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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:33अछिष्टविमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप्षिष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष
0:33–0:38of a pot, why is cognition of the counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot?
0:39–0:43Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage
0:43–0:48concerning absence of a pot. Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required
0:48–0:52only when there is a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an
0:52–0:55additional cognition of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition
0:55–1:01of a measuring unit is required for usage concerning length. When the span of a hand
1:01–1:06is delimited by a larger number, it measures length, the opposite, a smaller span, measure
1:06–1:12shortness. Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition
1:12–1:18of the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long. Similarly, on the Msocaview,
1:18–1:23although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition of a visible pot is needed for
1:23–1:29usage concerning pot absence. Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms
1:29–1:36is also useful in making them perceptible. It is not the case that when cognition of ground is
1:36–1:41destroyed, or when absence of absence of a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again.
1:42–1:46Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely
1:46–1:51the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition
1:51–1:58of empty ground. Therefore a destroyed pot does not reappear. When a dam breaks in an
1:58–2:04uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even if no human being is present,
2:04–2:09birds and other creatures cognize it. Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is,
2:09–2:14absence of error, no means of knowledge is observed within another person, from the effect in the
2:14–2:19form of usage concerning absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of
2:19–2:25the person who was the locus of that absence. When cognition of the locus of absence of error
2:25–2:29is destroyed, rebirth does not follow, because a continuous stream of that cognition of absence
2:29–2:34of error is available. Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established, because
2:34–2:40there is no proof for it. Thus absence is the very nature of an empty lock as distinct from a lock
2:40–2:44as possessing the counter positive. In this manner the Prabhukara Prima-Facey position is
2:44–2:54established. Thus ends the Prima-Facey view in the theory of absence. The theory of absence,
2:54–3:02Neayaka conclusion. Neayaka conclusion, an additional absence determined by a counter positive.
3:04–3:09The Nayayaka doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined by some
3:09–3:15counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth. Me experience of an
3:15–3:20empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence. Thus cognition of absence
3:20–3:24presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity to a cow, cognition of absence
3:24–3:29depends upon cognition of its counter-positive. Cognition merely of ground is possible without
3:29–3:33cognition of a counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not even an object of that cognition,
3:33–3:39therefore such cognition is not absence. If absence is not accepted as determined by a
3:39–3:44counter-positive, the question arises, of which absence is a pot the counter-positive?
3:45–3:50The Msaka may say that the empty locus alone is absence, while cognition of the pot is
3:50–3:53required for usage absence of a pot.
3:53–3:58Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the counter
3:58–4:05positive of the absence, it is not merely the counter positive of subsequent verbal usage.
4:05–4:10Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence.
4:10–4:14There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter positive
4:14–4:18is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence.
4:18–4:24the object whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition of the counter positive is seen to be required.
4:24–4:29Such additional cognition is not established as a cause in general usage concerning absence,
4:29–4:33if its separate causal status were accepted in each particular usage, there would be non-recurrence.
4:34–4:40Therefore both cognition of absence and usage concerning absence are grounded in an additional absence determined by the counter positive.
4:42–4:45Examples of shortness, length and similarity.
4:45–4:51Shortness and length are special dimensions distinct from dimension in general.
4:51–4:55Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as something is measured by a
4:55–4:58hand or other measure delimited by a smaller or larger number.
4:58–5:02Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object,
5:02–5:06particular usage as short or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure.
5:07–5:13Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a gavaia,
5:13–5:17but the particular cognition the gavaya is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow.
5:18–5:24At the time of cognition merely of a gavaya, determinant usage concerning similarity to a cow
5:24–5:29does not arise. Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its
5:29–5:37counter positive is not extraordinary. Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot.
5:39–5:44Memsaka objection, use of the expression absence of a pot is a cause of some cognition,
5:44–5:48In cognition of absence the counter-positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground.
