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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 20:42
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0:02–0:07नाटक आप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक
0:07–0:13Intrinsic apprehension of cognitive validity may be understood in three ways, being apprehensible
0:13–0:17by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions, being apprehensible by the means that apprehends
0:17–0:22every substrate of validity, or being apprehensible by a produced cognition that is not produced
0:22–0:27by another produced cognition taking the same validity as its object.
0:27–0:31Extrinsic apprehension of validity means being apprehensible without the stated aggregate.
0:31–0:35Under this definition, even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic
0:35–0:39Apprehension is not lost because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced
0:39–0:44from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object.
0:44–0:47After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative
0:47–0:49inference of the same kind.
0:49–0:54Example, this cognition of a body is valid because it is cognition of a body with respect
0:54–0:58to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body.
0:58–1:01The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet
1:01–1:07as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body.
1:07–1:14Recutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body
1:14–1:16This answer also refutes the following objection.
1:16–1:19In the inference, this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect
1:19–1:23to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be
1:23–1:27an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring
1:27–1:29exclusion.
1:29–1:33Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition
1:33–1:38making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant.
1:38–1:41Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is
1:41–1:43a body.
1:43–1:47If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that
1:47–1:50is the object of cognition, the reason, being body cognition that takes as object
1:50–1:54a substrate of hands and feet, will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also
1:54–1:58in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object.
1:58–2:02How can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid
2:02–2:05of hands and feet, be attached to the reason?
2:05–2:09If the locative phrase, in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified
2:09–2:13reason will mean, being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid
2:13–2:17of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object
2:17–2:22bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar.
2:22–2:25Nor will the qualifier, not functioning as body cognition with respect to an
2:25–2:29object devoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning
2:29–2:33would be objecthood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur.
2:33–2:36No other suitable qualifier is available.
2:36–2:40Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate
2:40–2:43of hands and feet it's qualifcant.
2:43–2:46In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the
2:46–2:49mode, so the reason is not deviant.
2:49–2:53And if objecthood delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be
2:53–2:57stated thus, being body-cognition-free from being cognition that makes its mode of body-hood
2:57–3:02residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness
3:02–3:07of object-hood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition.
3:07–3:13Recutation of the Prabhupācāra Objection of Infinite Regress
3:13–3:16The Prabhupākāra or Guru-Pāti may say, a cognition whose validity has already
3:16–3:20been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity
3:20–3:25of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition whose
3:25–3:29validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would
3:29–3:34have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose
3:34–3:39validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial
3:39–3:43cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to
3:43–3:47determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine
3:47–3:53its object. The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid,
3:53–3:56therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate.
3:57–4:01It may be objected that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid,
4:01–4:06how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that
4:06–4:10certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition.
4:11–4:14In cognition of an object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm,
4:14–4:19When no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object,
4:19–4:22and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity.
4:23–4:27But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt
4:27–4:32about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not
4:32–4:36act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a
4:36–4:40determination of validity. Therefore inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has
4:40–4:44not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in
4:44–4:49them the defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity
4:49–4:54also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of
4:54–4:59that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of
4:59–5:04the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition.
5:04–5:08of infinite regress.
5:08–5:10There is no infinite regress in this way.
5:10–5:14Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final
5:14–5:18cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some
5:18–5:22distinct object has already been obtained.
5:22–5:26On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the Bhav view, because cognition's validity
5:26–5:29is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition.
5:29–5:33In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither
5:33–5:37in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot
5:37–5:40be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate.
5:40–5:45It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means,
5:45–5:49and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing
5:49–5:50regress.
5:50–5:54Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity
5:54–5:58of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established,
5:58–6:01and so there is no infinite regress.
6:01–6:04They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the
6:04–6:08validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, no
6:08–6:11doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains.
6:11–6:16Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of
6:16–6:21cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress.
6:21–6:23But this view is not correct.
6:23–6:26If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the
6:26–6:30object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless
6:30–6:34for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial
6:34–6:37certainty about the object alone.
6:37–6:41It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object
6:41–6:44of cognition, causes activity.
6:44–6:47If it is asked how doubt about the first cognition's validity again raises doubt
6:47–6:52about an object already determined, one should consult experience.
6:52–6:55Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognition's validity or invalidity
6:55–7:00causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes
7:00–7:04the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object.
7:04–7:12Saka objection and Neyayaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference.
7:12–7:16Some masakas object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and
7:16–7:19pervasion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there
7:19–7:25is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished.
