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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:04–0:34तात्वः सिंठ मैः, प्रस्थ्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्
0:34–0:38first considered the view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the
0:38–0:42prima facie position. They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with
0:42–0:47the desire to complete the work. The direct result of the indication is therefore the
0:47–0:50completion of the work, that is, the desired completion.
0:51–0:56Gangesa Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions.
0:57–1:01He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication,
1:01–1:05as in the case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work
1:05–1:09remains unfinished even after a complete invocation has been performed.
1:11–1:15If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work,
1:15–1:19and completion follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort,
1:19–1:23then according to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of the
1:23–1:29invocation that assists in bringing the work to completion. According to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine,
1:29–1:34The principle and immediate result of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles,
1:34–1:41Vignadvasa. He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book,
1:41–1:45rather, it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition.
1:46–1:52Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary human effort.
1:52–2:00This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question. If an auspicious invocation destroys
2:00–2:05obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive authors, who do not perform such an
2:05–2:11invocation, sometimes completed? According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without
2:11–2:18obstruction in such a case, despite the absence of an invocation? This is a highly important
2:18–2:24question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously logical manner.
2:24–2:28According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed
2:28–2:32without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of
2:32–2:35obstacles, Vignabhava.
2:35–2:40Gangesa explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles
2:40–2:43carried over from a previous birth.
2:43–2:48times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all.
2:48–2:54Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles,
2:54–2:59no invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset.
2:59–3:04In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring
3:04–3:08the work to completion without obstruction.
3:08–3:102.
3:10–3:16The doctrine of validity, Pramayadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known?
3:16–3:20We shall now consider the doctrine of validity.
3:20–3:25The central dispute in this doctrine is between the msakhas and the nayayakas concerning
3:25–3:30how the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended.
3:30–3:36The msakhas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha.
3:36–3:40In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of the
3:40–3:46very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically.
3:46–3:53The Neiakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, parotiprameyavda.
3:53–3:57They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its
3:57–4:02own causal complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or
4:02–4:05a subsequently successful activity.
4:05–4:10The Neayakas put a very practical question to themsakas on this point.
4:10–4:15Logically, if themsaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically
4:15–4:19certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its
4:19–4:24validity such as hesitation or doubt would become wholly impossible in a condition of
4:24–4:29unfamiliarity when a new cognition occurs for the first time?
4:29–4:33If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising,
4:33–4:40a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in a state of unfamiliarity.
4:40–4:44Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life.
4:44–4:49On this basis, the Nayayakas refute the Msaaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish
4:49–4:54that a cognition's validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or
4:54–4:57through successful activity.
4:57–5:03The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha.
5:03–5:07When a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question from
5:07–5:14the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata, is,
5:14–5:18What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell
5:18–5:22lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous
5:22–5:24activity?
5:24–5:29The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present
5:29–5:34before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory.
5:34–5:39According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of silver,
5:39–5:42two distinct cognitions are actually present.
5:42–5:48First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell.
5:48–5:53Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory.
5:53–5:58The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions.
5:58–6:03In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, bedagraha, difference plus
6:03–6:05non-apprehension.
6:05–6:10Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick
6:10–6:13up the supposed silver.
6:13–6:18The nayayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension, anyathakiyati, do not agree that the error
6:18–6:22consists nearly in ignorance of the difference.
6:22–6:26In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier
6:26–6:33that does not in fact belong to it. The Neayakas hold that in error the person does not merely
6:33–6:37overlook the difference between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain.
6:38–6:42Rather, he positively apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in the
6:42–6:49shell but belongs to silver. For this reason, the error is called anyathakiyati, apprehending
6:49–6:55one thing as another, and is treated as a qualified cognition. The doctrine of validity,
6:55–7:00with respect to apprehension and production, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsically
7:00–7:05produced and known through its own causal complex, as the msakas hold, or extrinsically
7:05–7:11through some other means, as the Neayakas maintain. The fundamental dispute between the
7:11–7:16msakas and Neayakas in this discussion is how it is known that a cognition is veritical or valid
7:16–7:22its apprehension, and how that validity is produced, its production. The msakas uphold
7:22–7:28intrinsic validity. According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically
7:28–7:32through the same complete causal complex from which the cognition itself arises.
7:33–7:38If another means or cognition were needed to know its validity, a third would be required to
7:38–7:43establish the validity of the second, producing the defect of infinite regress, anovasta.
7:45–7:49The Neiaiakas, on the contrary, support extrinsic validity.
7:49–7:54They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically through some further
7:54–7:58means, such as inference or successful activity.
7:58–8:03In this context, the Neayakas raise a highly practical question.
8:03–8:07When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a
8:07–8:12person often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not.
