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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 21:40
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Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:04विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:04–0:06विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:06–0:09विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:09–0:11विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:11–0:13विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:13–0:15विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:15–0:17विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:17–0:19विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:19–0:26locus would be incompatible with its non-apprehension. The presence of waterhood in an atom is not
0:26–0:30incompatible with non-apprehension of waterhood, because non-apprehension of waterhood in an
0:30–0:35atom is possible owing to the absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation.
0:37–0:41Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye,
0:41–0:45because if color were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible.
0:45–0:51Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were
0:51–0:55identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would
0:55–0:58be impossible.
0:58–1:02In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that locus
1:02–1:05is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound.
1:05–1:09Thus qualifier hood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is the apprehensive
1:09–1:11relation of absence of sound.
1:11–1:15But the presence of water hood in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension
1:15–1:19therefore the eye does not apprehend waterhood.
1:19–1:22Objection, Inherence is the relation of absence.
1:22–1:30Objection, Qualifierhood is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence. Inherence alone is the relation.
1:30–1:36The qualified cognition that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here.
1:36–1:40The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound.
1:40–1:44sound, conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by
1:44–1:49inherent would become an absence, could be raised. In the perception of color,
1:49–1:53inherent has already been accepted as an apprehensive relation, to accept inherent
1:53–1:57for absence is no different from accepting qualifierhood. Prior absence and
1:57–2:00destruction in here in the respective lockie of their counter positives,
2:00–2:04destruction produced by the destruction of the counter positives lock as is described as
2:04–2:05in hearing in space or time.
2:05–2:11The reply destruction too should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is no
2:11–2:17answer, for then the destroyed pot would arise again. If destruction were destroyed,
2:17–2:23another entity capable of destroying it would be required. To say that positive entity hood regulates
2:23–2:29destructibility is cumbersome and impossible in the case of prior absence. On the Cidhantons
2:29–2:35view to destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction.
2:35–2:39An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and in
2:39–2:42hearing in many loci, would become universals.
2:42–2:47To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of universalhood is cumbersome.
2:47–2:50There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence on account of which
2:50–2:55adherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence.
2:55–2:57This objection is not sound.
2:57–3:01If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals, their relative extension
3:01–3:06and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as existence, substancehood,
3:06–3:07and earthhood.
3:07–3:11If existence, substancehood, and earthhood were narrower, their absence would necessarily
3:11–3:15occur in a pot, and if they were wider, they would have to occur in the universal absence
3:15–3:18of potness.
3:18–3:22The Sid Hentons reply.
3:22–3:26If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed
3:26–3:30with the destruction of its inhering cause.
3:30–3:34To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and
3:34–3:37impossible for prior absence.
3:37–3:42If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be
3:42–3:46destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus.
3:46–3:51The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise
3:51–3:54again is also unsound.
3:54–3:58conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its purpose
3:58–4:04will be undone. Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures
4:04–4:10that the destroyed pot is not produced again. A succession of destructions generated by
4:10–4:16the success of destruction of inhering loci cannot be accepted. If the destruction
4:16–4:20of loci from the pot, pot shards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted, the final
4:20–4:25destruction and the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible,
4:25–4:28the destruction too would become imperceptible.
4:28–4:33If destruction of the pot inhered only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist
4:33–4:36on the ground, if it inhered in both the ground and the potchards, then after the
4:36–4:40potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the
4:40–4:45pervasion of inheritance must extend throughout its locus.
4:45–4:49Thus sends the theory of inheritance and the perception section of the Tathacintmai
4:49–4:53composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
4:53–4:59The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge.
4:59–5:04Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge.
5:04–5:08The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is produced
5:08–5:14by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter positive.
5:14–5:18For when an eligible counter positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does
5:18–5:21not arise.
5:21–5:26should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced by non-apprehension
5:26–5:28of its absence rather than by a sense organ.
5:28–5:33A sense organ is invariably found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity.
5:33–5:37Otherwise a person with closed eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension
5:37–5:38of its absence.
