefore air is inferrable, not perceptible.
18:24–18:28The self is perceptible, air is not.
18:28–18:33Objection, if possession of manifest color regulates perception of substance, the self,
18:33–18:38air would also become imperceptible. It cannot be said that the cognition I know occurs without
18:38–18:43apprehension of a reason and therefore cognition of the self is not inferential. A person who
18:43–18:47does not know the self cannot have the qualified cognition I know hence this cognition can serve
18:47–18:54as the inferential mark. If the self were inferrable the present tense cognition I now know a pot
18:54–18:57would be impossible because the cognition of the pot would be destroyed in the third moment
18:57–19:02before inference of the self. This objection can be answered by a gross temporal adjunct,
19:02–19:06just as from seeing a pot as activity one infers, the potter is making a pot.
19:08–19:13Conclusion, the self is perceptible. The recognition, I who saw the pot and the very
19:13–19:18one touching it, directly presents the identity of the self. This is not merely an inference that,
19:18–19:21I, the locus of cognition of the pot produced by the tactile sense,
19:21–19:25am identical with the locus of visual cognition, because in such recognition the,
19:25–19:29i itself is the object of its cognition, just as i is the locus of cognition.
19:30–19:34If the i form were imperceptible, the inferential mark itself would become imperceptible.
19:36–19:40To infer the self first from cognition, then infer ownership by the self and cognition,
19:40–19:45and finally infer in the self-objecthood for i-cognition is an unnecessary sequence.
19:46–19:51The recognition i who saw the pot and the very one touching it occurs even in a person who
19:51–19:54does not know such a procedure.
19:54–19:58There is no such recognition with respect to air.
19:58–20:03Air that has blown backward is continuously moving and is not cognized again, the cognition
20:03–20:07the air that blew behind is now blowing ahead is not a direct recognition of numerical
20:07–20:12identity but only an inference of substancehood belonging to the same kind.
20:12–20:16Thus the conclusion is, air is not perceived by an external sense organ, because it is
20:16–20:20a colorless substance, like ether.
20:20–20:25Here will being the locus of manifest touch, which pervades the probandum occurring in the
20:25–20:30reason, be an extraneous condition, because manifest touch is not the reason in the original
20:30–20:36inference, hence that property cannot become an extraneous condition pervading the probandum.
20:36–20:41Thus ends the theory of perception of air.
20:41–20:46See, the theory that gold is fiery.
20:46–20:53If possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause, gold will be imperceptible.
20:53–20:58Again, if possession of manifest touches accepted is the cause of immediate awareness of substance
20:58–21:04produced by an external sense organ, the fiery substance gold will not be perceptible, for,
21:04–21:08as an array, touch in fiery gold is non-manifest.
21:08–21:15Its color is indeed manifest, but the supporting yellow color overwhelms it.
21:15–21:19Overwhelming means relation to a stronger color of the same kind.
21:19–21:24the manifest color of gold can be overwhelmed even when the yellow color is not apprehended
21:24–21:26in darkness.
21:26–21:30It cannot be said that even overwhelmed fire is perceived in darkness, that gold therefore
21:30–21:35ought to be perceived, and that a second fire cannot be accepted to reveal fire.
21:35–21:40A substance is visually perceived only when its color is perceived.
21:40–21:44Since the real color of gold is overwhelmed by yellow color it is not perceived, and
21:44–21:49In the absence of rays the supporting yellow color too is not perceived, therefore gold
21:49–21:50remains imperceptible.

