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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 28:39
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0:02–0:06विश्दाबश्द दाक्ष्द अछि।
0:32–0:36absence of the probandum is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a
0:36–0:41stronger cognition. Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandum in the
0:41–0:45subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason.
0:46–0:51Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum opposes inference.
0:53–0:5881. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum and the subject
0:58–1:02did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion
1:02–1:06and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom and
1:06–1:12establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain.
1:12–1:17But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been apprehended
1:17–1:23separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter reason.
1:23–1:28Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity
1:28–1:33is known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise.
1:33–1:38The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of
1:38–1:42the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason.
1:42–1:46Near veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not the
1:46–1:48defect.
1:48–1:4982.
1:49–1:54Objection, veridical cognition, here the reason is present and the probandom absent,
1:54–1:58That is, cognition of deviation should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is
1:58–2:00not the defect.
2:00–2:04Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition
2:04–2:07of validity would fail to inhibit inference.
2:07–2:11It may again be said that the cognition there is veritical cognition of the absence of the
2:11–2:16probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own
2:16–2:21force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom.
2:21–2:24Answer, this is not sound.
2:24–2:28Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence
2:28–2:32of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat.
2:32–2:35The same rule is observed in verbal cognition.
2:35–2:39Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly related
2:39–2:43to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason.
2:43–2:48In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation.
2:48–2:55is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is
2:55–3:01present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition of the
3:01–3:06validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence,
3:06–3:11the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom
3:11–3:17from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect.
3:17–3:21Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence
3:21–3:26of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater
3:26–3:27is needed.
3:27–3:32Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom
3:32–3:35could not establish that absence.
3:35–3:39Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference
3:39–3:45is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence.
3:45–3:50This defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason.
3:50–3:54The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted.
3:54–3:5584.
3:55–4:00Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, therefore,
4:00–4:04if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no cause
4:04–4:06to stop inference of fire.
4:06–4:11On this view, inferences of doulat from cowwood, odor from earthwood, and qualities
4:11–4:16from Substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties deviate from one another.
4:17–4:21The counter positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters,
4:21–4:27do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason,
4:27–4:32reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly establish
4:32–4:38either established or unestablished probanda. Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the
4:38–4:45reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandom
4:45–4:51is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of order from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood
4:51–4:56would fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction.
4:57–5:02In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom
5:02–5:08is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive
5:08–5:13of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate
5:13–5:19acceptance of defeat is necessary. DEFEAT is foundational.
5:19–5:2586. OBJECTION If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom,
5:25–5:29there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter
5:29–5:34of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject
5:34–5:38qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated.
5:38–5:44Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject,
5:44–5:47therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time.
5:47–5:52Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while
5:52–5:55prior absence or destruction exists.
5:55–6:02Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference.
6:02–6:06what is already established is not an independent defect.
6:06–6:1287, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious
6:12–6:13reason.
6:13–6:18Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference.
6:18–6:21Cognition that the pro-bandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily
6:21–6:26prevent renewed cognition of the pro-bandom, successive cognitions are possible.
6:26–6:30Even after the pro-bandom has been established by perception, inference may arise if
6:30–6:36someone desires to know that pro-bandim through inference. A person who delights in reasoning
6:36–6:42reflects again on a matter previously heard. A person who desires establishment in general
6:42–6:47abandons the desire once establishment has occurred, but one who desires establishment
6:47–6:53through a particular means retains the desire for inference. Therefore establishing what is
6:53–6:58already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct
6:58–7:00defective inference.
7:00–7:04A posed cognition is an inhibitor.
7:04–7:11It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general.
7:11–7:14Four.
7:14–7:21Certainty of silverhood and this is silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not silver.
7:21–7:27Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veridical cognition of presence,
7:27–7:31because the error, this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already
7:31–7:35ascertained this conch is not yellow.
7:35–7:39This argument, however, is not sound.
7:39–7:43Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous
7:43–7:45perception.
7:45–7:49Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness
7:49–7:56and a conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom
7:56–8:02inhibits inference of the probandom. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of
8:02–8:08the probandom is present, inference of the presence of the probandom cannot arise.