5:38–5:42Therefore, although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately
5:42–5:46precedes cognition of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ renders
5:46–5:48it otherwise established.
5:48–5:53When sense object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension
5:53–5:55of its absence.
5:55–6:00The Nyayika objects that in cognition of absence 2 the sense organ is a cause, because the cognition
6:00–6:01conforms to it.
6:01–6:06The BHA replies, the eye and other sense organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation
6:06–6:09with absence, they merely produce cognition of the locus of absence and then cease
6:09–6:10operating.
6:10–6:16A sense organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself.
6:16–6:21A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence.
6:21–6:25Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ,
6:25–6:30therefore that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of absence.
6:30–6:34Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established,
6:34–6:37the sense organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either.
6:38–6:47Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal status of the sense organ has first been established.
6:47–6:53But because the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, its causal status itself is unestablished.
6:54–7:04This also refutes the argument that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both causes, like a staff and a wheel, because their separate positive and negative concomitance is known.
7:05–7:10A sense organ lacking an apprehensive relation with absence cannot produce cognition of absence.
7:10–7:16Nor may it be held that a sense organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood,
7:16–7:20that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that lacks any other
7:20–7:22apprehensive relation.
7:22–7:26On such a view conjunction come inheritance and the other relations would become useless,
7:26–7:30and an unrelated staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized.
7:30–7:35A sense organ apprehends only an object apprehensively related to it.
7:35–7:38Qualifierhood or a self-linking relation is not an apprehensive relation of the
7:38–7:43sense organ, otherwise, even if adherence had not been accepted, its quality would still
7:43–7:44have to be admitted.
7:44–7:51Hence the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible.
7:51–7:54The Danton view.
7:54–7:58The Neayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore, since any
7:58–8:04other apprehensive relation is impossible, quality that is, the self-linking relation
8:04–8:08should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence, just as
8:08–8:12conjunction come inheritance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when
8:12–8:15conjunction is impossible.
8:15–8:19The Vedantin replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense organ does not cease
8:19–8:24after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction come inheritance is
8:24–8:26the apprehensive relation.
8:26–8:31But in cognition of absence, through economy, the sense organ ceases after producing cognition
8:31–8:37of the locus, hence there is no purpose in accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood.
8:37–8:43Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color, it should likewise
8:43–8:48not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touch as an inferential reason.
8:48–8:53The Nyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends
8:53–8:57upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon sensory
8:57–9:00apprehensibility of absence.
9:00–9:03Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object.
9:03–9:06A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations
9:06–9:11such as conjunction and inheritance are causes. From the mutual deviation of conjunction and
9:11–9:16inheritance one cannot formulate the general rule, a sense organ knows an object related to itself,
9:16–9:21in each instance, the specific relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition.
9:21–9:25The mere nature of the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception of
9:25–9:30absence, because a relation must be distinct from the relata, no object is known by itself
9:30–9:33through its own nature alone.
9:33–9:38The visual sense organ is not a cause.
9:38–9:41If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence, cognition of color and
9:41–9:46the light would also be produced by a self-linking relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive
9:46–9:50relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration of six kinds of sense-object contact
9:50–9:52would be fruitless.
9:52–9:55This also refutes the view that, the eye depends upon the assistance of light because
9:55–9:59light alone is its auxiliary cause.
9:59–10:04an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates the counter positive
10:04–10:10and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that the eye, while producing cognition
10:10–10:14of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of absence, and that non-apprehension
10:14–10:18produces cognition of absence in the presence of the other causes apart from the sense organ.
10:18–10:23But this is not correct. The eye, lacking an apprehensive relation, is not the cause of
10:23–10:27cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of the locus of absence and then ceases.
10:29–10:33Nor is the following argument acceptable, after a blue object has been known through touch,
10:33–10:38a blind person would cognize absence of blue from non-apprehension of a remembered yellow object,
10:38–10:42but this fault does not arise if cognition of absence is accepted as produced by the sense
10:42–10:45organ that apprehends the counter-positive, because the blind person has no eyes.
