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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:04–0:07The following discussion is principally based upon two subjects,
0:07–0:111. the inference of God, a logical proof of God's existence,
0:11–0:17and 2. the doctrine of the power to burn, which concerns causation and the rejection of an additional power.
0:19–0:23Let us understand both subjects in simple terms.
0:23–0:27The inference of God, proof of God's existence.
0:27–0:37In this section, the existence of God as the maker of the world is established on the logical foundations of Gaya philosophy.
0:38–0:43The fundamental argument, the visible world earth, water, mountains, and all similar things
0:43–0:46has been produced by some maker because these things are products.
0:47–0:53Just as a pot is a product whose maker is a potter, God is the maker of the product that is the world.
0:54–0:59The prima facie opponent's objection, the opponent argues that a maker has a body and
0:59–1:03acts through that body. If God is the maker of the world, God too must be embodied,
1:03–1:08but a body is impermanent and perishable. Moreover, there is no direct proof that this
1:08–1:15world was made by a single maker. The Niyayaka's definitive reply, the Niyayaka's refute this objection.
1:16–1:20According to them, God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, eternal desire,
1:20–1:26and eternal effort. These three qualities are everlasting in God. God does not require a human
1:26–1:30body to create the world, through knowledge and effort, and by means of unseen merit and
1:30–1:36demerit, God imparts motion to the atoms and brings about creation. On this basis, a single omniscient
1:36–1:43and omnipotent God is established. The doctrine of the power to burn, a theory of cause and effect.
1:45–1:51This section presents the celebrated debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning power as an
1:51–1:56unseen capacity. It is explained through the example of fire's capacity to burn.
1:56–2:02The msaka view, when a hand is placed in fire, the experience of burning occurs.
2:02–2:09Yet if a special jewel, such as a moonstone, or a mantra is present nearby, the fire does not
2:09–2:15burn. The Neayaka refutation, the absence of an inhibitor, the Neayakas reject this doctrine
2:15–2:20of an unseen power. They argue that there is no need to postulate an additional power in
2:20–2:27fire in accordance with the principle of theoretical economy. Fire alone is the principle cause of
2:27–2:34burning. The role of the inhibitor, the Neayakas hold that the presence of the jewel is an inhibitor
2:34–2:40or obstacle. An effect occurs only when its cause fire is present and the inhibitor, the jewel,
2:40–2:46is absent. If the jewel is present, the effect of burning does not occur, if it is absent,
2:46–2:52burning occurs. The postulation of any additional power is therefore unnecessary.
2:54–3:01Conclusion. In the inference of God, the world is a product and must therefore have a maker,
3:01–3:06God, who is a disembodied being endowed with eternal cognition, desire, and effort.
3:07–3:11In the theory of power, no additional unseen power, in his in an object,
3:11–3:15in effect occurs through the presence of the cause and the absence of an obstacle,
3:15–3:17that is, the absence of an inhibitor.
3:17–3:23The establishment of God through inference, a logical analysis of how Gangesha Upadyaya
3:23–3:27establishes an omniscient and disembodied God through the inference, earth, sprouts,
3:27–3:31and similar things are products, and whatever is a product must have a maker.
3:33–3:36The power to burn in the inhibitor, what is fire's power to burn?
3:38–3:42How do jewels, mantras, and similar things function as inhibitors,
3:42–3:45and how is the absence of an inhibitor treated as a cause of the effect?
3:45–3:51subject. These questions are examined logically.
3:51–3:55Analysis of technical terminology, the meaning and use in the text of complex Nyaya terms
3:55–4:02such as pervasion, subject, probandum, reason, extraneous condition, and mutual dependence.
4:02–4:07The principal constituents required to establish an inference in Nyaya philosophy are the
4:07–4:13subject, the probandum, and the reason. Let us understand these three terms, together
4:13–4:18with perversion, in the context of the original text.
4:18–4:22Probandom, the matter or property to be established.
4:22–4:26In the inference of God, the probandom is being produced by a maker, the state of having
4:26–4:29an agent as one's producer.
4:29–4:35Subject, the locus or matter in which the probandom is to be established.
