MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode1_Part1_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.987987)
Duration: 35:30
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:35तात्वा सिंट्माइ, प्रस्थ्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्
0:35–0:40view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the prima facie position.
0:40–0:44They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with the desire to complete the
0:44–0:45work.
0:45–0:49The direct result of the indication is therefore the completion of the work, that is, the
0:49–0:52desired completion.
0:52–0:57Gangesha Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions.
0:57–1:02He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication, as in the
1:02–1:07case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work remains unfinished
1:07–1:11even after a complete invocation has been performed.
1:11–1:16If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work, and completion
1:16–1:20follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort, then according to
1:20–1:25Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of the invocation that
1:25–1:28assists in bringing the work to completion?
1:28–1:33According to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine, the principle and immediate result of an auspicious
1:33–1:38invocation is that destruction of obstacles, vignet vasa.
1:38–1:42He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book, rather,
1:42–1:48it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition.
1:48–1:52Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary
1:52–1:55human effort.
1:55–1:59This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question.
1:59–2:04If an auspicious invocation destroys obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive
2:04–2:09authors who do not perform such an invocation, sometimes completed?
2:09–2:13According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without obstruction in such a
2:13–2:18case, despite the absence of an invocation?
2:18–2:22This is a highly important question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously
2:22–2:25logical manner.
2:25–2:29According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed
2:29–2:34without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of
2:34–2:36obstacles, Vignabhava.
2:36–2:41Dhanjiset explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles
2:41–2:44carried over from a previous birth.
2:44–2:51At times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all.
2:51–2:55Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles,
2:55–3:01no invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset.
3:01–3:06In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring
3:06–3:09the work to completion without obstruction.
3:09–3:122.
3:12–3:18The doctrine of validity, Pramiadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known?
3:18–3:22We shall now consider the doctrine of validity.
3:22–3:27The central dispute in this doctrine is between the Msaakas and the Neayakas concerning how
3:27–3:33the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended.
3:33–3:38The Msaakas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha.
3:38–3:42In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of
3:42–3:47very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically.
3:49–3:54The Neiakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, Parada Pramayavda.
3:55–4:00They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its own causal
4:00–4:05complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or a subsequently successful
4:05–4:12activity. The Neiakas put a very practical question to the Msaakas on this point.
4:12–4:17Logically, if the msaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically
4:17–4:23certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its validity,
4:23–4:28such as hesitation or doubt, would become wholly impossible in a condition of unfamiliarity,
4:28–4:32when a new cognition occurs for the first time?
4:32–4:36If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising,
4:36–4:40a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in
4:40–4:48a state of unfamiliarity. Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life. On this basis, the
4:48–4:53Nayayakas refute the msaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish that a cognition's
4:53–4:57validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or through
4:57–5:00successful activity.
5:00–5:06The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha. When
5:06–5:10a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question from
5:10–5:16From the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata is
5:16–5:21What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell
5:21–5:25lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous
5:25–5:27activity?
5:27–5:32The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present
5:32–5:37before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory.
5:37–5:42According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of silver,
5:42–5:45two distinct cognitions are actually present.
5:45–5:51First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell.
5:51–5:56Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory.
5:56–6:02The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions.
6:02–6:07In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, the dhagraha, difference plus
6:07–6:13non-apprehension. Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds
6:13–6:19to pick up the supposed silver. The Neayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension,
6:19–6:24Aniyathakiyati, do not agree that the error consists merely in ignorance of the difference.
6:25–6:30In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier that
6:30–6:37does not in fact belong to it. The Neayakas hold that in error the person does not merely overlook
6:37–6:43the difference between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain. Rather, he positively
6:43–6:48apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in the shell but belongs to silver.
6:49–6:54For this reason, the error is called anyathakiyati, apprehending one thing as another,
6:54–7:00and is treated as a qualified cognition. The doctrine of validity, with respect to
7:00–7:05apprehension and production, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsically produced and known
7:05–7:10through its own causal complex, as the msakas hold, or extrinsically through some other means,
7:10–7:17as the Neayakas maintain. The fundamental dispute between the msakas and Neayakas in this
7:17–7:21discussion is how it is known that a cognition is veridical or valid its apprehension,
7:21–7:28and how that validity is produced, its production. The msakas uphold intrinsic validity.
7:28–7:37According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically through the same complete causal complex from which the cognition itself arises.
7:37–7:48If another means or cognition were needed to know its validity, a third would be required to establish the validity of the second, producing the defect of infinite regress, and of Asta.
7:48–7:53The Neayakas, on the contrary, support extrinsic validity.
7:53–7:58They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically through some further
7:58–8:03means, such as inference or successful activity.