10:46–10:50The sense organ that the naiyayika regards as producing cognition of absence in fact
10:50–10:55ceases after producing cognition of the lockers. It must therefore be accepted that, after the
10:55–10:59the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter positive has made the lock as known,
10:59–11:04non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Otherwise cognition of absence of waterhood
11:04–11:08would arise in water atoms related to the eye.
11:08–11:15Awareness of absence of color and the like has non-apprehension as its inferential mark.
11:15–11:19Nayaika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence
11:19–11:23of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension because their locky, air
11:23–11:27and the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending
11:27–11:32the counter positives. It should not be asked how the Naiyayika can regard such absences
11:32–11:37as perceptible when the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ.
11:37–11:41Once air has been known by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible
11:41–11:45absence of color its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as
11:45–11:51its qualificant. Eligible cognition of the qualificant is a cause of perception.
11:51–11:55The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other
11:55–11:59Other things is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka
11:59–12:07himself regards the cognition air as colorless, whose qualificon is air, as inferential.
12:07–12:12Objection's cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ.
12:12–12:17The Neayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by a sense
12:17–12:21organ, because it is an immediate awareness.
12:21–12:26Therefore Qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive
12:26–12:31relation of the sense organ with cognition of absence. It is not the case that immediacy
12:31–12:37is the reason is unestablished. If on the Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as
12:37–12:44mediate, the distinction of cognition produced by an unknown cause would become impossible.
12:44–12:47From a trustworthy person's statement it is known that, even after someone entered
12:47–12:52the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside, from this known non-apprehension the hearer
12:52–12:58infers, kaitra was not in the temple. If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced
12:58–13:03by an unknown cause, because the universal mediate cognitionhood is known through a known cause.
13:04–13:09Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential
13:09–13:13mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does.
13:14–13:18Therefore cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate.
13:18–13:24Being produced by a sense organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality,
13:24–13:28because perceptuality itself is inferred from being produced by a sense organ.
13:30–13:35Establishment of the Ba view cognition of absence is mediate and produced by non-apprehension.
13:37–13:40The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct.
13:41–13:46Mediate cognitionhood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential
13:46–13:51cognition hood, it is merely cognition hood qualified by difference from immediate awareness.
13:52–13:58Therefore cognition of absence is mediate like memory. Verbal cognition, though produced by
13:58–14:04an unknown cause, is not inference. Similarly, cognition of the locus of absence, produced by
14:04–14:10a sense organ from an unknown cause, is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from
14:10–14:14cognition produced by a sense organ and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate.
14:14–14:21If perceptuality were established from being produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition
14:21–14:26and the like, produced by known causes, would become inferential.
14:26–14:30Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct effects
14:30–14:34because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ.
14:34–14:39Similarly, cognition of absence and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because
14:39–14:43unknown non-apprehension and the known sense organ differ.
14:43–14:48being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality, while not being produced by
14:48–14:51a sense organ establishes mediacy.
14:51–14:55To regard production by an unknown cause and production by a known cause as the grounds
14:55–15:02of perception and mediation is cumbersome, and neither applies to memory.
15:02–15:07Refutation of the objection of the author of the Kusumungeli
15:07–15:11The author of the Kusumungeli may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means
15:11–15:16of knowledge of absence, the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces
15:16–15:23external experience. Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute
15:23–15:29to the mind's production of external experience. Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense
15:29–15:33organ alone would produce external experience, inference and the other means of knowledge
15:33–15:39would cease to exist. The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a
15:39–15:43positive entity is the means of cognition of absence because cognition of absence is an external
15:43–15:49cognition is unsound. Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ because it is an absence like
15:49–15:54the absence of an ineligible object. The counter inference is this cognition of absence is not
15:54–15:59produced by a sense organ because it is cognition of absence like cognition of absence produced by
15:59–16:05an inferential mark and the light. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes
16:05–16:10the counter positive also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive
16:10–16:16of cognition of the counter positive, also produces cognition of its absence.
16:16–16:21Inference in verbal testimony, which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce
16:21–16:23cognition of absence.
16:23–16:27Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends
16:27–16:33the counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison.
16:33–16:38Eyehood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence,
16:38–16:41but comparisonhood is not a universal.