8:12–8:16If the msaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes
8:16–8:21intrinsically certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then
8:21–8:26according to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt,
8:26–8:28would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition?
8:30–8:32What is that particular property called?
8:34–8:403. The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of
8:40–8:44apprehension, whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as
8:44–8:50silver is the Prabhācāra doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference,
8:50–8:55or the Nayaṭha doctrine of misapprehension, anyath akhyati, namely a qualified cognition.
8:56–9:00The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell,
9:00–9:04sakti, takes it to be silver, rijitha, and is prompted to pick it up.
9:04–9:09What is the actual cause of that activity? Two principal views are offered.
9:09–9:16The Prabhakramsaka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition
9:16–9:18arises here.
9:18–9:22There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition is concerning the shell
9:22–9:28present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory.
9:28–9:31According to the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between
9:31–9:38these two cognitions, this is called non-apprehension of difference, the dhagraha, or akhyati.
9:38–9:43The Naayaka theory of misapprehension, the Naayakas maintain that the error is not merely
9:43–9:45ignorance of a difference.
9:45–9:51It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively apprehends
9:51–9:56silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him.
9:56–10:00In other words, one thing is apprehended as another.
10:00–10:05Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Sakha standpoint.
10:05–10:10If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely, according
10:10–10:15to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person fail to understand
10:15–10:21at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming impelled to act?
10:21–10:25According to the Prabhakram Sakha theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to
10:25–10:29apprehend the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver
10:29–10:31being recalled.
10:31–10:36When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind.
10:36–10:43According to the Prabhakras, this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions.
10:43–10:47Perceptual cognition, this is something, the general perception of the shell, in which,
10:47–10:53owing to a defect or distance, its shellhood is not apprehended.
10:53–10:57Memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously seen silver evoked by the shell's
10:57–10:59luster.
10:59–11:03The person cannot distinguish between this perception of the shell before him and the
11:03–11:06memory of previously seen silver.
11:06–11:10Because of this non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, he takes the two to be one and
11:10–11:14proceeds to pick up the supposed silver.
11:14–11:20Now consider the Neayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account.
11:20–11:25According to the Neayakas, who uphold Aniyathakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail
11:25–11:30to distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell
11:30–11:34before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as
11:34–11:36another.
11:36–11:41That distinctive property is silverhood, rajatattva.
11:41–11:46According to the nayayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present
11:46–11:51before him as the qualifakand, or substrate, and superimposes silverhood upon it as the
11:51–11:53qualifier or mode.
11:53–11:57This differs from the Prabhupācāra theory of non-apprehension because the person is
11:57–12:02not merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell of property,
12:02–12:05silverhood, that is not there at all.
12:05–12:10Because of this specific superimposition, the Nāyāyākas call the error Ānīyāthākyāti,
12:10–12:15the apprehension of one thing is another, an equalified cognition.
12:15–12:20Tattva-Sintmai, inference section.
12:20–12:24cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition and the
12:24–12:28various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions of pervasion and
12:28–12:33the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or an unconditional relation,
12:33–12:36together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account.
12:38–12:42In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyo's Tatvasant Mai, the study of inferential
12:42–12:46cognition and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy.
12:46–12:51It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various
12:51–12:55prima facie definitions of pavesion, such as the five definitions and those attributed
12:55–13:00to Sihar and Viagra, and Gangesh's decisive definition.
13:00–13:05Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail.
13:05–13:10The nature of inferential cognition, Anumitai.
13:10–13:15In Nyaya philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent
13:15–13:21and valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony.
13:21–13:26Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason
13:26–13:30is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation
13:30–13:34of invariable concomitance.
13:34–13:38In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and
13:38–13:42one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition
13:42–13:49of fire arises in that subject. This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary
13:49–13:54cause is subsumptive reflection, paramarsa.
13:54–13:59The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions
13:59–14:04Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition. It is not sufficient merely to
14:04–14:08characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason from the probandom, many prima
14:08–14:13prema-facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate its philosophical definition.
14:13–14:17Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions
14:17–14:18of pervasion.
14:18–14:23Ah, the five definitions of pervasion.
14:23–14:27Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify pervasion.
14:27–14:32Gangesa takes them up as prema-facie views and subjects them to examination.
14:32–14:36The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the
14:36–14:42the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur. This is called absence of occurrence
14:42–14:48and a locus of the absence of the probandom. The reasons non-occurrence and a locus of the
14:48–14:52absence of the probandom that is distinct from the locus of the probandom, in places
14:52–14:57other than the probandom zone locus where the probandom is absent, the reason must
14:57–15:02not occur. Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence
15:02–15:08whose counter positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum.
15:08–15:12The state of being the counter positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the
15:12–15:15absence of the probandum.
