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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 23:25
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0:02–0:33अबजेक्षिन, अग्डिन इन्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्�
0:33–0:38With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
0:39–0:46Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause.
0:46–0:5714. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises,
0:57–1:07Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form smoke or light is pervaded by fire and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form smoke or light is a property of the mountain.
1:07–1:13On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
1:13–1:21In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable,
1:21–1:30nevertheless, Gaugia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
1:30–1:33Otherness from that is not the reason.
1:33–1:3815. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason.
1:38–1:43But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary
1:43–1:46breadth and the possibility of deviation.
1:46–1:51Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood.
1:51–1:54Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire.
1:54–1:5516.
1:55–2:00The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire.
2:00–2:04In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire.
2:04–2:08Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless.
2:09–2:20The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting perversion by fire, smokehood or lighthood.
2:21–2:24Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual.
2:26–2:32Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference.
2:32–2:39Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension
2:39–2:43of subject propertyhood, can produce cognitions smoke or light pervaded by fire is present
2:43–2:45on the mountain.
2:45–2:50Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier,
2:50–2:54qualificon relation are decisive.
2:54–2:59Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception.
2:59–3:04It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless
3:04–3:08qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or
3:08–3:12light is pervaded by fire.
3:12–3:14But this objection is untenable.
3:14–3:18Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier,
3:18–3:21through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitance it
3:21–3:25assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire.
3:25–3:29Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference,
3:29–3:33there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke
3:33–3:37or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject.
3:37–3:41In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognitions smoke or light is pervaded
3:41–3:46by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection, therefore
3:46–3:52cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference.
3:52–3:56Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire.
3:56–3:5819.
3:58–4:02It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself
4:02–4:07the delimiter of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated
4:07–4:12in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes.
4:13–4:19But there is no evidence for this view. A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes
4:19–4:25is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of pervasion
4:25–4:31by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervations,
4:31–4:35subsumptive reflection concerning general perversion is impossible.
4:36–4:41Therefore, when smokehood and perversion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain,
4:41–4:45cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference.
4:47–4:52Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity.
4:53–4:5820. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition
4:58–5:00does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supposed
5:00–5:02विचार-विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक
5:02–5:04विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक
5:04–5:06विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक
5:06–5:09financial commitment concerning causality is not itself a
5:09–5:13even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified
5:13–5:16subsumptive reflection with the assistance of cognition of
5:16–5:19smokehood and recollection of perversion.
5:19–5:23Just as concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends
5:23–5:26perversion with the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior
5:26–5:29inference and recollection, so subsumptive reflection concerning
5:29–5:34the mountain smokes perversion by fire is possible.
5:34–5:39Application is not a separate means of knowledge.
5:39–5:44Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association
5:44–5:49generated by thought, like poetic imagination, substantive reflection is possible on the
5:49–5:54basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion.
5:54–6:00Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
6:00–6:05The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent.
6:05–6:1122. The view is unacceptable that the perversion of all individual smokes by fire is known through
6:11–6:15the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular
6:15–6:21mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted,
6:21–6:26cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood,
6:26–6:29and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure.
6:29–6:31Fire.
6:31–6:36Recollection of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating
6:36–6:42it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex.
6:42–6:46Veridical perception of fire is impossible.
6:46–6:4723.
6:47–6:52In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual
6:52–6:57through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta.
6:57–7:01The fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, therefore
7:01–7:07a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression.
7:07–7:12In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known,
7:12–7:17hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance
7:17–7:19of an impression.
7:19–7:22But the perversion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as
7:22–7:28a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established
7:28–7:31by an impression alone.
7:31–7:36Pervasion is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom.
7:36–7:42Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke
7:42–7:45through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain
7:45–7:48fire is not directly perceived.
7:48–7:54Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both
7:54–8:00reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore
8:00–8:04the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception
8:04–8:07but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection.
8:07–8:16Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension
8:16–8:22of the relation between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation,
8:22–8:27perception of the qualificand, and sense-contact are all causes of veridical qualified perception.
8:27–8:33In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion
8:33–8:37and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain.
8:37–8:41The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular
8:41–8:48smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises.
8:48–8:52But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there
8:52–8:58is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire.
8:58–9:03through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood.
9:03–9:0426.
9:04–9:08Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through
9:08–9:13an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression, that same being pervaded
9:13–9:16by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke.
9:16–9:22From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
9:22–9:26In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded
9:26–9:32by fire in smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire.
9:32–9:39The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes.
9:39–9:43But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, the role of the
9:43–9:48individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character
9:48–9:52contact becomes unnecessary.
