MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode1_Part4_RadioPlay.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996126)
Duration: 23:02
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:34विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ
0:34–0:40This determinant cognition is called upamiti, and its means is called comparison or upamana.
0:41–0:47The section contains a major debate between Sakas and Nayayakas concerning similarity.
0:47–0:52According to them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category.
0:53–0:58According to the text, does the Nayayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view?
0:58–1:04Is similarity an independent category, or merely the presence of certain common properties?
1:04–1:11According to the comparison section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly rejects
1:11–1:17the claim that similarity is an autonomous or separately existing category.
1:17–1:20The Nayayaka position is as follows.
1:20–1:26Not a separate category, similarity is neither an independent entity nor a distinct ontological
1:26–1:27class.
1:27–1:32Possession of common properties, similarity is not a separate thing but merely the presence
1:32–1:37or possession in one object of several properties common to another related object.
1:37–1:42For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties common to a cow.
1:42–1:49According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity.
1:49–1:53When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than
1:53–1:55the presence of shared properties.
1:55–2:00Thus, the gavaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form,
2:00–2:03and these give rise to the cognition of similarity.
2:03–2:09Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity.
2:09–2:13When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow on the instruction what resembles
2:13–2:18a cow as a gavaya is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination,
2:18–2:21this animal is a gavaya.
2:21–2:25The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called
2:25–2:29upamiti, the result of upamana.
2:29–2:34When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination
2:34–2:39arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaya.
2:39–2:43The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of
2:43–2:48the relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word.
2:48–2:53The person understands that the word Gavaaya applies to that animal on account of a distinctive
2:53–2:56ground, Gavaayahud.
2:56–2:59An important question arises here.
2:59–3:03Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and
3:03–3:07verbal testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Nayayakas regard it as a holy
3:07–3:12distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception or
3:12–3:14testimony?
3:14–3:17This is a very important question.
3:17–3:22The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal
3:22–3:28testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons.
3:28–3:32Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then a
3:32–3:37person who had never heard the instruction, a gavya resembles a cow, would also come
3:37–3:40to know the word gavya merely by seeing the animal.
3:40–3:43This does not happen.
3:43–3:48Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement,
3:48–3:53a person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon hearing
3:53–3:56the instruction, even without seeing the animal.
3:56–3:59This too is impossible.
3:59–4:04Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through
4:04–4:08the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process
4:08–4:10of a distinct kind.
4:10–4:15In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the relation between
4:15–4:18the word and its meaning.
4:18–4:22This cognition of similarity, distinct from both testimony and perception, is therefore
4:22–4:26the means of knowledge called comparison.
4:26–4:31Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life.
4:31–4:35Suppose a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name.
4:35–4:41Instruction, a friend says, broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color
4:41–4:43is deep green.
4:43–4:48Perception and recollection, several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees
4:48–4:52a green vegetable resembling cauliflower.
4:52–4:57On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered.
4:57–5:01Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this green vegetable
5:01–5:05is the referent of the word broccoli.
5:05–5:09Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's statement, the person has fully
5:09–5:12learned the meaning of the new word broccoli.
5:12–5:18This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge.
5:18–5:21Suppose a child has never seen a zebra.
5:21–5:26Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse, but its body
5:26–5:29has black and white stripes.
5:29–5:33Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and
5:33–5:40sees a striped, horse-like animal. The teacher's statement is then recalled.
5:40–5:45Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra. Through
5:45–5:51resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra.
5:51–5:57This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life.
5:57–6:02The final part of the comparison section makes an important point. Suppose someone
6:02–6:07gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal that does not resemble a
6:07–6:13cow is not a gavaia. According to the work, even a negative instructional statement such
6:13–6:17as, an animal unlike a cow is not a gavaia fully assists in understanding the meaning
6:17–6:23of a new word through the cognition of similarity. Although the statement is negative, the
6:23–6:27speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate the similarity between a gavaia
6:27–6:33and a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by an indirect route, toward the same
6:33–6:40similarity through which the hearer grasps the words referent. With this subject, the comparison
6:40–6:46section of the Tattva Sintmai comes to an end. The text is a profound philosophical analysis
6:46–6:53of the manner in which comparison or similarity cognition operates. Gangesa Upadyaya refutes
6:53–6:57the views of other schools, especially the masakas, and of earlier scholars within his
6:57–7:04own tradition, and establishes the Navianyaya position. The principal philosophical points
7:04–7:10of the entire discussion are as follows. The nature of similarity, the masakas regard
7:10–7:15similarity as an independent category distinct from the seven accepted categories. Gangesa
7:15–7:19refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession, in one object,
7:19–7:21of properties common to another.
