MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part13_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Collection
Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status
asr-draft
Human verified
No
Editorial review
not-reviewed
ASR model
small
Detected language
en (0.996915)
Duration
21:23
Source
Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

  1. 0:02–0:06प्रिमब्फ़शि व्य।, इनहेर्विम्स नाट अनप्रहेंषव रेलेशिन
  2. 0:06–0:12To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely
  3. 0:12–0:15an error, because a defeating contradiction is present.
  4. 0:15–0:19On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness in
  5. 0:19–0:24the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed.
  6. 0:24–0:27The prima facie objecta says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be
  7. 0:27–0:31neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction
  8. 0:31–0:34or non-establishment.
  9. 0:34–0:38nor is their merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified
  10. 0:38–0:41cognition is already established.
  11. 0:41–0:45The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that
  12. 0:45–0:50is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition.
  13. 0:50–0:54On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation,
  14. 0:54–0:58such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence.
  15. 0:58–1:02Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a relation
  16. 1:02–1:06as its object, the probandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata, in cognition
  17. 1:06–1:11of absence such a reason would deviate from the probandom. A reason qualified by, accompanied
  18. 1:11–1:16by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the probandom as, distinct
  19. 1:16–1:20from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition of absence is possible without a
  20. 1:20–1:24distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness produced by a special
  21. 1:24–1:28qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise possible in qualify cognition
  22. 1:28–1:32without mentioning any particular inheritance.
  23. 1:32–1:36The Prima-Facey Objector also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here
  24. 1:36–1:41are concerning parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from
  25. 1:41–1:45a container-contained relation, therefore inheritance is established.
  26. 1:45–1:48Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified
  27. 1:48–1:53cognition such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition.
  28. 1:53–1:57The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience
  29. 1:57–2:00is possible merely through the container-contained relation.
  30. 2:00–2:05The prima facie objecta says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance,
  31. 2:05–2:09and cognition is the locus or substrate.
  32. 2:09–2:17Bavu qualifierhood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation.
  33. 2:17–2:21Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation,
  34. 2:21–2:24inheritance can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation
  35. 2:24–2:29by the following inference sound soundness color and the like are related to a sense organ because
  36. 2:29–2:35they are perceptible like a part a sense organ apprehends an object related to itself hence
  37. 2:35–2:38inheritance itself is not perceived since it is not related to the sense organ.
  38. 2:40–2:43Inherence cannot be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier
  39. 2:43–2:49for that would entail an infinite regress of relations cognition merely by its own nature
  40. 2:49–2:53produces cognition of the object related to it similarly inheritance to merely by its own
  41. 2:53–2:59nature produces cognition of its relata. If an additional relation were admitted for cognition,
  42. 2:59–3:03every entity could, merely by its own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it.
  43. 3:04–3:08Nevertheless the fact that universals and the light produce cognition of their relata merely
  44. 3:08–3:12by their own nature does not eliminate inheritance, otherwise, in the absence of a relation to a
  45. 3:12–3:16sense organ, universals, and the light would be imperceptible just as inheritance is.
  46. 3:17–3:22This proposal is not correct. Even when inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive
  47. 3:22–3:27relation, a self-linking relation must still be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation
  48. 3:27–3:31of substance to quality or universal, the self-linking relation alone may be accepted
  49. 3:31–3:35as the apprehensive relation, just as in the relation between the ground and an absence.
  50. 3:36–3:39What need is there, then, for a separate relation called inheritance?
  51. 3:40–3:44An object is apprehended through the self-linking relation between ground and absence.
  52. 3:44–3:48Sound may be apprehended through its quality with respect to what is related to the sense
  53. 3:48–3:53organ sound is through qualifier heard of a qualifier and color through qualifier heard of an object related to a sense organ.
  54. 3:55–4:00One should not ask here how qualities such as color will be known to exist in a substance through a
  55. 4:00–4:05self-linking relation for even after inheritance is accepted the same difficulty remains how will
  56. 4:05–4:12those entities be known to exist in the substance through inheritance. Refutation of the guru school.
  57. 4:14–4:20The teachers say when one part of a pot is baked that same pot successively acquires black and red
  58. 4:20–4:25colors in its two parts, these two colors are not produced from the two earlier colors.
  59. 4:25–4:31Since color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time.
