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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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1. 0:02–0:04Gageeos Conclusion
2. 0:04–0:118. Gagee concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither
3. 0:11–0:15makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition
4. 0:15–0:20or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition
5. 0:20–0:24is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition,
6. 0:24–0:29is the qualifcant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its
7. 0:29–0:34complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like
8. 0:34–0:39are cognized, a doubt such as, is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible.
9. 0:40–0:44Consequently the naiyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic
10. 0:44–0:48character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reason smoke and all
11. 0:48–0:52individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means
12. 0:52–0:56cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire.
13. 0:56–1:00The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded.
14. 1:00–1:117. The theory of the extraneous condition.
15. 1:11–1:17Upadhibita. Introduction.
16. 1:17–1:241. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandum,
17. 1:24–1:29therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandum cannot be ascertained.
18. 1:29–1:34For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter.
19. 1:34–1:43definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that
20. 1:43–1:49pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason.
21. 1:51–1:56But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition
22. 1:56–2:01that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defective mutual dependence
23. 2:01–2:06arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition
24. 2:06–2:13of Provision, and Cognition of Provision causes Cognition of Freedom from an extraneous condition.
25. 2:13–2:18An alternative definition of an extraneous condition.
26. 2:18–2:193.
27. 2:19–2:22Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows.
28. 2:22–2:26Its Provision of the Probandom is the state in which it is not the counter positive of
29. 2:26–2:30an absolute absence of the Probandom occurring in a locus possessing the Probandom, and
30. 2:30–2:34its non-Provision of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive
31. 2:34–2:39of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other
32. 2:39–2:44words, an extraneous condition is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in
33. 2:44–2:49the locus of the reason, but not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring
34. 2:49–2:55in the locus of the probandum. But this alternative definition is untenable.
35. 2:55–3:00It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandum delimited
36. 3:00–3:04by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property
37. 3:04–3:07of the reason.
38. 3:07–3:12Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions.
39. 3:12–3:19For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom
40. 3:19–3:24perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced
41. 3:24–3:29by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason property
42. 3:29–3:34being mitra's sun, are not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include
43. 3:34–3:40them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation
44. 3:40–3:46from the probandom. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum
45. 3:46–3:50of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is
46. 3:50–3:55dark because it is mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic
47. 3:55–4:00as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates
48. 4:00–4:05from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness.
49. 4:05–4:09If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded
50. 4:09–4:15as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine.
51. 4:15–4:20Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended.
52. 4:20–4:24In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property
53. 4:24–4:28of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition,
54. 4:28–4:34yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension
55. 4:34–4:43and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition.
56. 4:43–4:48Five, it may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain
57. 4:48–4:52because it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain,
58. 4:52–4:58That is, the reason is stated as, being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs
59. 4:58–5:00on the mountain, so that generic other
60. 5:00–5:02नाटक आदन अछि।
61. 5:02–5:04नाटक आदन अछि।
62. 5:04–5:06नाटक आदन अछि।
63. 5:06–5:08नाटक आदन अछि।
64. 5:08–5:10नाटक आदन अछि।
65. 5:10–5:12नाटक आदन अछि।
66. 5:12–5:14नाटक आदन अछि।
67. 5:14–5:16नाटक आदन अछि।
68. 5:16–5:18नाटक आदन अछि।
69. 5:18–5:20नाटक आदन अछि।
70. 5:20–5:24is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence
71. 5:24–5:28follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the counter instance of
72. 5:28–5:30the absence of the probandom.
73. 5:30–5:36It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result.
74. 5:36–5:41For generic subject-otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom
75. 5:41–5:46cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject-mountain.
76. 5:46–5:50For the expression the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on
77. 5:50–5:55the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition.
78. 5:55–6:01An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition.
79. 6:01–6:076. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject, occurring
80. 6:07–6:12in the subject and actually pervading the probandom, is an extraneous condition.
81. 6:12–6:17Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous
82. 6:17–6:21condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the
83. 6:21–6:26probandum is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the
84. 6:26–6:33probandum. Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject-otherness.
85. 6:33–6:38If subject-otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates
86. 6:38–6:42doubt about the probandum and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions
87. 6:42–6:46in general would disappear.
88. 6:46–6:51refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added.
89. 6:53–7:037. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition.
90. 7:04–7:15Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced.
