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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:06नाटक आप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक
0:06–0:08अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक
0:08–0:10अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक
0:10–0:15may be understood in three ways, being apprehensible by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions,
0:15–0:20being apprehensible by the means that apprehends every substrate of validity, or being apprehensible
0:20–0:24by a produced cognition that is not produced by another produced cognition taking the same
0:24–0:29validity as its object. Extrinsic apprehension of validity means being apprehensible without
0:29–0:34the stated aggregate. Under this definition, even if validity is apprehended by the
0:34–0:38mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended by
0:38–0:42another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object.
0:43–0:47After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative
0:47–0:52inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid because it is
0:52–0:56cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition
0:56–1:01of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands
1:01–1:05and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body.
1:05–1:11Refutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body
1:11–1:17This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference of this body
1:17–1:21cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet.
1:21–1:25Being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason,
1:25–1:28because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion.
1:29–1:33Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition
1:33–1:38making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property
1:38–1:43is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body.
1:43–1:47If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is
1:47–1:51the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate
1:51–1:55of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes
1:55–2:00a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct
2:00–2:05from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason.
2:05–2:09If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified
2:09–2:13reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid
2:13–2:17of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object
2:17–2:22bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar.
2:22–2:25Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object
2:25–2:30avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood,
2:30–2:35and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available.
2:36–2:41Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate of hands
2:41–2:46and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet
2:46–2:51itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood delimits both
2:51–2:55modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being body-cognition-free
2:55–2:59from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an object devoid of hands,
2:59–3:03feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood.
3:03–3:08This reason establishes the validity of cognition.
3:08–3:13Recutation of the Prabhukra objection of infinite regress
3:13–3:17The Prabhukara or Guru-Pati may say, a cognition whose validity has already been
3:17–3:20determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity
3:20–3:25of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition whose
3:25–3:29validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would
3:29–3:34have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose
3:34–3:39validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial
3:39–3:43cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to
3:43–3:47determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object.
3:47–3:53The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore
3:53–3:58its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected
3:58–4:02that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine
4:02–4:07the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object
4:07–4:12arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an
4:12–4:16object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity
4:16–4:20arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object
4:20–4:23produces unwavering activity.
4:23–4:27But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt
4:27–4:32about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does
4:32–4:36not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon
4:36–4:37a determination of validity.
4:37–4:41Therefore, inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been
4:41–4:45apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect
4:45–4:48that consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent.
4:48–4:52If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its
4:52–4:55validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity.
4:55–5:00Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the
5:00–5:04validity of the object cognition.
5:04–5:08Avoidance of infinite regress
5:08–5:10There is no infinite regress in this way.
5:10–5:14Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of
5:14–5:18final cognition is present because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered or
5:18–5:22because some distinct object has already been obtained.
5:22–5:26On the contrary, infinite regressorizes in the bar view because cognition's validity
5:26–5:29is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition.
5:29–5:33In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in
5:33–5:37the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot
5:37–5:40be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate.
5:40–5:45It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means,
5:45–5:49and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing
5:49–5:50regress.
5:50–5:54Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the
5:54–5:58first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there
5:58–6:01is no infinite regress.
6:01–6:04They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the
6:04–6:08validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established,
6:08–6:13doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had
6:13–6:17been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt
6:17–6:24about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about
6:24–6:28the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is
6:28–6:32already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object,
6:32–6:36unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone.
6:36–6:41It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object
6:41–6:44of cognition, causes activity.
6:44–6:48If it is asked how doubt about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object
6:48–6:52already determined, one should consult experience.
6:52–6:55Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions validity or invalidity
6:55–6:58causes doubt about the object.
6:58–7:01The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity
7:01–7:05and produces doubt concerning the object.
7:05–7:12Masaka objection and Naya Yaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference.
7:12–7:16Some masaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and
7:16–7:19perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is
7:19–7:25an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished.
7:25–7:28The Naya Yaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require
7:28–7:31cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all
7:31–7:35inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the
7:35–7:39rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes.
7:39–7:42But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason
7:42–7:46produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt
7:46–7:52about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative.
7:52–7:56The Niyayika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about
7:56–7:59invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the
7:59–8:01object.