  60. 4:31–4:35Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only production
  61. 4:35–4:41and destruction of their relation are possible, and that relation is inherent.
  62. 4:41–4:43This view is not correct.
  63. 4:43–4:48The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves
  64. 4:48–4:54color to be non-eternal. No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance.
  65. 4:55–5:00On the Guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance,
  66. 5:00–5:04smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed.
  67. 5:05–5:10Cognition of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence
  68. 5:10–5:16of a defeating contradiction. The Siddhantans reply, inheritance can be inferred.
  69. 5:16–5:21The Siddhantin concludes, the inference that establishes
  70. 5:21–5:25inheritance as an apprehensive relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities,
  71. 5:25–5:29actions, and universals take the relation of their qualifiers as an object,
  72. 5:29–5:33because they are qualified cognitions, like the cognition of a man carrying a staff.
  73. 5:34–5:38Deviation of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this
  74. 5:38–5:42inference, because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the qualifier relation
  75. 5:42–5:47in the form of a self-linking relation. Nor does the inference establish a relation wholly
  76. 5:47–5:51different on the ground that qualify cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking
  77. 5:51–5:56relation as their object. By the force of subjecthood and through economy, the qualifier relation
  78. 5:56–6:01that is the object of qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals is established
  79. 6:01–6:07as one and the same relation, inheritance, not a self-linking relation. Self-linking relations
  80. 6:07–6:11are innumerable, owing to the innumerable natures of particular individuals, and are not a
  81. 6:11–6:17common relation. Alternatively, let the pro-bandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let
  82. 6:17–6:22the reason be qualified by while being veridical. The qualifier relation that causes qualifier
  83. 6:22–6:26cognition is established as the single relation of inheritance because a recurrent effect is
  84. 6:26–6:31regulated by a recurrent cause. Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent.
  85. 6:32–6:35It is not the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to
  86. 6:35–6:40qualifier cognition. If perceptual qualifier cognition neither took a relation as its object
  87. 6:40–6:44nor were produced by a relation, a separate qualifier cognition would likewise have to
  88. 6:44–6:49to be admitted in a collected cognition of horses and cows.
  89. 6:49–6:52The Navya Nyaya inference
  90. 6:52–6:57Navya Nyaya could say, a qualified cognition of a quality, action, or universal takes as
  91. 6:57–7:01its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified
  92. 7:01–7:06cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified
  93. 7:06–7:11cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier. In qualified cognition
  94. 7:11–7:15of absence the reason does not deviate from the pro-bandom. This inference does
  95. 7:15–7:19not fail to establish inheritance because it rests upon an unconditioned pervasion.
  96. 7:20–7:24Inherence is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from unqualified cognition.
  97. 7:26–7:30Alternatively, the inference establishes inheritance as the apprehensive relation of a quality,
  98. 7:30–7:34action, or universal related to a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the
  99. 7:34–7:38like is produced by a relation belonging to an entity connected with a sense organ,
  100. 7:38–7:42because it is a produced perception. By the force of subjecthood the relation
  101. 7:42–7:47is established as one recurrent relation. A recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause,
  102. 7:47–7:50the qualifier hood of color and the like in a particular object connected with the sense
  103. 7:50–7:56organ is individual specific, non-recurrent, and therefore not a recurrent cause. Hence,
  104. 7:56–8:00through economy, only the recurrent inheritance is established as the cause of perceptions of color,
  105. 8:00–8:06taste, and the like. This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only
  106. 8:06–8:13conjunction and quality is apprehensive relations. Since quality is the particular nature of
  107. 8:13–8:18an individual, it is non-recurrent, inheritance is needed to explain apprehension through the
  108. 8:18–8:23fourfold relations involving inheritance. Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive
  109. 8:23–8:29relation, inheritance itself is also established as apprehensible because both relata are perceptible.
  110. 8:31–8:34Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation.
  111. 8:34–8:40Objection, since conjunction and adherence are mutually exclusive, and perception of absence
  112. 8:40–8:45is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be accepted as the
  113. 8:45–8:48apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence.
