Austin: Saying Is Also Doing

Research record

In the long tradition of linguistic philosophy, there has been a tendency to view statements primarily as sentences that are either true or false. But in daily life, I often say sentences whose main function is not to describe the world, but to fulfill a social task. ‘I promise’, ‘I appoint you’, ‘Sit down’, ‘I beg your pardon’, ‘This meeting is over’—these sentences are not meant merely as statements of fact. J.S. L. Austin brings this fact to the center of the philosophy of language. His basic question is—when is saying itself an action? Pronouncing a sentence is not just about producing sound; Within the proper circumstances, rights, intentions and social norms, they can become promises, orders, naming, marriages, declarations, appointments, forgiveness, warnings or judgments. In this respect, the traditional criterion of truth–falsehood proves incomplete. The main question of the sentence ‘I warn you’ is not whether it is true or false; The questions are whether the warning was successfully given, whether the speaker is authorized, whether the circumstances are appropriate, and whether the hearer understood his or her linguistic action. The basic assertion of this chapter is that language is not merely a means of depicting the world or describing facts; Language performs social actions. Saying a sentence can itself be a regulative act—promising, ordering, permitting, warning, declaring, naming, asking for forgiveness. Austin shows the linguistic act in three analytical levels: the locutionary act—the uttering of meaningful sentences; illocutionary act—what is done by saying a sentence, such as an order, a word, a question, a warning; perlocutionary act—the effect the sentence had on the listener, such as fear, motivation, belief, anger, or agreement. The success of linguistic action does not depend solely on grammar. Social institutions, rights, procedures, contexts, intentions, validated traditions and expected next actions may also be necessary.

Structured debate

Pūrvapakṣa

The first form of the antecedent states that ‘saying = doing’ is a general fact, not a philosophical principle. Orders, promises, pardons and declarations were already understood by the people; So what’s Austin’s novelty? The second premise states that the type of narrative verb is highly context-dependent. A single sentence can be an order, a suggestion, a sarcasm or a complaint; So is a stable classification of theories possible? The third premise states that linguistic action theory does not adequately question the legitimacy of social institutions. If the authorized person gives an unjust order, then the principle can call it ‘successful’—this is morally inadequate. The fourth premise is from the Indian perspective. Mimansa has long considered the functional effects of precepts, prohibitions, duties, commands, and classical language; Judgment checks speaker, word-evidence and syntactic conditions. Then history would be incomplete if we called Western speech-act theory the first philosophy of language-act.

Uttarapakṣa

Answer to the first premise—Austin’s originality lies in this daily fact becoming a systematic philosophical criterion. Breaking the monopoly of truth–falsehood, the philosophy of language was restructured in the direction of action, institutions and conditions of success. Answer to the second precedent—context-dependence is a matter of principle, not weakness. Linguistic meaning itself is influenced by social conditions, intentions, and rules; Therefore, a method of analysis is more necessary than a static list. Answer to the third premise—functional success is not moral legitimacy. The parallel philosophy adds dignity-based ethics on top of Austin's analysis: linguistic action may be institutionally successful, but unacceptable on the criterion of rights, justice, and equality. Answer to the fourth precedent—the independent history of the Indian tradition is valid. The method-speech of mysticism is not the same as Austin's narrative verb; Both have different philosophical goals and contexts. The comparison should be in the form of problem-dialogue, not retrospective-claim.

Parallel conclusion

Austin takes the philosophy of language out of the limited duality of truth–falsehood and into the wider realm of social action. Saying is not just describing; In the right circumstances, saying it is doing it yourself. The distinction between statement-verb, narrative action and statement-effect makes clear the different dimensions of the same utterance. The conditions for success show that language is connected to social norms, authority and institutions. The initial descriptive–verbal distinction would not have been ultimately simple; Almost every sentence does some linguistic work. Problem dialogue with mysticism, jurisprudence and the Indian legal-sentence tradition is extremely fruitful, but historical parallels of the ‘mimansa = speech-act theory’ type are inappropriate.

Section index

1. Problem and scope · 5 source passages
2. Central thesis · 5 source passages
3. Major arguments · 10 source passages
4. Pūrvapakṣa · 4 source passages
5. Uttarapakṣa · 4 source passages
6. Indian philosophical dialogue · 5 source passages
7. Mithila’s parallel perspective · 6 source passages
8. Contemporary applications · 7 source passages
9. Chapter conclusion · 6 source passages
10. Chapter bibliography · 14 source passages

Cite this record

Gajendra Thakur. “Austin: Saying Is Also Doing.” Videha Digital Research Archive: Mithila–Vajji–Anga. Videha — https://www.videha.co.in/ · ISSN 2229-547X · GitHub mirror: https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/ · Digital Research Archives on GitHub: https://github.com/videha-ejournal. https://videha-ejournal.github.io/mithila-vajji-anga/records/idea/philosophy-v2-16/