8:03–8:08In this context, the Neayakas raise a highly practical question.
8:08–8:12When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a person
8:12–8:17often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not.
8:17–8:21If the Mzaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes
8:21–8:26intrinsically certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then
8:26–8:30according to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt,
8:30–8:33would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition?
8:35–8:37What is that particular property called?
8:39–8:463. The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of apprehension,
8:46–8:50whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as silver
8:50–8:55is the Prabhācāra doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference,
8:55–9:00or the Nayaaka doctrine of misapprehension, anyathakhyati, namely a qualified cognition.
9:02–9:05The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell,
9:05–9:09Sukti, takes it to be silver, rajatā, and is prompted to pick it up.
9:09–9:11What is the actual cause of that activity?
9:12–9:14Two principal views are offered.
9:14–9:21The Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition
9:21–9:27arises here. There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition this concerning
9:27–9:33the shell present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory. According to
9:33–9:38the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions,
9:38–9:44This is called non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, or Akiyati.
9:44–9:48The Nayayaka theory of misapprehension, the Nayayakas maintain that the error is not
9:48–9:51merely ignorance of a difference.
9:51–9:56It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively
9:56–10:01apprehends silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him.
10:01–10:06In other words, one thing is apprehended as another.
10:06–10:10Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Saka standpoint.
10:10–10:16If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely, according
10:16–10:20to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person fail to understand
10:20–10:24at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming impelled to
10:24–10:27act?
10:27–10:31According to the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to apprehend
10:31–10:35the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver being recalled.
10:37–10:43When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind. According to the Prabhakras,
10:43–10:47this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions.
10:48–10:52Perceptual cognition, this is something, the general perception of the shell,
10:52–10:56in which, owing to a defect or distance, its shellhood is not apprehended.
10:56–11:05memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously seen silver evoked by the shell's luster.
11:05–11:09the person cannot distinguish between this perception of the shell before him and the
11:09–11:12memory of previously seen silver.
11:12–11:17because of this non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, he takes the two to be one and
11:17–11:21proceeds to pick up the supposed silver.
11:21–11:26now consider the nayayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account.
11:26–11:41According to the Neayakas, who uphold any Athakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail to distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as another.
11:43–11:46That distinctive property is Silverhood, Rajatattva.
11:46–11:52According to the Neayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present
11:52–11:57before him as the qualifacand, or substrate, and superimposes silverhood upon it as the
11:57–12:00qualifier or mode.
12:00–12:04This differs from the Prabhupra theory of non-apprehension because the person is not
12:04–12:09merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell a property,
12:09–12:12silverhood, that is not there at all.
12:12–12:17Because of this specific superimposition, the Neayakas call the error Aniyathakiyati, the
12:17–12:22apprehension of one thing is another, and a qualified cognition.
12:22–12:27Tatvasintmai, inference section.
12:27–12:31Influential cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition
12:31–12:35and the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions of
12:35–12:39pervasion and the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or
12:39–12:43an unconditional relation, together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account.
12:44–12:53In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyoya's Tattvasankmai, the study of inferential cognition and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy.
12:53–13:06It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions and those attributed to Sihar and Viagra, and Gangesa's decisive definition.
13:06–13:13Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail.
13:13–13:16The nature of inferential cognition, anumitai.
13:16–13:28In Nyaia philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent and valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony.
13:28–13:34Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason
13:34–13:38is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation of
13:38–13:42invariable concomitance.
13:42–13:46In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and
13:46–13:50one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition
13:50–13:53of fire arises in that subject.
13:53–13:58This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary cause is subsumptive
13:58–14:02reflection, paramarsa.
14:02–14:08The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions.
14:08–14:11Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition.
14:11–14:15It is not sufficient merely to characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason
14:15–14:19from the probandom, many prima facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate
14:19–14:21its philosophical definition.
14:21–14:26Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions of pervasion.
14:28–14:30The five definitions of pervasion.
14:31–14:35Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify pervasion.
14:35–14:39Gangesa takes them up as prima facie views and subjects them to examination.
14:41–14:48The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur.
14:48–14:53This is called absence of occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandum.
14:53–15:00The reasons non-occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandum that is distinct from the locus of the probandum,
15:00–15:06in places other than the probandum zone locus where the probandum is absent, the reason must not occur.
15:06–15:15Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence whose counter-positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum.
15:15–15:22The state of being the counter positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the absence of the probandom.
15:22–15:28The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandom.
15:28–15:44Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative inference, in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandom, as in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandom in such a case.
15:44–15:45case.
15:45–15:52b. Definitions of perversion attributed to Sihat and Viagra
15:52–15:58Certain logicians referred to as Sihat and Viagra proposed two further marks of perversion.