  114. 8:48–8:54Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present
  115. 8:54–8:58together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also
  116. 8:58–9:02arise, because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same
  117. 9:02–9:08as that belonging to cloth absence. It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there,
  118. 9:08–9:13because the qualifiteness of cloth absence is different. If the absence of cloth absence is
  119. 9:13–9:18itself an absence, then through the same relation of qualifiteness that absence would certainly
  120. 9:18–9:22be present there, and if it is a positive entity, then cloth alone would have to be
  121. 9:22–9:28accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified cognition. If qualifiteness differs in accordance
  122. 9:28–9:33with each distinct absence, no single qualifedness will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition
  123. 9:33–9:38of absence. Only a non-recurrent, individual-specific qualifedness would then have to be accepted
  124. 9:38–9:42as the apprehensive relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence.
  125. 9:43–9:47But infinitely many such non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted,
  126. 9:47–9:51there is then no need to posit infinitely many qualifedness relations for absences.
  127. 9:52–9:56The prima facie objecta himself accepts the qualifierhood of an entity related to the sense
  128. 9:56–10:00organ as the apprehensive relation in the perception of Inherence and Qualifiedness.
  129. 10:02–10:04The arrangement of possessing and lacking color
  130. 10:06–10:10Objection, if Inherence is one, how can the different arrangement, possessing color,
  131. 10:10–10:13in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible?
  132. 10:14–10:17It cannot be said that Inherence is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the
  133. 10:17–10:22relation to color but not so in relation to air. If being the nature of the color relation
  134. 10:22–10:26were the very nature of Inherence itself, the same Inherence could not also be the
  135. 10:26–10:29nature of the relation to taste because the two would be mutually incompatible.
  136. 10:31–10:36Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in air
  137. 10:36–10:42and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself the
  138. 10:42–10:48substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions possessing color with respect to a
  139. 10:48–10:52pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction.
  140. 10:52–11:001. Refutation of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as,
  141. 11:00–11:05the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation.
  142. 11:06–11:10Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future pots
  143. 11:10–11:17would be erroneous. This objection is not sound. If knownness did not belong to past and future
  144. 11:17–11:21pots, discourse concerning them would be impossible, because cognition of them has been held to
  145. 11:21–11:26arise through cognition of knownness. To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition
  146. 11:26–11:31of the object is needlessly cumbersome. If only past and future objects are taken as objects of
  147. 11:31–11:35cognition of knownness, then in the case of a present pop both the cognition and its object would
  148. 11:35–11:39likewise be objects of cognition of knownness, there would be no difference among the objects
  149. 11:39–11:45of cognitions of knownness concerning past and present things. Prima-facy view, the relation
  150. 11:45–11:53between equality and its possessor is identity. Proposal, the relation between qualities such as
  151. 11:53–11:57color in possessors such as a pot is not inherent but only identity, that is,
  152. 11:57–12:04selfhood or numerical identity. In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of
  153. 12:04–12:08blue color in the pot is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and
  154. 12:08–12:15this man carries a staff. If both, this pot is blue, and this man carries a staff, took only
  155. 12:15–12:20a qualifier relation as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together
  156. 12:20–12:25with blue pot, and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man,
  157. 12:25–12:30would be equally required. Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other
  158. 12:30–12:34there is a qualifier relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition.
  159. 12:35–12:40Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of qualifier
  160. 12:40–12:45hood and qualifier canhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus, the blue pot,
  161. 12:45–12:48just as staph possession and manhood occur in one staph-bearing man.
  162. 12:49–12:54Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in qualifican
  163. 12:54–13:00words blue and pot is established. The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct
  164. 13:00–13:06grounds of usage blueness and potness, form a single utterance. It is unnecessary to hold
  165. 13:06–13:10that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through restoration of an alighted
  166. 13:10–13:15mad up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity, the cognition of identity between
  167. 13:15–13:19blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical identity.
  168. 13:19–13:24There is no ground for a figurative use based on identity, and no contradiction in accepting
  169. 13:24–13:28blue color as the primary meaning.
  170. 13:28–13:35Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity.
  171. 13:35–13:39If white and cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth
  172. 13:39–13:42would be incongruous like, this pot is a jar.
  173. 13:42–13:47If white color and cloth were identical, a blind person apprehending cloth by touch would
  174. 13:47–13:52also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension of the cloth would be required just as non-apprehension
  175. 13:52–13:54of its color is.
  176. 13:54–13:59In a cloth dyed red with matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would
  177. 13:59–14:04be necessary, otherwise, just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would
  178. 14:04–14:06not be apprehended.