4:35–4:39In the original text, earth, a sprout, and similar things are treated as subjects
4:39–4:43in which the existence of a maker, God, is established.
4:43–4:49Reason, the mark or ground on the basis of which the probandom is established.
4:49–4:53In the inference of God, being a product is the reason.
4:53–4:59Purvation, the unbroken and universal relation between reason and probandom.
4:59–5:04One form presented in the text is, wherever producthood occurs, there is production by
5:04–5:08one who knows the material cause of that product.
5:08–5:14We shall next discuss the defects of an extraneous condition and mutual dependence.
5:14–5:18Before doing so, however, it is necessary to see whether these basic terms have become
5:18–5:21clear.
5:21–5:27Consider the common inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there.
5:27–5:32What are the subject, pro-bandem, and reason in this inference?
5:32–5:36This familiar example, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there,
5:36–5:40makes the three principal constituents of Nyaya inference clear.
5:40–5:47Subject, the mountain, because it is the locus in which the probandum, fire, is being established.
5:47–5:53Probandum, fire, the property, or matter to be established on the mountain.
5:53–6:00Reason, smoke, the ground or mark on the basis of which fire is established on the mountain.
6:00–6:05On this basis, one can understand how an inference is constructed in Nyayalogic.
6:06–6:12The text then introduces two further complex terms, extraneous condition and mutual dependence.
6:14–6:21Let us understand and detail these two exceptionally important and difficult technical terms of Nabhya Nyaya, Upadi and Añonayas Reya.
6:23–6:27Upadi, conditional limitation or conditional defect.
6:29–6:30What is in Upadi?
6:30–6:35In Nyaelogic, and Upadi is a defect that gives rise to doubt concerning the
6:35–6:40perversion or universal rule between the reason and the probandum. In simple terms,
6:40–6:45it is a concealed restrictive condition that is invariably connected with the
6:45–6:50probandum but not invariably connected with the reason. Consequently, the
6:50–6:55inference from the reason to the probandum proves erroneous. Example
6:55–6:57from the original text.
6:57–7:03Inference, earth and similar objects are produced by a maker because they are products.
7:03–7:08Here producthood is the reason and being produced by a maker is the probandom.
7:08–7:12Objection in the form of an upadi, the prima facie opponent argues that, being produced
7:12–7:15through a body, is an extraneous condition.
7:15–7:20Wherever something is produced by a maker, the opponent claims, it is necessarily produced
7:20–7:24through a body, as pots and cloth are made by embodied agents such as potters.
7:24–7:28this property of being produced through a body does not invariably accompany the reason,
7:28–7:32producthood, because God is disembodied, a body is therefore not indispensable to the
7:32–7:35production of the earth.
7:35–7:40The definitive reply, Nayakas such as Gangesa Upadyaya established that being produced
7:40–7:45through a body does not pervade the probandam and therefore cannot be a genuine Upady.
7:45–7:50Mere production by a maker is sufficient for establishing the probandam, embodiment
7:50–7:53is not necessary.
7:53–8:00mutual dependence, anionis rea circular dependency or mutual interdependence.
8:00–8:03What is mutual dependence?
8:03–8:07When two things or arguments depend upon each other in such a manner that the second is
8:07–8:11required to establish the first and the first to establish the second, the defect
8:11–8:16of mutual dependence, or circular reasoning, arises.
8:16–8:20In this defect, neither proposition can easily serve as a foundation because each looks
8:20–8:24to the other for its proof.
8:24–8:27from the original text.
8:27–8:32First context, the inference of God, a neutral adjudicator is in doubt between the inferences
8:32–8:34of the proponent and the opponent.
8:34–8:37If it is said that the proponent's inference causes doubt about the opponents and that
8:37–8:42the opponent's inference causes doubt about the proponent's, mutual dependence results,
8:42–8:45because the establishment of the first requires the second and the establishment of the
8:45–8:48second requires the first.