8:01–8:06When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object.
8:06–8:10Some Nāyāyikas say that even the Memsākō admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes
8:10–8:13arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not.
8:13–8:17The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri—
8:17–8:21It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth
8:21–8:26and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless,
8:26–8:28why then pursue an inference determining its validity.
8:28–8:34Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established,
8:34–8:38no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice
8:38–8:40as its object.
8:40–8:44Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second
8:44–8:49cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity.
8:49–8:53Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing
8:53–8:57doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity.
8:57–9:03In Ayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness
9:03–9:05is not.
9:05–9:09Some Nayayikas, including Vakaspati, say that the validity of an inference free from any
9:09–9:13suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal
9:13–9:15aggregate.
9:15–9:19This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object
9:19–9:24possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity.
9:24–9:29As a perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference.
9:29–9:33Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity
9:33–9:39is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity.
9:39–9:44In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself
9:44–9:47is not a cause of activity.
9:47–9:52Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity
9:52–9:53arises.
9:53–9:58In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition
9:58–10:04of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth.
10:04–10:08Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first
10:08–10:14cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition.
10:14–10:19Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body,
10:19–10:24effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflex
10:24–10:29of awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity
10:29–10:32is determined extrinsically.
10:32–10:34This view is unsound.
10:34–10:39Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of
10:39–10:44an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination
10:44–10:48must occur extrinsically through another means.
10:48–10:53This reflex of awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition and the substrate
10:53–10:59of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately
10:59–11:02produces activity.
11:02–11:06Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause
11:06–11:08of activity.
11:08–11:12The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence
11:12–11:16of the first cognition's own causal aggregate.
11:16–11:20A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy,
11:20–11:24the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known.
11:24–11:29Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section
11:29–11:34of the Tat the Sintmai composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya.
11:34–11:39The theory of the production of validity.
11:39–11:45The Nayayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically.
11:45–11:49The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not
11:49–11:54produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone.
11:54–11:59Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate,
11:59–12:01would become valid.
12:01–12:06And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid.
12:06–12:10If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into
12:10–12:15the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition,
12:15–12:21would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate.
12:21–12:25Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be
12:25–12:30a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate.
12:30–12:34A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and
12:34–12:38defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if
12:38–12:43If one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity
12:43–12:45and invalidity should arise.
12:45–12:49Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and
12:49–12:52invalidity, is no separate effect.
12:52–12:56The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific
12:56–12:58cognitions, valid and invalid.
12:58–13:02No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific
13:02–13:03cognition.
13:03–13:08Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear.
13:08–13:14The Mensaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly
13:14–13:27The Mensaka Objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other.
13:27–13:32It should not be said that because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent
13:32–13:36cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot
13:36–13:39arise from non-recurrent causes.
13:39–13:42Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of
13:42–13:44effect hood.
13:44–13:48Being a property residing only in effect, is likewise deviant in such specific properties
13:48–13:52as blue pot hood and pot cognition hood.
13:52–13:56The author of the Kusumunjali may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive
13:56–14:01cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition,
14:01–14:04it is a produced cognition.
14:04–14:07But this inference is unsound.
14:07–14:11Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by
14:11–14:16the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and
14:16–14:18contradiction results.
14:18–14:22If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition
14:22–14:27in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in
14:27–14:30the example in valid cognition.
14:30–14:37Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either.
14:37–14:41If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some
14:41–14:45one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what
14:45–14:48is already established.
14:48–14:53Even valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in
14:53–14:58general, be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction
14:58–15:00arise.
15:00–15:05It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct
15:05–15:10aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition.
15:10–15:14Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between
15:14–15:17their effects.
15:17–15:22This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct
15:22–15:25from the cause of cognition in general.
15:25–15:29If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the
15:29–15:34inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property
15:34–15:39bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished.
15:39–15:43Refutation of other inferences.
15:43–15:47Here is the following pro-bandim admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose
15:47–15:52causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited
15:52–15:58by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities
15:58–16:01and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood.
16:01–16:06Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends
16:06–16:11on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier,
16:11–16:16Unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities
16:16–16:19such as space and does not depend on a cause.