  179. 14:06–14:10On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing.
  180. 14:10–14:16The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like, this cloth is a noncloth.
  181. 14:16–14:21When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through contact with fire,
  182. 14:21–14:26both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot.
  183. 14:26–14:31The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the substance,
  184. 14:31–14:35the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property
  185. 14:35–14:37and substance.
  186. 14:37–14:41A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not the property whiteness,
  187. 14:41–14:46hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without apprehension of the quality.
  188. 14:46–14:51The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a self-linking relation.
  189. 14:51–14:56The Siddhantan replies, If properties such as whiteness are accepted as present in a
  190. 14:56–14:59substance, then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other sense
  191. 14:59–15:02organs that apprehend the substance.
  192. 15:02–15:08One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility by a determinate sense organ, but then the
  193. 15:08–15:12fact that properties such as color residing in a substance are apprehensible by a determinate
  194. 15:12–15:18sense organ is itself proof of the distinction between quality and its possessor.
  195. 15:18–15:22If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color
  196. 15:22–15:26of the cloth, would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as, the cloth
  197. 15:26–15:30as blueness, would be required.
  198. 15:30–15:35The Madhva view, the relation is difference and non-difference.
  199. 15:35–15:40The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity.
  200. 15:40–15:45According to the Madhva view, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference
  201. 15:45–15:47and non-difference.
  202. 15:47–15:50This removes the fault of redundancy.
  203. 15:50–15:54The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference
  204. 15:54–15:56and non-difference.
  205. 15:56–16:01Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving
  206. 16:01–16:04difference and non-difference.
  207. 16:04–16:08Co-reference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical,
  208. 16:08–16:13hence even the absence of mere co-reference can establish difference and non-difference.
  209. 16:13–16:17It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore
  210. 16:17–16:20cannot constitute one relation.
  211. 16:20–16:25Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed like conjunction and its absence.
  212. 16:25–16:29When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience, this pot is red, but not black,
  213. 16:29–16:35mutual absence of black color is established in the substrate of red color. For this reason the
  214. 16:35–16:38Siddhantin II ought to accept the relation of difference and non-difference.
  215. 16:39–16:44Inference, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it,
  216. 16:44–16:49because it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence,
  217. 16:49–16:54like absolute absence. Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason,
  218. 16:54–16:59because the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively.
  219. 16:59–17:07By this inference difference and non-difference is established as an apprehensive relation.
  220. 17:07–17:12Refutation of the doctrine of difference and non-difference.
  221. 17:12–17:13The Siddhantan replies,
  222. 17:13–17:18The absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very locus of that thing is delimited
  223. 17:18–17:22by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction with a monkey in a tree that
  224. 17:22–17:27is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another part of the tree.
  225. 17:27–17:31In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited
  226. 17:31–17:37by red color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence of the pot
  227. 17:37–17:42delimited by black color. Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different as delimited
  228. 17:42–17:47by blue color, because in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence of the
  229. 17:47–17:53blue color delimited pot. But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence of
  230. 17:53–17:58the mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the
  231. 17:58–18:05pot delimited by potness. A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and the same locus
  232. 18:05–18:10under the same delimiter, though they can under different delimiters. Even when both difference
  233. 18:10–18:15and non-difference are absent in the pot delimited by potness, the experience this pot is blue
  234. 18:15–18:21remains possible. The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be
  235. 18:21–18:26neutral absence, but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of
  236. 18:26–18:32neutral absence. The Cithantin replies that absence of neutral absence is precisely the
  237. 18:32–18:37ground of usage concerning non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue,
  238. 18:37–18:43only the inheritance of blue color appears as related to the pot. Once relation objecthood
  239. 18:43–18:48is accepted, a cognition such as this pot possesses blueness is indeed expected,
  240. 18:48–18:52in the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes the locus of blue color through
  241. 18:52–18:58an alighted mad-up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity. Proposal,
  242. 18:58–19:05Qualifierhood alone is the apprehender. Proposal, in the perception of sound, color,
  243. 19:05–19:09and the like, let only the Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ be
  244. 19:09–19:14accepted as the apprehensive relation. What need is there then to accept Inherence and the other
  245. 19:14–19:19relations? It may be said that Inherence is the cause of Qualifierhood, and conjunction
  246. 19:19–19:23come Inherence, and the other relations are causes of the Qualifierhood belonging to an
  247. 19:23–19:28object related to a sense organ, because qualifierhood is impossible without such relations.