91. 7:16–7:19But this proposal is untenable.
92. 7:19–7:25Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance,
93. 7:25–7:31because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances.
94. 7:31–7:37Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood,
95. 7:37–7:42contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished.
96. 7:42–7:48Subject otherness possesses both perversion of the probandum and non-perversion of the reason.
97. 7:48–7:55When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandum and the subject becomes possible.
98. 7:55–8:05Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandum, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present.
99. 8:05–8:10For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition.
100. 8:10–8:14The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of
101. 8:14–8:19the probandam and the counter-instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous
102. 8:19–8:21condition.
103. 8:21–8:26Refutation of the objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition.
104. 8:26–8:32Eight, the objection that subject-otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition
105. 8:32–8:36because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating
106. 8:36–8:39rejoinder known as a jati is rejected.
107. 8:39–8:43subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
108. 8:43–8:48therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect.
109. 8:48–8:53This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness
110. 8:53–8:57from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded
111. 8:57–8:59as the extraneous condition.
112. 8:59–9:03Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable
113. 9:03–9:07of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it
114. 9:07–9:11certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition.
115. 9:11–9:18The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation.
116. 9:18–9:22It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom
117. 9:22–9:27through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
118. 9:27–9:32therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation.
119. 9:32–9:36But the absence of subject-otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of
120. 9:36–9:41the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance.
121. 9:41–9:47Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation
122. 9:47–9:52after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
123. 9:52–9:57Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on
124. 9:57–9:59the ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the
125. 10:00–10:30नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम ना
126. 10:30–10:35establishes the absence of the probandum. Cognition of pervasion and absence of
127. 10:35–10:39cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in establishing the
128. 10:39–10:44probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition
129. 10:44–10:49that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seat of vitiation.
130. 10:49–10:56An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason. It may be
131. 10:56–11:00objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason
132. 11:00–11:04constituting an equally strong counter reason.
133. 11:04–11:07This objection is untenable.
134. 11:07–11:11If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion
135. 11:11–11:14to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally
136. 11:14–11:19strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter
137. 11:19–11:22reason against an inference already possessing one.
138. 11:22–11:27Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter reason, the
139. 11:27–11:31The defect of subject otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and
140. 11:31–11:36the inference fire is not hot because it is produced would not qualify as an extraneous
141. 11:36–11:40condition either because denial of the probandom through subject otherness is a specific cause
142. 11:40–11:45establishing the absence of the probandom.
143. 11:45–11:48Objection to treating subject otherness as an extraneous condition
144. 11:48–11:5411. It may be said that the rule concerning subject otherness as an extraneous condition
145. 11:54–11:58does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject.
146. 11:58–12:03For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke,
147. 12:03–12:06subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
148. 12:06–12:10Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom
149. 12:10–12:12is absent.
150. 12:12–12:17In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, non-fireiness
151. 12:17–12:21and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness
152. 12:21–12:24does not apply directly.
153. 12:24–12:29this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject
154. 12:29–12:33instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what
155. 12:33–12:38occurs in the subject fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore
156. 12:38–12:43subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases.
157. 12:43–12:48Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition.
158. 12:48–12:5312, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs
159. 12:53–12:57in a part of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being
160. 12:57–13:01the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from
161. 13:01–13:06both lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there is
162. 13:06–13:10fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke.
163. 13:10–13:14In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon suitor reason
164. 13:14–13:19cannot persist, and an equally strong counter reason also arises from the counter positive
165. 13:19–13:24of the absence of subject otherness occurring in the subject mountain.
166. 13:24–13:28The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong
167. 13:28–13:34counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason
168. 13:34–13:36and becomes a defect.
169. 13:36–13:40Both the relation between reason and probandom and that between probandom and extraneous
170. 13:40–13:45condition oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment
171. 13:45–13:49of pervasion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from
172. 13:49–13:52the probandom.
173. 13:52–13:56In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason
174. 13:56–13:59deviates from the probandom.
175. 13:59–14:03Such defect is fully present in subject-otherness as well.
176. 14:03–14:08Eudaeanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt
177. 14:08–14:11about deviation.
178. 14:11–14:15One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear
179. 14:15–14:19that all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted
180. 14:19–14:24that the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject
181. 14:24–14:27otherness as well.
182. 14:27–14:30Udayanakkarya's definition of an extraneous condition
183. 14:30–14:3313.
