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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.99761)
Duration: 23:53
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0:02–0:34रेकॉताषिन अद दिवूव, फिर्टि फृद, तो विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-�
0:34–0:38reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements
0:38–0:42employed by the proponent.
0:42–0:45The view of Suwadsa.
0:45–0:4655.
0:46–0:50Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely
0:50–0:53affirmative inference.
0:53–0:57For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property
0:57–1:01distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general
1:01–1:06property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the
1:06–1:14mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive
1:14–1:19of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence,
1:19–1:25like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of
1:25–1:31counterbalance. When near opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional
1:31–1:38qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally
1:38–1:41strong counter-reason ends.
1:41–1:45Prima-facive view of non-establishment.
1:45–1:50Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment,
1:50–1:56because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. Absence qualified by
1:56–2:05provision and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment
2:05–2:10is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of
2:10–2:16provision and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absence is held to differ from
2:16–2:22the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual
2:22–2:27absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the
2:27–2:33individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of
2:33–2:37succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified
2:37–2:42and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may
2:42–2:49constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In
2:49–2:54In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the
2:54–2:58inference and defeat of the proponent or possible merely through cognition or demonstration of
2:58–3:03the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence
3:03–3:05is unnecessary.
3:05–3:10Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences
3:10–3:13of perversion and subject propertyhood.
3:13–3:18If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be
3:18–3:24treated as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences
3:24–3:30become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence.
3:30–3:35Individual absences such as absence of pervasion can independently constitute the defect of
3:35–3:41non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect.
3:41–3:4758. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment.
3:47–3:53Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment,
3:53–3:59positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier.
3:59–4:07Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent.
4:07–4:11The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence.
4:11–4:14There is no need to raise the qualified absence.
4:15–4:18For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected.
4:18–4:23The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification
4:23–4:29is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual
4:29–4:34absences. Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment.
4:34–4:37They are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent.
4:38–4:43If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish perversion,
4:43–4:48non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through
4:48–4:54deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation,
4:54–4:59then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the
4:59–5:03extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an
5:03–5:10unnecessary qualifier. This reputation also rejects the view that either absence of
5:10–5:16perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence
5:16–5:22constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification
5:22–5:27absence of either one of the two is pointless.
5:27–5:33Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars
5:33–5:38say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in
5:38–5:42the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of
5:42–5:49the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present,
5:49–5:54inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because
5:54–6:01veridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when veridical cognition itself is
6:01–6:06known, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment.
6:08–6:12Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason.
6:15–6:19The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood,
6:19–6:23and veridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or
6:23–6:27demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible.
6:27–6:34Abstance of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of
6:34–6:38some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless.
6:39–6:45Abstance of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by
6:45–6:50the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason.
6:51–6:56It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion
6:56–7:01and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by
7:01–7:07perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion,
7:07–7:12then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment.
7:13–7:17If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own
7:17–7:21form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of
7:21–7:26inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic
7:26–7:30of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such
7:30–7:33an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason.
7:35–7:40This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of
7:40–7:44perversion or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is
7:44–7:50non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both
7:50–7:56both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend.
7:56–8:02Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment.
8:02–8:04Let it be granted.
8:04–8:09Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment,
8:09–8:14and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment.
8:14–8:19For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject,
8:19–8:24cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood.
8:25–8:29Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject,
8:29–8:34inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain.
8:35–8:40It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason
8:40–8:45valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason.
8:45–8:52non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason.
8:52–8:57Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion and
8:57–9:04subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by pervasion
9:04–9:09and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified
9:09–9:11certainty obstructs the inferential result.
9:11–9:2362. No, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects
9:23–9:29within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason,
9:29–9:33demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing
9:33–9:39non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment,
9:39–9:43because certainty of pervasion is said to be possible even in their presence,
9:43–9:47then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate
9:47–9:52fallacious reasons, since certainty of pervasion is possible even when cognition of such non-
9:52–9:58establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another,
9:58–10:04cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning
10:04–10:08the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment in inference
10:08–10:13for oneself and for its demonstration and inference for another.
10:13–10:18The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved.