15:15–15:20The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum.
15:20–15:25Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative
15:25–15:30inference in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandum, as
15:30–15:34in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandum
15:34–15:36in such a case.
15:36–15:42b. Definitions of pervasion attributed to Sihat and Viagra
15:42–15:48Certain logicians referred to as Sihat and Viagra propose two further marks of pervasion.
15:48–15:53The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandums
15:53–15:55collocation.
15:55–16:00The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum.
16:00–16:05Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain
16:05–16:08special cases.
16:08–16:11Gangesa therefore rejects them as well.
16:11–16:16In addition, Gangesa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions,
16:16–16:21including the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different
16:21–16:25possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation.
16:27–16:30Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion.
16:32–16:36After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical
16:36–16:40examination, Gangesa Upadyoya presents his definitive characterization of perversion.
16:42–16:42Definition.
16:44–16:47Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom,
16:47–16:52But this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness whose
16:52–16:56counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but
16:56–17:02is not collocated with its own counter-positive. In simple terms,
17:03–17:09perversion is the concomitance or collocation of the reason with the probandom. This concomitance,
17:09–17:14however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive and a different
17:14–17:19or incongruent locus and absence that occurs in the locus of the reason but not in the locus of
17:19–17:25its actual counter positive. Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the
17:25–17:30defect of a reason burdened by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of
17:30–17:37pervasion. The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Yupati its nature, the basis of its
17:37–17:41vitiating force, and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference.
17:41–17:48Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas Tattvasintmai, the doctrine of the extraneous
17:48–17:53condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Nyaya philosophy.
17:54–17:58And Upadi plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the probandom
17:58–18:04in an inference. Let us examine and detail the nature of a Upadi, the basis of its
18:04–18:09vitiating force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain upity upon inference.
18:11–18:18The nature of a newpity. In Nyaya philosophy, a newpity is a property that does not pervade the
18:18–18:23property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom.
18:24–18:29In simple terms, a newpity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the
18:29–18:33probandom and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore
18:33–18:39does not pervade the reason. Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire.
18:40–18:46In this inference, fire is the reason and smoke is the probandom. The conjunction of
18:46–18:50damp fuel is the upity, it does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in dry wood
18:50–18:55or cow dung cakes without moisture, but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without
18:55–19:01moisture or damp fuel. The basis of the upity's vitiating force.
19:01–19:10How is an upadee regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference?
19:10–19:15By means of its own absence, the upadee establishes the absence of the probandom and thereby produces
19:15–19:19deviation of the reason from the probandom.
19:19–19:24When an inference contains a reason accompanied by an upadee, the natural pervasion or invariable
19:24–19:28relation between that reason and the probandom is destroyed.
19:28–19:34The Yupadi establishes that the apparent association between them is not intrinsic but depends upon
19:34–19:36the concealed condition.
19:36–19:43For this reason, the Yupadi is the principal basis of the inference's defectiveness.
19:43–19:48The effect of a certain and a doubtful Yupadi upon inference.
19:48–19:54In the Tatvasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes.
19:54–19:56A. Certain Upity.
19:56–20:03Nature, a Upity that is certainly pervasive of the probandom and non-pervasive of the reason,
20:03–20:10and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the probandom, is called a certain Upity.
20:10–20:15Effect upon inference, the presence of a certain Upity completely defeats an inference.
20:15–20:19It wholly destroys the perversion between the reason and the probandom, so that no
20:19–20:23inferential cognition of the probandom can arise.
20:23–20:28For example, in the inference, the lake is smoked because it has fire, the possession
20:28–20:31of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain upity.
20:31–20:34b. doubtful upity.
20:34–20:40nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails to pervade the pro-bandom
20:40–20:45or that the condition pervades the pro-bandom, and only doubt remains, the condition is
20:45–20:48a doubtful upity.
20:48–20:52Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful
20:52–20:58Upadi gives rice to doubt about deviation between the probandum and the reason. This doubt weakens
20:58–21:03the proponents cognition and obstructs the production of a determinate inferential cognition.
21:04–21:09For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra, being produced
21:09–21:14by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful Upadi relative to the probandum of blackness.
21:15–21:20Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of Upadi in the inference section of the Tatthasint
21:20–21:26my, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true, the reason must
21:26–21:32be free from inupati. Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection, the definition of subjecthood in
21:32–21:37terms of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence of an establishing proof,
21:37–21:42and the dispute between msakas and nayayakas over whether subsumptive reflection is the
21:42–21:47extraordinary cause of inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's
21:47–21:52Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive reflection are highly important and original
21:52–21:58doctrines of Nyaya philosophy. The discussion explains the definition of the inferential subject
21:58–22:03in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof,
22:03–22:07and examines the extensive controversy between Msaakas and Nyayakas concerning
22:07–22:10subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
22:12–22:15Let us examine all these matters in detail.