8:48–8:52Second context, the subjects of a sprout and the earth, if God is first inferred
8:52–8:56in relation to the sprout and then, on that basis, inferred in relation to the earth, or
8:56–9:00if the inference concerning the sprout is made only after the inference concerning the
9:00–9:05earth, each inference becomes dependent upon the other, producing the defect of mutual
9:05–9:07dependence.
9:07–9:11The distinction in brief.
9:11–9:15A newpity is an additional condition or restriction that defeats the relation between
9:15–9:18the reason and the probandom.
9:18–9:23dependence is a logical circle in which the argument turns around and returns to its starting
9:23–9:26point.
9:26–9:30In the Tatbhisentmai, the two subjects of the nature of God and the power to burn are founded
9:30–9:35upon profound logical doctrines of Gaya philosophy.
9:35–9:40The nature of God, according to the Nayayakas, God is the maker of the entire world, including
9:40–9:43the earth and other things.
9:43–9:48God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, desire, and effort.
9:48–9:53individual selves, God does not perform bodily operations through hands and feet.
9:54–10:00The doctrine of the power to burn, the msaka's maintain that fire possesses an unseen power to
10:00–10:04burn, which is arrested when an inhibitor such as a jewel or mantret is present.
10:05–10:10The Neyayakas reject this account and, instead of admitting an additional power, treat the
10:10–10:16absence of an inhibitor as a cause of burning. Let us understand in greater depth, on the
10:16–10:21basis of the Tathasintmai, the Nayayaka account of the nature of God.
10:21–10:27In this work, Gangesa Upadyaya does not treat God as an ordinary entity but establishes God
10:27–10:33upon a supremely logical and philosophical foundation. According to the original text,
10:33–10:37the chief characteristics of God are as follows.
10:37–10:42An omniscient and disembodied maker, in the Nayayaka view, God is the efficient cause
10:42–10:48or maker of the whole world, including the earth. Unlike human beings, God is disembodied
10:48–10:54and performs no bodily operation through hands or feet. At the same time, God is omniscient
10:54–10:57and knows all things.
10:57–11:02Eternal cognition, desire, and effort, three distinctive qualities immediate cognition,
11:02–11:08the desire to act, and effort, exist eternally in God. These three qualities directly cause
11:08–11:12the creation of the world.
11:12–11:17Freedom from worldly defects, God is unlike an individual worldly self.
11:17–11:22God undergoes neither pleasure nor pain and possesses neither ignorance nor any form of
11:22–11:23error.
11:23–11:28Although knowing all things, God is never deluded.
11:28–11:31Originator of the Veda and language, at the beginning of creation, the Veda and
11:31–11:36the convention governing ordinary words such as pot, the relation between language and
11:36–11:40meaning, are established through God's desire and effort.
11:40–11:44An important philosophical question arises here.
11:44–11:50Since God is disembodied and lacks a physical body, hands, feet, and bodily operations,
11:50–11:52then.
11:52–11:56According to the Neayakas, God has no need of a physical body or hands, because the
11:56–12:01process of divine creation is wholly different from human production.
12:01–12:06The text explains that God is the efficient cause of the world.
12:06–12:11A human being requires bodily operations through hands and feet to perform a task, but God
12:11–12:17creates solely through eternal cognition, desire to act, and effort.
12:17–12:21God's eternal effort is so powerful that, without any physical organ, it can set atoms
12:21–12:26and the unseen karmic forces of living beings into motion.
12:26–12:30Although the Supreme Self is devoid of bodily operations, this effort causes products
12:30–12:36such as the earth. God's cognition is connected with the specific and successive complex of causes,
12:36–12:41including unseen merit and demerit related to earth and other effects, and the world is produced in
12:41–12:48accordance with divine desire. Now that it has been explained how God creates through desire and
12:48–12:54effort, another question calls for consideration. Since God is complete and has no pleasure,
12:54–12:59pain, or physical need, why does God create a world filled with diversity without any personal
12:59–13:05purpose. What does the original text say on this matter?
13:05–13:10The Prima-facie opponent raises precisely this doubt, if God has no pleasure, pain, or purpose,
13:10–13:15why create the world? If it is said that God creates out of compassion, then only happy
13:15–13:19beings and heaven should be produced, not suffering beings and hell. If the world's
13:19–13:24diversity is attributed to the individual acts of living beings, their merit and de-merit,
13:24–13:27then karma would have to be supreme, what?