5:48–5:53Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used should
5:53–5:57itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression,
5:57–6:01absence of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter-positive
6:01–6:05relatum relation between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing a
6:05–6:11counter-positive. Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence
6:11–6:17of a pot. Experience takes the form, there is absence of a pot on the ground, or, there
6:17–6:23is no pot on the ground. This usage shows absence of the pot to be distinct from the ground,
6:23–6:28just as in there is a pot on the ground, the pot is not the ground.
6:28–6:32If the grounds being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application of
6:32–6:37the expression absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an object of
6:37–6:40that expression only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence
6:40–6:44of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression.
6:44–6:47Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application, and here absence
6:47–6:51of pothood itself is the ground of application.
6:51–6:56Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage.
6:56–6:59This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of
6:59–7:03a counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an
7:03–7:05object of that usage.
7:05–7:08The ground alone is not absence of a pot, because a container contains relation
7:08–7:13between absence of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible
7:13–7:14in an identical thing.
7:14–7:18Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded
7:18–7:22as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would
7:22–7:26be obstructed.
7:26–7:32Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence.
7:32–7:36The Msaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot
7:36–7:41possessing ground is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground
7:41–7:44is understood as its locus.
7:44–7:49Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive
7:49–7:53pot, this has already been established.
7:53–7:55There are two alternatives.
7:55–8:00First, cognition of the nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence
8:00–8:02of a pot.
8:02–8:06Then no pot absence is something contained in the ground would be presented.
8:06–8:11Second, cognition in the form of negation together with the ground's character as locus
8:11–8:13may be the cause.
8:13–8:18But at that time cognition of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition
8:18–8:21of difference from it is also unavailable.
8:21–8:25If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of pot possessing
8:25–8:29ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an oculodeffect, cognition of pot possession
8:29–8:33fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence of the pot
8:33–8:36would have to be accepted there.
8:36–8:39concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then no longer
8:39–8:45be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object.
8:45–8:49Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual cognition
8:49–8:54of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground possessing
8:54–8:56a pot.
8:56–9:00Cognition of ground as distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground as possible only
9:00–9:04after absence of a pot on the ground has already been ascertained through non-apprehension
9:04–9:10of an eligible counter-positive pot. Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment
9:10–9:15of absence is again required, a circle or mutual dependence.
9:15–9:21Impossibility of recurrent usage concerning absence.
9:21–9:26On the Msakavu, different empty loci and their cognitions are non-recurrent. How then is
9:26–9:31recurrent usage of absence possible? On the Nayayakavu, on the strength of one
9:31–9:36mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent usage, a pot and a like are not cloth,
9:36–9:40On the strength of one absolute absence of conus, conus is not in a pot and the like,
9:40–9:45on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the pot has been destroyed in different potchards,
9:45–9:49and on the strength of one prior absence of the pot, the pot does not exist in the
9:49–9:53potchards before its production.
9:53–9:58Thus each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction,
9:58–10:02and prior absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci.
10:02–10:07The Msaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms of
10:07–10:09recurrent negative usage.
10:09–10:14Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a
10:14–10:21single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence.
10:21–10:26Conjunction with a particular time is not absence.
10:26–10:30The Msaka says, let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence
10:30–10:32expressed by there is no pot on the ground now.
10:32–10:36This also establishes a container-contained relation.
10:36–10:40If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional
10:40–10:46absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted.
10:46–10:51Whatever recurrent property the Neayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in conjunction
10:51–10:53with a particular time.
10:53–10:58Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter-positive
10:58–11:03pot and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence.
11:03–11:07In there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a locus of
11:07–11:11absence, not as absence itself.
11:11–11:15If the particular time is said to reside in conjunction with that particular time, relation
11:15–11:19is impossible because of identity.
11:19–11:22What is the particular time?
11:22–11:26If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time, an additional absence
11:26–11:31has been accepted effortlessly. If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence.
11:32–11:38On the Neyayakavu one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time is only one
11:38–11:44delimiter of it. On Lamsakavu, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground exists
11:44–11:49now, but not, there is absence of a pot on the ground, because the particular time,
11:49–11:55becoming its own qualifier, produces a cognition of itself, not an absence determined by a
11:55–12:01counter-positive. Pot shards and the like would become causes of usage concerning a pot.