8:08–8:1110 Types of Defeated Reason
8:11–8:18Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge
8:18–8:25or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists.
8:25–8:30A reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal
8:30–8:33substance.
8:33–8:37A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone
8:37–8:41because it is a mountain.
8:41–8:46A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for
8:46–8:51example, fire is not hot because it is produced.
8:51–8:56A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the probandum, for
8:56–9:01example, sound is inaudible because it is equality.
9:01–9:06A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahood is not the ground for using the
9:06–9:11word gavaya, because it is a universal.
9:11–9:16A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the probandum, for example, the skull of
9:16–9:23a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body.
9:23–9:28A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example, water and air are
9:28–9:34hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire.
9:34–9:39A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the mind is omnipresent
9:39–9:46because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition.
9:46–9:51A reason defeated by verbal testimony in joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example,
9:51–9:55a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven,
9:55–9:59the Agni Elma sacrifice.
9:59–10:03Phalacious reasons establish incapacity to prove.
10:03–10:0490.
10:04–10:08Phalacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five
10:08–10:12kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the probandom.
10:12–10:16By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity
10:16–10:20of the proponents reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they
10:20–10:22are improper replies.
10:22–10:26An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stocked merely by cognition
10:26–10:30of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reasons in capacity
10:30–10:35through fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when
10:35–10:38the defect raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the
10:38–10:40defect should suffice.
10:40–10:47Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes. First, to stop inference
10:47–10:53for another, second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponent's reason. The first
10:53–10:58Both purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled
10:58–11:02only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason.
11:02–11:07Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of
11:07–11:11showing that the proponent's reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions,
11:11–11:16obstructing inference and establishing incapacity.
11:16–11:20Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible.
11:20–11:24It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaia statement
11:24–11:29would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would
11:29–11:33not be fully established as incapable.
11:33–11:36This objection is not sound.
11:36–11:40Debate proceeds on the accepted provision that every fallacious reason is incapable.
11:40–11:43It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this
11:43–11:46particular reason.
11:46–11:48Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why
11:48–11:54a defect counts as a fallacious reason. It may again be said that in the inference,
11:54–11:58sound is impermanent because it is produced, the pervasion of producedness by impermanence
11:58–12:02is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent, there is therefore no need separately
12:02–12:06to show the pervasion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence.
12:07–12:12This argument too is not sound. During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect
12:12–12:16by incapacity is an indispensable matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent
12:16–12:20statement itself would become disputable.
12:20–12:23Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere.
12:23–12:2792, an objection may be raised.
12:27–12:30Debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence of sound from producedness
12:30–12:35is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness by impermanence.
12:35–12:38Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does
12:38–12:42not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity.
12:42–12:46Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition,
12:46–12:50merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere,
12:50–12:53use of all five members is necessary.
12:53–13:00But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable.
13:00–13:02Definition of incapacity to prove
13:02–13:0593.
13:05–13:09Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in
13:09–13:11the subject.
13:11–13:15A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the
13:15–13:21probandum and the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition
13:21–13:26of the probandum because the necessary causes are incomplete.
13:26–13:30It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject
13:30–13:35qualified by the probandum at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective
13:35–13:39reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandum arises from it,
13:39–13:43whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum arises
13:43–13:46from a valid reason.
13:46–13:49This view, however, is not sound.
13:49–13:54A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter-reason,
13:54–13:58may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject
13:58–14:01qualified by the probandum.
14:01–14:06Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason.
14:06–14:11Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandum.
14:11–14:1794, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom.
14:17–14:22A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandom when its defeated
14:22–14:26or contradictory status is unknown.
14:26–14:29But this view too is not sound.
14:29–14:33A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an
14:33–14:37illusion of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or
14:37–14:42uncommon status is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion.
14:42–14:47Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a reason, because
14:47–14:53a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence.
14:53–14:59At a particular time a valid reason too may assume a defective form.
14:59–15:03Perversion by the context-specific probandum may sometimes be unestablished, or, because
15:03–15:08As the probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it
15:08–15:10again.
15:10–15:16Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons.