7:25–7:28The Nayaika may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition
7:28–7:32of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would
7:32–7:36disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically
7:36–7:39dependent on their own causes.
7:39–7:42But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason
7:42–7:46produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt
7:46–7:52about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative.
7:52–7:57The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity,
7:57–8:01cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object.
8:01–8:06When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object.
8:06–8:10Some Nayaikas say that even the Memsarco admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes
8:10–8:13arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not.
8:13–8:17The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri...
8:17–8:21It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth
8:21–8:26and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless,
8:26–8:28why then pursue an inference determining its validity?
8:28–8:33Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been
8:33–8:37established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the
8:37–8:40same sacrifice as its object.
8:40–8:44Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second
8:44–8:48cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity.
8:48–8:55Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless by preventing doubt about invalidity. It assists unwavering activity
8:57–9:03Neayaka conclusion inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not
9:05–9:11Some Neayayikas including the Kasperty say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning
9:11–9:14Invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate
9:14–9:19This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke,
9:19–9:23and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity.
9:23–9:28Because a perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference.
9:28–9:34Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded,
9:34–9:38and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity.
9:38–9:44In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself
9:44–9:47is not a cause of activity.
9:47–9:51Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity
9:51–9:53arises.
9:53–9:58In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition
9:58–10:04of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth.
10:04–10:08In an illusion, reflexive awareness states silverness and the like is modes of the first
10:08–10:14cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition.
10:14–10:19Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflexive awareness such as this is my body,
10:19–10:24extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated
10:24–10:29reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity
10:29–10:32is determined extrinsically.
10:32–10:34This view is unsound.
10:34–10:39Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter-positive of
10:39–10:44an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination
10:44–10:48must occur extrinsically through another means.
10:48–10:52Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition
10:52–10:57in the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from
10:57–11:02doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity.
11:02–11:06Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause
11:06–11:08of activity.
11:08–11:12The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence
11:12–11:16of the first cognition's own causal aggregate.
11:16–11:20A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy,
11:20–11:25the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known.
11:25–11:28Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception
11:28–11:32section of the tat the synthmi composed by the illustrious Gangesopadia.
11:34–11:42The theory of the production of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically.
11:44–11:49The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause,
11:49–11:53it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone.
11:54–11:59Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate,
11:59–12:05would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid.
12:06–12:10If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the
12:10–12:15cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, would be a
12:15–12:21special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. Therefore
12:21–12:26the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a
12:26–12:30a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate.
12:30–12:34A further objection, where neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and
12:34–12:39defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the
12:39–12:43same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity
12:43–12:45should arise.
12:45–12:49Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity
12:49–12:52and invalidity, is no separate effect.
12:52–12:56The general aggregate for cognition includes, within itself the aggregates of the specific
12:56–12:58cognitions, valid and invalid.
12:58–13:04No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition.
13:04–13:09Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear.
13:09–13:15The Mensaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly
13:15–13:19The Mensaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates
13:19–13:23of the same kind may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two
13:23–13:28pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other.
13:28–13:32It should not be said that because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent
13:32–13:36cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot
13:36–13:41arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot
13:41–13:44be established as the delimiter of effect hood.
13:44–13:48Being a property residing only in effects is likewise deviant in such specific properties
13:48–13:51as blue-pot hood and pot-cognition hood.
13:51–13:56The author of the Kusumunjeli may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive
13:56–14:01cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition,
14:01–14:04it is a produced cognition.
14:04–14:07But this inference is unsound.
14:07–14:11Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced
14:11–14:15by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject
14:15–14:18and contradiction results.
14:18–14:22If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition
14:22–14:27in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in
14:27–14:30the example in valid cognition.
14:30–14:37Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either.
14:37–14:41If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some
14:41–14:45one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what
14:45–14:48is already established.
14:48–14:53Orchin-valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in
14:53–14:58general be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction
14:58–15:00arise.
15:00–15:04It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have
15:04–15:08two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific
15:08–15:10cognition.
15:10–15:14Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference
15:14–15:17between their effects.
15:17–15:22This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct
15:22–15:25from the cause of cognition in general.
15:25–15:29If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the
15:29–15:34inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property
15:34–15:39bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished.
15:39–15:43Refutation of other inferences.
15:43–15:47Here is the following pro-bandim admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose
15:47–15:52causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited
15:52–15:58by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities
15:58–16:02and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood.
16:02–16:06Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate
16:06–16:11depends on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier,
16:11–16:16Unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities
16:16–16:19such as space and does not depend on a cause.