15:58–16:03The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandoms
16:03–16:05collocation.
16:05–16:10The reasons non-occurrence and a place distinct from the locus of the probandom.
16:10–16:15Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain
16:15–16:18special cases.
16:18–16:21Gangisa therefore rejects them as well.
16:21–16:26In addition, Gangisa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions, including
16:26–16:31the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different locus,
16:31–16:36possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation.
16:36–16:41Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion.
16:41–16:47After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical examination,
16:47–16:52Gangesa Upadyoya presents his definitive characterization of perversion.
16:52–16:55Definition
16:55–16:58Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom,
16:58–17:02but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness
17:02–17:07whose counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated
17:07–17:12with the reason but is not co-located with its own counter-positive.
17:12–17:15In simple terms.
17:15–17:20Provision is the concomitance or co-location of the reason with the probandum.
17:20–17:25This concomitance, however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive
17:25–17:29and a different or incongruent locus, an absence that occurs in the locus of the reason but
17:29–17:33not in the locus of its actual counter-positive.
17:33–17:38Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the defect of a reason burdened
17:38–17:44by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of perversion.
17:44–17:49The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Upadi its nature, the basis of its vitiating force,
17:49–17:55and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference.
17:55–17:59Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadiya is Tattvasintmai, the doctrine
17:59–18:04of the extraneous condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Gaya philosophy.
18:04–18:11And Yupadi plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the probandom in an inference.
18:11–18:20Let us examine and detail the nature of a Yupadi, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain Yupadi upon inference.
18:20–18:24The nature of a Yupadi.
18:24–18:35In Nyaia philosophy, a Yupadi is a property that does not pervade the property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom.
18:35–18:47In simple terms, and upity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the probandum and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore does not pervade the reason.
18:47–18:56Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire. In this inference, fire is the reason and smoke is the probandum.
18:56–19:08The conjunction of damp fuel is the upity, it does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in drywood or cow dung cakes without moisture, but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without moisture or damp fuel.
19:08–19:21The basis of the upity's vitiating force. How is an upity regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference?
19:21–19:28By means of its own absence, the Upiti establishes the absence of the probandum and thereby produces
19:28–19:34deviation of the reason from the probandum. When an inference contains a reason accompanied
19:34–19:39by an Upiti, the natural pervasion or invariable relation between that reason and the probandum
19:39–19:45is destroyed. The Upiti establishes that the apparent association between them is not intrinsic
19:45–19:52but depends upon the concealed condition. For this reason, the Upadi is the principle basis of
19:52–19:59the inference's defectiveness. The effect of a certain and a doubtful Upadi upon inference.
20:01–20:06In the Tatvasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes.
20:08–20:15A. Certain Upadi. Nature, an Upadi that is certainly pervasive of the probandum and
20:15–20:19non-pervasive of the reason, and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the
20:19–20:25probandum, is called a certain eupity. Effect upon inference, the presence of
20:25–20:31a certain eupity completely defeats an inference. It wholly destroys the pervasion between the
20:31–20:36reason and the probandum, so that no inferential cognition of the probandum can arise.
20:37–20:41For example, in the inference, the lake has smoked because it has fire,
20:41–20:44The possession of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain upity.
20:46–20:52B. Doubtful upity. Nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails
20:52–20:58to pervade the probandom or that the condition pervades the probandom, and only doubt remains,
20:58–21:04the condition is a doubtful upity. Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or
21:04–21:09deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful upity gives rise to doubt about deviation between
21:09–21:15the probandum and the reason. This doubt weakens the proponents cognition and obstructs the production
21:15–21:21of a determinate inferential cognition. For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is
21:21–21:27the son of Mitra. Being produced by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful upity relative to the
21:27–21:33probandum of blackness. Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of upity in the inference section
21:33–21:39of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true,
21:39–21:45the reason must be free from inupati. Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection,
21:45–21:50the definition of subjecthood in terms of the desire to establish the probandham and the
21:50–21:55absence of an establishing proof, and the dispute between msakkas and naayakas over whether
21:55–22:00subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary cause of inference. In the inference section of
22:00–22:06of Dangesa Upadyas Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive reflection are highly important
22:06–22:11and original doctrines of Nyaya philosophy. The discussion explains the definition of
22:11–22:16the inferential subject in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence
22:16–22:20of an establishing proof, and examines the extensive controversy between Msaakas and
22:20–22:27Nayayakas concerning subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
22:27–22:32Let us examine all these matters in detail.
22:32–22:38The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference.
22:38–22:42To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject, such
22:42–22:45as the mountain in which fire is to be established.
22:45–22:49In the prima facie view, several teachers treated doubt about the pro-bandham, or
22:49–22:54merely the absence of evidence either establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood.