184. 14:33–14:38To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition,
185. 14:38–14:42the condition, while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom,
186. 14:42–14:44is unsuitable.
187. 14:44–14:49otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous
188. 14:49–14:54condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong
189. 14:54–14:57counter reason.
190. 14:57–15:00The qualifier, co-extensive with the probandom in the definition
191. 15:00–15:31नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक �
192. 15:31–15:35and comitance, because the probandum may remain in the absence of that property and the absence
193. 15:35–15:38of the probandum may remain in its presence.
194. 15:38–15:43Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition.
195. 15:43–15:46But this proposal is untenable.
196. 15:46–15:51A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandum means a property
197. 15:51–15:57that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
198. 15:57–16:02This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason.
199. 16:02–16:07Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum, serves no purpose in producing the defect and
200. 16:07–16:10is therefore pointless.
201. 16:10–16:17An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal.
202. 16:17–16:1815.
203. 16:18–16:22Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is
204. 16:22–16:24reflected upon another object.
205. 16:24–16:28For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because the
206. 16:28–16:31hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal.
207. 16:31–16:35Similarly, the probandum pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the
208. 16:35–16:40extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with
209. 16:40–16:44wet fuel is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain
210. 16:44–16:46because there is fire.
211. 16:46–16:50The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely
212. 16:50–16:53because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required.
213. 16:54–16:59It is therefore concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition.
214. 17:01–17:03Use of the word extraneous condition
215. 17:05–17:1016, the question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word,
216. 17:10–17:13extraneous condition, because it does not produce a defect?
217. 17:14–17:19Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term,
218. 17:19–17:25extraneous condition is absent. The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically
219. 17:25–17:29pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom.
220. 17:29–17:34The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a
221. 17:34–17:39co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another. For example, in the sentence,
222. 17:39–17:44this action was performed on the condition of gain, the word condition is used in the sense
223. 17:44–17:49of a condition of profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the word,
224. 17:49–17:54extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's
225. 17:54–17:59inference in debate. The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandom
226. 17:59–18:04while not pervading the reason. In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense.
227. 18:06–18:10An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition,
228. 18:10–18:14The view of another decisive criterion.
229. 18:14–18:2117. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the reason's deviation from the probandom.
230. 18:21–18:27But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reason's deviation from the probandom,
231. 18:27–18:31because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object.
232. 18:31–18:35For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality,
233. 18:35–18:38No ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood,
234. 18:38–18:41rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no ability.
235. 18:41–18:44There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood,
236. 18:44–18:48that is, the reason qualityhood deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality.
237. 18:49–18:53But the absence of an object co-extensive with the pro-bandom is concomitant with the
238. 18:53–18:55absence of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom.
239. 18:56–18:59The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the
240. 18:59–19:01pro-bandom does not deviate from the pro-bandom.
241. 19:01–19:08In a case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition.
242. 19:08–19:15Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandum but does not pervade the reason.
243. 19:15–19:19Refutation of the Other Scholar's View
244. 19:19–19:2318. This view also fails.
245. 19:23–19:29fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom
246. 19:29–19:34as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary,
247. 19:34–19:38but this criterion too is untenable because you yourself have shown deviation in this
248. 19:38–19:42rule. Being pervaded by something that pervades the
249. 19:42–19:48probandom cannot be the decisive criterion of non-deviation, nor can merely being
250. 19:48–19:53pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons freedom from an
251. 19:53–19:57extraneous condition, because the very condition would have to be regarded as freedom from
252. 19:57–19:59an extraneous condition even in the state of being
253. 20:00–20:30नाटक आप प्रवेडिद भावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावा
254. 20:30–20:35a reason and a cause of cognition of deviation. But something in whose absence inferential
255. 20:35–20:40cognition arises is not defective merely for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the
256. 20:40–20:46like would also become pseudo-reasons causing cognition of deviation.
257. 20:46–20:51Non-pervasion of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition.
258. 20:51–20:5619. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a
259. 20:56–21:01property of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood,
260. 21:01–21:06because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom
261. 21:06–21:12delimited by a property of the reason. Under this definition, in the inference sound is
262. 21:12–21:17nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous
263. 21:17–21:23condition. Non-audibility pervades the probandom nameability delimited by qualityhood,
264. 21:23–21:28because the property of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not
265. 21:28–21:34pervade the reason no ability. Therefore non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the
266. 21:34–21:41reason and undesirable consequence. This definition also fails to include the extraneous
267. 21:41–21:45condition conjunction with wet fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because
268. 21:45–21:50there is fire, because conjunction with wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom
269. 21:50–21:53delimited by the property of the reason occurring in the subject.