12:03–12:08If different loci can join with different times produce usage concerning absence of a pot on the
12:08–12:13ground, then various parts and pot shards of a pot, as delimited by a particular aggregate of
12:13–12:18parts, should likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's existence.
12:19–12:23What need would there then be to accept a separate pot or counter-positive?
12:23–12:28Cognition of the counter positive would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence.
12:30–12:34Nor is the following objection established. First the pot is seen, then the hammer falls,
12:34–12:39and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive is seen,
12:39–12:42and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless.
12:43–12:47The cognition of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents
12:47–12:51an additional destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced
12:51–12:55produced by the hammer, both existed before the blow.
12:55–12:59If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence, how could destructionhood
12:59–13:02belong to absence?
13:02–13:06And if it could, every absence would become destruction.
13:06–13:09Nor can it be said that what destroys on the Neiajaka view, the hammer blow or the
13:09–13:13ground slash cognition of ground can join with it, is itself destruction on the
13:13–13:16Mzaka view.
13:16–13:21Destruction is produced by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself.
13:21–13:25of the pot is experienced as determined by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer
13:25–13:31blow is not determined by the pot as counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct
13:31–13:38from its destroyer, and absence distinct from the empty locus. Qualifier hood, that is,
13:38–13:44a self linking relation, is the apprehensive relation of absence.
13:44–13:48The men's arc as final objection, if the ground has no relation with absence, how
13:48–13:53can there be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground. If a self linking
13:53–13:57relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self-related to absence
13:57–14:01of a pot at a crossroads, because a self-linking relation is nothing over and about the ground
14:01–14:04and the absence.
14:04–14:08If it is said that superimposing the counter positive pot on the locus and then negating
14:08–14:13it is itself the self-linking relation, mutual dependence results, superimposition
14:13–14:20depends upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon superimposition.
14:20–14:24apply, the very thickness of absence and its lockers to produce a qualified cognition without
14:24–14:27any other relation is the self-linking relation.
14:27–14:31Ground possessing a pot and absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly produce
14:31–14:36the cognition, there is absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension.
14:36–14:40If a separate relation were again accepted between cognition and its object, and then
14:40–14:44another relation for that relation, an infinite regress would follow.
14:44–14:48Hence qualityhood in the form of a self-linking relation alone should be accepted as the
14:48–14:53apprehensive relation between absence and its lockers. Thus an additional entity, absence,
14:53–14:57and its apprehensive relation, qualifierhood, established.
14:57–15:02The theory of absence ends here.
15:02–15:09The theory of the causes of perception. The theory of the causes of perception and
15:09–15:11the perception section of the Tatmasintmai.
15:11–15:21Ah, the theory of sense, object, contact. Conjunction of object and light is a cause
15:21–15:24of visual perception.
15:24–15:28Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions.
15:28–15:33In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular object is a cause,
15:33–15:36conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause.
15:36–15:39An eye situated in light does not see an object situated in darkness, whereas an eye
15:39–15:43situated in darkness can see an illuminated object.
15:43–15:47Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite
15:47–15:49the eye is illuminated.
15:49–15:52The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for apprehension
15:52–15:57of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no proof for postulating
15:57–16:01separate conditions for apprehension of the parts.
16:01–16:04If conjunction of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is
16:04–16:09accepted as the cause, why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part
16:09–16:11facing the eye as the cause?
16:11–16:15If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause, limiting the incompatibility
16:15–16:19of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension of cloth and
16:19–16:21gold or cloth and water.
16:21–16:24One would then have to accept conjunction of light and eye delimited by conjunction
16:24–16:26with the pot as the cause.
16:26–16:31If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of eye and pot is accepted as
16:31–16:35the cause, the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and eye in the same
16:35–16:37way arises.
16:37–16:41Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light
16:41–16:44as the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of
16:44–16:45the pot.
16:45–16:51Therefore conjunction of light and eye is not a separate cause.
16:51–16:55color is a cause of illumination.