22:54–22:58Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts.
22:58–23:03The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood.
23:03–23:08A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together
23:08–23:13with the absence of a desire to establish the probandom.
23:13–23:20In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors.
23:20–23:24Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is
23:24–23:29already available to establish the probandum, for example fire, in that locus.
23:30–23:34The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish
23:34–23:39subjecthood is determined by the particular configuration of the desire to establish the
23:39–23:42probandum and the absence of evidence that would already establish it.
23:44–23:48Where the probandum has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood,
23:48–23:54and therefore no need for a fresh inference. The controversy between
23:54–24:01Misakas and Neayakas over subsumptive reflection as the direct cause of inference. There is a
24:01–24:06serious philosophical dispute between the Neayakas and Misakas over whether subsumptive reflection,
24:06–24:11the cognition that a property serving as a reason and pervaded by the probandum occurs in the
24:11–24:16subject, as in the mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the extraordinary cause
24:16–24:23that produces inferential cognition. The Misakha view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct
24:23–24:30cause. The Msaqas maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection
24:30–24:36is required. They argue that recollection of perversion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire,
24:36–24:41together with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain,
24:41–24:47directly produces the inference. From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third
24:47–24:52cognition called subsumptive reflection in addition to these two cognitions introduces
24:52–24:58needless theoretical complexity. The Neayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection
24:58–25:05alone is the extraordinary cause of inference. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Neayakas firmly
25:05–25:11refute themsaka position. They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from
25:11–25:15separate cognitions of perversion and of the reason's occurrence and the subject.
25:16–25:21Until the specific cognition arises that the reason qualified by that perversion is
25:21–25:26present in the subject, subsumptive reflection, no determinate conclusion or inferential cognition
25:26–25:33can be obtained. Subsumptive reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential
25:33–25:36cognition, and inference cannot be accomplished without this process.
25:38–25:43Types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative and
25:43–25:49purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom. Within the inference section of
25:49–25:55of Gangesa Upadyayas Tathasintmai, the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference,
25:55–26:00and the detailed explanation of how the probandam is proved in each, are highly important topics
26:00–26:03in Gaya philosophy.
26:03–26:08Let us examine both types of inference in detail.
26:08–26:13Purely affirmative inference, Kevalan Vayan.
26:13–26:17Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance, no locus where the
26:17–26:21probandam is absent, is called purely affirmative.
26:21–26:26contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because no locus
26:26–26:29of the probandum's absence is available.
26:29–26:34Example, the pot is nameable because it is knowable.
26:34–26:40Explanation, here knowability is the reason and nameability is the probandum. Both properties
26:40–26:44are found in every object in the world. There is no object that is neither knowable
26:44–26:49nor capable of being named. Where the probandum has no negative instance, purely
26:49–26:52affirmative pervasion is established.
26:52–26:57Gangesa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an unestablished
26:57–27:01probandom in subjects such as, aether, or, the nameable, an inference becomes purely
27:01–27:05affirmative when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence is not present in
27:05–27:06the subject.
27:06–27:12In this type of inference, the probandom is established solely through positive pervasion.
27:12–27:17Purely negative inference, Kevalay the Aterican.
27:17–27:22definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom
27:22–27:26is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative
27:26–27:28inference.
27:28–27:35Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses smell.
27:35–27:39Explanation, in this inference, the probandom is that Earth differs from the other substances
27:39–27:45– water, air, ether, and so forth – and possession of smell is the reason.
27:45–27:49No substance in the world other than earth possesses the quality called smell.
27:49–27:53Consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which both smell and earthhood
27:53–27:55are found.
27:55–28:00In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference
28:00–28:05from the other substances is absent, that is, wherever the thing is not distinct in
28:05–28:07the way earth is, smell is also absent.
28:07–28:12Thus, when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom
28:12–28:16Earth is different from the other substances is conclusively established through negative
28:16–28:19pervasion.
28:19–28:22Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai,
28:22–28:27Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient
28:27–28:31to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative inference
28:31–28:35are both indispensable where appropriate.
28:35–28:38The doctrine of presumption, artha-patti the dispute between the msaka view that
28:38–28:43presumption is a separate means of knowledge and the Nayaka view that it falls under purely
28:43–28:50negative inference. The dispute between Msaakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in
28:50–28:54the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattva Sintma is a highly philosophical and
28:54–29:03logical issue within Nyaya. Let us examine this dispute in detail. The Msaaka view,
29:03–29:10presumption as a separate means of knowledge. The Msaakas regard presumption as an independent
29:10–29:16means of knowledge distinct from perception, inference, and verbal testimony, the sixth type of Prama.