16:19–16:23Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting
16:23–16:27effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon
16:27–16:30a cause, cognition hood is not such a property.
16:30–16:33If the pro-bandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal
16:33–16:37entities, the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already
16:37–16:41established, since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general
16:41–16:45but produces cognition of its own type.
16:45–16:49This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which
16:49–16:54is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it is
16:54–16:58a property directly pervaded by cognition hood.
16:58–17:02Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit
17:02–17:04effect hood.
17:04–17:08The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood
17:08–17:15of non-eternal entities to limits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties.
17:15–17:20It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effectorizing
17:20–17:24from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid
17:24–17:25cognition.
17:25–17:27This is unsound.
17:27–17:30Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own
17:30–17:36object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a part
17:36–17:40is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also
17:40–17:45proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity
17:45–17:48is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes.
17:50–17:52Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view
17:54–17:58It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effected is delimited by a
17:58–18:03property upcent from invalid cognition because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous
18:03–18:05to invalid cognition.
18:05–18:09If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is determined
18:09–18:13as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition.
18:13–18:17But this inference suffers from proving what is already established.
18:17–18:20Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upcent from
18:20–18:24invalid cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact
18:24–18:29as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties.
18:29–18:33The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates
18:33–18:37identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless.
18:37–18:41It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor
18:41–18:46blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either
18:46–18:47valid or invalid.
18:47–18:52Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception,
18:52–18:56like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition.
18:57–19:00But these inferences too prove what is already established.
19:01–19:06The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid
19:06–19:09cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory perception.
19:11–19:15This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its
19:15–19:20contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition.
19:20–19:26When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's
19:26–19:31limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and
19:31–19:37to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice
19:37–19:42and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific
19:42–19:47sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and
19:47–19:52the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established
19:52–19:58recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the
19:58–20:02causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition.
20:03–20:08Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid
20:08–20:12perceptions. Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class.
20:12–20:16Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity
20:16–20:21in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Sri Gangesopad Haya.
20:21–20:27The first is the third is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the
20:27–20:32fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is
20:32–20:36the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth
20:36–20:41is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the

Plain text

नाटक आप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक Intrinsic apprehension of cognitive validity may be understood in three ways, being apprehensible by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions, being apprehensible by the means that apprehends every substrate of validity, or being apprehensible by a produced cognition that is not produced by another produced cognition taking the same validity as its object. Extrinsic apprehension of validity means being apprehensible without the stated aggregate. Under this definition, even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic Apprehension is not lost because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body. Recutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference, this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion. Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body. If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is the object of cognition, the reason, being body cognition that takes as object a substrate of hands and feet, will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object. How can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet, be attached to the reason? If the locative phrase, in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified reason will mean, being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar. Nor will the qualifier, not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object devoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available. Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being body-cognition-free from being cognition that makes its mode of body-hood residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of object-hood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition. Recutation of the Prabhupācāra Objection of Infinite Regress The Prabhupākāra or Guru-Pāti may say, a cognition whose validity has already been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object. The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm, When no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition. of infinite regress. There is no infinite regress in this way. Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some distinct object has already been obtained. On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the Bhav view, because cognition's validity is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition. In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means, and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress. Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt about the first cognition's validity again raises doubt about an object already determined, one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognition's validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object. Saka objection and Neyayaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference. Some masakas object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and pervasion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished. The Nayaika may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative. The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object. Some Nayaikas say that even the Memsarco admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri... It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference determining its validity? Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless by preventing doubt about invalidity. It assists unwavering activity Neayaka conclusion inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not Some Neayayikas including the Kasperty say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning Invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity. Because a perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference. Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth. In an illusion, reflexive awareness states silverness and the like is modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflexive awareness such as this is my body, extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter-positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically through another means. Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition in the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity. The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy, the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section of the tat the synthmi composed by the illustrious Gangesopadia. The theory of the production of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate. A further objection, where neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise. Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity, is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes, within itself the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Mensaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly The Mensaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other. It should not be said that because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue-pot hood and pot-cognition hood. The author of the Kusumunjeli may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition. Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established. Orchin-valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished. Refutation of other inferences. Here is the following pro-bandim admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood. Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier, Unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause. Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognition hood is not such a property. If the pro-bandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established, since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood. Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood. The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of non-eternal entities to limits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties. It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effectorizing from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition. This is unsound. Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effected is delimited by a property upcent from invalid cognition because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established. Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upcent from invalid cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition. Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid perceptions. Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Sri Gangesopad Haya. The first is the third is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the fourth is the

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