The Second Turn in Philosophy: From Consciousness to Language

Research record

Philosophical history does not proceed in a straight line. The basic nature of the world in any age becomes the principal question; the possibility of knowledge in another age; then the consciousness, self-awareness and feeling of the knower; And in many influential currents of the twentieth century, language, meaning, signs, usage, logical forms, rules and communication become the focus of philosophical inquiry. This change is often referred to as the “linguistic turn”. But the linguistic turn did not mean that philosophy left the world, mind, morality, history or society and began to see only the meaning of words. The basic problem is more serious: humans understand the world through language, concepts, classifications, sentences, logic and shared rules; So how can the question of knowledge and reality remain completely separate from language? An influential line of European modern philosophy begins with the consciousness of the knower. Descartes' methodological skepticism seeks the certainty of the knower by examining the external world, the senses, tradition, and the basis of belief. Locke examines the sources of experience, Berkeley the relationship between perception and object-existence, Hume the self, causality and arrival, and Kant the potential conditions of perception. In this tradition, the question is simply “What is the world?” No living, but rather “how does the world appear in my experience?”. is formed. With this achievement, a limitation is also evident: if the knower is assumed to be a stand-alone consciousness, then the role of language, social training, shared rules, public meanings and counterarguments is obscured. Here is the crux of the chapter's problem: how to understand the transition from consciousness-centered modern philosophy to language-centered twentieth-century philosophy without the fallacy that language completely supplants reality? Furthermore, how can Indian philosophy—especially Nyaya, Mimansa, Grammar, Buddhist Pramanamimansa—and the Navya-nyaya of Mithila be included in this discussion without the triumphal claim that “the Indian tradition had already said all the modern theories”? The basic assertion of this chapter is that the linguistic turn of the twentieth century is not a negation of consciousness-centered philosophy, but an extension of it. The knower is not only the private mind; He is also a linguistic, social, historical and rule-driven creature. Humans share meanings, learn definitions, improve the use of signs, present arguments, accept oppositions, and make decisions in institutionalized language. Therefore Knowledge, truth, metaphysics, ethics, politics and history—all are influenced by language. But the other half of this assertion is equally essential: language is not omnipotent. The physical phenomenon of an earthquake is not dependent on the word “earthquake”; The biological process of disease does not end with the name of diagnosis; The river would not change its water course by changing the category on paper; Historical events would not become uneventful by being suppressed in the records. Language, therefore, collides with objective resistance even as it participates in the construction of social reality. Parallel philosophy rejects two extremes for this reason. First—language is only a transparent glass, which has no active effect on knowledge. Second—all reality is constructed by language, so the question of truth outside language is meaningless. Between these two is the assertion: language is the active medium of human experience, classification, communication and interpretation of reality; But language is not the only criterion for truth. Proof, argument, objective resistance, counterargument and re-examination are necessary.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The former might suggest that the linguistic turn takes philosophy away from the real question. The basic questions of philosophy are God, the soul, the world, freedom, justice, death, society and suffering; Analysis of words, sentences and usage cannot replace this problem. If there is hunger in society, looking at the grammar of the word “hunger” will not provide food; If there is injustice, saying language-game will not change the institution. Therefore, linguistic philosophy risks turning philosophical problems into academic wordplay. The second variant of the former view is that increasing the importance of public usage will make truth dependent on majority or prevalence. If meaning is in use, should what society says be true? Social norms can be wrong, discriminatory or oppressive. Language itself can carry biases. Therefore, publicity is not a sufficient criterion of truth. The third premise applies to comparative philosophy. The Indian tradition has long discussed words, sentences, proofs and meanings; In such a situation, it may be West-centric history that gives particular novelty to the modern linguistic turn. The hyperbole of the reverse side might say that whatever Frege, What Russell or Wittgenstein said, what Nyaya, Mimansa, Bhartrihari or Navya-nyaya had already said.

Uttarapakṣa

The answer to the first premise is that language is the entrance, not the final destination, of philosophy. To remove injustice, policies, institutions, resources and power must change; But the policy debate itself can become confusing when the meaning of concepts like “rights,” “equality,” “disadvantage,” “person,” “community,” “race,” “religion,” and “freedom” are unclear. Laws are made in language, evidence is presented in language, orders are issued in language, oaths and affirmations are linguistic acts. So language is not the external decoration of real life. The answer to the second premise is that usage is a source of meaning, not the ultimate proof of truth. Society makes the wrong rules; The majority can accept misclassification; Institutional language can be oppressive. Therefore, while acknowledging the sociality of meaning, evidence, reasoning, moral criticism and objective resistance remain necessary. “What is in vogue” and “what is true or proper” are not the same thing. The answer to the third precedent is in the comparative method. The antiquity of the linguistic discourse of the Indian tradition must be acknowledged, but also the historical independence. Navya-nyaya = not analytical philosophy; Bhartrihari = not structuralist; Apoh = not deconstruction; Polytheism = not postmodern relativism. The presence of similar questions does not prove historical identity. The real intellectual benefit comes when the arguments of different traditions are pitted against each other and examined. The general formula for parallel answers is: make the statement clear; understand its linguistic structure; Then ask—what reality does he claim, what is the evidence for it, what are the social consequences, what are the moral justifications, what are the counterarguments, and whether the conclusion will change when new evidence comes along. Language is the gateway; The world, experience, institutions, power and morality are the next areas of the journey.

Parallel conclusion

The linguistic turn of the twentieth century would not have eliminated the consciousness-centered questions of modern philosophy; It opens up its social, logical and linguistic dimensions. The knower is not speechless consciousness. They learn language, obey rules, correct expressions, listen to counterarguments, and share meaning in the social world. For this reason, truth, knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, politics and history cannot be completely separated from language. But to focus on language is not to merge the world into language. The formula of parallel philosophy is: language is the active medium of human experience of reality; not the sole creator of truth. Language can classify and shape social reality, but bodies, matter, pain, nature, history and evidence resist its limits. Indian jurisprudence, mysticism, grammar and Buddhist linguistic discussion are independent traditions, not historical precursors of modern linguistic philosophy. The Navya-nyaya of Mithila is not an analytic philosophy either; But the linguistic clarity, the subtlety of relationships, the discipline of proof, absence, inference and counterargument open up a fruitful dialogue with modern questions. Five formulas emerge from this chapter. First—consciousness is an important focus of philosophical questions, but not the only one. Second—language is not merely the outer covering of thought; is the active medium of conceptual knowledge. Third—meaning is not merely a private feeling; It is associated with usage, rules, context and shared behaviour. Fourth—language can shape social reality, but reality is not language alone. Fifth, the comparison of Indian and modern Western linguistic traditions should be for problem-solving, not to prove historical similarities.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 4 source passages
2. Central thesis · 4 source passages
3. Major arguments · 9 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 3 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 4 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 4 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 5 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 5 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 12 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “The Second Turn in Philosophy: From Consciousness to Language.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-1/