16:55–17:00Other Niyayikas say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception, conjunction
17:00–17:04of light and object is itself established as the cause.
17:04–17:07Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and
17:07–17:11conjunction with light are accepted, conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately
17:11–17:14remains the cause.
17:14–17:18The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended,
17:18–17:22because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts.
17:22–17:25If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with
17:25–17:29Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative
17:29–17:33concomitance, revealing cause of perception.
17:33–17:37Prima-facy view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by
17:37–17:41firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible.
17:41–17:45If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality
17:45–17:49like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest color
17:49–17:52are present, perceptual effect does not invariably occur.
17:52–17:57Reply, both light and manifest color are causes.
17:57–18:02There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colorhood or manifest colorhood
18:02–18:05delimits firehood.
18:05–18:09Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel, here positive and negative concomitance
18:09–18:14cannot be established for one while excluding the other, therefore causal status must
18:14–18:17be accepted in both.
18:17–18:24of the tradition nor the color of the eye is also a revealer. The nor of the tradition says,
18:24–18:28in that case the color of the eye too would be a revealer because it is the color of revealing fire.
18:29–18:33If color is a revealer to regard manifest colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood
18:33–18:38residing in fire as an extraneous condition is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness
18:38–18:43through economy revealing color alone is the extraneous condition. Manifest color present
18:43–18:46an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual illumination.
18:48–18:53A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs,
18:53–18:57and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness,
18:57–18:59because the required causes of perception are absent.
19:00–19:05Therefore recurrent properties such as colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their
19:05–19:11perception, not substancehood, and the like in substances. Otherwise apprehension of color
19:11–19:15would necessarily accompany apprehension of touch and hot vapor, and apprehension of touch
19:15–19:22accompany apprehension of color in array. There is no need to accept one recurrent property
19:22–19:27common to both color and touch, causal status can be established by distinct properties residing
19:27–19:33respectively in each color and the like. When one is apprehended, the other is not,
19:33–19:38so their recurrent properties differ. There is no contradiction of higher and lower
19:38–19:42universals, the distinction of colorhood and touchhood is possible like the distinction
19:42–19:49between higher and lower tones. Thus each manifestation assists perception of its own color and the
19:49–19:50like.
19:50–19:55Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard
19:55–19:59magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately in color
19:59–20:04and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the
20:04–20:09magnitude of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically
20:09–20:13in visually apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present
20:13–20:18in the general quality magnitude. Nor is it the case that non-manifestness
20:18–20:24alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility, while perception arises through its absence.
20:25–20:30Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper
20:30–20:36to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception. To regard non-manifestness
20:36–20:40as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly cumbersome.
20:41–20:49This is the view of the tradition-noir. Ah the theory of sense, object-contact, remaining portion.

Plain text

अछिष्टविमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप्षिष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष of a pot, why is cognition of the counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot? Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage concerning absence of a pot. Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required only when there is a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an additional cognition of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition of a measuring unit is required for usage concerning length. When the span of a hand is delimited by a larger number, it measures length, the opposite, a smaller span, measure shortness. Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition of the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long. Similarly, on the Msocaview, although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition of a visible pot is needed for usage concerning pot absence. Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms is also useful in making them perceptible. It is not the case that when cognition of ground is destroyed, or when absence of absence of a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again. Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition of empty ground. Therefore a destroyed pot does not reappear. When a dam breaks in an uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even if no human being is present, birds and other creatures cognize it. Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is, absence of error, no means of knowledge is observed within another person, from the effect in the form of usage concerning absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of the person who was the locus of that absence. When cognition of the locus of absence of error is destroyed, rebirth does not follow, because a continuous stream of that cognition of absence of error is available. Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established, because there is no proof for it. Thus absence is the very nature of an empty lock as distinct from a lock as possessing the counter positive. In this manner the Prabhukara Prima-Facey position is established. Thus ends the Prima-Facey view in the theory of absence. The theory of absence, Neayaka conclusion. Neayaka conclusion, an additional absence determined by a counter positive. The Nayayaka doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined by some counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth. Me experience of an empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence. Thus cognition of absence presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity to a cow, cognition of absence depends upon cognition of its counter-positive. Cognition merely of ground is possible without cognition of a counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not even an object of that cognition, therefore such cognition is not absence. If absence is not accepted as determined by a counter-positive, the question arises, of which absence is a pot the counter-positive? The Msaka may say that the empty locus alone is absence, while cognition of the pot is required for usage absence of a pot. Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the counter positive of the absence, it is not merely the counter positive of subsequent verbal usage. Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence. There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter positive is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence. the object whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition of the counter positive is seen to be required. Such additional cognition is not established as a cause in general usage concerning absence, if its separate causal status were accepted in each particular usage, there would be non-recurrence. Therefore both cognition of absence and usage concerning absence are grounded in an additional absence determined by the counter positive. Examples of shortness, length and similarity. Shortness and length are special dimensions distinct from dimension in general. Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as something is measured by a hand or other measure delimited by a smaller or larger number. Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object, particular usage as short or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure. Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a gavaia, but the particular cognition the gavaya is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow. At the time of cognition merely of a gavaya, determinant usage concerning similarity to a cow does not arise. Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its counter positive is not extraordinary. Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot. Memsaka objection, use of the expression absence of a pot is a cause of some cognition, In cognition of absence the counter-positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground. Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used should itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression, absence of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter-positive relatum relation between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing a counter-positive. Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence of a pot. Experience takes the form, there is absence of a pot on the ground, or, there is no pot on the ground. This usage shows absence of the pot to be distinct from the ground, just as in there is a pot on the ground, the pot is not the ground. If the grounds being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application of the expression absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an object of that expression only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression. Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application, and here absence of pothood itself is the ground of application. Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage. This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of a counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an object of that usage. The ground alone is not absence of a pot, because a container contains relation between absence of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible in an identical thing. Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would be obstructed. Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence. The Msaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground is understood as its locus. Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive pot, this has already been established. There are two alternatives. First, cognition of the nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence of a pot. Then no pot absence is something contained in the ground would be presented. Second, cognition in the form of negation together with the ground's character as locus may be the cause. But at that time cognition of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition of difference from it is also unavailable. If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of pot possessing ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an oculodeffect, cognition of pot possession fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence of the pot would have to be accepted there. concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then no longer be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object. Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual cognition of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground possessing a pot. Cognition of ground as distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground as possible only after absence of a pot on the ground has already been ascertained through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive pot. Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment of absence is again required, a circle or mutual dependence. Impossibility of recurrent usage concerning absence. On the Msakavu, different empty loci and their cognitions are non-recurrent. How then is recurrent usage of absence possible? On the Nayayakavu, on the strength of one mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent usage, a pot and a like are not cloth, On the strength of one absolute absence of conus, conus is not in a pot and the like, on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the pot has been destroyed in different potchards, and on the strength of one prior absence of the pot, the pot does not exist in the potchards before its production. Thus each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction, and prior absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci. The Msaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms of recurrent negative usage. Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence. Conjunction with a particular time is not absence. The Msaka says, let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence expressed by there is no pot on the ground now. This also establishes a container-contained relation. If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted. Whatever recurrent property the Neayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in conjunction with a particular time. Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter-positive pot and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence. In there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a locus of absence, not as absence itself. If the particular time is said to reside in conjunction with that particular time, relation is impossible because of identity. What is the particular time? If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time, an additional absence has been accepted effortlessly. If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence. On the Neyayakavu one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time is only one delimiter of it. On Lamsakavu, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground exists now, but not, there is absence of a pot on the ground, because the particular time, becoming its own qualifier, produces a cognition of itself, not an absence determined by a counter-positive. Pot shards and the like would become causes of usage concerning a pot. If different loci can join with different times produce usage concerning absence of a pot on the ground, then various parts and pot shards of a pot, as delimited by a particular aggregate of parts, should likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's existence. What need would there then be to accept a separate pot or counter-positive? Cognition of the counter positive would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence. Nor is the following objection established. First the pot is seen, then the hammer