9:52–9:56In practice, even one who does not understand pervasion at the level of the universal
9:56–10:00infers fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the
10:00–10:32नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक �
10:32–10:37an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded
10:37–10:43means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from
10:43–10:47cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject
10:47–10:53propertyhood and the probandom's pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence
10:53–10:57wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandom's pervadingness.
10:57–11:05But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of
11:05–11:10perversion by the probandom, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the
11:10–11:19probandom. Definition of pervadingness. 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection
11:19–11:23fire pervades the mountain smoke is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the
11:23–11:27object of substantive reflection, since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not
11:27–11:29previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred.
11:31–11:36Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the
11:36–11:41collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject.
11:42–11:47If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness.
11:47–11:53In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence
11:53–11:58of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke.
11:58–12:02Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire.
12:02–12:07The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the
12:07–12:11subject, only the relation of pervasion is known.
12:11–12:16A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact
12:16–12:20with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental.
12:20–12:24The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and
12:24–12:27negative concomitance.
12:27–12:29Rule concerning the subject as qualifacand
12:29–12:3230.
12:32–12:36It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate
12:36–12:40or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot
12:40–12:44become the principal qualifacand in the inferential cognition, there is fire on
12:44–12:48mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to
12:48–12:53become the principal qualificant in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain
12:53–12:58has already been established as the principal qualificant in the experiential inference,
12:58–13:02there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificants of causal cognition and resulting
13:02–13:08cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man,
13:08–13:13produces the cognition, the man is staff bearing. The proponent of the established
13:13–13:18conclusion says, in the subsumptive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain,
13:18–13:23fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand.
13:24–13:29There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the
13:29–13:34qualificand of the resulting cognition. Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning
13:34–13:39the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of
13:39–13:42the probandom becomes the principal qualificand.
13:43–13:49Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference.
13:51–13:56Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason regarded as
13:56–14:03qualified by perversion is not itself the cause. Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of
14:03–14:08perversion, but subsumptive reflection including the reasons perversion, is the cause, therefore
14:08–14:14the reason to becomes a cause. Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection,
14:14–14:19but it has no independent causality. If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause,
14:19–14:23every qualifier known through sense contact in perception would have to be regarded as an
14:23–14:29independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises
14:29–14:33not from cognition of smoke, but from the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is
14:33–14:39present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces
14:39–14:44cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular
14:44–14:51time of subsumptive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason
14:51–14:55is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate
14:55–15:00operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive
15:00–15:00reflective reflection would not be the extraordinary cause.
15:00–15:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ�
15:30–15:37always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition
15:37–15:42of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason
15:42–15:49and subsumptive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive.
15:49–15:53Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark.
15:53–15:5933. The proposal cannot be accepted that the prior absence of future smoke or destruction
15:59–16:04of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether
16:04–16:10an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also
16:10–16:16be doubtful. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition
16:16–16:22is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior
16:22–16:29absence or destruction of smoke is the reason incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier.
16:29–16:33The general cause of inference is not smoke but subsumptive reflection concerning smoke's
16:33–16:35pervasion.
16:35–16:40The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity
16:40–16:43of the particular subsumptive reflection.
16:43–16:48Subsumptive reflection in general is the cause of inference in general.
16:48–16:52Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference.
16:52–16:58Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of
16:58–17:02present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
17:04–17:09Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke.
17:10–17:14Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause.
17:15–17:20From the cognition of pervasion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the subsumptive
17:20–17:25reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises, this subsumptive
17:25–17:32reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the
17:32–17:39cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is
17:39–17:44not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation, cognition of perversion
17:44–17:51is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent
17:51–17:55of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises as the result
17:55–17:59of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter,
17:59–18:03subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference.
18:04–18:08The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an
18:08–18:13effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection.
18:15–18:18With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
18:18–18:25and purely affirmative inference.
18:25–18:30Definition of purely affirmative inference.
18:30–18:35Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative.
18:35–18:40An inference in which the pro-bandom has no counter-instance is purely affirmative.
18:41–18:47Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable.
18:47–18:51Nameability has no counter-instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a
18:51–18:54the locus of the absence of nameability is impossible.
18:55–18:57Objection to the definition.
18:58–19:01Objection, an unnameable object can be referred
19:01–19:02to by the word ether,
19:02–19:06therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible.
19:06–19:09Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable
19:09–19:15because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative.
19:15–19:17Reply, if unnameability is not distinct
19:17–19:20from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely
19:20–19:25affirmative, and if un-namability is regarded as distinct from the un-namable, the probandom
19:25–19:31will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that namability is purely
19:31–19:33affirmative.