29:18–29:22Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible,
29:22–29:26and an unseen or absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them,
29:26–29:32the resulting cognition is called presumption. The famous example is Devdutta,
29:32–29:37who is alive but is not seen at home during the day. Here there are two facts,
29:37–29:43that he is alive and that he is absent from home. Once his absence from home is certain,
29:43–29:46his continuing life is possible only if he is gone somewhere outside.
29:47–29:51His being outside is thus postulated through presumption.
29:52–29:57Themsaka argument, Themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference,
29:57–30:00because no determinant reason and perversion are directly operative.
30:01–30:06An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent
30:06–30:15contradiction. The Nayayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference. The
30:15–30:21Nayayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption is an
30:21–30:28independent means of knowledge. The Nayayaka argument, no separate prama called presumption need be
30:28–30:34postulated. The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative
30:34–30:41inference. The inferential form, Dev Duttas being outside the house is known through the following
30:41–30:47inference. Living Dev Duttas is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the
30:47–30:54continuous absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it. Economy, the
30:54–30:58Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an ordinary purely negative
30:58–31:03inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called presumption introduces
31:03–31:09needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted as an independent means
31:09–31:15of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between Sakas and Nayayakas.
31:15–31:21The Nayayakas include it within inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas
31:21–31:26Tathasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive reflection, and purely negative inference
31:26–31:33are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical topics in Nyaya. All three occupy a central
31:33–31:37place in the process of inferential cognition.
31:37–31:44Let us discuss these three topics in detail. The extraneous condition, Yupati the source
31:44–31:51of a fallacy. According to Nyaya, and Yupati is a property that pervades the probandum,
31:51–31:57the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the proof rests.
31:57–32:03In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the reason.
32:03–32:08The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective?
32:08–32:12When a reason accompanied by an upity is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural
32:12–32:17pervasion or invariable relation between the reason and the probandom.
32:17–32:22The upity shows that their apparent association is not genuine but depends upon some other
32:22–32:24concealed condition.
32:24–32:29Example, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire.
32:29–32:32Here fire is the reason and smoke the probandom.
32:32–32:36Yet fire alone does not produce smoke.
32:36–32:40Conjunction with damp fuel is the upity, although it does not pervade fire, it does
32:40–32:42pervade smoke.
32:42–32:47The inference is defective because of this upity.
32:47–32:53Subsumptive reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition.
32:53–32:57In the Neayaka view, subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary or direct cause that
32:57–33:02produces inferential cognition, the cognition of the conclusion.
33:02–33:08Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific cognition expressed in the formula, the property
33:08–33:13occurring in the subject and qualified by pervasion is subsumptive reflection.
33:13–33:18That is, the subject, such as the mountain, possesses a reason, such as smoke, that
33:18–33:22is pervaded by the probandum, fire.
33:22–33:26Its distinction from recollection of perversion and cognition of the reason in the subject,
33:26–33:30merely remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that
33:30–33:35there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection.
33:35–33:39It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded
33:39–33:41by fire.
33:41–33:46Themsaka and Ayaka dispute, Themsaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection
33:46–33:50need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reason's
33:50–33:53presence and the subject together suffice.
33:53–33:58Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayayakas, however, establish that no determinant
33:58–34:02inferential cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of
34:02–34:08subsumptive reflection occurs. Purely negative inference, Kevaladi
34:08–34:13Atarikin. Nyaya recognizes three forms of
34:13–34:17inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative, and purely
34:17–34:21negative. Nature, an inference that employs
34:21–34:25only negative perversion because no directly observable positive similar
34:25–34:28instance is available is called purely negative.
34:28–34:31It proceeds by the rule wherever the probandom is absent
34:31–34:34the reason is also absent.
34:35–34:39Classical example, earth differs from the other substances because it possesses
34:39–34:43smell. Analysis, the inference seeks to
34:43–34:46establish that earth differs from the other eight substances such as water,
34:46–34:50ether and air. Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the
34:50–34:54reason, no positive similar instance is available in which both smell and difference from the
34:54–34:58other substances can be directly observed.
34:58–35:02In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different
35:02–35:07in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not
35:07–35:09possess smell.
35:09–35:15By the force of this negative provision, earth's difference from the other substances is established.
35:15–35:19In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great
35:19–35:24subtlety to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self,
35:24–35:27the validity of cognition, and the distinctness of earth.

