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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.998493)
Duration: 21:28
Source: Open preserved recording

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0:02–0:33आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड, बड नाटक आप्रहेंचन इस नाटक आप्संष नाटक आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड, बड नाटक आप्रहेंचन इस नाटक आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड आप्संष नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक �
0:33–0:38color in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension
0:38–0:42itself remains unestablished.
0:42–0:46Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force
0:46–0:48of pervasion.
0:48–0:53That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced
0:53–0:54by non-apprehension.
0:54–0:59If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition
0:59–1:01of absence.
1:01–1:06If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension,
1:06–1:13the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted.
1:13–1:17Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be, air
1:17–1:21is colorless, not that there is absence of color in air.
1:21–1:26Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot-possessing ground not cognize absence of the pot from
1:26–1:29its non-apprehension prior to seeing it?
1:29–1:34If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced
1:34–1:39by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory.
1:39–1:43If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of
1:43–1:49the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence.
1:49–1:54Refutation of the repetition concerning non-apprehension.
1:54–1:59The msaka again says, after kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether mikra
1:59–2:01was inside.
2:01–2:06his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Micra, Micra was not in
2:06–2:07the house.
2:07–2:12This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not remember
2:12–2:17Micra and therefore had no prior experience of Micra's absence.
2:17–2:21Since Micra's absence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of
2:21–2:25a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other
2:25–2:28cognitions of absence as well.
2:28–2:32A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another
2:32–2:39person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands Maitre's absence.
2:39–2:45The Neyayaka replies, unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence,
2:45–2:50non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive and a distant house is impossible.
2:50–2:55If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension
2:55–2:59is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension.
3:00–3:05Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of mitra, in its unknown form, produce cognition of
3:05–3:10mitra's absence, on the M. Sakavu apprehension is supersensible, and therefore mitra's absence
3:10–3:14cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
3:16–3:19Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark.
3:22–3:26Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by
3:26–3:31an eligible micro produces cognition of micro's absence in the house.
3:31–3:36Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro
3:36–3:41in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as, micro was in the house at some time,
3:41–3:47should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced.
3:47–3:51Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by
3:51–3:53a defect.
3:53–3:57A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the
3:57–4:02like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible
4:02–4:05mitra, which is naturally a means of knowledge.
4:05–4:10The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging
4:10–4:12to its causes.
4:12–4:16Distance and the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature,
4:16–4:22like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it.
4:22–4:27Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge, because
4:27–4:32cognition of micro-zapsons is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an eligible
4:32–4:33micro.
4:33–4:38Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge, non-recollection of an
4:38–4:43eligible micro known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition
4:43–4:48of micro-zapsons is possible from that mark alone.
4:48–4:51Conclusion Cognition of absence is perceptual.
4:51–4:57Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitre is not known by the mind, because there
4:57–5:01is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitre is
5:01–5:03not eligible for a sense organ.
5:03–5:07Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifier had
5:07–5:13belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation.
5:13–5:16Cognition of absence of colour and the like in air is not produced by an inferential
5:16–5:20mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ.
5:20–5:25The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence
5:25–5:27cognition of absence is perceptual.
5:27–5:32It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential mark.
5:32–5:36How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise?
5:36–5:40Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential
5:40–5:44mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark.
5:44–5:48A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra,
5:48–5:53non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is
5:53–5:58deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object,
5:58–6:05excluding mere non-recollection. Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used
6:05–6:11only as an inferential mark. The complete inference is, at that time there was absence
6:11–6:15of mitra in the house, because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions
6:15–6:19and other features comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra,
6:19–6:24wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot.
6:26–6:30Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge in the perception
6:30–6:39section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of absence.
6:41–6:45The theory of absence in the perception section of the tatva-sintmai.
6:45–6:51Mtsaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature.
6:51–6:58The Mtsaka says, The absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence
6:58–7:03of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which
7:03–7:06the counter positive is not present.
7:06–7:10Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should
7:10–7:15be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation
7:15–7:21called Qualifierhood or Self-Linking Relation for Cognition of Absence.
7:21–7:25Reply of the earlier Neayakas.
7:25–7:30The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this
7:30–7:33ground occurs in direct experience.
7:33–7:37This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would
7:37–7:40occur on ground possessing a pot.
7:40–7:45Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness
7:45–7:50distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted.