7:22–7:23Difference from inference.
7:23–7:28Some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could be known through inference or presumption.
7:28–7:34Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of knowledge.
7:35–7:37The result of comparison.
7:37–7:42Earlier Neayakas such as Janta by held that the result of comparison is nearly understanding
7:42–7:43this animal is a Gavaia.
7:44–7:46According to Gangesa, however,
7:46–7:50Its true result is the determination that the semantic power and referent of the word
7:50–7:55Gavaia resides in Gavaiavud, the universal, and not merely in one particular animal.
7:57–8:02Let us first understand the dispute between Gangeset and the earlier Neayakas concerning
8:02–8:08the final result of comparison. This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaya.
8:09–8:151. The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jataba, when a person sees the animal in the forest,
8:15–8:20The conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the word gavaya.
8:21–8:26Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal.
8:27–8:332. Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word gavaya were
8:33–8:38restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second gavaya encountered in the
8:38–8:44forest the next day? Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the
8:44–8:49determination that the semantic power or referent of the word gavya resides not in one animal but
8:49–8:56in gavyahood, the universal, or common property. In simple terms, the person learns not merely
8:56–9:01the name of one animal but that every animal possessing gavyahood is called a gavya.
9:02–9:07By the same principle, the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located in
9:07–9:11and applehood, the common property of all apples.
9:11–9:16If only one particular red apple were accepted as apple, it would be impossible to call a
9:16–9:20green or yellow specimen seen the next day an apple.
9:20–9:24Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaya is not one particular
9:24–9:28animal but the universal gavaya-hood.
9:28–9:32Inference requires prior knowledge of a perversion or universal rule in order to
9:32–9:34cognize something new.
9:34–9:40Thus, to infer fire from smoke, one must already know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire.
9:41–9:57When a person sees the animal in the forest and learns the meaning of the word gavaia, does the person already possess a pervasion cognition such as whatever resembles a cow is the referent of the word gavaia, or does the comparison arise directly after hearing the instruction and seeing the animal?
9:58–10:01The logical process is as follows.
10:01–10:08The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form differs in certain respects.
10:08–10:12The instructive statement is then recalled.
10:12–10:22The important point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of a pervasion such as wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent.
10:22–10:28The meaning is grasped directly through the conjunction of the instruction and perception.
10:28–10:33After seeing the animal and recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion,
10:33–10:42this animal is the referent of the word gavaaya, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one animal but extends to the entire universal gavaayahood.
10:42–10:46This is the final result of comparison, upamiti.
10:46–10:56That is, the person understands that the word gavaaya applies to the particular animal seen in the forest and that its referent is gavaayahood, the universal.
10:56–11:011. Why is comparison different from perception?
11:01–11:06If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving
11:06–11:11any instruction, can the name Gavaya be known merely by sight?
11:11–11:15Inference requires previously established knowledge of perversion, as in the relation
11:15–11:18between fire and smoke.
11:18–11:22No such perversion cognition is required to understand the word Gavaya upon seeing
11:22–11:26the animal, recollection of the instructional statement together with the perception of
11:26–11:31similarity reveals the relation between word and meaning.
11:31–11:35Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition
11:35–11:39differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means
11:39–11:42of knowledge?
11:42–11:46Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition distinct
11:46–11:50from both perception and inference.
11:50–11:54Different from perception, merely seeing a wild animal cannot reveal that its name is
11:54–11:58Gavaia or that it is the referent of that word.
11:58–12:02Perception can display form and features but not the relation between a name and its
12:02–12:04meaning.
12:04–12:08Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or pervasion,
12:08–12:11as in the relation of smoke and fire.
12:11–12:16In comparison, however, without any prior universal rule, a person understands the
12:16–12:22referent merely by seeing similarity and recalling the instruction.