13:27–13:32The Neyayaka presents the following definitive solution.
13:32–13:36Creation is the object of God's natural desire, the entire world falls within the scope of
13:36–13:38divine desire.
13:38–13:44God's cognition and desire are not motivated by personal interest, pleasure, or pain.
13:44–13:48Direction of Unseen Karmic Results When God's cognition is connected with the specific
13:48–13:53unseen karmic result of living beings and the relevant causal complex, God creates
13:53–13:57or dissolves the world according to divine desire.
13:57–14:01The diversity is therefore caused by karma, but a conscious divine will is required to
14:01–14:05direct that karma toward its results.
14:05–14:10Natural operation, God's eternal cognition is neither causeless nor purposeless, it naturally
14:10–14:15produces the world, just as the self is said to produce pleasure and ether to produce
14:15–14:16sound.
14:16–14:21Thus, Gaya philosophy treats God as free from worldly desire yet as the regulator
14:21–14:24of the fruits of action.
14:24–14:30This brings clarity to the profound discussion of God's nature in agency.
14:30–14:35The doctrine of the power to burn is a celebrated controversy between Nyaya and MMA with Makron
14:35–14:38as a with Makron.
14:38–14:42The Memsaka Prima facee view holds that fire possesses a super sensible and unseen power
14:42–14:44to burn.
14:44–14:48To establish this, it presents a specific example in paragraph 115 of the original
14:48–14:50text.
14:50–14:55Ordinarily, when a hand comes into contact with fire, it burns and the experience of
14:55–14:57burning arises.
14:57–15:02But if a particular jewel or mantra, called an inhibitor, is present, the hand does not
15:02–15:05burn despite the presence of fire.
15:05–15:10When the jewel is removed, fire burns the hand once again.
15:10–15:14On the basis of this illustration, what reason do the msakkas give for the hands
15:14–15:18not burning in the presence of the jewel or mantra?
15:18–15:23What effect does the jewel have upon fire's unseen power to burn?
15:23–15:28According to the msakkas, the jewel, or mantra is an inhibitor.
15:28–15:32When the jewel is placed near the fire, its influence destroys the unseen power to burn
15:32–15:35or renders that power unproductive.
15:35–15:40Because the power has been destroyed or obstructed, contact between fire and hand does not
15:40–15:43produce the experience of burning.
15:43–15:48When the jewel is removed, the power returns to the fire and the hand burns.
15:48–15:55The Neyayaka Gangesa Upadyaya, however, rejects the doctrine of an unseen power.
15:55–15:59He says that no additional and imperceptible power need be admitted in fire, because doing
15:59–16:04so introduces needless theoretical multiplication.
16:04–16:11To explain the event, the Neyayakas present the doctrine of the absence of an inhibitor.
16:11–16:15In the Neyayaka view, the real cause of the experience of burning, in relation to the
16:15–16:21jewel, is the absence of the inhibitor, the absence of the obstructing jewel.
16:21–16:25They argue that an effect requires a complete causal complex.
16:25–16:30The causal complex for burning consists not merely of fire but of fire together with
16:30–16:35the absence of an inhibitor, namely the absence of the jewel.
16:35–16:39The Neyayakas explain the process as follows.
16:39–16:43When the hand comes into contact with fire and no jewel is present, the absence of the
16:43–16:49inhibitor is present, the causal complex is complete, and the hand burns.
16:49–16:55When the jewel, the inhibitor, is present, the jewel's absence is no longer present.
16:55–17:00The causal complex is therefore incomplete, and the hand does not burn despite the presence
17:00–17:02of fire.
17:02–17:07In this manner, the Neayakas explain the process merely by treating an absence,
17:07–17:13non-presence as a cause, without producing or destroying any new power.
17:13–17:18Nyaia philosophy places great importance upon theoretical economy and seeks to avoid postulating
17:18–17:21new super-sensible entities.