Plain text

तात्वा सिंट्माइ, प्रस्थ्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष् view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the prima facie position. They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with the desire to complete the work. The direct result of the indication is therefore the completion of the work, that is, the desired completion. Gangesha Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions. He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication, as in the case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work remains unfinished even after a complete invocation has been performed. If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work, and completion follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort, then according to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of the invocation that assists in bringing the work to completion? According to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine, the principle and immediate result of an auspicious invocation is that destruction of obstacles, vignet vasa. He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book, rather, it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition. Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary human effort. This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question. If an auspicious invocation destroys obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive authors who do not perform such an invocation, sometimes completed? According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without obstruction in such a case, despite the absence of an invocation? This is a highly important question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously logical manner. According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of obstacles, Vignabhava. Dhanjiset explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles carried over from a previous birth. At times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all. Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles, no invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset. In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring the work to completion without obstruction. 2. The doctrine of validity, Pramiadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known? We shall now consider the doctrine of validity. The central dispute in this doctrine is between the Msaakas and the Neayakas concerning how the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended. The Msaakas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha. In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically. The Neiakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, Parada Pramayavda. They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its own causal complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or a subsequently successful activity. The Neiakas put a very practical question to the Msaakas on this point. Logically, if the msaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its validity, such as hesitation or doubt, would become wholly impossible in a condition of unfamiliarity, when a new cognition occurs for the first time? If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising, a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in a state of unfamiliarity. Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life. On this basis, the Nayayakas refute the msaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish that a cognition's validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or through successful activity. The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha. When a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question from From the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata is What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous activity? The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory. According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of silver, two distinct cognitions are actually present. First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell. Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory. The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions. In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, the dhagraha, difference plus non-apprehension. Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. The Neayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension, Aniyathakiyati, do not agree that the error consists merely in ignorance of the difference. In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier that does not in fact belong to it. The Neayakas hold that in error the person does not merely overlook the difference between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain. Rather, he positively apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in the shell but belongs to silver. For this reason, the error is called anyathakiyati, apprehending one thing as another, and is treated as a qualified cognition. The doctrine of validity, with respect to apprehension and production, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsically produced and known through its own causal complex, as the msakas hold, or extrinsically through some other means, as the Neayakas maintain. The fundamental dispute between the msakas and Neayakas in this discussion is how it is known that a cognition is veridical or valid its apprehension, and how that validity is produced, its production. The msakas uphold intrinsic validity. According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically through the same complete causal complex from which the cognition itself arises. If another means or cognition were needed to know its validity, a third would be required to establish the validity of the second, producing the defect of infinite regress, and of Asta. The Neayakas, on the contrary, support extrinsic validity. They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or successful activity. In this context, the Neayakas raise a highly practical question. When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a person often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not. If the Mzaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then according to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt, would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition? What is that particular property called? 3. The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of apprehension, whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as silver is the Prabhācāra doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference, or the Nayaaka doctrine of misapprehension, anyathakhyati, namely a qualified cognition. The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell, Sukti, takes it to be silver, rajatā, and is prompted to pick it up. What is the actual cause of that activity? Two principal views are offered. The Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition arises here. There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition this concerning the shell present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory. According to the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions, This is called non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, or Akiyati. The Nayayaka theory of misapprehension, the Nayayakas maintain that the error is not merely ignorance of a difference. It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively apprehends silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him. In other words, one thing is apprehended as another. Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Saka standpoint. If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely, according to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person fail to understand at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming impelled to act? According to the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver being recalled. When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind. According to the Prabhakras, this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions. Perceptual cognition, this is something, the general perception of the shell, in which, owing to a defect or distance, its shellhood is not apprehended. memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously seen silver evoked by the shell's luster. the person cannot distinguish between this perception of the shell before him and the memory of previously seen silver. because of this non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, he takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. now consider the nayayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account. According to the Neayakas, who uphold any Athakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail to distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as another. That distinctive property is Silverhood, Rajatattva. According to the Neayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present before him as the qualifacand, or substrate, and superimposes silverhood upon it as the qualifier or mode. This differs from the Prabhupra theory of non-apprehension because the person is not merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell a property, silverhood, that is not there at all. Because of this specific superimposition, the Neayakas call the error Aniyathakiyati, the apprehension of one thing is another, and a qualified cognition. Tatvasintmai, inference section. Influential cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition and the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions of pervasion and the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or an unconditional relation, together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyoya's Tattvasankmai, the study of inferential cognition and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy. It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions and those attributed to Sihar and Viagra, and Gangesa's decisive definition. Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail. The nature of inferential cognition, anumitai. In Nyaia philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent and valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony. Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation of invariable concomitance. In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition of fire arises in that subject. This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary cause is subsumptive reflection, paramarsa. The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions. Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition. It is not sufficient merely to characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason from the probandom, many prima facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate its philosophical definition. Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions of pervasion. The five definitions of pervasion. Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify pervasion. Gangesa takes them up as prima facie views and subjects them to examination. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur. This is called absence of occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandum. The reasons non-occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandum that is distinct from the locus of the probandum, in places other than the probandum zone locus where the probandum is absent, the reason must not occur. Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence whose counter-positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum. The state of being the counter positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the absence of the probandom. The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandom. Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative inference, in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandom, as in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandom in such a case. case. b. Definitions of perversion attributed to Sihat and Viagra Certain logicians referred to as Sihat and Viagra proposed two further marks of perversion. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandoms collocation. The reasons non-occurrence and a place distinct from the locus of the probandom. Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain special cases. Gangisa therefore rejects them as well. In addition, Gangisa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions, including the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different locus, possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation. Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion. After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical examination, Gangesa Upadyoya presents his definitive characterization of perversion. Definition Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness whose counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but is not co-located with its own counter-positive. In simple terms. Provision is the concomitance or co-location of the reason with the probandum. This concomitance, however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive and a different or incongruent locus, an absence that occurs in the locus of the reason but not in the locus of its actual counter-positive. Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the defect of a reason burdened by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of perversion. The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Upadi its nature, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference. Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadiya is Tattvasintmai, the doctrine of the extraneous condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Gaya philosophy. And Yupadi plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the probandom in an inference. Let us examine and detail the nature of a Yupadi, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain Yupadi upon inference. The nature of a Yupadi. In Nyaia philosophy, a Yupadi is a property that does not pervade the property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom. In simple terms, and upity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the probandum and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore does not pervade the reason. Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire. In this inference, fire is the reason and smoke is the probandum. The conjunction of damp fuel is the upity, it does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in drywood or cow dung cakes without moisture, but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without moisture or damp fuel. The basis of the upity's vitiating force. How is an upity regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference? By means of its own absence, the Upiti establishes the absence of the probandum and thereby produces deviation of the reason from the probandum. When an inference contains a reason accompanied by an Upiti, the natural pervasion or invariable relation between that reason and the probandum is destroyed. The Upiti establishes that the apparent association between them is not intrinsic but depends upon the concealed condition. For this reason, the Upadi is the principle basis of the inference's defectiveness. The effect of a certain and a doubtful Upadi upon inference. In the Tatvasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes. A. Certain Upadi. Nature, an Upadi that is certainly pervasive of the probandum and non-pervasive of the reason, and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the probandum, is called a certain eupity. Effect upon inference, the presence of a certain eupity completely defeats an inference. It wholly destroys the pervasion between the reason and the probandum, so that no inferential cognition of the probandum can arise. For example, in the inference, the lake has smoked because it has fire, The possession of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain upity. B. Doubtful upity. Nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails to pervade the probandom or that the condition pervades the probandom, and only doubt remains, the condition is a doubtful upity. Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful upity gives rise to doubt about deviation between the probandum and the reason. This doubt weakens the proponents cognition and obstructs the production of a determinate inferential cognition. For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra. Being produced by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful upity relative to the probandum of blackness. Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of upity in the inference section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true, the reason must be free from inupati. Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection, the definition of subjecthood in terms of the desire to establish the probandham and the absence of an establishing proof, and the dispute between msakkas and naayakas over whether subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary cause of inference. In the inference section of of Dangesa Upadyas Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive reflection are highly important and original doctrines of Nyaya philosophy. The discussion explains the definition of the inferential subject in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and examines the extensive controversy between Msaakas and Nayayakas concerning subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Let us examine all these matters in detail. The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference. To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject, such as the mountain in which fire is to be established. In the prima facie view, several teachers treated doubt about the pro-bandham, or merely the absence of evidence either establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood. Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts. The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood. A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together with the absence of a desire to establish the probandom. In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors. Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is already available to establish the probandum, for example fire, in that locus. The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish subjecthood is determined by the particular configuration of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of evidence that would already establish it. Where the probandum has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood, and therefore no need for a fresh inference. The controversy between Misakas and Neayakas over subsumptive reflection as the direct cause of inference. There is a serious philosophical dispute between the Neayakas and Misakas over whether subsumptive reflection, the cognition that a property serving as a reason and pervaded by the probandum occurs in the subject, as in the mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the extraordinary cause that produces inferential cognition. The Misakha view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct cause. The Msaqas maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection is required. They argue that recollection of perversion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, together with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain, directly produces the inference. From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third cognition called subsumptive reflection in addition to these two cognitions introduces needless theoretical complexity. The Neayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection alone is the extraordinary cause of inference. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Neayakas firmly refute themsaka position. They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from separate cognitions of perversion and of the reason's occurrence and the subject. Until the specific cognition arises that the reason qualified by that perversion is present in the subject, subsumptive reflection, no determinate conclusion or inferential cognition can be obtained. Subsumptive reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential cognition, and inference cannot be accomplished without this process. Types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom. Within the inference section of of Gangesa Upadyayas Tathasintmai, the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference, and the detailed explanation of how the probandam is proved in each, are highly important topics in Gaya philosophy. Let us examine both types of inference in detail. Purely affirmative inference, Kevalan Vayan. Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance, no locus where the probandam is absent, is called purely affirmative. contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because no locus of the probandum's absence is available. Example, the pot is nameable because it is knowable. Explanation, here knowability is the reason and nameability is the probandum. Both properties are found in every object in the world. There is no object that is neither knowable nor capable of being named. Where the probandum has no negative instance, purely affirmative pervasion is established. Gangesa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an unestablished probandom in subjects such as, aether, or, the nameable, an inference becomes purely affirmative when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence is not present in the subject. In this type of inference, the probandom is established solely through positive pervasion. Purely negative inference, Kevalay the Aterican. definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative inference. Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses smell. Explanation, in this inference, the probandom is that Earth differs from the other substances – water, air, ether, and so forth – and possession of smell is the reason. No substance in the world other than earth possesses the quality called smell. Consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which both smell and earthhood are found. In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference from the other substances is absent, that is, wherever the thing is not distinct in the way earth is, smell is also absent. Thus, when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom Earth is different from the other substances is conclusively established through negative pervasion. Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative inference are both indispensable where appropriate. The doctrine of presumption, artha-patti the dispute between the msaka view that presumption is a separate means of knowledge and the Nayaka view that it falls under purely negative inference. The dispute between Msaakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattva Sintma is a highly philosophical and logical issue within Nyaya. Let us examine this dispute in detail. The Msaaka view, presumption as a separate means of knowledge. The Msaakas regard presumption as an independent means of knowledge distinct from perception, inference, and verbal testimony, the sixth type of Prama. Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible, and an unseen or absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them, the resulting cognition is called presumption. The famous example is Devdutta, who is alive but is not seen at home during the day. Here there are two facts, that he is alive and that he is absent from home. Once his absence from home is certain, his continuing life is possible only if he is gone somewhere outside. His being outside is thus postulated through presumption. Themsaka argument, Themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference, because no determinant reason and perversion are directly operative. An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent contradiction. The Nayayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference. The Nayayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption is an independent means of knowledge. The Nayayaka argument, no separate prama called presumption need be postulated. The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative inference. The inferential form, Dev Duttas being outside the house is known through the following inference. Living Dev Duttas is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the continuous absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it. Economy, the Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an ordinary purely negative inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called presumption introduces needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted as an independent means of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between Sakas and Nayayakas. The Nayayakas include it within inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas Tathasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive reflection, and purely negative inference are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical topics in Nyaya. All three occupy a central place in the process of inferential cognition. Let us discuss these three topics in detail. The extraneous condition, Yupati the source of a fallacy. According to Nyaya, and Yupati is a property that pervades the probandum, the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the proof rests. In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the reason. The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective? When a reason accompanied by an upity is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural pervasion or invariable relation between the reason and the probandom. The upity shows that their apparent association is not genuine but depends upon some other concealed condition. Example, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. Here fire is the reason and smoke the probandom. Yet fire alone does not produce smoke. Conjunction with damp fuel is the upity, although it does not pervade fire, it does pervade smoke. The inference is defective because of this upity. Subsumptive reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition. In the Neayaka view, subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary or direct cause that produces inferential cognition, the cognition of the conclusion. Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific cognition expressed in the formula, the property occurring in the subject and qualified by pervasion is subsumptive reflection. That is, the subject, such as the mountain, possesses a reason, such as smoke, that is pervaded by the probandum, fire. Its distinction from recollection of perversion and cognition of the reason in the subject, merely remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection. It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. Themsaka and Ayaka dispute, Themsaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reason's presence and the subject together suffice. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayayakas, however, establish that no determinant inferential cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of subsumptive reflection occurs. Purely negative inference, Kevaladi Atarikin. Nyaya recognizes three forms of inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative, and purely negative. Nature, an inference that employs only negative perversion because no directly observable positive similar instance is available is called purely negative. It proceeds by the rule wherever the probandom is absent the reason is also absent. Classical example, earth differs from the other substances because it possesses smell. Analysis, the inference seeks to establish that earth differs from the other eight substances such as water, ether and air. Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the reason, no positive similar instance is available in which both smell and difference from the other substances can be directly observed. In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not possess smell. By the force of this negative provision, earth's difference from the other substances is established. In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great subtlety to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self, the validity of cognition, and the distinctness of earth.

← Transcript index