16:19–16:23Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting
16:23–16:27effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon
16:27–16:30a cause, cognition hood is not such a property.
16:30–16:34If the pro-bandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities,
16:34–16:38the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established,
16:38–16:42each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition
16:42–16:47of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity
16:47–16:53delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality,
16:53–16:58because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood. Validity
16:58–17:04is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood.
17:04–17:08The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of
17:08–17:15non-eternal entities to limits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties.
17:15–17:20It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effectorizing
17:20–17:24from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid
17:24–17:25cognition.
17:25–17:27This is unsound.
17:27–17:31Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object,
17:31–17:35therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition.
17:35–17:40If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition.
17:40–17:44The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning
17:44–17:48a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual
17:48–17:50causes.
17:50–17:54Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:54–17:58It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect it is delimited
17:58–18:03by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous
18:03–18:08to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive
18:08–18:13effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition.
18:13–18:17But this inference suffers from proving what is already established.
18:17–18:21Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upset from invalid
18:21–18:24cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact
18:24–18:29as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties.
18:29–18:33The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates
18:33–18:37identity within valid cognition is likewise meaningless.
18:37–18:41It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor
18:41–18:46blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid
18:46–18:47or invalid.
18:47–18:52Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception,
18:52–18:56like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition.
18:57–19:00But these inferences too prove what is already established.
19:01–19:06The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid
19:06–19:09cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory perception.
19:11–19:15This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its
19:15–19:20contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition.
19:20–19:26When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's
19:26–19:31limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post
19:31–19:36and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such
19:36–19:41as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition.
19:41–19:46But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer
19:46–19:51of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what
19:51–19:53is already established recurs.
19:53–19:59Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality
19:59–20:03of another cognition is established in valid cognition.
20:03–20:07Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such
20:07–20:09as valid perceptions.
20:09–20:14Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class.
20:14–20:18and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal of causeness.
20:19–20:24Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the property of
20:24–20:28producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only
20:28–20:33invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production
20:33–20:37within the theory of validity in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Shri
20:37–20:39and keep your feet down and keep your feet so bad high.

Plain text

नाटक आप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक अप्रहेंषिक may be understood in three ways, being apprehensible by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions, being apprehensible by the means that apprehends every substrate of validity, or being apprehensible by a produced cognition that is not produced by another produced cognition taking the same validity as its object. Extrinsic apprehension of validity means being apprehensible without the stated aggregate. Under this definition, even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body. Refutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference of this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet. Being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion. Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body. If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason. If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar. Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available. Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being body-cognition-free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition. Recutation of the Prabhukra objection of infinite regress The Prabhukara or Guru-Pati may say, a cognition whose validity has already been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object. The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore, inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect that consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition. Avoidance of infinite regress There is no infinite regress in this way. Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of final cognition is present because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered or because some distinct object has already been obtained. On the contrary, infinite regressorizes in the bar view because cognition's validity is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition. In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means, and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress. Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object already determined, one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object. Masaka objection and Naya Yaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference. Some masaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished. The Naya Yaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative. The Niyayika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object. Some Nāyāyikas say that even the Memsākō admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri— It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference determining its validity. Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity. In Ayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not. Some Nayayikas, including Vakaspati, say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate. This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity. As a perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference. Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth. Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body, effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflex of awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically through another means. This reflex of awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition and the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity. The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy, the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section of the Tat the Sintmai composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya. The theory of the production of validity. The Nayayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate. A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if If one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise. Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity, is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Mensaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly The Mensaka Objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other. It should not be said that because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effect, is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue pot hood and pot cognition hood. The author of the Kusumunjali may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition. Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established. Even valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general, be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished. Refutation of other inferences. Here is the following pro-bandim admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood. Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier, Unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause. Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognition hood is not such a property. If the pro-bandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established, each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood. Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood. The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of non-eternal entities to limits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties. It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effectorizing from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition. This is unsound. Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect it is delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established. Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity within valid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition. Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid perceptions. Causes such as sense object contact do not form a recurrent class. and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal of causeness. Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Shri and keep your feet down and keep your feet so bad high.

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