7:50–7:54If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement there
7:54–7:58is absence of a pot on the ground becomes unnecessary.
7:58–8:03And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence and the containership
8:03–8:09of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation would be impossible.
8:09–8:13Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus.
8:13–8:18A particular entity is the locus of absence.
8:18–8:23Objection, the Naya Yaka who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence,
8:23–8:28because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this ground.
8:28–8:32Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground.
8:32–8:36That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur
8:36–8:41on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be, ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual
8:41–8:46dependence, and it cannot be ground possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction.
8:46–8:49Thus absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus.
8:51–8:54Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground,
8:54–8:58but a distinct empty locus qualified by absence of a pot.
8:59–9:03This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent,
9:03–9:07nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence,
9:07–9:11just as one pot is the locus of its own single counter positive.
9:13–9:18Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence.
9:18–9:21Question, where is absence?
9:21–9:24Reply, wherever it is experienced.
9:24–9:27Again, where is it experienced?
9:27–9:30Reply, wherever it actually exists.
9:30–9:37There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence of universals such as conus either,
9:37–9:42since usage could be explained on the basis of individual cows.
9:42–9:47Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot.
9:47–9:50Before the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot,
9:50–9:55after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing absence of a pot.
9:55–10:00There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence.
10:00–10:06A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container, contained relation,
10:06–10:11therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground.
10:11–10:18The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence, is only verbal ingenuity.
10:18–10:24It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground.
10:24–10:34Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground.
10:34–10:38The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely of ground,
10:38–10:42but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity Agnoma is cognition of
10:42–10:48both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone,
10:48–10:53because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said that such usage is based
10:53–10:57upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward, that second cognition of
10:57–11:01ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot.
11:01–11:08Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition
11:08–11:12of pot-possessing ground produced by sense contact, through a difference in causal conditions
11:12–11:16eliminate the additional status of absence.
11:16–11:20Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot-possessing ground.
11:20–11:25Therefore, the intended meaning of empty ground is the grounds possession of absence
11:25–11:31of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground.
11:31–11:36The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence.
11:36–11:40Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter positive pot or by something
11:40–11:43pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot.
11:43–11:48Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also
11:48–11:53be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot.
11:53–11:56Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on
11:56–12:01the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence,
12:01–12:04it is not separately cognized.
12:04–12:07The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is
12:07–12:11absence of a pot, has already been refuted.
12:11–12:15Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter positive, cognition of the ground
12:15–12:19is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter positive.
12:19–12:23Cognition of a lockers is possible without reference to the counter positive, but cognition
12:23–12:25of absence is not.
12:25–12:29The claim, cognition of the visible counter positive is needed only for usage concerning
12:29–12:34absence, while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience.
12:34–12:39Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object.
12:39–12:43If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were
12:43–12:47absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection
12:47–12:51of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place,
12:51–12:55outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it.
12:55–13:00Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, and
13:00–13:06since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear.
13:06–13:10If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after
13:10–13:14a pot has been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground
13:14–13:17that formerly possessed the pot?
13:17–13:21Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground is itself proof of
13:21–13:25an additional absence of the pot.
13:25–13:30Prabhupāda view, cognition of the ground itself is absence.
13:30–13:35The Nāyāyika objects, on the Memsākā view usage concerning absence is impossible, because
13:35–13:39cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lockers depend upon one another.
13:39–13:43The Prabhākāra replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing
13:43–13:48ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot.
13:48–13:52merely because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a
13:52–13:57a pot, that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically
13:57–14:01distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence
14:01–14:03of a pot.
14:03–14:08An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground.
14:08–14:13In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive
14:13–14:17never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus
14:17–14:22possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence.
14:23–14:27Co-referential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter
14:27–14:32positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot,
14:32–14:38the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neiaiaka view, that very
14:38–14:42cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the
14:42–14:47cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition
14:47–14:53of the locus. But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning
14:53–14:58absence of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it
14:58–15:03sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence,
15:03–15:07because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formally
15:07–15:15not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and
15:15–15:22locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition
15:22–15:27of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator,
15:27–15:32no separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say that not seeing
15:32–15:37the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of possession of the counter-positive,
15:37–15:41is the cause of cognition of empty ground. But even while a pot is seen at present,
15:41–15:47the cognition, there was no pot here before, is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable.