22:15–22:21The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference.
22:21–22:27To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject,
22:27–22:31such as the mountain in which fire is to be established. In the prima facie view,
22:31–22:35several teachers treated doubt about the probandam, or merely the absence of evidence either
22:35–22:41establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood. Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts.
22:41–22:46The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood.
22:46–22:55A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together with the absence of a desire to establish the probandom.
22:55–23:02In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors.
23:02–23:05factors.
23:05–23:09Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is
23:09–23:15already available to establish the probandom, for example fire, in that locus.
23:15–23:20The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish, subjecthood is determined by
23:20–23:24the particular configuration of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence
23:24–23:28of evidence that would already establish it.
23:28–23:33the probandum has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood, and therefore no
23:33–23:37need for a fresh inference.
23:37–23:42The controversy between msakas and neayakas over subsumptive reflection as the direct
23:42–23:45cause of inference.
23:45–23:50There is a serious philosophical dispute between the neayakas and msakas over whether subsumptive
23:50–23:54reflection, the cognition that a property serving is a reason and pervaded by the
23:54–23:58probandum occurs in the subject, as in in the mountain possesses smoke pervaded
23:58–24:03by fire is the extraordinary cause that produces inferential cognition.
24:03–24:09Themsaka view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct cause.
24:09–24:14Themsaka's maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection is
24:14–24:16required.
24:16–24:20They argue that recollection of perversion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, together
24:20–24:25with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain,
24:25–24:28directly produces the inference.
24:28–24:33From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third cognition called subsumptive reflection
24:33–24:39in addition to these two cognitions introduces needless theoretical complexity.
24:39–24:45The Neayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection alone is the extraordinary cause of inference.
24:45–24:51Gangesa Upadyaya and the Neayakas firmly refute themsaka position.
24:51–24:55They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from separate cognitions
24:55–25:01of perversion and of the reasons occurrence and the subject. Until the specific cognition
25:01–25:05arises that the reason qualified by that perversion is present in the subject,
25:05–25:10subsumptive reflection, no determinant conclusion or inferential cognition can be obtained.
25:11–25:16Subsumptive reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential
25:16–25:19cognition, and inference cannot be accomplished without this process.
25:19–25:26types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative
25:26–25:31and purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom.
25:31–25:36Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyais Tathasintmai, the establishment of purely
25:36–25:40affirmative and purely negative inference, and the detailed explanation of how the
25:40–25:46pro-bandom is proved in each, are highly important topics in Gaya philosophy.
25:46–25:51Let us examine both types of inference in detail.
25:51–25:55Purely affirmative inference, Kevilland-Veyen.
25:55–25:59Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance, no locus where the
25:59–26:03probandom is absent, is called purely affirmative.
26:03–26:08It contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because no locus
26:08–26:11of the probandom's absence is available.
26:11–26:16Example, the pot is nameable because it is knowable.
26:16–26:21Explanation, here knowability is the reason and nameability is the probandom.
26:21–26:25Both properties are found in every object in the world.
26:25–26:29There is no object that is neither knowable nor capable of being named.
26:29–26:34Where the probandom has no negative instance, purely affirmative pervasion is established.
26:34–26:38Gangesa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an
26:38–26:42an unestablished probandom in subjects such as, ether, or, the nameable, an inference
26:42–26:46becomes purely affirmative when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence
26:46–26:50is not present in the subject. In this type of inference, the probandom is established
26:50–26:54solely through positive pervasion.
26:54–26:59Purely negative inference, Kevaladi eterican.
26:59–27:03Definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom
27:03–27:07is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative
27:07–27:14inference. Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses
27:14–27:18smell. Explanation, in this inference, the probandum
27:18–27:23is that Earth differs from the other substances, water, air, ether, and so forth, and possession
27:23–27:28of smell is the reason. No substance in the world other than Earth possesses the
27:28–27:33quality called smell, consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which
27:33–27:39both smell and earthhood are found. In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative
27:39–27:43concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference from the other substances is absent, that
27:43–27:49is, wherever the thing is not distinct in the way earth is, smell is also absent. Thus,
27:49–27:54when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom earth is different
27:54–27:59from the other substances is conclusively established through negative pervasion.
27:59–28:03Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai,
28:03–28:08Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient
28:08–28:12to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative inference
28:12–28:15are both indispensable where appropriate.
28:15–28:20The doctrine of presumption, Arthapatti the dispute between the Mtsaka view that presumption
28:20–28:24is a separate means of knowledge and the Neayaka view that it falls under purely
28:24–28:27negative inference.