Plain text

A complex absence of non-manifestness is a cause of perception. The Siddhantan says, in the manifestation produced by contact with fire of colors delimited by whiteness and the like, it is impossible to accept lesser and greater extension of one and the same universal, therefore the manifestness residing in colors must be diverse. If merely manifest color is called the cause, there will be no recurrent cause. Hence the aggregate of absences of all universals of non-manifestness that are pervaded by whiteness and the like should be the cause of perception of color and the rest, otherwise recurrent perception of color would be impossible. In the same way, in perception of touch and the like, the aggregate of absences of the relevant universals of non-manifestness should be accepted as the cause. The second alternative is not to regard manifestness or non-manifestness as a universal. of a universal pervaded by colourhood may be manifestness, and its absence non-manifestness. In perceptible white colour there are universals such as greater whiteness and greatest whiteness, in the colour of vapour, the eye, and the like there is only general whiteness, because there is no proof establishing a special universal pervaded by whiteness there, and superior whiteness is absent. It cannot be said that colourhood itself establishes a universal pervaded by whiteness and therefore that universal should be the cause of perception. Once colorhood is accepted through economy as the cause, perception of white color is established, causal status of a special universal pervaded by whiteness is then unnecessary. Similarly, general touchhood alone suffices in perception of touch. Nor is it established that manifestness together with magnitude is a cause of perception of color, because air of extremely great magnitude is not perceived. INHEBITERS OF PERCEPTION Objection, fire present in a roasting potshard and sunlight illuminating a pot situated in water ought to be perceived, because the potshard and water are perceptible and therefore possess manifest colour. Their particular conjunction cannot be called an inhibitor, because water and potshard themselves are revealed by light, if that very conjunction were inhibitory, both fire can joined with the potshard and sunlight can joined with water would become imperceptible. If differences of conjunction are regarded as generated by universals, they would overlap, because in both cases conjunction may be produced by motion on either side. To accept many conjunctions like high and low tones is cumbersome, to regard each individual conjunction as different destroys recurrence. Reply, sunlight situated in water is in fact perceived, but because both water and light are extremely transparent, they are not distinctly seen as separate. From the part of a roasting potchard conjoined with fire there arises a particular fire whose color is non-manifest but whose touch is manifest. When a part of fire with manifest color enters extremely boiling oil, the fire is sometimes perceived. It is not accepted that curd is produced from curd atoms conjoined with milk. Curd is a substance produced after destruction of milk, as with curdled milk, its material causes are the material causes of milk. For this example does not defeat the causal status of manifest color. Magnitude is also a cause of perception. Objection, fire possessing manifest color does not possess manifest touch, cognition of heat there arises by a rule concerning another fire conjoined with heat. The causal conditions of manifest color and manifest touch in hot fire appear mutually incompatible. Reply, the undefeated recognition the very fire that I saw is what I am touching, both seeing and touching establish both color and touch in fire. Firehood is not an inhibitor of production of touch, production and non-production of a quality arise from differences in efficient causes. Firehood pervaded by substancehood is present in fire possessing manifest color and touch. Manifest color and touch coexist in water and earth, the apparent conflict in light is merely produced by a difference of efficient causes. related to manifest color and possession of many substances appear equally present through positive and negative concomitance in one substance, nevertheless only magnitude regulates perception of substance, and economy favors this view. In a heap of cotton, compactness increases magnitude without increasing the number of parts, and clarity of perception also increases. One should not accept possession of many substances as the cause merely because a distant mass of hair is perceived through possession of many substances or conjunction of similar hairs without an increase in the number of parts. Possession of many substances can be a cause through inherent, not through conjunction. Rather than treating conjunction of similar parts in a distant object as its auxiliary, it is simpler to treat that conjunction as an auxiliary to magnitude. Nor is it the case that possession of manifest colour and magnitude are merely natural eligibility for perception of substance, causes, like starford. Excellence of perception depends upon excellence of manifest colour and magnitude, therefore both are causes. Absence of excellence in a cause does not invariably accompany absence of the effect, so