12:22–12:25Conclusion
12:25–12:29The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and the perception
12:29–12:34of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference.
12:34–12:40Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called comparison.
12:40–12:45Perception, inference, and verbal testimony.
12:45–12:50In Nyaia philosophy, these three are among the most primary and important means of acquiring
12:50–12:53knowledge.
12:53–12:56Perception – Pratyaka
12:56–13:01Meaning – Prati, before, Blasaka, I, or, sense faculty.
13:01–13:06The direct cognition produced through contact between a sense faculty, I, ear, nose, tongue,
13:06–13:09or skin, and an object is called perception.
13:09–13:12Nyaia regards it as the foremost means of knowledge.
13:12–13:17Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes or smelling the fragrance of a flower
13:17–13:21through the nose is perceptual cognition of the object.
13:21–13:25Inference, a pneumona.
13:25–13:30The word a pneumona signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition.
13:30–13:34On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision, cognition of an
13:34–13:37unobserved probandom arises.
13:37–13:44Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes, there is fire on the mountain.
13:44–13:49The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire.
13:49–13:53Verbal testimony, sabda.
13:53–14:02Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text.
14:02–14:11Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact, but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge.
14:11–14:17Example, an experienced physician says, this medicine cures fever, and one takes it.
14:17–14:22The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony.
14:22–14:30Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone, it is raining very heavily in Putnamow, and the hearer accepts the statement is true.
14:30–14:37True. Which of the three means perception, inference, or testimony is being used?
14:37–14:44The friend is truthful and apta, and the hero relies solely upon what the friend has said.
14:44–14:50Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy.
14:50–14:54Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are
14:54–15:01principally present. True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate
15:01–15:08knowledge of the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded. Truthfulness, the person
15:08–15:13must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is, without alteration, deceit, or
15:13–15:19fraud. Impartiality, the person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal
15:19–15:25interest that could influence the statement. A statement made by a person possessing all
15:25–15:32three qualities is accepted as verbal testimony. According to the sage Godama, such a trustworthy
15:32–15:36person may be a seer, an aria, or a mecha, provided these qualities are present.
15:38–15:44Now consider an example. Suppose there is a highly renowned physician who possesses
15:44–15:49accurate medical knowledge, but who accepts a bride from a particular pharmaceutical company
15:49–15:52and prescribes that company's medicine.
15:52–15:56Under Nyaya's three conditions, should the physician statement at that time be accepted
15:56–15:59as fully valid verbal testimony?
15:59–16:01No.
16:01–16:08At that time, the physician statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony.
16:08–16:12Although the physician possesses accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the
16:12–16:17bride makes the physician act from self-interest and destroys impartiality.
16:17–16:22According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly free from attachment, hatred,
16:22–16:24personal greed, and self-interest.
16:24–16:31If greed is present in the speaker's mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative.
16:31–16:36Now that the four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony
16:36–16:40have been understood, an interesting question arises concerning the truth of cognition,
16:40–16:46related to the previously identified topic of truth and error.
16:46–16:52obtained through perception is not always 100% true. At times, the sense faculties lead
16:52–17:00us into error. Nyaya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, aprama, or illusion.
17:00–17:06Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this.
17:06–17:10Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope
17:10–17:15lying on the road to be a snake. The eye and the object, the rope, are present,
17:15–17:18darkness causes the cognition to be erroneous.
17:18–17:23Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert,
17:23–17:29but nothing is found upon approaching it. A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in
17:29–17:35a glass filled with water appears bent when viewed from outside. These circumstances show
17:35–17:40that although perception is a principal source of cognition, it may produce error under
17:40–17:45defective conditions such as poor light, excessive distance, or limitations of the sense faculties.
17:47–17:49This leads to a new situation.
17:50–17:53If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake,
17:53–17:56how can it be established that it is really a rope rather than a snake?
17:57–17:59What should be done to test the cognition's validity?
18:01–18:06Nyea offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error,
18:06–18:08called the capacity for successful activity.
18:10–18:15The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the action connected with it.
18:15–18:19If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to drink but finds
18:19–18:24no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion.
18:24–18:29Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake.
18:29–18:34If a rope in darkness appears to be a snake, what immediate practical measures can a person
18:34–18:37take to ascertain the truth?