28:27–28:31The dispute between Sakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in the inference
28:31–28:36section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattvasintmaya is a highly philosophical and logical issue
28:36–28:38within Nyaya.
28:38–28:43Let us examine this dispute in detail.
28:43–28:48The Msaaka view, presumption as a separate means of knowledge.
28:48–28:53The Msaaka's regard presumption as an independent means of knowledge distinct from perception,
28:53–28:57and verbal testimony, the sixth type of prama.
28:57–29:09Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible, and an unseen or absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them, the resulting cognition is called presumption.
29:09–29:15The famous example is Devdutta, who is alive but is not seen at home during the day.
29:15–29:20Here there are two facts, that he is alive and that he is absent from home.
29:20–29:27Once his absence from home is certain, his continuing life is possible only if he has gone somewhere outside.
29:27–29:31His being outside is thus postulated through presumption.
29:31–29:41Themsaka argument, themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference, because no determinant reason and provision are directly operative.
29:41–29:48An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent contradiction.
29:48–29:53The Neyayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference.
29:54–30:02The Neyayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption is an independent means of knowledge.
30:03–30:08The Neyayaka argument, no separate prama called presumption need be postulated.
30:09–30:14The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative inference.
30:14–30:20The inferential form, Dev Dutta's being outside the house is known through the following inference.
30:20–30:27Living Dev Dutta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the continuous
30:27–30:30absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it.
30:30–30:36Economy, the Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an
30:36–30:40ordinary purely negative inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called
30:40–30:47presumption introduces needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted
30:47–30:51as an independent means of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between Sakas
30:51–30:57and Nayakas. The Nayakas include it within inference.
30:57–31:03In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tapasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive
31:03–31:08reflection, and purely negative inference are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical
31:08–31:14topics in Nyaia. All three occupy a central place in the process of inferential cognition.
31:15–31:21Let us discuss these three topics in detail. The extraneous condition,
31:21–31:28Upati the source of a fallacy. According to Nyaia and Upati is a property that
31:28–31:33pervades the probandom, the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the
31:33–31:39proof rests. In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the
31:39–31:47reason. The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective? When a reason accompanied by an
31:47–31:52Eupode is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural pervasion or invariable relation
31:52–31:58between the reason and the probandom. The Eupode shows that their apparent association is not
31:58–32:04genuine but depends upon some other concealed condition. Example, there is smoke on the mountain
32:04–32:12because there is fire. Here fire is the reason and smoke the probandom. Yet fire alone does not
32:12–32:17produce smoke. Conjunction with damp fuel is the upity, although it does not pervade fire,
32:17–32:22it does pervade smoke. The inference is defective because of this upity.
32:22–32:30subsumptive reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition.
32:30–32:35In the Neayaka view, subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary or direct cause that
32:35–32:40produces inferential cognition, the cognition of the conclusion.
32:40–32:45Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific cognition expressed in the formula, the
32:45–32:51property occurring in the subject and qualified by pervasion is subsumptive reflection.
32:51–32:55That is, the subject, such as the mountain, possesses a reason, such as smoke, that is
32:55–32:59pervaded by the probandum, fire.
32:59–33:03Its distinction from recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reason and the subject,
33:03–33:08nearly remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that
33:08–33:12there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection.
33:12–33:16It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded
33:16–33:19by fire.
33:19–33:23The Mthaka and Nayaka dispute, the Mthaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection
33:23–33:28need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reasons
33:28–33:31presence and the subject together suffice.
33:31–33:36Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayakas, however, establish that no determinant inferential
33:36–33:43cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of subsumptive reflection occurs.
33:43–33:48Purely negative inference, Kevaladi-Aterican
33:48–33:53IA recognizes three forms of inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative,
33:53–33:55and purely negative.
33:55–34:00Nature, an inference that employs only negative perversion because no directly observable
34:00–34:05positive similar instance is available is called purely negative.
34:05–34:12It proceeds by the rule, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason is also absent.
34:12–34:17Classical example, Earth differs from the other substances because it possesses smell.
34:17–34:22Analysis, the inference seeks to establish that earth differs from the other eight substances,
34:22–34:24such as water, ether, and air.
34:24–34:28Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the reason, no positive similar instance
34:28–34:32is available in which both smell and difference from the other substances can be directly
34:32–34:34observed.
34:34–34:39In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different
34:39–34:43in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not
34:43–34:45possess smell.
34:45–34:51By the force of this negative provision, Earth's difference from the other substances is established.
34:51–34:56In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great subtlety
34:56–35:01to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self, the validity
35:01–35:03of cognition, and the distinctness of Earth.