the example of starford does not apply. In visual perception of substance, possession of manifest colour and magnitude are both object-located causes, as common recurrent properties, they delimit causal status. B. The theory of perception of air Prima-facy view air is perceptible, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception of substance. The Prima-facy objector says possession of manifest color does not regulate perception of substance because air is perceived even without manifest color. Inference, air is perceptible because while possessing magnitude it is the locus of manifest touch, like a pot. The fact that hot vapor is perceptible does not make the reason deviant. of manifest touch together with magnitude establishes tactile perceptibility, possession of manifest color does not. Nor is possession of manifest color an extraneous condition pervading both the probandum delimited by a property of the subject and the probandum delimited by the reason, because it does not establish tactile perceptibility. After operation of the tactile sense organ there is a direct experience, the air is blowing. Even if touch is not apprehended as a reason, perceptibility of a pot is not destroyed, therefore this experience cannot be explained merely as inference of air from touch. If touch were inferred, the cognition would be there is touch in air, not air is hot or air is cold. Sometimes, even when touch is not distinctly understood, there is the direct experience, the air is cold. There is no proof that this cognition arises only after air has first been inferred is a reason for cognition of a cold substance, nor does perception of a particular quality involve superimposition of an opposed quality. Nor is visual imperceptibility an inhibitor of tactile perceptibility. The eye cognizes substance alone and the skin touch, if the skin cognizes touch together with its substrate, it can also cognize touch together with its substrate in air. The rule that substance is apprehended only when number, magnitude, and the like Like belonging to it or apprehended does not hold in every individual perception of substance. Cloth on one's back is known by touch even when its number and magnitude are not understood, in blowing air, touch on the body and sometimes number, magnitude, and the like are also experienced. Conclusion Air is Imperceptible. The Siddhantan says that air is not perceptible. In perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest color together with magnitude is a cause, it is improper to abandon a possible cause. Neither possession of a produced special quality apprehensible by an external sense organ nor possession of a special quality co-located with resultant magnitude is the cause, otherwise a yellow substance in the tongue, manifest bitter taste, and a fragrance substance carried by air would also have to be perceived. Prima-facy rejoinder possession of manifest touch is sufficient. The prima facie objecta replies possession of manifest color is not a cause of perception of substance, otherwise the yellow substance situated in the eye would be perceived. Alternatively, possession of manifest touch may be accepted as the cause in perception of air. On this view array will not become imperceptible because array is a fiery substance and its perceptibility depends upon manifest color just as perception of hot vapor does. How are conjunction, disjunction, and motion in the rays of a blue jewel and the like known? They are not perceived in moonbeams and the like. Array of a blue jewel is devoid of color in an earlier place and colored in a later place, from this, conjunction and disjunction of its substrate are inferred. Such inference as possible just as movement of air is inferred after general touch has been perceived in air. Smoke and vapor are not objects of a tactile sense, therefore even without manifest color they are objects of visual perception. To regard possession of many special qualities apprehensible by external sense organs as the cause of perception of substance is a cumbersome postulate that would make moats moving in a sunbeam imperceptible. If both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are accepted as causes of perception of substance, separate causalities must be posited for visual perception of a pot and tactile perception of air. Through economy, possession of a manifest special quality that determines a particular external sense organ should be accepted as the common cause. The objection that particular perception and general perception arise from different causal complexes and therefore one property cannot cause perceptions of substance produced by two different sense organs, is unestablished. There is no contradiction in accepting possession of manifest colour as the cause of visual perception of substance and possession of manifest touch as the cause of tactile perception of substance. Air is perceptible. The experience I touch is valid with respect to air. Objection, if air is a substance that is the object of immediate awareness produced by an external sense organ, how can colorless air be an object of perception? The rule is that a substance that is an object of immediate awareness produces color. Reply, a substance produces color only when it in his inner locus of color, merely being a substance