15:48–15:52The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is merely a
15:52–15:57difference in the natures of their objects. If that difference is called mutual absence,
15:57–16:02infinite regress and self-dependence result. It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging
16:02–16:06to cognition of pot possessing ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely
16:06–16:09of ground produce distinct cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity.
16:09–16:16Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing
16:16–16:20an eternal neutral absence between absence and its locus.
16:20–16:25When the counter positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve
16:25–16:30as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus.
16:30–16:35The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the
16:35–16:40locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence.
16:40–16:45of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing
16:45–16:48ground is absence.
16:48–16:52Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object.
16:52–16:56On the Prabhikara view absence and empty lockers are identical, how then can cognition
16:56–16:59of absence and cognition of the lockers differ?
16:59–17:03Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal
17:03–17:07conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise
17:07–17:10in a stream of cognition.
17:10–17:14Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of
17:14–17:16a pot.
17:16–17:21The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards
17:21–17:24the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature
17:24–17:27of the locus of absence.
17:27–17:32In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs.
17:32–17:36The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground, compels even the
17:36–17:41Nayaaka to accept a difference of nature, the only distinction is that the Nayaaka calls
17:41–17:45this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhākara calls it the
17:45–17:47nature of the locus.
17:47–17:51Objection, how did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing
17:51–17:54ground later become different from it?
17:54–17:58Reply, the Nayaaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential
17:58–18:02negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either.
18:02–18:07and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. When
18:07–18:12empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground
18:12–18:15possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it.
18:15–18:20How can both neutral absence and its absence occur in ground delimited by pot and absence
18:20–18:26of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and
18:26–18:31its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference. Doubt, is
18:31–18:35Because there are pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on
18:35–18:39the ground or possible through a defect owing to the defect.
18:39–18:43Difference from pot possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot
18:43–18:47possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained.
18:47–18:52If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent
18:52–18:54usage concerning absence?
18:54–18:58The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it
18:58–19:06is difficult to establish one universal absenceshood in diverse absences. A proper definition of
19:06–19:13absenceshood is impossible. Absenceshood cannot be called a universal, one universal and the
19:13–19:19form of absenceshood cannot pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive
19:19–19:24entity is not absenceshood, because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the
19:24–19:30non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus.
19:30–19:34counter-positiveness determined by a positive entity is not absencehood, because counter-positiveness
19:34–19:39itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter-positive of absence of an absence,
19:39–19:42that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself.
19:43–19:47Nor is the state of possessing a counter-positive absencehood, for
19:47–19:52inheritance and similarity also have counter-positives. If it is called the nature residing in an
19:52–19:56opposed object, there is overextension to cognition and the like, and the word, nature,
19:56–20:02in the sense of its own form, is not recurrent. Nor is lack of existence absenthood because lack
20:02–20:10itself is an absence. Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence. One absence is
20:10–20:16not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation to another absence.
20:17–20:22Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence because cognition of existence in
20:22–20:26universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence
20:26–20:30to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus.
20:31–20:36If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence
20:36–20:41and creates self dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity,
20:41–20:46and difference as the nature of the locus is mutual absence, self dependence again
20:46–20:50follows, determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence.
20:50–20:56If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even
20:56–20:59on the Neayaka view.
20:59–21:04What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence?
21:04–21:08Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus,
21:08–21:13because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived.