16:41–16:45It has already been established that the eye and other sense organs cannot produce cognition
16:45–16:50of absence without an apprehensive relation.
16:50–16:55A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence, not apprehension produces cognition
16:55–16:58of absence.
16:58–17:02Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present as
17:02–17:07possible, and this is produced by a defect in the instrument.
17:07–17:12Memory of the counter positive, cognition of the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically
17:12–17:16defective, the sense organ is impaired by bile and other defects, and the illusion
17:16–17:20is produced by that impaired sense organ.
17:20–17:25Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence.
17:25–17:31Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation
17:31–17:35to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension.
17:35–17:39It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise from
17:39–17:44a known cause, the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition of absence
17:44–17:48should also be understood in that form, making the postulation of a separate means
17:48–17:51of non-apprehension unnecessary.
17:51–17:55The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence.
17:55–17:59A defective sense organ may produce an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye
17:59–18:04produces an illusion of smell and a stone, but veritical cognition of absence is not produced
18:04–18:07by a sense organ because there is no apprehensive relation.
18:09–18:13Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a positive entity
18:13–18:18and an absence. Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced
18:18–18:22neither by a sense organ nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone
18:22–18:28should be accepted as apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an
18:28–18:33absence supplied by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ,
18:33–18:37but cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground,
18:37–18:42is produced by non-apprehension. Similarly, the eye produces the cognition,
18:42–18:46sandalwood is fragrant, while the nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood.
18:47–18:52The argument non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge because it has no operation is also
18:52–18:58one sound. The rule is that, apart from non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the
18:58–19:03action is an instrument, there is no need to add the expression, possessing an operation,
19:03–19:12to the definition of a means of knowledge. The Neiyaka Refutation of Non-Apprehension.
19:12–19:16Neiyaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ capable
19:16–19:21of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence,
19:21–19:27because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge.
19:27–19:31Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ, not by
19:31–19:33non-apprehension.
19:33–19:36Non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a trustworthy statement that
19:36–19:39makes it known.
19:39–19:43It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension of the existence of color and the like produces
19:43–19:48cognition of their absence, as non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence
19:48–19:50of a pot on the ground.
19:50–19:55When the Msaaka view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence
19:55–20:01cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
20:01–20:05Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence.
20:05–20:10To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension
20:10–20:13contradicts the Msaaka doctrine.
20:13–20:17Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension
20:17–20:23alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known from its non-apprehension.
20:24–20:28Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension.
20:30–20:32Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark.
20:35–20:38Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument,
20:38–20:42because it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like.
20:43–20:47Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection
20:47–20:52of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status of non-apprehension.
20:53–20:58Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing
20:58–21:04color inferred from it, the inferential mark. Absence of knownness of possessing color in air
21:04–21:09is equivalent to absence of color, and therefore would not be known. If absence of knownness
21:09–21:15of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can equally be regarded as perceptible.
21:15–21:22Absonance cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior.
21:22–21:27Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person,
21:27–21:29existence remains.