  248. 19:28–19:33Reply, Inherence, conjunction come inherence, and the like may be causes only of the nature
  249. 19:33–19:37of qualifierhood, not causes producing the status of qualifierhood as an apprehensive
  250. 19:37–19:43relation. Qualifierhood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation.
  251. 19:43–19:47If it is said, without inheritance and the like, qualifierhood in colour and so forth
  252. 19:47–19:51is not cognized, the reply is that qualifierhood is an apprehensive relation not because
  253. 19:51–19:55it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature.
  254. 19:55–19:58This view is not correct.
  255. 19:58–20:00Sound and the like are objects of perception.
  256. 20:00–20:04In an inference of relation to the sense organ, the qualifier hood of sound and the
  257. 20:04–20:07like is apprehended only after inheritance has been apprehended.
  258. 20:07–20:11Therefore, inheritance, remembered earlier, and not qualifier hood remembered at the
  259. 20:11–20:17end, is the object of perceptual cognition, that is, the apprehensive relation.
  260. 20:17–20:21Qualifier hood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence,
  261. 20:21–20:25A very month-faced view.
  262. 20:25–20:29Objection, qualityhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ is not the apprehensive
  263. 20:29–20:33relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception of absence of waterhood
  264. 20:33–20:38in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be required.
  265. 20:38–20:42Therefore only qualityhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible subject
  266. 20:42–20:46should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of waterhood.
  267. 20:46–20:50Absence of manifest colour in the gross element air, absence of fragrance in a flower,
  268. 20:50–20:54absence of bitterness in molasses is not perceived by the eye and other sense organs, it is inferred
  269. 20:54–21:00only from non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Nor is qualifierhood belonging to
  270. 21:00–21:04an object related to a sense organ the apprehensive relation of cognition of absence,
  271. 21:04–21:08otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would be perceived. If absence of sound is
  272. 21:08–21:13perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would have to be accepted for absence of sound.
  273. 21:14–21:18No, through economy, qualifierhood alone belonging to an object related to a sense organ
  274. 21:18–21:20is the apprehensive relation of absence.

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प्रिमब्फ़शि व्य।, इनहेर्विम्स नाट अनप्रहेंषव रेलेशिन To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely an error, because a defeating contradiction is present. On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness in the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed. The prima facie objecta says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction or non-establishment. nor is their merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified cognition is already established. The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition. On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation, such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence. Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a relation as its object, the probandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata, in cognition of absence such a reason would deviate from the probandom. A reason qualified by, accompanied by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the probandom as, distinct from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition of absence is possible without a distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness produced by a special qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise possible in qualify cognition without mentioning any particular inheritance. The Prima-Facey Objector also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here are concerning parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from a container-contained relation, therefore inheritance is established. Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified cognition such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition. The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience is possible merely through the container-contained relation. The prima facie objecta says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance, and cognition is the locus or substrate. Bavu qualifierhood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation. Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation, inheritance can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation by the following inference sound soundness color and the like are related to a sense organ because they are perceptible like a part a sense organ apprehends an object related to itself hence inheritance itself is not perceived since it is not related to the sense organ. Inherence cannot be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier for that would entail an infinite regress of relations cognition merely by its own nature produces cognition of the object related to it similarly inheritance to merely by its own nature produces cognition of its relata. If an additional relation were admitted for cognition, every entity could, merely by its own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it. Nevertheless the fact that universals and the light produce cognition of their relata merely by their own nature does not eliminate inheritance, otherwise, in the absence of a relation to a sense organ, universals, and the light would be imperceptible just as inheritance is. This proposal is not correct. Even when inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, a self-linking relation must still be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation of substance to quality or universal, the self-linking relation alone may be accepted as the apprehensive relation, just as in the relation between the ground and an absence. What need is there, then, for a separate relation called inheritance? An object is apprehended through the self-linking relation between ground and absence. Sound may be apprehended through its quality with respect to what is related to the sense organ sound is through qualifier heard of a qualifier and color through qualifier heard of an object related to a sense organ. One should not ask here how qualities such as color will be known to exist in a substance through a self-linking relation for even after inheritance is accepted the same difficulty remains how will those entities be known to exist in the substance through inheritance. Refutation of the guru school. The teachers say when one part of a pot is baked that same pot successively acquires black and red colors in its two parts, these two colors are not produced from the two earlier colors. Since color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time. Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only production and destruction of their relation are possible, and that relation is inherent. This view is not correct. The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves color to be non-eternal. No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance. On the Guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance, smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed. Cognition of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence of a defeating contradiction. The Siddhantans reply, inheritance can be inferred. The Siddhantin concludes, the inference that establishes inheritance as an apprehensive relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals take the relation of their qualifiers as an object, because they are qualified cognitions, like the cognition of a man carrying a staff. Deviation of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this inference, because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the qualifier relation in the form of a self-linking relation. Nor does the inference establish a relation wholly different on the ground that qualify cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking relation as their object. By the force of subjecthood and through economy, the qualifier relation that is the object of qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals is established as one and the same relation, inheritance, not a self-linking relation. Self-linking relations are innumerable, owing to the innumerable natures of particular individuals, and are not a common relation. Alternatively, let the pro-bandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let the reason be qualified by while being veridical. The qualifier relation that causes qualifier cognition is established as the single relation of inheritance because a recurrent effect is regulated by a recurrent cause. Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent. It is not the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to qualifier cognition. If perceptual qualifier cognition neither took a relation as its object nor were produced by a relation, a separate qualifier cognition would likewise have to to be admitted in a collected cognition of horses and cows. The Navya Nyaya inference Navya Nyaya could say, a qualified cognition of a quality, action, or universal takes as its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier. In qualified cognition of absence the reason does not deviate from the pro-bandom. This inference does not fail to establish inheritance because it rests upon an unconditioned pervasion. Inherence is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from unqualified cognition. Alternatively, the inference establishes inheritance as the apprehensive relation of a quality, action, or universal related to a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the like is produced by a relation belonging to an entity connected with a sense organ, because it is a produced perception. By the force of subjecthood the relation is established as one recurrent relation. A recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause, the qualifier hood of color and the like in a particular object connected with the sense organ is individual specific, non-recurrent, and therefore not a recurrent cause. Hence, through economy, only the recurrent inheritance is established as the cause of perceptions of color, taste, and the like. This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only conjunction and quality is apprehensive relations. Since quality is the particular nature of an individual, it is non-recurrent, inheritance is needed to explain apprehension through the fourfold relations involving inheritance. Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, inheritance itself is also established as apprehensible because both relata are perceptible. Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation. Objection, since conjunction and adherence are mutually exclusive, and perception of absence is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence. Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also arise, because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same as that belonging to cloth absence. It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there, because the qualifiteness of cloth absence is different. If the absence of cloth absence is itself an absence, then through the same relation of qualifiteness that absence would certainly be present there, and if it is a positive entity, then cloth alone would have to be accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified cognition. If qualifiteness differs in accordance with each distinct absence, no single qualifedness will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition of absence. Only a non-recurrent, individual-specific qualifedness would then have to be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence. But infinitely many such non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted, there is then no need to posit infinitely many qualifedness relations for absences. The prima facie objecta himself accepts the qualifierhood of an entity related to the sense organ as the apprehensive relation in the perception of Inherence and Qualifiedness. The arrangement of possessing and lacking color Objection, if Inherence is one, how can the different arrangement, possessing color, in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible? It cannot be said that Inherence is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the relation to color but not so in relation to air. If being the nature of the color relation were the very nature of Inherence itself, the same Inherence could not also be the nature of the relation to taste because the two would be mutually incompatible. Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in air and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself the substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions possessing color with respect to a pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction. 1. Refutation of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as, the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation. Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future pots would be erroneous. This objection is not sound. If knownness did not belong to past and future pots, discourse concerning them would be impossible, because cognition of them has been held to arise through cognition of knownness. To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition of the object is needlessly cumbersome. If only past and future objects are taken as objects of cognition of knownness, then in the case of a present pop both the cognition and its object would likewise be objects of cognition of knownness, there would be no difference among the objects of cognitions of knownness concerning past and present things. Prima-facy view, the relation between equality and its possessor is identity. Proposal, the relation between qualities such as color in possessors such as a pot is not inherent but only identity, that is, selfhood or numerical identity. In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of blue color in the pot is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and this man carries a staff. If both, this pot is blue, and this man carries a staff, took only a qualifier relation as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together with blue pot, and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man, would be equally required. Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other there is a qualifier relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition. Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of qualifier hood and qualifier canhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus, the blue pot, just as staph possession and manhood occur in one staph-bearing man. Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in qualifican words blue and pot is established. The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct grounds of usage blueness and potness, form a single utterance. It is unnecessary to hold that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through restoration of an alighted mad up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity, the cognition of identity between blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical identity. There is no ground for a figurative use based on identity, and no contradiction in accepting blue color as the primary meaning. Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity. If white and cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth would be incongruous like, this pot is a jar. If white color and cloth were identical, a blind person apprehending cloth by touch would also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension of the cloth would be required just as non-apprehension of its color is. In a cloth dyed red with matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would be necessary, otherwise, just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would not be apprehended. On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing. The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like, this cloth is a noncloth. When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through contact with fire, both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot. The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the substance, the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property and substance. A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not the property whiteness, hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without apprehension of the quality. The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a self-linking relation. The Siddhantan replies, If properties such as whiteness are accepted as present in a substance, then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other sense organs that apprehend the substance. One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility by a determinate sense organ, but then the fact that properties such as color residing in a substance are apprehensible by a determinate sense organ is itself proof of the distinction between quality and its possessor. If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color of the cloth, would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as, the cloth as blueness, would be required. The Madhva view, the relation is difference and non-difference. The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity. According to the Madhva view, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference and non-difference. This removes the fault of redundancy. The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference and non-difference. Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving difference and non-difference. Co-reference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical, hence even the absence of mere co-reference can establish difference and non-difference. It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore cannot constitute one relation. Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed like conjunction and its absence. When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience, this pot is red, but not black, mutual absence of black color is established in the substrate of red color. For this reason the Siddhantin II ought to accept the relation of difference and non-difference. Inference, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it, because it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence, like absolute absence. Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason, because the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively. By this inference difference and non-difference is established as an apprehensive relation. Refutation of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. The Siddhantan replies, The absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very locus of that thing is delimited by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction with a monkey in a tree that is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another part of the tree. In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by red color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by black color. Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different as delimited by blue color, because in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot. But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence of the mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the pot delimited by potness. A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and the same locus under the same delimiter, though they can under different delimiters. Even when both difference and non-difference are absent in the pot delimited by potness, the experience this pot is blue remains possible. The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be neutral absence, but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of neutral absence. The Cithantin replies that absence of neutral absence is precisely the ground of usage concerning non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue, only the inheritance of blue color appears as related to the pot. Once relation objecthood is accepted, a cognition such as this pot possesses blueness is indeed expected, in the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes the locus of blue color through an alighted mad-up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity. Proposal, Qualifierhood alone is the apprehender. Proposal, in the perception of sound, color, and the like, let only the Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ be accepted as the apprehensive relation. What need is there then to accept Inherence and the other relations? It may be said that Inherence is the cause of Qualifierhood, and conjunction come Inherence, and the other relations are causes of the Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ, because qualifierhood is impossible without such relations. Reply, Inherence, conjunction come inherence, and the like may be causes only of the nature of qualifierhood, not causes producing the status of qualifierhood as an apprehensive relation. Qualifierhood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation. If it is said, without inheritance and the like, qualifierhood in colour and so forth is not cognized, the reply is that qualifierhood is an apprehensive relation not because it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature. This view is not correct. Sound and the like are objects of perception. In an inference of relation to the sense organ, the qualifier hood of sound and the like is apprehended only after inheritance has been apprehended. Therefore, inheritance, remembered earlier, and not qualifier hood remembered at the end, is the object of perceptual cognition, that is, the apprehensive relation. Qualifier hood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence, A very month-faced view. Objection, qualityhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ is not the apprehensive relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception of absence of waterhood in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be required. Therefore only qualityhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible subject should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of waterhood. Absence of manifest colour in the gross element air, absence of fragrance in a flower, absence of bitterness in molasses is not perceived by the eye and other sense organs, it is inferred only from non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Nor is qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ the apprehensive relation of cognition of absence, otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would be perceived. If absence of sound is perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would have to be accepted for absence of sound. No, through economy, qualifierhood alone belonging to an object related to a sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence.

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