15:16–15:20Incinclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof, inconclusiveness concerning
15:20–15:25the context-specific probandom would remain unestablished, and in the case of a partially
15:25–15:29established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established.
15:29–15:36The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom.
15:36–15:43One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom.
15:43–15:4495.
15:44–15:50Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific
15:50–15:54probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to produce
15:54–15:59veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject.
16:01–16:06It should not be objected that the counter positive of such an absence cannot be established,
16:06–16:09because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter positiveness.
16:11–16:17But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced,
16:17–16:22it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context specific probandom,
16:22–16:24consequently a two would be incapable.
16:25–16:30Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason.
16:31–16:34In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all,
16:34–16:37and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons,
16:37–16:40the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain.
16:42–16:45Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces
16:45–16:47veridical cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom.
16:48–16:51Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference.
16:52–16:59Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inference.
16:59–17:0896, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inferential cognition.
17:08–17:13An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason,
17:13–17:20and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-eason inhibits inference.
17:20–17:31This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counterbalanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference.
17:31–17:39And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor which is unacceptable.
17:39–17:46Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandim is an inhibitor.
17:46–17:5197. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the
17:51–17:56probandom, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and
17:56–18:02that this cognition alone is veridical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself
18:02–18:06as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor, cognition that it produces
18:06–18:11the absence of the probandom is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity
18:11–18:17and non-establishment. Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect in either of the two
18:17–18:23components of a counterbalanced reason, perversion or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor,
18:23–18:29because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Nor should
18:29–18:33it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason
18:33–18:38and a non-reason is the defect. When such a general property is known to deviate
18:38–18:43from the probandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the probandom in general.
18:44–18:48In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter reason,
18:48–18:53which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them,
18:53–18:59inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under
18:59–19:06non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular
19:06–19:13inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition
19:13–19:20concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not in capacity. For example,
19:20–19:25this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject,
19:25–19:30an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness,
19:30–19:32like another cognition of inconclusiveness.
19:34–19:38Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason,
19:38–19:43but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the same
19:43–19:50time, cannot arise later. Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic
19:50–19:56of incapacity. Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the
19:56–19:59probandum and subject.
19:59–20:0599. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the
20:05–20:07subject and probandum.
20:07–20:13Viridical cognition of a true probandum may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory,
20:13–20:15or inconclusive reason.
20:15–20:19For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke
20:19–20:24and an inferential cognition of fire may arise. This cognition concerning fire is
20:24–20:30veritical even though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition
20:30–20:36of a different fire occurs there. One in the same fire in one locus is cognized,
20:36–20:39and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible.
20:40–20:45Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor
20:45–20:49is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke.
20:49–20:55Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical.
20:55–21:01Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition.
21:01–21:05Presence and absence do not both occur in one lock as, nevertheless,
21:05–21:08the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence.
21:08–21:15Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may
21:15–21:22arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier.
21:22–21:26Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor.
21:26–21:33100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom.
21:33–21:37If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines
21:37–21:43inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily
21:43–21:48present there. Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always
21:48–21:52cognized in fire, consequently identity with a property pervasive of fire would
21:52–21:56also be known as pervaded by fire in numerous reasons. Then inference of
21:56–22:03fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid. Answer, not so. Where
22:03–22:06inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light,
22:06–22:11numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible. Identity with
22:11–22:16The property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore
22:16–22:19the stated overextension does not arise.
22:19–22:23The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition.
22:23–22:28101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition,
22:28–22:32because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of
22:32–22:36cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference,
22:36–22:39like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself.
22:39–22:44A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the
22:44–22:49other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier.
22:49–22:54Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus
22:54–22:58is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke.
22:58–23:02Cessation of inferential cognition is possible.
23:02–23:08Objection, once the pervasion of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity
23:08–23:13for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate.
23:13–23:17Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the
23:17–23:21object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless
23:21–23:26prolixity. Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other
23:26–23:30than the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference. The
23:30–23:34causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and
23:34–23:37should therefore necessarily produce its result.
23:37–23:40Answer, this objection is not sound.
23:40–23:46Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow of inferential cognition,
23:46–23:49cessation of inference is therefore possible.