18:37–18:40One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to
18:40–18:43see whether the object moves.
18:43–18:48If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope in the torchlight, the cognition
18:48–18:52of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends.
18:52–18:55If it raises its hood, the cognition is shown to be true and the person should
18:55–18:57flee.
18:57–19:01In this manner, the truth of cognition is tested through the success or failure
19:01–19:03of action.
19:03–19:09Besides Nya is four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony,
19:09–19:14there is another well-known Indian school, the Kavaka philosophy.
19:14–19:19Of the four means, the Kavaka's accept only one, perception.
19:19–19:23Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the
19:23–19:27senses, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, is true.
19:27–19:32They therefore completely reject inference, comparison, and verbal testimony as sources
19:32–19:34of true knowledge.
19:34–19:37An important issue now arises.
19:37–19:42Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant mountain, fire is inferred there, and that
19:42–19:45this is a valid means of knowledge.
19:45–19:50Carvaka philosophy does not regard even this as absolutely certain.
19:50–19:55The Carvaka central argument is that knowledge obtained through inference is not always 100%
19:55–20:01certain and therefore cannot be accepted as an infallible means of knowledge.
20:01–20:06According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances.
20:06–20:10Consider several practical examples.
20:10–20:12Smoke or fog?
20:12–20:17Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is inferred.
20:17–20:22On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust.
20:22–20:26The inference was completely wrong.
20:26–20:30Inference from past to future, the Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together
20:30–20:34in a kitchen does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be accompanied
20:34–20:41by fire. We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases.
20:41–20:46Their clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty.
20:46–20:51This raises a serious question. If we accept the Karbaka claim that knowledge obtained
20:51–20:56through inference has no value and only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect
20:56–20:59What would this have upon everyday life?
20:59–21:05Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable.
21:05–21:12If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible.
21:12–21:16Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy hunger
21:16–21:19and is not poisonous.
21:19–21:23We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood.
21:23–21:28If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all.
21:28–21:33Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at the
21:33–21:35destination.
21:35–21:39We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall arrive
21:39–21:42safely.
21:42–21:46Taking medicine, when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will
21:46–21:47cure us.
21:47–21:53We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach.
21:53–21:58understanding in other person's emotions, from someone's face, smile, or tears, we infer
21:58–22:01that the person is happy or sad.
22:01–22:05The emotion within cannot be directly perceived.
22:05–22:09It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot
22:09–22:12be sustained in practical life.
22:12–22:16No worldly activity could continue without inference.
22:16–22:23Hirgnyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition.
22:23–22:27Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most
22:27–22:33important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering.
22:33–22:37According to Nyaya, the most fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false
22:37–22:40cognition, ignorance or avidya.
22:40–22:45In his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire
22:45–22:47chain of suffering.
22:47–22:481.
22:48–22:51False cognition, the first cause.
22:51–22:55It consists in taking a thing to be what it is not, for example, treating the body itself
22:55–22:59as the self, or seeking complete happiness in material objects.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ This determinant cognition is called upamiti, and its means is called comparison or upamana. The section contains a major debate between Sakas and Nayayakas concerning similarity. According to them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category. According to the text, does the Nayayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view? Is similarity an independent category, or merely the presence of certain common properties? According to the comparison section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly rejects the claim that similarity is an autonomous or separately existing category. The Nayayaka position is as follows. Not a separate category, similarity is neither an independent entity nor a distinct ontological class. Possession of common properties, similarity is not a separate thing but merely the presence or possession in one object of several properties common to another related object. For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties common to a cow. According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity. When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than the presence of shared properties. Thus, the gavaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form, and these give rise to the cognition of similarity. Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity. When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow on the instruction what resembles a cow as a gavaya is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination, this animal is a gavaya. The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called upamiti, the result of upamana. When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaya. The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word. The person understands that the word Gavaaya applies to that animal on account of a distinctive ground, Gavaayahud. An important question arises here. Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and verbal testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Nayayakas regard it as a holy distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception or testimony? This is a very important question. The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons. Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then a person who had never heard the instruction, a gavya resembles a cow, would also come to know the word gavya merely by seeing the animal. This does not happen. Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement, a person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon hearing the instruction, even without seeing the animal. This too is impossible. Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process of a distinct kind. In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the relation between the word and its meaning. This cognition of similarity, distinct from both testimony and perception, is therefore the means of knowledge called comparison. Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life. Suppose a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name. Instruction, a friend says, broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color is deep green. Perception and recollection, several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees a green vegetable resembling cauliflower. On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this green vegetable is the referent of the word broccoli. Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's statement, the person has fully learned the meaning of the new word broccoli. This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge. Suppose a child has never seen a zebra. Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse, but its body has black and white stripes. Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and sees a striped, horse-like animal. The teacher's statement is then recalled. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra. Through resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra. This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life. The final part of the comparison section makes an important point. Suppose someone gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal that does not resemble a cow is not a gavaia. According to the work, even a negative instructional statement such as, an animal unlike a cow is not a gavaia fully assists in understanding the meaning of a new word through the cognition of similarity. Although the statement is negative, the speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate the similarity between a gavaia and a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by an indirect route, toward the same similarity through which the hearer grasps the words referent. With this subject, the comparison section of the Tattva Sintmai comes to an end. The text is a profound philosophical analysis of the manner in which comparison or similarity cognition operates. Gangesa Upadyaya refutes the views of other schools, especially the masakas, and of earlier scholars within his own tradition, and establishes the Navianyaya position. The principal philosophical points of the entire discussion are as follows. The nature of similarity, the masakas regard similarity as an independent category distinct from the seven accepted categories. Gangesa refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession, in one object, of properties common to another. Difference from inference. Some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could be known through inference or presumption. Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of knowledge. The result of comparison. Earlier Neayakas such as Janta by held that the result of comparison is nearly understanding this animal is a Gavaia. According to Gangesa, however, Its true result is the determination that the semantic power and referent of the word Gavaia resides in Gavaiavud, the universal, and not merely in one particular animal. Let us first understand the dispute between Gangeset and the earlier Neayakas concerning the final result of comparison. This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaya. 1. The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jataba, when a person sees the animal in the forest, The conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the word gavaya. Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal. 2. Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word gavaya were restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second gavaya encountered in the forest the next day? Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the determination that the semantic power or referent of the word gavya resides not in one animal but in gavyahood, the universal, or common property. In simple terms, the person learns not merely the name of one animal but that every animal possessing gavyahood is called a gavya. By the same principle, the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located in and applehood, the common property of all apples. If only one particular red apple were accepted as apple, it would be impossible to call a green or yellow specimen seen the next day an apple. Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaya is not one particular animal but the universal gavaya-hood. Inference requires prior knowledge of a perversion or universal rule in order to cognize something new. Thus, to infer fire from smoke, one must already know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. When a person sees the animal in the forest and learns the meaning of the word gavaia, does the person already possess a pervasion cognition such as whatever resembles a cow is the referent of the word gavaia, or does the comparison arise directly after hearing the instruction and seeing the animal? The logical process is as follows. The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form differs in certain respects. The instructive statement is then recalled. The important point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of a pervasion such as wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent. The meaning is grasped directly through the conjunction of the instruction and perception. After seeing the animal and recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion, this animal is the referent of the word gavaaya, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one animal but extends to the entire universal gavaayahood. This is the final result of comparison, upamiti. That is, the person understands that the word gavaaya applies to the particular animal seen in the forest and that its referent is gavaayahood, the universal. 1. Why is comparison different from perception? If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving any instruction, can the name Gavaya be known merely by sight? Inference requires previously established knowledge of perversion, as in the relation between fire and smoke. No such perversion cognition is required to understand the word Gavaya upon seeing the animal, recollection of the instructional statement together with the perception of similarity reveals the relation between word and meaning. Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means of knowledge? Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition distinct from both perception and inference. Different from perception, merely seeing a wild animal cannot reveal that its name is Gavaia or that it is the referent of that word. Perception can display form and features but not the relation between a name and its meaning. Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or pervasion, as in the relation of smoke and fire. In comparison, however, without any prior universal rule, a person understands the referent merely by seeing similarity and recalling the instruction. Conclusion The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and the perception of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference. Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called comparison. Perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In Nyaia philosophy, these three are among the most primary and important means of acquiring knowledge. Perception – Pratyaka Meaning – Prati, before, Blasaka, I, or, sense faculty. The direct cognition produced through contact between a sense faculty, I, ear, nose, tongue, or skin, and an object is called perception. Nyaia regards it as the foremost means of knowledge. Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes or smelling the fragrance of a flower through the nose is perceptual cognition of the object. Inference, a pneumona. The word a pneumona signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition. On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision, cognition of an unobserved probandom arises. Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes, there is fire on the mountain. The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Verbal testimony, sabda. Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text. Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact, but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge. Example, an experienced physician says, this medicine cures fever, and one takes it. The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony. Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone, it is raining very heavily in Putnamow, and the hearer accepts the statement is true. True. Which of the three means perception, inference, or testimony is being used? The friend is truthful and apta, and the hero relies solely upon what the friend has said. Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy. Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are principally present. True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate knowledge of the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded. Truthfulness, the person must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is, without alteration, deceit, or fraud. Impartiality, the person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal interest that could influence the statement. A statement made by a person possessing all three qualities is accepted as verbal testimony. According to the sage Godama, such a trustworthy person may be a seer, an aria, or a mecha, provided these qualities are present. Now consider an example. Suppose there is a highly renowned physician who possesses accurate medical knowledge, but who accepts a bride from a particular pharmaceutical company and prescribes that company's medicine. Under Nyaya's three conditions, should the physician statement at that time be accepted as fully valid verbal testimony? No. At that time, the physician statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony. Although the physician possesses accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the bride makes the physician act from self-interest and destroys impartiality. According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly free from attachment, hatred, personal greed, and self-interest. If greed is present in the speaker's mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative. Now that the four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony have been understood, an interesting question arises concerning the truth of cognition, related to the previously identified topic of truth and error. obtained through perception is not always 100% true. At times, the sense faculties lead us into error. Nyaya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, aprama, or illusion. Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this. Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope lying on the road to be a snake. The eye and the object, the rope, are present, darkness causes the cognition to be erroneous. Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert, but nothing is found upon approaching it. A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in a glass filled with water appears bent when viewed from outside. These circumstances show that although perception is a principal source of cognition, it may produce error under defective conditions such as poor light, excessive distance, or limitations of the sense faculties. This leads to a new situation. If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake, how can it be established that it is really a rope rather than a snake? What should be done to test the cognition's validity? Nyea offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error, called the capacity for successful activity. The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the action connected with it. If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to drink but finds no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion. Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake. If a rope in darkness appears to be a snake, what immediate practical measures can a person take to ascertain the truth? One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to see whether the object moves. If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope in the torchlight, the cognition of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends. If it raises its hood, the cognition is shown to be true and the person should flee. In this manner, the truth of cognition is tested through the success or failure of action. Besides Nya is four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony, there is another well-known Indian school, the Kavaka philosophy. Of the four means, the Kavaka's accept only one, perception. Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the senses, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, is true. They therefore completely reject inference, comparison, and verbal testimony as sources of true knowledge. An important issue now arises. Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant mountain, fire is inferred there, and that this is a valid means of knowledge. Carvaka philosophy does not regard even this as absolutely certain. The Carvaka central argument is that knowledge obtained through inference is not always 100% certain and therefore cannot be accepted as an infallible means of knowledge. According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances. Consider several practical examples. Smoke or fog? Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is inferred. On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust. The inference was completely wrong. Inference from past to future, the Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together in a kitchen does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be accompanied by fire. We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases. Their clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty. This raises a serious question. If we accept the Karbaka claim that knowledge obtained through inference has no value and only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect What would this have upon everyday life? Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable. If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible. Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy hunger and is not poisonous. We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood. If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all. Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at the destination. We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall arrive safely. Taking medicine, when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will cure us. We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach. understanding in other person's emotions, from someone's face, smile, or tears, we infer that the person is happy or sad. The emotion within cannot be directly perceived. It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot be sustained in practical life. No worldly activity could continue without inference. Hirgnyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition. Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering. According to Nyaya, the most fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false cognition, ignorance or avidya. In his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire chain of suffering. 1. False cognition, the first cause. It consists in taking a thing to be what it is not, for example, treating the body itself as the self, or seeking complete happiness in material objects.

← Transcript index