21:29–21:33In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while
21:33–21:36absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। locus would be incompatible with its non-apprehension. The presence of waterhood in an atom is not incompatible with non-apprehension of waterhood, because non-apprehension of waterhood in an atom is possible owing to the absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation. Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye, because if color were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible. Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would be impossible. In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that locus is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound. Thus qualifier hood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence of sound. But the presence of water hood in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension therefore the eye does not apprehend waterhood. Objection, Inherence is the relation of absence. Objection, Qualifierhood is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence. Inherence alone is the relation. The qualified cognition that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here. The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound. sound, conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by inherent would become an absence, could be raised. In the perception of color, inherent has already been accepted as an apprehensive relation, to accept inherent for absence is no different from accepting qualifierhood. Prior absence and destruction in here in the respective lockie of their counter positives, destruction produced by the destruction of the counter positives lock as is described as in hearing in space or time. The reply destruction too should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is no answer, for then the destroyed pot would arise again. If destruction were destroyed, another entity capable of destroying it would be required. To say that positive entity hood regulates destructibility is cumbersome and impossible in the case of prior absence. On the Cidhantons view to destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction. An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and in hearing in many loci, would become universals. To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of universalhood is cumbersome. There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence on account of which adherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence. This objection is not sound. If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals, their relative extension and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as existence, substancehood, and earthhood. If existence, substancehood, and earthhood were narrower, their absence would necessarily occur in a pot, and if they were wider, they would have to occur in the universal absence of potness. The Sid Hentons reply. If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed with the destruction of its inhering cause. To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and impossible for prior absence. If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus. The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise again is also unsound. conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its purpose will be undone. Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures that the destroyed pot is not produced again. A succession of destructions generated by the success of destruction of inhering loci cannot be accepted. If the destruction of loci from the pot, pot shards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted, the final destruction and the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible, the destruction too would become imperceptible. If destruction of the pot inhered only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist on the ground, if it inhered in both the ground and the potchards, then after the potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the pervasion of inheritance must extend throughout its locus. Thus sends the theory of inheritance and the perception section of the Tathacintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge. Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge. The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is produced by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter positive. For when an eligible counter positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does not arise. should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced by non-apprehension of its absence rather than by a sense organ. A sense organ is invariably found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity. Otherwise a person with closed eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension of its absence. Therefore, although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately precedes cognition of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ renders it otherwise established. When sense object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension of its absence. The Nyayika objects that in cognition of absence 2 the sense organ is a cause, because the cognition conforms to it. The BHA replies, the eye and other sense organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation with absence, they merely produce cognition of the locus of absence and then cease operating. A sense organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself. A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence. Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ, therefore that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of absence. Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established, the sense organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either. Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal status of the sense organ has first been established. But because the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, its causal status itself is unestablished. This also refutes the argument that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both causes, like a staff and a wheel, because their separate positive and negative concomitance is known. A sense organ lacking an apprehensive relation with absence cannot produce cognition of absence. Nor may it be held that a sense organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that lacks any other apprehensive relation. On such a view conjunction come inheritance and the other relations would become useless, and an unrelated staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized. A sense organ apprehends only an object apprehensively related to it. Qualifierhood or a self-linking relation is not an apprehensive relation of the sense organ, otherwise, even if adherence had not been accepted, its quality would still have to be admitted. Hence the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible. The Danton view. The Neayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore, since any other apprehensive relation is impossible, quality that is, the self-linking relation should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence, just as conjunction come inheritance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when conjunction is impossible. The Vedantin replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense organ does not cease after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction come inheritance is the apprehensive relation. But in cognition of absence, through economy, the sense organ ceases after producing cognition of the locus, hence there is no purpose in accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood. Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color, it should likewise not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touch as an inferential reason. The Nyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon sensory apprehensibility of absence. Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object. A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations such as conjunction and inheritance are causes. From the mutual deviation of conjunction and inheritance one cannot formulate the general rule, a sense organ knows an object related to itself, in each instance, the specific relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition. The mere nature of the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence, because a relation must be distinct from the relata, no object is known by itself through its own nature alone. The visual sense organ is not a cause. If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence, cognition of color and the light would also be produced by a self-linking relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration of six kinds of sense-object contact would be fruitless. This also refutes the view that, the eye depends upon the assistance of light because light alone is its auxiliary cause. an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates the counter positive and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that the eye, while producing cognition of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of absence, and that non-apprehension produces cognition of absence in the presence of the other causes apart from the sense organ. But this is not correct. The eye, lacking an apprehensive relation, is not the cause of cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of the locus of absence and then ceases. Nor is the following argument