23:49–23:52Validity of inferential cognition.
23:52–23:58103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason,
23:58–24:03validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the reason possess incapacity?
24:03–24:05Letting capacity be admitted.
24:05–24:11But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke?
24:11–24:17Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel and not other fire be held to pervade smoke?
24:17–24:25It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel.
24:25–24:31Because of the illusion of smoke and vapor, perversion by fire would be known, but since smoke is absent in vapor,
24:31–24:34inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid.
24:34–24:38Therefore smoke is said to be accidentally present there.
24:39–24:43In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire.
24:44–24:49Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor,
24:49–24:59The Probandom fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true.
24:59–25:07According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference of the Probandom fire will be true.
25:07–25:12In Capacity, the Decisive View
25:12–25:15104. Here we present our Decisive View.
25:15–25:26The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject.
25:27–25:38For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject.
25:38–25:44subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status
25:44–25:49and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom and the
25:49–25:55subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject. It must
25:55–25:59also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like, cognition
25:59–26:05of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason. Consequently,
26:05–26:10The defect of treating the probandum is unestablished or unproved because the counter positive is
26:10–26:15unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided.
26:15–26:20Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential
26:20–26:22cognition.
26:22–26:28105, alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits
26:28–26:31being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition
26:31–26:35of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject.
26:35–26:39For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being
26:39–26:43the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because it is an inconclusive or
26:43–26:47other defective reason, like another fallacious reason.
26:47–26:50It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits
26:50–26:55inferential cognition is in fact simply inconclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an
26:55–26:57object of cognition.
26:57–27:00But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being
27:00–27:04the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition because only difference from an
27:04–27:07extraneous condition becomes an object of inference.
27:07–27:11For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting
27:11–27:15water capable of quenching thirst as water.
27:15–27:19Incapacity incapacity to prove conclusion.
27:19–27:25106, the view of other scholars is as follows, in the case of inconclusive, defeated,
27:25–27:29and contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded, in the case of
27:29–27:33reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in
27:33–27:38the case of a reason unestablished in nature, a counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason,
27:38–27:42the condition of being, at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential
27:42–27:47cognition, all these constitute the condition of not establishing or proving the pro-bandom
27:47–27:49in the subject.
27:49–27:53It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove
27:53–27:56the pro-bandom would be incoherent.
27:56–28:02The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the probandham.
28:02–28:06It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious
28:06–28:11reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential
28:11–28:13cognition is fallacious.
28:13–28:18Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tatbhāsintmai composed by Sri
28:18–28:23Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not
28:23–28:28establishing or proving the probandum in capacity ends.
28:28–28:34The inference division ends through the section on defeat.
28:34–28:35Appendix 3

Plain text

विश्दाबश्द दाक्ष्द अछि। absence of the probandum is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition. Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandum in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason. Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum opposes inference. 81. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum and the subject did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom and establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain. But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter reason. Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise. The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Near veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not the defect. 82. Objection, veridical cognition, here the reason is present and the probandom absent, That is, cognition of deviation should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference. It may again be said that the cognition there is veritical cognition of the absence of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat. The same rule is observed in verbal cognition. Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly related to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason. In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation. is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect. Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater is needed. Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence. This defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason. The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted. 84. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, therefore, if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doulat from cowwood, odor from earthwood, and qualities from Substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties deviate from one another. The counter positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly establish either established or unestablished probanda. Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandom is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of order from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction. In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary. DEFEAT is foundational. 86. OBJECTION If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom, there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated. Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject, therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time. Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists. Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference. what is already established is not an independent defect. 87, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason. Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference. Cognition that the pro-bandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent renewed cognition of the pro-bandom, successive cognitions are possible. Even after the pro-bandom has been established by perception, inference may arise if someone desires to know that pro-bandim through inference. A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard. A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred, but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference. Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct defective inference. A posed cognition is an inhibitor. It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general. Four. Certainty of silverhood and this is silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not silver. Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veridical cognition of presence, because the error, this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow. This argument, however, is not sound. Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception. Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness and a conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom inhibits inference of the probandom. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom is present, inference of the presence of the probandom cannot arise. 10 Types of Defeated Reason Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain. A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for example, fire is not hot because it is produced. A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the probandum, for example, sound is inaudible because it is equality. A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahood is not the ground for using the word gavaya, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the probandum, for example, the skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire. A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition. A reason defeated by verbal testimony in joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, the Agni Elma sacrifice. Phalacious reasons establish incapacity to prove. 90. Phalacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the probandom. By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity of the proponents reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper replies. An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stocked merely by cognition of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reasons in capacity through fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice. Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes. First, to stop inference for another, second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponent's reason. The first Both purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason. Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing that the proponent's reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions, obstructing inference and establishing incapacity. Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible. It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaia statement would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would not be fully established as incapable. This objection is not sound. Debate proceeds on the accepted provision that every fallacious reason is incapable. It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular reason. Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason. It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced, the pervasion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the pervasion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence. This argument too is not sound. During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent statement itself would become disputable. Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere. 92, an objection may be raised. Debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness by impermanence. Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity. Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition, merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere, use of all five members is necessary. But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable. Definition of incapacity to prove 93. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject. A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the probandum and the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandum because the necessary causes are incomplete. It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandum arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum arises from a valid reason. This view, however, is not sound. A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter-reason, may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum. Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason. Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandum. 94, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom. A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandom when its defeated or contradictory status is unknown. But this view too is not sound. A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion. Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a reason, because a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason too may assume a defective form. Perversion by the context-specific probandum may sometimes be unestablished, or, because As the probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again. Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons. Incinclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof, inconclusiveness concerning the context-specific probandom would remain unestablished, and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom. One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom. 95. Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject. It should not be objected that the counter positive of such an absence cannot be established, because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter positiveness. But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced, it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context specific probandom, consequently a two would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain. Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom. Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference. Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inference. 96, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inferential cognition. An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-eason inhibits inference. This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counterbalanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference. And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor which is unacceptable. Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandim is an inhibitor. 97. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the probandom, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and that this cognition alone is veridical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor, cognition that it produces the absence of the probandom is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment. Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced reason, perversion or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Nor should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect. When such a general property is known to deviate from the probandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the probandom in general. In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter reason, which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them, inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not in capacity. For example, this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness. Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason, but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity. Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandum and subject. 99. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the subject and probandum. Viridical cognition of a true probandum may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of fire may arise. This cognition concerning fire is veritical even though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One in the same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical. Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition. Presence and absence do not both occur in one lock as, nevertheless, the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence. Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier. Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor. 100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom. If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily present there. Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in numerous reasons. Then inference of fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid. Answer, not so. Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible. Identity with The property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore the stated overextension does not arise. The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition. 101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition, because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference, like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself. A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier. Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke. Cessation of inferential cognition is possible. Objection, once the pervasion of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate. Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless prolixity. Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other than the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference. The causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should therefore necessarily produce its result. Answer, this objection is not sound. Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible. Validity of inferential cognition. 103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the reason possess incapacity? Letting capacity be admitted. But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke? Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel and not other fire be held to pervade smoke? It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel. Because of the illusion of smoke and vapor, perversion by fire would be known, but since smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid. Therefore smoke is said to be accidentally present there. In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire. Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, The Probandom fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true. According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference of the Probandom fire will be true. In Capacity, the Decisive View 104. Here we present our Decisive View. The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject. For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject. subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom and the subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like, cognition of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason. Consequently, The defect of treating the probandum is unestablished or unproved because the counter positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided. Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition. 105, alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason. It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition is in fact simply inconclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an object of cognition. But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition because only difference from an extraneous condition becomes an object of inference. For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as water. Incapacity incapacity to prove conclusion. 106, the view of other scholars is as follows, in the case of inconclusive, defeated, and contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded, in the case of reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in nature, a counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition of being, at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all these constitute the condition of not establishing or proving the pro-bandom in the subject. It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the pro-bandom would be incoherent. The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the probandham. It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tatbhāsintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the probandum in capacity ends. The inference division ends through the section on defeat. Appendix 3

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