21:13–21:17Nor is one and the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were
21:17–21:22Returnal, usage-concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and
21:22–21:25the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

Plain text

आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड, बड नाटक आप्रहेंचन इस नाटक आप्संष नाटक आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड, बड नाटक आप्रहेंचन इस नाटक आप्संष मेथी इन्फर्ड आप्संष नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक आप्संस नाटक � color in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished. Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion. That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension. If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence. If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension, the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted. Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be, air is colorless, not that there is absence of color in air. Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot-possessing ground not cognize absence of the pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it? If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory. If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence. Refutation of the repetition concerning non-apprehension. The msaka again says, after kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether mikra was inside. his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Micra, Micra was not in the house. This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not remember Micra and therefore had no prior experience of Micra's absence. Since Micra's absence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions of absence as well. A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands Maitre's absence. The Neyayaka replies, unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence, non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive and a distant house is impossible. If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension. Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of mitra, in its unknown form, produce cognition of mitra's absence, on the M. Sakavu apprehension is supersensible, and therefore mitra's absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by an eligible micro produces cognition of micro's absence in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as, micro was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible mitra, which is naturally a means of knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging to its causes. Distance and the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it. Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge, because cognition of micro-zapsons is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an eligible micro. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge, non-recollection of an eligible micro known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition of micro-zapsons is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion Cognition of absence is perceptual. Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitre is not known by the mind, because there is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitre is not eligible for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifier had belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of colour and the like in air is not produced by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ. The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence cognition of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential mark. How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise? Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark. A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra, non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding mere non-recollection. Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark. The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house, because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot. Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge in the perception section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of absence. The theory of absence in the perception section of the tatva-sintmai. Mtsaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature. The Mtsaka says, The absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which the counter positive is not present. Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation called Qualifierhood or Self-Linking Relation for Cognition of Absence. Reply of the earlier Neayakas. The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement there is absence of a pot on the ground becomes unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence and the containership of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation would be impossible. Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus. A particular entity is the locus of absence. Objection, the Naya Yaka who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence, because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this ground. Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground. That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be, ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual dependence, and it cannot be ground possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction. Thus absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus. Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty locus qualified by absence of a pot. This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent, nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot is the locus of its own single counter positive. Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence. Question, where is absence? Reply, wherever it is experienced. Again, where is it experienced? Reply, wherever it actually exists. There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of individual cows. Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot. Before the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence, is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground. Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground. The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity Agnoma is cognition of both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition of pot-possessing ground produced by sense contact, through a difference in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence. Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot-possessing ground. Therefore, the intended meaning of empty ground is the grounds possession of absence of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence. Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter positive pot or by something pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot. Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot. Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence, it is not separately cognized. The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is absence of a pot, has already been refuted. Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter positive, cognition of the ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter positive. Cognition of a lockers is possible without reference to the counter positive, but cognition of absence is not. The claim, cognition of the visible counter positive is needed only for usage concerning absence, while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience. Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object. If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place, outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it. Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, and since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear. If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot has been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formerly possessed the pot? Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground is itself proof of an additional absence of the pot. Prabhupāda view, cognition of the ground itself is absence. The Nāyāyika objects, on the Memsākā view usage concerning absence is impossible, because cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lockers depend upon one another. The Prabhākāra replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot. merely because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a a pot, that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot. An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground. In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence. Co-referential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neiaiaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus. But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence, because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formally not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of possession of the counter-positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground. But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before, is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable. The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is merely a difference in the natures of their objects. If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result. It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity. Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing an eternal neutral absence between absence and its locus. When the counter positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus. The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence. of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing ground is absence. Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object. On the Prabhikara view absence and empty lockers are identical, how then can cognition of absence and cognition of the lockers differ? Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise in a stream of cognition. Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of a pot. The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature of the locus of absence. In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs. The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground, compels even the Nayaaka to accept a difference of nature, the only distinction is that the Nayaaka calls this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhākara calls it the nature of the locus. Objection, how did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing ground later become different from it? Reply, the Nayaaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either. and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. When empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it. How can both neutral absence and its absence occur in ground delimited by pot and absence of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference. Doubt, is Because there are pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on the ground or possible through a defect owing to the defect. Difference from pot possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained. If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent usage concerning absence? The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it is difficult to establish one universal absenceshood in diverse absences. A proper definition of absenceshood is impossible. Absenceshood cannot be called a universal, one universal and the form of absenceshood cannot pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive entity is not absenceshood, because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus. counter-positiveness determined by a positive entity is not absencehood, because counter-positiveness itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter-positive of absence of an absence, that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself. Nor is the state of possessing a counter-positive absencehood, for inheritance and similarity also have counter-positives. If it is called the nature residing in an opposed object, there is overextension to cognition and the like, and the word, nature, in the sense of its own form, is not recurrent. Nor is lack of existence absenthood because lack itself is an absence. Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence. One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation to another absence. Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence because cognition of existence in universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus. If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates self dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the locus is mutual absence, self dependence again follows, determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence. If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even on the Neayaka view. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence? Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one and the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were Returnal, usage-concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

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