that is an object of immediate awareness does not make it a producer of color. Only after color has been produced is it known in that state as a substance that is an object of perception. Nor does it follow that if a sense organ other than the eye apprehends substance, a pot would become colorless, touchless, and visually imperceptible. Although the tactile sense is an external sense organ that apprehends substance, it does not apprehend color, just as the eye does not apprehend touch, nevertheless the pot is an object of touch. With respect to air, as with a pot, a subsequent cognition, I am touching, arises, therefore air is perceptible. Manifest touch alone regulates tactile perception. It may again be said that manifest color, like manifest touch, is also a cause of tactile perceptibility, because substances possessing manifest color are seen to be perceived by touch. Reply, a sunray, though possessing manifest color, is imperceptible to touch, therefore manifest touch is necessary in tactile perception, while manifest color is purposeless. When manifest touch is present, absence of manifest color does not produce absence of tactile perceptibility. If it is said that manifestation located in touch is the cause but color is not, the reply is that both touch and its manifestation are causes, color is not. The universal's manifestness located in color and touch are only delimiters of causal status, not themselves causes. Modern view, air is imperceptible. Modern Neayakas say, manifest touch alone does not regulate tactile perception of substance. If it did, some are heat vapor, cold and hot substances carried by air, and their numbers, magnitudes, conjunctions, disjunctions, and motions would all be perceived. Number and the like residing in an eligible individual are apprehended when the appropriate conditions are present, yet no one knows the number of hot vapor is one nose apart by touching it with the hand. If possession of manifest color alone in general were the cause of perception of substance, the number of moonbeams and the yellow substance in the eye would be perceived. Even when subtle vapor is seen, its duality, hand-sized magnitude, or motion is not understood. Therefore both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are causes and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, because they deviate from one another, air is imperceptible. In the cognition, the conch is yellow, only the yellowness of the eye appears, not a yellow substance, the parts of the yellow substance are dispersed like rays. Accepting this does not violate the Neayaka doctrine. This is the modern view. View of of the tradition nor air is imperceptible. The tradition nor says, if only possession of manifest touch, and not possession of manifest color, caused perception of substance, disjunction from an eastern place in conjunction with a northern place and a row of flying birds would not be perceived, because the mass of rays in the eastern and northern places lacks manifest touch. Then the inference, the row of birds is moving on the basis of the mass of rays would be impossible, and inference, the moon and stars are moving from conjunction and disjunction would also be obstructed. Nor may one first infer the birds in the northeast region and then infer their conjunction and disjunction, because those regions are not perceived. Thus possession of manifest color alone is an indispensable cause of perception of air, and air is imperceptible. Explanation of the cognition, the air is cold. Objection, if air is knowable only by inference, how can cold touch qualify air in the illusion, the air is cold? Air is not an eligible substrate of cold touch. It is not enough to say that there is no obstruction to mentioning cold touch in cognition of air in general, because attribution of the quality to a particular air is impossible. It is also difficult to regard cold touch known by the tactile sense as superimposed upon air supplied by inference, because the mind does not directly perceive the four qualities such as touch inferred through air. Nor can cold touch be mentally superimposed upon air inferred as the cause of cognition of a cold substance because air is inferred as not being a locus of cold touch. If air is cold as an illusion produced by an external sense organ, such an illusion would likewise arise through defect and inferential apprehension of a particular. It is not an erroneous inference produced by a fallacious reason because cold touch is not erroneously taken as the mark of air. Nor is identity with remembered air superimposed upon the cold substance inferred from cold touch, the cognition is an awareness of cold touch with air as its qualificand. Even the attenuated illusion this cold touch belongs to air is unestablished. It is not merely a mental cognition of cold touch like a dream illusion, because it follows the operation of the tactile sense organ. The tradition or replies, cold touch known in water in the like may, through a sensory defect, be superimposed upon inferred air as a property contrary to it, like an illusion of direction in space. By superimposing the character of being an inferential mark of air upon cold touch, the inference this cold touch belongs to air becomes possible. Then through mental superimposition the cognition this air