Plain text

Gageeos Conclusion 8. Gagee concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition, is the qualifcant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like are cognized, a doubt such as, is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible. Consequently the naiyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reason smoke and all individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire. The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded. 7. The theory of the extraneous condition. Upadhibita. Introduction. 1. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandum, therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandum cannot be ascertained. For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter. definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason. But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defective mutual dependence arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of Provision, and Cognition of Provision causes Cognition of Freedom from an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of an extraneous condition. 3. Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows. Its Provision of the Probandom is the state in which it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence of the Probandom occurring in a locus possessing the Probandom, and its non-Provision of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other words, an extraneous condition is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, but not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandum. But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandum delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason property being mitra's sun, are not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is dark because it is mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness. If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine. Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended. In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition, yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition. Five, it may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, That is, the reason is stated as, being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। नाटक आदन अछि। is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom. It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result. For generic subject-otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject-mountain. For the expression the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition. 6. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject, occurring in the subject and actually pervading the probandom, is an extraneous condition. Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the probandum is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandum. Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject-otherness. If subject-otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates doubt about the probandum and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions in general would disappear. refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added. 7. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition. Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced. But this proposal is untenable. Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance, because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances. Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood, contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished. Subject otherness possesses both perversion of the probandum and non-perversion of the reason. When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandum and the subject becomes possible. Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandum, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present. For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition. The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandam and the counter-instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous condition. Refutation of the objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. Eight, the objection that subject-otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating rejoinder known as a jati is rejected. subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect. This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded as the extraneous condition. Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition. The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation. It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation. But the absence of subject-otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance. Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम नाटक आप्रबान्धम ना establishes the absence of the probandum. Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in establishing the probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seat of vitiation. An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason. It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting an equally strong counter reason. This objection is untenable. If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter reason against an inference already possessing one. Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter reason, the The defect of subject otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference fire is not hot because it is produced would not qualify as an extraneous condition either because denial of the probandom through subject otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence of the probandom. Objection to treating subject otherness as an extraneous condition 11. It may be said that the rule concerning subject otherness as an extraneous condition does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, non-fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness does not apply directly. this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases. Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition. 12, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs in a part of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there is fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke. In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon suitor reason cannot persist, and an equally strong counter reason also arises from the counter positive of the absence of subject otherness occurring in the subject mountain. The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason and becomes a defect. Both the relation between reason and probandom and that between probandom and extraneous condition oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment of pervasion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the probandom. In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom. Such defect is fully present in subject-otherness as well. Eudaeanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about deviation. One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject otherness as well. Udayanakkarya's definition of an extraneous condition 13. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition, the condition, while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom, is unsuitable. otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong counter reason. The qualifier, co-extensive with the probandom in the definition नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक � and comitance, because the probandum may remain in the absence of that property and the absence of the probandum may remain in its presence. Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition. But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandum means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason. Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum, serves no purpose in producing the defect and is therefore pointless. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal. 15. Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is reflected upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because the hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal. Similarly, the probandum pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition. Use of the word extraneous condition 16, the question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word, extraneous condition, because it does not produce a defect? Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term, extraneous condition is absent. The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom. The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain, the word condition is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate. The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandom while not pervading the reason. In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, The view of another decisive criterion. 17. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the reason's deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reason's deviation from the probandom, because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object. For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, No ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood, rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no ability. There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood, that is, the reason qualityhood deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive with the pro-bandom is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom. The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the pro-bandom does not deviate from the pro-bandom. In a case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition. Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandum but does not pervade the reason. Refutation of the Other Scholar's View 18. This view also fails. fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion too is untenable because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule. Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion of non-deviation, nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because the very condition would have to be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being नाटक आप प्रवेडिद भावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावा a reason and a cause of cognition of deviation. But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons causing cognition of deviation. Non-pervasion of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition. 19. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood, because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition. Non-audibility pervades the probandom nameability delimited by qualityhood, because the property of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade the reason no ability. Therefore non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence. This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction with wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of the reason occurring in the subject.

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