10:18–10:23If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent,
10:23–10:25both would be fallacious.
10:25–10:29If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty
10:29–10:36of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious.
10:36–10:42unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here,
10:42–10:46in sleep or waking, even when pervasion and subject property had actually exist,
10:46–10:51inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs
10:51–10:54because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is
10:54–10:58observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown.
10:58–11:03It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of pervasion
11:03–11:08and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects
11:08–11:13such as deviation within non-establishment of pervasion and the like, because non-establishment
11:13–11:18of pervasion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general.
11:18–11:21This view is not sound.
11:21–11:25If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become
11:25–11:28nothing but non-establishment.
11:28–11:32Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences
11:32–11:37In causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated
11:37–11:39as separate fallacious reasons.
11:39–11:44In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because
11:44–11:47of absence of a cause.
11:47–11:51Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence
11:51–11:54of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present.
11:54–12:00Burning does not arise if fire itself is absent.
12:00–12:05of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons.
12:05–12:09It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious
12:09–12:11reason.
12:11–12:15But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be
12:15–12:17causes of inference.
12:17–12:22If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood occurred
12:22–12:27only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious
12:27–12:28reason.
12:28–12:32And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of
12:32–12:38inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal
12:38–12:43status of the remaining factors would become pointless.
12:43–12:47Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
12:47–12:50Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to
12:50–12:55inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence,
12:55–12:58is fallacious reasonhood.
12:58–13:02For non-phalacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength
13:02–13:04is counterbalance.
13:04–13:08Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment,
13:08–13:14and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory.
13:14–13:20It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment.
13:20–13:24When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason
13:24–13:29is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of
13:29–13:33difference functions separately in erroneous cognition.
13:33–13:36But this view too is not sound.
13:36–13:40Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject
13:40–13:44propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier.
13:44–13:48Ganges' intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion
13:48–13:52and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the
13:52–13:57object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie
13:57–14:00discussion of non-establishment ends.
14:00–14:05The three divisions of non-establishment.
14:05–14:09The established doctrine is now stated.
14:09–14:13Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment
14:13–14:18of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition, or demonstration
14:18–14:23of each separately obstructs inference in its own form.
14:23–14:27Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion
14:27–14:33qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, the
14:33–14:36qualification is unnecessary.
14:36–14:41Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form.
14:41–14:46Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not meant to fit definitions.
14:46–14:50The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object
14:50–14:52of subsumptive reflection.
14:52–14:56Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established fivefold
14:56–15:01division of fallacious reasons is contradicted.
15:01–15:04Restatement of the Established Doctrine
15:04–15:08For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms
15:08–15:13of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment,
15:13–15:18Several defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context,
15:18–15:21confirms our own position.
15:21–15:24The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and
15:24–15:28counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction
15:28–15:32are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound.
15:32–15:36The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural
15:36–15:39traditions would disappear.
15:39–15:44Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its
15:44–15:49fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends.
15:49–15:57Dependent defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract.
15:57–16:01Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment.
16:01–16:06Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment
16:06–16:09concerning the subject be raised?
16:09–16:13It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and
16:13–16:18denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake,
16:18–16:23for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible.
16:23–16:28Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower, the skyflower
16:28–16:33is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference.
16:33–16:37Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the
16:37–16:42qualificand in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it
16:42–16:48is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of
16:48–16:53perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first
16:53–17:00non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises.
17:00–17:05An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion.
17:05–17:10It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous condition
17:10–17:12of the reason.
17:12–17:17If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive
17:17–17:21in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in
17:21–17:24the valid reason smoke.
17:24–17:28In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those
17:28–17:33loci deviating from the reason in the form of absence of an extraneous condition is pervasion.
17:35–17:40A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous
17:40–17:47condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition. What is pervaded by absence
17:47–17:53of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference
17:53–17:58but not independently, it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it.
17:58–18:03Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason.
18:03–18:12In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition.
18:12–18:22In earth is different from water because it possesses odor, earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of earthhood.
18:22–18:28If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of perversion,
18:28–18:34unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of perversion and in the defect of self-dependence.
18:34–18:42Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason.