acceptable, after a blue object has been known through touch, a blind person would cognize absence of blue from non-apprehension of a remembered yellow object, but this fault does not arise if cognition of absence is accepted as produced by the sense organ that apprehends the counter-positive, because the blind person has no eyes. The sense organ that the naiyayika regards as producing cognition of absence in fact ceases after producing cognition of the lockers. It must therefore be accepted that, after the the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter positive has made the lock as known, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Otherwise cognition of absence of waterhood would arise in water atoms related to the eye. Awareness of absence of color and the like has non-apprehension as its inferential mark. Nayaika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension because their locky, air and the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending the counter positives. It should not be asked how the Naiyayika can regard such absences as perceptible when the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ. Once air has been known by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible absence of color its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as its qualificant. Eligible cognition of the qualificant is a cause of perception. The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other Other things is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka himself regards the cognition air as colorless, whose qualificon is air, as inferential. Objection's cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ. The Neayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by a sense organ, because it is an immediate awareness. Therefore Qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the sense organ with cognition of absence. It is not the case that immediacy is the reason is unestablished. If on the Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as mediate, the distinction of cognition produced by an unknown cause would become impossible. From a trustworthy person's statement it is known that, even after someone entered the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside, from this known non-apprehension the hearer infers, kaitra was not in the temple. If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced by an unknown cause, because the universal mediate cognitionhood is known through a known cause. Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does. Therefore cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate. Being produced by a sense organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality, because perceptuality itself is inferred from being produced by a sense organ. Establishment of the Ba view cognition of absence is mediate and produced by non-apprehension. The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct. Mediate cognitionhood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential cognition hood, it is merely cognition hood qualified by difference from immediate awareness. Therefore cognition of absence is mediate like memory. Verbal cognition, though produced by an unknown cause, is not inference. Similarly, cognition of the locus of absence, produced by a sense organ from an unknown cause, is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from cognition produced by a sense organ and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate. If perceptuality were established from being produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition and the like, produced by known causes, would become inferential. Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct effects because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ. Similarly, cognition of absence and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because unknown non-apprehension and the known sense organ differ. being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality, while not being produced by a sense organ establishes mediacy. To regard production by an unknown cause and production by a known cause as the grounds of perception and mediation is cumbersome, and neither applies to memory. Refutation of the objection of the author of the Kusumungeli The author of the Kusumungeli may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge of absence, the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces external experience. Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute to the mind's production of external experience. Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense organ alone would produce external experience, inference and the other means of knowledge would cease to exist. The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a positive entity is the means of cognition of absence because cognition of absence is an external cognition is unsound. Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ because it is an absence like the absence of an ineligible object. The counter inference is this cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because it is cognition of absence like cognition of absence produced by an inferential mark and the light. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes the counter positive also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive of cognition of the counter positive, also produces cognition of its absence. Inference in verbal testimony, which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce cognition of absence. Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends the counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison. Eyehood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence, but comparisonhood is not a universal. It has already been established that the eye and other sense organs cannot produce cognition of absence without an apprehensive relation. A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence, not apprehension produces cognition of absence. Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present as possible, and this is produced by a defect in the instrument. Memory of the counter positive, cognition of the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically defective, the sense organ is impaired by bile and other defects, and the illusion is produced by that impaired sense organ. Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence. Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension. It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise from a known cause, the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition of absence should also be understood in that form, making the postulation of a separate means of non-apprehension unnecessary. The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence. A defective sense organ may produce an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye produces an illusion of smell and a stone, but veritical cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because there is no apprehensive relation. Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a positive entity and an absence. Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced neither by a sense organ nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone should be accepted as apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an absence supplied by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ, but cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground, is produced by non-apprehension. Similarly, the eye produces the cognition, sandalwood is fragrant, while the nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood. The argument non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge because it has no operation is also one sound. The rule is that, apart from non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the action is an instrument, there is no need to add the expression, possessing an operation, to the definition of a means of knowledge. The Neiyaka Refutation of Non-Apprehension. Neiyaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence, because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ, not by non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a trustworthy statement that makes it known. It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension of the existence of color and the like produces cognition of their absence, as non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence of a pot on the ground. When the Msaaka view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence. To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension contradicts the Msaaka doctrine. Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known from its non-apprehension. Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark. Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument, because it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like. Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status of non-apprehension. Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing color inferred from it, the inferential mark. Absence of knownness of possessing color in air is equivalent to absence of color, and therefore would not be known. If absence of knownness of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can equally be regarded as perceptible. Absonance cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior. Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person, existence remains. In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

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