is cold arises, like air is not hot. Therefore air is knowable only through inference. Establishment of the air is blowing and cold air is blowing. Objection, after operation of the tactile sense, how can one When inferred, the air is blowing, when conjunction and disjunction, which are reasons for movement, are imperceptible. If impact of air upon the body is called the reason, impact itself is a conjunction and therefore imperceptible. Reply, from a particular pleasure or pain produced by impact, impact upon the body is inferred, in that impact, production by a swift stream possessing touch is inferred, and from the stream the blowing motion of air is inferred. A person who does not know this mediating process does not infer blowing. A further question, how is there one qualified inferential cognition cold air is blowing? Cognition of air qualified by cold touch is mental, while cognition of the blowing motion is inferential, there would be an overlap of kinds. Reply, the blowing motion is inferred and air remembered is qualified by cold touch, therefore one inferential qualified cognition of air is qualified by blowing motion is possible. Cold touch and blowing motion are not jointly apprehended in air at one and the same moment. This is not faulted by cumbersomeness of postulation, because perception of both qualifiers in air is prevented by a stronger defeater. Once possession of manifest color is established as a cause and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest color, pervading the probandum delimited by a property of the subject or the the probandum delimited by the reason, becomes an extraneous condition of the inference proving perception of air. There is no fault of proving something else or of deviation in the qualificand, ultimately deviation of the probandum perceptibility in air and absence of the qualificand are established. Therefore air is inferrable, not perceptible. The self is perceptible, air is not. Objection, if possession of manifest color regulates perception of substance, the self, air would also become imperceptible. It cannot be said that the cognition I know occurs without apprehension of a reason and therefore cognition of the self is not inferential. A person who does not know the self cannot have the qualified cognition I know hence this cognition can serve as the inferential mark. If the self were inferrable the present tense cognition I now know a pot would be impossible because the cognition of the pot would be destroyed in the third moment before inference of the self. This objection can be answered by a gross temporal adjunct, just as from seeing a pot as activity one infers, the potter is making a pot. Conclusion, the self is perceptible. The recognition, I who saw the pot and the very one touching it, directly presents the identity of the self. This is not merely an inference that, I, the locus of cognition of the pot produced by the tactile sense, am identical with the locus of visual cognition, because in such recognition the, i itself is the object of its cognition, just as i is the locus of cognition. If the i form were imperceptible, the inferential mark itself would become imperceptible. To infer the self first from cognition, then infer ownership by the self and cognition, and finally infer in the self-objecthood for i-cognition is an unnecessary sequence. The recognition i who saw the pot and the very one touching it occurs even in a person who does not know such a procedure. There is no such recognition with respect to air. Air that has blown backward is continuously moving and is not cognized again, the cognition the air that blew behind is now blowing ahead is not a direct recognition of numerical identity but only an inference of substancehood belonging to the same kind. Thus the conclusion is, air is not perceived by an external sense organ, because it is a colorless substance, like ether. Here will being the locus of manifest touch, which pervades the probandum occurring in the reason, be an extraneous condition, because manifest touch is not the reason in the original inference, hence that property cannot become an extraneous condition pervading the probandum. Thus ends the theory of perception of air. See, the theory that gold is fiery. If possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause, gold will be imperceptible. Again, if possession of manifest touches accepted is the cause of immediate awareness of substance produced by an external sense organ, the fiery substance gold will not be perceptible, for, as an array, touch in fiery gold is non-manifest. Its color is indeed manifest, but the supporting yellow color overwhelms it. Overwhelming means relation to a stronger color of the same kind. the manifest color of gold can be overwhelmed even when the yellow color is not apprehended in darkness. It cannot be said that even overwhelmed fire is perceived in darkness, that gold therefore ought to be perceived, and that a second fire cannot be accepted to reveal fire. A substance is visually perceived only when its color is perceived. Since the real color of gold is overwhelmed by yellow color it is not perceived, and In the absence of rays the supporting yellow color too is not perceived, therefore gold remains imperceptible.

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