Plain text

तात्वः सिंठ मैः, प्रस्थ्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष् first considered the view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the prima facie position. They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with the desire to complete the work. The direct result of the indication is therefore the completion of the work, that is, the desired completion. Gangesa Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions. He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication, as in the case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work remains unfinished even after a complete invocation has been performed. If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work, and completion follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort, then according to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of the invocation that assists in bringing the work to completion. According to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine, The principle and immediate result of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles, Vignadvasa. He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book, rather, it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition. Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary human effort. This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question. If an auspicious invocation destroys obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive authors, who do not perform such an invocation, sometimes completed? According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without obstruction in such a case, despite the absence of an invocation? This is a highly important question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously logical manner. According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of obstacles, Vignabhava. Gangesa explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles carried over from a previous birth. times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all. Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles, no invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset. In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring the work to completion without obstruction. 2. The doctrine of validity, Pramayadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known? We shall now consider the doctrine of validity. The central dispute in this doctrine is between the msakhas and the nayayakas concerning how the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended. The msakhas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha. In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of the very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically. The Neiakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, parotiprameyavda. They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its own causal complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or a subsequently successful activity. The Neayakas put a very practical question to themsakas on this point. Logically, if themsaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its validity such as hesitation or doubt would become wholly impossible in a condition of unfamiliarity when a new cognition occurs for the first time? If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising, a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in a state of unfamiliarity. Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life. On this basis, the Nayayakas refute the Msaaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish that a cognition's validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or through successful activity. The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha. When a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question from the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata, is, What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous activity? The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory. According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of silver, two distinct cognitions are actually present. First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell. Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory. The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions. In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, bedagraha, difference plus non-apprehension. Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. The nayayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension, anyathakiyati, do not agree that the error consists nearly in ignorance of the difference. In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier that does not in fact belong to it. The Neayakas hold that in error the person does not merely overlook the difference between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain. Rather, he positively apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in the shell but belongs to silver. For this reason, the error is called anyathakiyati, apprehending one thing as another, and is treated as a qualified cognition. The doctrine of validity, with respect to apprehension and production, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsically produced and known through its own causal complex, as the msakas hold, or extrinsically through some other means, as the Neayakas maintain. The fundamental dispute between the msakas and Neayakas in this discussion is how it is known that a cognition is veritical or valid its apprehension, and how that validity is produced, its production. The msakas uphold intrinsic validity. According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically through the same complete causal complex from which the cognition itself arises. If another means or cognition were needed to know its validity, a third would be required to establish the validity of the second, producing the defect of infinite regress, anovasta. The Neiaiakas, on the contrary, support extrinsic validity. They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or successful activity. In this context, the Neayakas raise a highly practical question. When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a person often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not. If the msaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then according to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt, would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition? What is that particular property called? 3. The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of apprehension, whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as silver is the Prabhācāra doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference, or the Nayaṭha doctrine of misapprehension, anyath akhyati, namely a qualified cognition. The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell, sakti, takes it to be silver, rijitha, and is prompted to pick it up. What is the actual cause of that activity? Two principal views are offered. The Prabhakramsaka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition arises here. There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition is concerning the shell present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory. According to the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions, this is called non-apprehension of difference, the dhagraha, or akhyati. The Naayaka theory of misapprehension, the Naayakas maintain that the error is not merely ignorance of a difference. It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively apprehends silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him. In other words, one thing is apprehended as another. Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Sakha standpoint. If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely, according to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person fail to understand at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming impelled to act? According to the Prabhakram Sakha theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver being recalled. When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind. According to the Prabhakras, this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions. Perceptual cognition, this is something, the general perception of the shell, in which, owing to a defect or distance, its shellhood is not apprehended. Memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously seen silver evoked by the shell's luster. The person cannot distinguish between this perception of the shell before him and the memory of previously seen silver. Because of this non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, he takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. Now consider the Neayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account. According to the Neayakas, who uphold Aniyathakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail to distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as another. That distinctive property is silverhood, rajatattva. According to the nayayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present before him as the qualifakand, or substrate, and superimposes silverhood upon it as the qualifier or mode. This differs from the Prabhupācāra theory of non-apprehension because the person is not merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell of property, silverhood, that is not there at all. Because of this specific superimposition, the Nāyāyākas call the error Ānīyāthākyāti, the apprehension of one thing is another, an equalified cognition. Tattva-Sintmai, inference section. cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition and the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions of pervasion and the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or an unconditional relation, together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyo's Tatvasant Mai, the study of inferential cognition and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy. It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various prima facie definitions of pavesion, such as the five definitions and those attributed to Sihar and Viagra, and Gangesh's decisive definition. Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail. The nature of inferential cognition, Anumitai. In Nyaya philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent and valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony. Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation of invariable concomitance. In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition of fire arises in that subject. This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary cause is subsumptive reflection, paramarsa. The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition. It is not sufficient merely to characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason from the probandom, many prima prema-facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate its philosophical definition. Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions of pervasion. Ah, the five definitions of pervasion. Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify pervasion. Gangesa takes them up as prema-facie views and subjects them to examination. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur. This is called absence of occurrence and a locus of the absence of the probandom. The reasons non-occurrence and a locus of the absence of the probandom that is distinct from the locus of the probandom, in places other than the probandom zone locus where the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur. Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence whose counter positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum. The state of being the counter positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the absence of the probandum. The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum. Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative inference in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandum, as in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandum in such a case. b. Definitions of pervasion attributed to Sihat and Viagra Certain logicians referred to as Sihat and Viagra propose two further marks of pervasion. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandums collocation. The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum. Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain special cases. Gangesa therefore rejects them as well. In addition, Gangesa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions, including the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation. Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion. After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical examination, Gangesa Upadyoya presents his definitive characterization of perversion. Definition. Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, But this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness whose counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but is not collocated with its own counter-positive. In simple terms, perversion is the concomitance or collocation of the reason with the probandom. This concomitance, however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive and a different or incongruent locus and absence that occurs in the locus of the reason but not in the locus of its actual counter positive. Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the defect of a reason burdened by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of pervasion. The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Yupati its nature, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference. Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas Tattvasintmai, the doctrine of the extraneous condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Nyaya philosophy. And Upadi plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the probandom in an inference. Let us examine and detail the nature of a Upadi, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain upity upon inference. The nature of a newpity. In Nyaya philosophy, a newpity is a property that does not pervade the property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom. In simple terms, a newpity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the probandom and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore does not pervade the reason. Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire. In this inference, fire is the reason and smoke is the probandom. The conjunction of damp fuel is the upity, it does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in dry wood or cow dung cakes without moisture, but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without moisture or damp fuel. The basis of the upity's vitiating force. How is an upadee regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference? By means of its own absence, the upadee establishes the absence of the probandom and thereby produces deviation of the reason from the probandom. When an inference contains a reason accompanied by an upadee, the natural pervasion or invariable relation between that reason and the probandom is destroyed. The Yupadi establishes that the apparent association between them is not intrinsic but depends upon the concealed condition. For this reason, the Yupadi is the principal basis of the inference's defectiveness. The effect of a certain and a doubtful Yupadi upon inference. In the Tatvasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes. A. Certain Upity. Nature, a Upity that is certainly pervasive of the probandom and non-pervasive of the reason, and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the probandom, is called a certain Upity. Effect upon inference, the presence of a certain Upity completely defeats an inference. It wholly destroys the perversion between the reason and the probandom, so that no inferential cognition of the probandom can arise. For example, in the inference, the lake is smoked because it has fire, the possession of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain upity. b. doubtful upity. nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails to pervade the pro-bandom or that the condition pervades the pro-bandom, and only doubt remains, the condition is a doubtful upity. Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful Upadi gives rice to doubt about deviation between the probandum and the reason. This doubt weakens the proponents cognition and obstructs the production of a determinate inferential cognition. For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra, being produced by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful Upadi relative to the probandum of blackness. Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of Upadi in the inference section of the Tatthasint my, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true, the reason must be free from inupati. Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection, the definition of subjecthood in terms of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence of an establishing proof, and the dispute between msakas and nayayakas over whether subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary cause of inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive reflection are highly important and original doctrines of Nyaya philosophy. The discussion explains the definition of the inferential subject in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and examines the extensive controversy between Msaakas and Nyayakas concerning subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Let us examine all these matters in detail. The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference. To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject, such as the mountain in which fire is to be established. In the prima facie view, several teachers treated doubt about the probandam, or merely the absence of evidence either establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood. Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts. The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood. A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together with the absence of a desire to establish the probandom. In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors. factors. Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is already available to establish the probandom, for example fire, in that locus. The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish, subjecthood is determined by the particular configuration of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence of evidence that would already establish it. the probandum has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood, and therefore no need for a fresh inference. The controversy between msakas and neayakas over subsumptive reflection as the direct cause of inference. There is a serious philosophical dispute between the neayakas and msakas over whether subsumptive reflection, the cognition that a property serving is a reason and pervaded by the probandum occurs in the subject, as in in the mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire is the extraordinary cause that produces inferential cognition. Themsaka view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct cause. Themsaka's maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection is required. They argue that recollection of perversion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, together with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain, directly produces the inference. From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third cognition called subsumptive reflection in addition to these two cognitions introduces needless theoretical complexity. The Neayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection alone is the extraordinary cause of inference. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Neayakas firmly refute themsaka position. They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from separate cognitions of perversion and of the reasons occurrence and the subject. Until the specific cognition arises that the reason qualified by that perversion is present in the subject, subsumptive reflection, no determinant conclusion or inferential cognition can be obtained. Subsumptive reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential cognition, and inference cannot be accomplished without this process. types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom. Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyais Tathasintmai, the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference, and the detailed explanation of how the pro-bandom is proved in each, are highly important topics in Gaya philosophy. Let us examine both types of inference in detail. Purely affirmative inference, Kevilland-Veyen. Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance, no locus where the probandom is absent, is called purely affirmative. It contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because no locus of the probandom's absence is available. Example, the pot is nameable because it is knowable. Explanation, here knowability is the reason and nameability is the probandom. Both properties are found in every object in the world. There is no object that is neither knowable nor capable of being named. Where the probandom has no negative instance, purely affirmative pervasion is established. Gangesa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an an unestablished probandom in subjects such as, ether, or, the nameable, an inference becomes purely affirmative when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence is not present in the subject. In this type of inference, the probandom is established solely through positive pervasion. Purely negative inference, Kevaladi eterican. Definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative inference. Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses smell. Explanation, in this inference, the probandum is that Earth differs from the other substances, water, air, ether, and so forth, and possession of smell is the reason. No substance in the world other than Earth possesses the quality called smell, consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which both smell and earthhood are found. In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference from the other substances is absent, that is, wherever the thing is not distinct in the way earth is, smell is also absent. Thus, when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom earth is different from the other substances is conclusively established through negative pervasion. Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative inference are both indispensable where appropriate. The doctrine of presumption, Arthapatti the dispute between the Mtsaka view that presumption is a separate means of knowledge and the Neayaka view that it falls under purely negative inference. The dispute between Sakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattvasintmaya is a highly philosophical and logical issue within Nyaya. Let us examine this dispute in detail. The Msaaka view, presumption as a separate means of knowledge. The Msaaka's regard presumption as an independent means of knowledge distinct from perception, and verbal testimony, the sixth type of prama. Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible, and an unseen or absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them, the resulting cognition is called presumption. The famous example is Devdutta, who is alive but is not seen at home during the day. Here there are two facts, that he is alive and that he is absent from home. Once his absence from home is certain, his continuing life is possible only if he has gone somewhere outside. His being outside is thus postulated through presumption. Themsaka argument, themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference, because no determinant reason and provision are directly operative. An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent contradiction. The Neyayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference. The Neyayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption is an independent means of knowledge. The Neyayaka argument, no separate prama called presumption need be postulated. The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative inference. The inferential form, Dev Dutta's being outside the house is known through the following inference. Living Dev Dutta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the continuous absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it. Economy, the Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an ordinary purely negative inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called presumption introduces needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted as an independent means of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between Sakas and Nayakas. The Nayakas include it within inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tapasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive reflection, and purely negative inference are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical topics in Nyaia. All three occupy a central place in the process of inferential cognition. Let us discuss these three topics in detail. The extraneous condition, Upati the source of a fallacy. According to Nyaia and Upati is a property that pervades the probandom, the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the proof rests. In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the reason. The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective? When a reason accompanied by an Eupode is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural pervasion or invariable relation between the reason and the probandom. The Eupode shows that their apparent association is not genuine but depends upon some other concealed condition. Example, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. Here fire is the reason and smoke the probandom. Yet fire alone does not produce smoke. Conjunction with damp fuel is the upity, although it does not pervade fire, it does pervade smoke. The inference is defective because of this upity. subsumptive reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition. In the Neayaka view, subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary or direct cause that produces inferential cognition, the cognition of the conclusion. Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific cognition expressed in the formula, the property occurring in the subject and qualified by pervasion is subsumptive reflection. That is, the subject, such as the mountain, possesses a reason, such as smoke, that is pervaded by the probandum, fire. Its distinction from recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reason and the subject, nearly remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection. It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. The Mthaka and Nayaka dispute, the Mthaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reasons presence and the subject together suffice. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayakas, however, establish that no determinant inferential cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of subsumptive reflection occurs. Purely negative inference, Kevaladi-Aterican IA recognizes three forms of inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative, and purely negative. Nature, an inference that employs only negative perversion because no directly observable positive similar instance is available is called purely negative. It proceeds by the rule, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason is also absent. Classical example, Earth differs from the other substances because it possesses smell. Analysis, the inference seeks to establish that earth differs from the other eight substances, such as water, ether, and air. Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the reason, no positive similar instance is available in which both smell and difference from the other substances can be directly observed. In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not possess smell. By the force of this negative provision, Earth's difference from the other substances is established. In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great subtlety to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self, the validity of cognition, and the distinctness of Earth.

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