17:21–17:26If fire together with the absence of an inhibitor suffices to establish the effect of burning,
17:26–17:30what logical defect, according to Nyaia, would arise from admitting with themsaka's
17:30–17:32a new unseen power in fire?

Plain text

The following discussion is principally based upon two subjects, 1. the inference of God, a logical proof of God's existence, and 2. the doctrine of the power to burn, which concerns causation and the rejection of an additional power. Let us understand both subjects in simple terms. The inference of God, proof of God's existence. In this section, the existence of God as the maker of the world is established on the logical foundations of Gaya philosophy. The fundamental argument, the visible world earth, water, mountains, and all similar things has been produced by some maker because these things are products. Just as a pot is a product whose maker is a potter, God is the maker of the product that is the world. The prima facie opponent's objection, the opponent argues that a maker has a body and acts through that body. If God is the maker of the world, God too must be embodied, but a body is impermanent and perishable. Moreover, there is no direct proof that this world was made by a single maker. The Niyayaka's definitive reply, the Niyayaka's refute this objection. According to them, God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, eternal desire, and eternal effort. These three qualities are everlasting in God. God does not require a human body to create the world, through knowledge and effort, and by means of unseen merit and demerit, God imparts motion to the atoms and brings about creation. On this basis, a single omniscient and omnipotent God is established. The doctrine of the power to burn, a theory of cause and effect. This section presents the celebrated debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning power as an unseen capacity. It is explained through the example of fire's capacity to burn. The msaka view, when a hand is placed in fire, the experience of burning occurs. Yet if a special jewel, such as a moonstone, or a mantra is present nearby, the fire does not burn. The Neayaka refutation, the absence of an inhibitor, the Neayakas reject this doctrine of an unseen power. They argue that there is no need to postulate an additional power in fire in accordance with the principle of theoretical economy. Fire alone is the principle cause of burning. The role of the inhibitor, the Neayakas hold that the presence of the jewel is an inhibitor or obstacle. An effect occurs only when its cause fire is present and the inhibitor, the jewel, is absent. If the jewel is present, the effect of burning does not occur, if it is absent, burning occurs. The postulation of any additional power is therefore unnecessary. Conclusion. In the inference of God, the world is a product and must therefore have a maker, God, who is a disembodied being endowed with eternal cognition, desire, and effort. In the theory of power, no additional unseen power, in his in an object, in effect occurs through the presence of the cause and the absence of an obstacle, that is, the absence of an inhibitor. The establishment of God through inference, a logical analysis of how Gangesha Upadyaya establishes an omniscient and disembodied God through the inference, earth, sprouts, and similar things are products, and whatever is a product must have a maker. The power to burn in the inhibitor, what is fire's power to burn? How do jewels, mantras, and similar things function as inhibitors, and how is the absence of an inhibitor treated as a cause of the effect? subject. These questions are examined logically. Analysis of technical terminology, the meaning and use in the text of complex Nyaya terms such as pervasion, subject, probandum, reason, extraneous condition, and mutual dependence. The principal constituents required to establish an inference in Nyaya philosophy are the subject, the probandum, and the reason. Let us understand these three terms, together with perversion, in the context of the original text. Probandom, the matter or property to be established. In the inference of God, the probandom is being produced by a maker, the state of having an agent as one's producer. Subject, the locus or matter in which the probandom is to be established. In the original text, earth, a sprout, and similar things are treated as subjects in which the existence of a maker, God, is established. Reason, the mark or ground on the basis of which the probandom is established. In the inference of God, being a product is the reason. Purvation, the unbroken and universal relation between reason and probandom. One form presented in the text is, wherever producthood occurs, there is production by one who knows the material cause of that product. We shall next discuss the defects of an extraneous condition and mutual dependence. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to see whether these basic terms have become clear. Consider the common inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there. What are the subject, pro-bandem, and reason in this inference? This familiar example, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there, makes the three principal constituents of Nyaya inference clear. Subject, the mountain, because it is the locus in which the probandum, fire, is being established. Probandum, fire, the property, or matter to be established on the mountain. Reason, smoke, the ground or mark on the basis of which fire is established on the mountain. On this basis, one can understand how an inference is constructed in Nyayalogic. The text then introduces two further complex terms, extraneous condition and mutual dependence. Let us understand and detail these two exceptionally important and difficult technical terms of Nabhya Nyaya, Upadi and Añonayas Reya. Upadi, conditional limitation or conditional defect. What is in Upadi? In Nyaelogic, and Upadi is a defect that gives rise to doubt concerning the perversion or universal rule between the reason and the probandum. In simple terms, it is a concealed restrictive condition that is invariably connected with the probandum but not invariably connected with the reason. Consequently, the inference from the reason to the probandum proves erroneous. Example from the original text. Inference, earth and similar objects are produced by a maker because they are products. Here producthood is the reason and being produced by a maker is the probandom. Objection in the form of an upadi, the prima facie opponent argues that, being produced through a body, is an extraneous condition. Wherever something is produced by a maker, the opponent claims, it is necessarily produced through a body, as pots and cloth are made by embodied agents such as potters. this property of being produced through a body does not invariably accompany the reason, producthood, because God is disembodied, a body is therefore not indispensable to the production of the earth. The definitive reply, Nayakas such as Gangesa Upadyaya established that being produced through a body does not pervade the probandam and therefore cannot be a genuine Upady. Mere production by a maker is sufficient for establishing the probandam, embodiment is not necessary. mutual dependence, anionis rea circular dependency or mutual interdependence. What is mutual dependence? When two things or arguments depend upon each other in such a manner that the second is required to establish the first and the first to establish the second, the defect of mutual dependence, or circular reasoning, arises. In this defect, neither proposition can easily serve as a foundation because each looks to the other for its proof. from the original text. First context, the inference of God, a neutral adjudicator is in doubt between the inferences of the proponent and the opponent. If it is said that the proponent's inference causes doubt about the opponents and that the opponent's inference causes doubt about the proponent's, mutual dependence results, because the establishment of the first requires the second and the establishment of the second requires the first. Second context, the subjects of a sprout and the earth, if God is first inferred in relation to the sprout and then, on that basis, inferred in relation to the earth, or if the inference concerning the sprout is made only after the inference concerning the earth, each inference becomes dependent upon the other, producing the defect of mutual dependence. The distinction in brief. A newpity is an additional condition or restriction that defeats the relation between the reason and the probandom. dependence is a logical circle in which the argument turns around and returns to its starting point. In the Tatbhisentmai, the two subjects of the nature of God and the power to burn are founded upon profound logical doctrines of Gaya philosophy. The nature of God, according to the Nayayakas, God is the maker of the entire world, including the earth and other things. God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, desire, and effort. individual selves, God does not perform bodily operations through hands and feet. The doctrine of the power to burn, the msaka's maintain that fire possesses an unseen power to burn, which is arrested when an inhibitor such as a jewel or mantret is present. The Neyayakas reject this account and, instead of admitting an additional power, treat the absence of an inhibitor as a cause of burning. Let us understand in greater depth, on the basis of the Tathasintmai, the Nayayaka account of the nature of God. In this work, Gangesa Upadyaya does not treat God as an ordinary entity but establishes God upon a supremely logical and philosophical foundation. According to the original text, the chief characteristics of God are as follows. An omniscient and disembodied maker, in the Nayayaka view, God is the efficient cause or maker of the whole world, including the earth. Unlike human beings, God is disembodied and performs no bodily operation through hands or feet. At the same time, God is omniscient and knows all things. Eternal cognition, desire, and effort, three distinctive qualities immediate cognition, the desire to act, and effort, exist eternally in God. These three qualities directly cause the creation of the world. Freedom from worldly defects, God is unlike an individual worldly self. God undergoes neither pleasure nor pain and possesses neither ignorance nor any form of error. Although knowing all things, God is never deluded. Originator of the Veda and language, at the beginning of creation, the Veda and the convention governing ordinary words such as pot, the relation between language and meaning, are established through God's desire and effort. An important