falls, and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive is seen, and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless. The cognition of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents an additional destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced produced by the hammer, both existed before the blow. If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence, how could destructionhood belong to absence? And if it could, every absence would become destruction. Nor can it be said that what destroys on the Neiajaka view, the hammer blow or the ground slash cognition of ground can join with it, is itself destruction on the Mzaka view. Destruction is produced by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself. of the pot is experienced as determined by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer blow is not determined by the pot as counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct from its destroyer, and absence distinct from the empty locus. Qualifier hood, that is, a self linking relation, is the apprehensive relation of absence. The men's arc as final objection, if the ground has no relation with absence, how can there be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground. If a self linking relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self-related to absence of a pot at a crossroads, because a self-linking relation is nothing over and about the ground and the absence. If it is said that superimposing the counter positive pot on the locus and then negating it is itself the self-linking relation, mutual dependence results, superimposition depends upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon superimposition. apply, the very thickness of absence and its lockers to produce a qualified cognition without any other relation is the self-linking relation. Ground possessing a pot and absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly produce the cognition, there is absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension. If a separate relation were again accepted between cognition and its object, and then another relation for that relation, an infinite regress would follow. Hence qualityhood in the form of a self-linking relation alone should be accepted as the apprehensive relation between absence and its lockers. Thus an additional entity, absence, and its apprehensive relation, qualifierhood, established. The theory of absence ends here. The theory of the causes of perception. The theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the Tatmasintmai. Ah, the theory of sense, object, contact. Conjunction of object and light is a cause of visual perception. Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions. In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular object is a cause, conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. An eye situated in light does not see an object situated in darkness, whereas an eye situated in darkness can see an illuminated object. Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite the eye is illuminated. The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for apprehension of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no proof for postulating separate conditions for apprehension of the parts. If conjunction of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is accepted as the cause, why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part facing the eye as the cause? If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause, limiting the incompatibility of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension of cloth and gold or cloth and water. One would then have to accept conjunction of light and eye delimited by conjunction with the pot as the cause. If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of eye and pot is accepted as the cause, the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and eye in the same way arises. Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light as the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of the pot. Therefore conjunction of light and eye is not a separate cause. color is a cause of illumination. Other Niyayikas say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception, conjunction of light and object is itself established as the cause. Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and conjunction with light are accepted, conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately remains the cause. The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended, because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts. If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative concomitance, revealing cause of perception. Prima-facy view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible. If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest color are present, perceptual effect does not invariably occur. Reply, both light and manifest color are causes. There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colorhood or manifest colorhood delimits firehood. Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel, here positive and negative concomitance cannot be established for one while excluding the other, therefore causal status must be accepted in both. of the tradition nor the color of the eye is also a revealer. The nor of the tradition says, in that case the color of the eye too would be a revealer because it is the color of revealing fire. If color is a revealer to regard manifest colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood residing in fire as an extraneous condition is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness through economy revealing color alone is the extraneous condition. Manifest color present an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual illumination. A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs, and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness, because the required causes of perception are absent. Therefore recurrent properties such as colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their perception, not substancehood, and the like in substances. Otherwise apprehension of color would necessarily accompany apprehension of touch and hot vapor, and apprehension of touch accompany apprehension of color in array. There is no need to accept one recurrent property common to both color and touch, causal status can be established by distinct properties residing respectively in each color and the like. When one is apprehended, the other is not, so their recurrent properties differ. There is no contradiction of higher and lower universals, the distinction of colorhood and touchhood is possible like the distinction between higher and lower tones. Thus each manifestation assists perception of its own color and the like. Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately in color and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the magnitude of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically in visually apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present in the general quality magnitude. Nor is it the case that non-manifestness alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility, while perception arises through its absence. Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception. To regard non-manifestness as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly cumbersome. This is the view of the tradition-noir. Ah the theory of sense, object-contact, remaining portion.

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