19:33–19:37An inference is purely affirmative when the counter positive of an absolute absence
19:37–19:43is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter instance is called
19:43–19:46purely affirmative.
19:46–19:52in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter positive of an
19:52–19:57absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative
19:57–20:00is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form.
20:00–20:08Only the perversion of a property whose counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative.
20:08–20:17Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter-positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative.
20:17–20:22The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative.
20:22–20:274. It should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction
20:27–20:33of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. In the locus where the
20:33–20:38prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality
20:38–20:43cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there
20:43–20:48is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum,
20:48–20:51The very locus of the quality no longer exists.
20:51–20:57Therefore the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative.
20:57–21:03The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative.
21:03–21:08Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative.
21:08–21:13If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter
21:13–21:19positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether.
21:19–21:25Absence is generally in the form of a counter positive. The absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property.
21:26–21:31Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence.
21:33–21:37With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end.
21:39–21:42Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion.
21:44–21:51Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence, is purely affirmative.
21:53–21:57The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether,
21:57–22:01but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of
22:01–22:08an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative.
22:09–22:14In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and
22:14–22:19knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated
22:19–22:22absolute absences.
22:22–22:26No ability is purely affirmative.
22:26–22:32Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized.
22:32–22:39Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge,
22:39–22:43objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability
22:43–22:48applies to many individuals and can be generalized.
22:48–22:52A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual.
22:52–22:57In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive
22:57–23:00cognition such as inheritance.
23:00–23:04At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property
23:04–23:09delimiting the individual must also be admitted.
23:09–23:14Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word.
23:14–23:19Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual,
23:19–23:24therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

Plain text

अबजेक्षिन, अग्डिन इन्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्� With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause. 14. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form smoke or light is pervaded by fire and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form smoke or light is a property of the mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, Gaugia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Otherness from that is not the reason. 15. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood. Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire. 16. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire. Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting perversion by fire, smokehood or lighthood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual. Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference. Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognitions smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualificon relation are decisive. Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception. It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitance it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire. Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognitions smoke or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference. Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire. 19. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes. But there is no evidence for this view. A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of pervasion by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervations, subsumptive reflection concerning general perversion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and perversion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supposed विचार-विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक financial commitment concerning causality is not itself a even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified subsumptive reflection with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of perversion. Just as concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends perversion with the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so subsumptive reflection concerning the mountain smokes perversion by fire is possible. Application is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination, substantive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent. 22. The view is unacceptable that the perversion of all individual smokes by fire is known through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure. Fire. Recollection of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex. Veridical perception of fire is impossible. 23. In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta. The fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the perversion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone. Pervasion is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom. Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection. Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand, and sense-contact are all causes of veridical qualified perception. In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire. through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood. 26. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression, that same being pervaded by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand pervasion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक � an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandom's pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandom's pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of perversion by the probandom, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandom. Definition of pervadingness. 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection fire pervades the mountain smoke is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the object of substantive reflection, since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred. Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject. If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness. In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the subject, only the relation of pervasion is known. A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. Rule concerning the subject as qualifacand 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualifacand in the inferential cognition, there is fire on mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the principal qualificant in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualificant in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificants of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the man is staff bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the subsumptive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand. There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificand of the resulting cognition. Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom becomes the principal qualificand. Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference. Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause. Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion, but subsumptive reflection including the reasons perversion, is the cause, therefore the reason to becomes a cause. Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent causality. If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke, but from the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of subsumptive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflective reflection would not be the extraordinary cause. नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark. 33. The proposal cannot be accepted that the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke is the reason incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke but subsumptive reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity of the particular subsumptive reflection. Subsumptive reflection in general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference. Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause. From the cognition of pervasion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises, this subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation, cognition of perversion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter, subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference. The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection. With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. and purely affirmative inference. Definition of purely affirmative inference. Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative. An inference in which the pro-bandom has no counter-instance is purely affirmative. Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable. Nameability has no counter-instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a the locus of the absence of nameability is impossible. Objection to the definition. Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible. Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative. Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative, and if un-namability is regarded as distinct from the un-namable, the probandom will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that namability is purely affirmative. An inference is purely affirmative when the counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter instance is called purely affirmative. in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the perversion of a property whose counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter-positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative. The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative. 4. It should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, The very locus of the quality no longer exists. Therefore the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative. Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether. Absence is generally in the form of a counter positive. The absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence, is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated absolute absences. No ability is purely affirmative. Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized. Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized. A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual. In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance. At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted. Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word. Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

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