philosophical question arises here. Since God is disembodied and lacks a physical body, hands, feet, and bodily operations, then. According to the Neayakas, God has no need of a physical body or hands, because the process of divine creation is wholly different from human production. The text explains that God is the efficient cause of the world. A human being requires bodily operations through hands and feet to perform a task, but God creates solely through eternal cognition, desire to act, and effort. God's eternal effort is so powerful that, without any physical organ, it can set atoms and the unseen karmic forces of living beings into motion. Although the Supreme Self is devoid of bodily operations, this effort causes products such as the earth. God's cognition is connected with the specific and successive complex of causes, including unseen merit and demerit related to earth and other effects, and the world is produced in accordance with divine desire. Now that it has been explained how God creates through desire and effort, another question calls for consideration. Since God is complete and has no pleasure, pain, or physical need, why does God create a world filled with diversity without any personal purpose. What does the original text say on this matter? The Prima-facie opponent raises precisely this doubt, if God has no pleasure, pain, or purpose, why create the world? If it is said that God creates out of compassion, then only happy beings and heaven should be produced, not suffering beings and hell. If the world's diversity is attributed to the individual acts of living beings, their merit and de-merit, then karma would have to be supreme, what? The Neyayaka presents the following definitive solution. Creation is the object of God's natural desire, the entire world falls within the scope of divine desire. God's cognition and desire are not motivated by personal interest, pleasure, or pain. Direction of Unseen Karmic Results When God's cognition is connected with the specific unseen karmic result of living beings and the relevant causal complex, God creates or dissolves the world according to divine desire. The diversity is therefore caused by karma, but a conscious divine will is required to direct that karma toward its results. Natural operation, God's eternal cognition is neither causeless nor purposeless, it naturally produces the world, just as the self is said to produce pleasure and ether to produce sound. Thus, Gaya philosophy treats God as free from worldly desire yet as the regulator of the fruits of action. This brings clarity to the profound discussion of God's nature in agency. The doctrine of the power to burn is a celebrated controversy between Nyaya and MMA with Makron as a with Makron. The Memsaka Prima facee view holds that fire possesses a super sensible and unseen power to burn. To establish this, it presents a specific example in paragraph 115 of the original text. Ordinarily, when a hand comes into contact with fire, it burns and the experience of burning arises. But if a particular jewel or mantra, called an inhibitor, is present, the hand does not burn despite the presence of fire. When the jewel is removed, fire burns the hand once again. On the basis of this illustration, what reason do the msakkas give for the hands not burning in the presence of the jewel or mantra? What effect does the jewel have upon fire's unseen power to burn? According to the msakkas, the jewel, or mantra is an inhibitor. When the jewel is placed near the fire, its influence destroys the unseen power to burn or renders that power unproductive. Because the power has been destroyed or obstructed, contact between fire and hand does not produce the experience of burning. When the jewel is removed, the power returns to the fire and the hand burns. The Neyayaka Gangesa Upadyaya, however, rejects the doctrine of an unseen power. He says that no additional and imperceptible power need be admitted in fire, because doing so introduces needless theoretical multiplication. To explain the event, the Neyayakas present the doctrine of the absence of an inhibitor. In the Neyayaka view, the real cause of the experience of burning, in relation to the jewel, is the absence of the inhibitor, the absence of the obstructing jewel. They argue that an effect requires a complete causal complex. The causal complex for burning consists not merely of fire but of fire together with the absence of an inhibitor, namely the absence of the jewel. The Neyayakas explain the process as follows. When the hand comes into contact with fire and no jewel is present, the absence of the inhibitor is present, the causal complex is complete, and the hand burns. When the jewel, the inhibitor, is present, the jewel's absence is no longer present. The causal complex is therefore incomplete, and the hand does not burn despite the presence of fire. In this manner, the Neayakas explain the process merely by treating an absence, non-presence as a cause, without producing or destroying any new power. Nyaia philosophy places great importance upon theoretical economy and seeks to avoid postulating new super-sensible entities. If fire together with the absence of an inhibitor suffices to establish the effect of burning, what logical defect, according to Nyaia, would arise from admitting with themsaka's a new unseen power in fire?

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