18:42–18:46Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason,
18:46–18:51because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is
18:51–18:56itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is,
18:56–19:00defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the
19:00–19:03same defeat is not a fallacious reason.
19:03–19:07Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is
19:07–19:11apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at
19:11–19:15the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise all previously known objects
19:15–19:21would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference.
19:21–19:24Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions.
19:24–19:3075, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for another
19:30–19:35person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because that person
19:35–19:36does not know it.
19:36–19:40There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there
19:40–19:43one in one's own inference.
19:43–19:46Or is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors
19:46–19:52applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons?
19:52–19:55Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other
19:55–19:56inhibitor is present.
19:56–20:02Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason.
20:02–20:07Collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat.
20:07–20:2076. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in both.
20:20–20:32The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, firehood, and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
20:32–20:35Answer, this is not sound.
20:35–20:47When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary.
20:47–20:57If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat.
20:57–21:0377. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by
21:03–21:07the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandom.
21:09–21:13Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence
21:13–21:17of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain.
21:18–21:21If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an
21:21–21:25opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all
21:25–21:30characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious.
21:31–21:34A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength.
21:35–21:40Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without
21:40–21:46excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation
21:46–21:51arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandum cannot be made
21:51–21:58an independent defect or a new fallacious reason? Defeat is a separate fallacious reason.
21:59–22:0478. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat,
22:04–22:08but establishment of deviation would depend on the reason's establishment of the probandom.
22:08–22:12Otherwise mutual dependence would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation,
22:12–22:18and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer. Absence of cognition that the reason
22:18–22:24is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of
22:24–22:29the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandom.
22:30–22:34Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject causes
22:34–22:40deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only
22:40–22:46in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently. Thus veridical
22:46–22:51cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the
22:51–22:57subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need
22:57–23:04to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. The radical cognition
23:04–23:08of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not an independent defect.
23:10–23:15Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the
23:15–23:19The probandum and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandum, therefore
23:19–23:23it should be regarded as the same defect in inference.
23:23–23:30Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason.
23:30–23:35Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandum and the
23:35–23:38subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference.
23:38–23:42Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other
23:42–23:48means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference.
23:48–23:50Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

Plain text

रेकॉताषिन अद दिवूव, फिर्टि फृद, तो विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-� reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of counterbalance. When near opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends. Prima-facive view of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. Absence qualified by provision and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of provision and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent or possible merely through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood. If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence. Individual absences such as absence of pervasion can independently constitute the defect of non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect. 58. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence. For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences. Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment. They are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent. If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish perversion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier. This reputation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because veridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when veridical cognition itself is known, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and veridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible. Abstance of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless. Abstance of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason. It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment. If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason. This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of perversion or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend. Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted. Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain. It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason. non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason. Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by pervasion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result. 62. No, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty of pervasion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons, since certainty of pervasion is possible even when cognition of such non- establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration and inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious. unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when pervasion and subject property had actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of pervasion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as deviation within non-establishment of pervasion and the like, because non-establishment of pervasion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general. This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences In causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present. Burning does not arise if fire itself is absent. of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons. It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious reason. But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes of inference. If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood occurred only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence, is fallacious reasonhood. For non-phalacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength is counterbalance. Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory. It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment. When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition. But this view too is not sound. Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier. Ganges' intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment. The established doctrine is now stated. Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition, or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form. Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, the qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form. Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not meant to fit definitions. The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object of subsumptive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established fivefold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted. Restatement of the Established Doctrine For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, Several defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms our own position. The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear. Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends. Dependent defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract. Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment. Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised? It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible. Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower, the skyflower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference. Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualificand in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion. It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason in the form of absence of an extraneous condition is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition. What is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference but not independently, it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason. In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition. In earth is different from water because it possesses odor, earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of perversion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of perversion and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference. Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions. 75, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference. Or is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons? Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason. Collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat. 76. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, firehood, and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary. If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious. A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength. Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandum cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason? Defeat is a separate fallacious reason. 78. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment of deviation would depend on the reason's establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation, and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer. Absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandom. Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. The radical cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the The probandum and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandum, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference. Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason. Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandum and the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference. Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference. Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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