Early Wittgenstein: Language, Fact, Picture and the Limits of Expression

Research record

Central to the philosophical project of early Ludwig Wittgenstein is a hard question—how does language make meaningful statements about the world? If a sentence is true or false about reality, what structural relationship exists between the sentence and the world that makes meaning possible? Against the backdrop of this question is the logical revolution of Frege and Russell. The superficial grammar of a normal language too often hides the real logical structure. The early Wittgenstein gives this idea a more comprehensive form: a meaningful statement is a logical picture of the possible state of the world. But that is not the only problem. If language can only depict factual situations, how far is morality, beauty, the meaning of life, God, values ​​or philosophy itself narrative? This is where early Wittgenstein’s famous idea of ​​limits comes in—some things cannot be ‘said’ in language, although they can be ‘seen’. The basic assertion of this chapter is that the early Wittgenstein offers a structural paradigm of philosophy of language: the world is not merely a collection of things, but a composite of facts; The sentence is a picture of possible facts; Pictures and facts should share a logical form; And the limits of meaningful statements are linked to this capacity for depiction. The task of philosophy in this project is not to discover new facts, but to clarify the logical limits of thought and language. Philosophy becomes an act of explanation instead of a collection of theories. The early Wittgenstein distinguishes between ‘what can be said’ and ‘what only appears’. The logical form itself would not be described fact-like by the sentence; it manifests itself in linguistic semantic structures.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first form of the former argues that the ‘sentence = picture’ theory restricts language too much. Questions, commands, prayers, words, jokes, metaphors, poems, satire, legal declarations and social expressions are not just facts. The second premise says that ‘logical form’ is a highly abstract concept. If it cannot be said directly, how clear is its philosophical use? This theory itself may seem to rely on unprovable structures. The third premise is ethical. If a moral sentence is not a factual statement, should 'murder is wrong' or 'injustice is unjust' be meaningless? Such a conclusion may seem unacceptable to moral philosophy. The fourth premise is from the Indian perspective. The Upanishads, Buddhism, Vedanta, Mimansa and philosophy of language have lengthy discussions of narrativity, ineffability, the limits of words and the ultimate truth. To regard early Wittgenstein’s thought of limits as a uniquely universal quest, then, reduces the polycentricity of history.

Uttarapakṣa

Answer to the first premise—picture theory is primarily a project to understand the logical structure of declarative statements. Its full goal is not to cover all the functions of a common language. This limitation itself accounts for the transformation of later Wittgenstein's philosophy. Answer to the second premise—the idea of ​​logical forms ‘looking’ is difficult, of course, but the purpose is to point out that it is not appropriate to make the condition of representation another object of the facts represented. This is the humility of metaphysics. Answer to the third premise—parallel philosophy would not have accepted early Wittgenstein’s factual theory of meaning as the ultimate criterion for moral truth. The justification of moral statements can be checked by public reason, human dignity, experience, consequences, rights and reason. The answer to the fourth precedent—a comparison with the Indian ineffability discussion—is possible, but with caution. ‘Neti-neti’, emptiness, non-alternativeness, the ineffability or wordlimit of Brahman have their own historical projects; He should not be declared to be identical with the early Wittgensteinian theory of logical limits.

Parallel conclusion

The early Wittgensteinian philosophy is an ambitious attempt to understand the relationship between language and the world in structural terms. The world is the set of facts, the sentence is the picture of possible facts, and the logical form is the condition of the depiction. In this view, truth and meaningfulness are separate questions: untrue sentences can also be meaningful if they depict possible facts. Philosophically, his most profound teaching is perhaps boundary-judgment—call the obvious what can be said to be logically obvious; Do not fill with metaphysical speculations about which language creates confusion. But a parallel philosophy would not make this principle of limitation a prohibition of moral, religious, aesthetic, or social experience. Different types of claims may have different justifications.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 5 source passages
2. Central thesis · 5 source passages
3. Major arguments · 10 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 4 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 4 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 7 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 6 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 6 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 14 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “Early Wittgenstein: Language, Fact, Picture and the Limits of Expression.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-10/